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The purpose of this thesis is to explore themes in the development of 
national ideology in Scotland and Greece largely in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. The analysis consists of two pairs of case studies where, 
using the comparative method, the role of historiography in providing 
'mental maps', precise boundaries for the nation in space and time, its 
application in constructing a national consensus on an acceptable past, and 
the use of the latter in consolidating a national identity, are explored in detail. 
This process followed intricate paths in both Scotland and Greece and 
displayed rifts and fissures in patterns thought common in the development 
of nationalism in Europe. The fundamental ideological challenges to which 
significant segments of the Scottish and Greek society had to respond are 
shown to have influenced their respective societies' worldview until the 
present time. The resilience of a number of different valid perceptions of 
Scodand in the nineteenth century and the dichotomy between equally 
possible concepts of Greece demonstrate, in concluding, the fluidity of 
national identity and the indeterminacy of their modem ethnogenesis as late 
as the eve of the Great War. 
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Introduction 
'We live in an age of nationalism, but one which spends a lot of its 
energies denying that nationalism exists", David McCrone asserts in the 
opening pages of one of his most recent works.1 There is indeed plenty of 
evidence around us to support this view. From the declarations of all sides 
enmeshed in the successive wars in former Yugoslavia to the demands of 
Basque autonomists and the continuing uncertainty in Ireland and the 
Middle East it seems that the right to self-determination can be actually 
expressed in any number of ways from peace talks to terrorism to armed 
conflict without those engaged accepting the unwanted adjective. Other 
variations are preferred to underline devotion to country: loyal, national, 
ethnic, patriotic. We have to deal, not just in academic but in everyday life, 
with an array of concepts that, far from having permanently disappeared as 
an optimistic and progress-oriented interpretation of history maintained, 
were merely submerged to surface again when conditions permitted it. The 
modem course of nationalism shows that there is no clean break with the 
past and these continuities are the canon, not the exception. 
'We know what it is when you do not ask us, but we cannot very 
quickly explain or define it,,2: the obvious place to start this discussion, a 
definition of nationalism, constitutes a rather murky territory. Along with 
liberalism and democracy it forms one of the fundamental building blocks of 
modem society, yet we still seem to lack precision in its study. To admit of 
course that it remains "obdurately alien and incomprehensible to those who 
are not possessed by it", as Ernest Gellner's editor maintained in 19833, 
would be to render an injustice to all those researchers who strove towards 
its understanding. Gellner himself offered a simple and widely accepted 
I David McCrone, The Sociology o/Nationalism, (London and New York, 1998), p.vii. 
2 Walter Bagehot, quoted in E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and nationalism since 1780. 
Programme, myth, reality, (Cambridge, 1992), p.1. 
3 Ernest Gellner, Nations and nationalism, (London, 1983), Editor's note. 
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description as a political principle propagating the convergence of a political 
and a national entity.4 
There are other points of agreement for current historians. Most 
scholars today consider nationalism as a modem phenomenon. But research 
having bypassed the old dilemmas between primordialism and modernism 
essentially considers the impact of modernity on older forms of 
consciousness. The mere act of constructing something does not render it 
false. Nationalism therefore is not the 'false consciousness' of marxist 
thinkers such as Hobsbawm. However, it is not also a fact devoid of roots 
and origins. Links and affinities between modem nations and pre-existing 
ethnies were tracked in Anthony D. Smith's early work. In later years even 
more flexible notions seem to carry us beyond static schemes in his studies. 
What brings together pre-national sentiments and national constructs is the 
use of ideology. And the present work focuses on this nexus which ensures 
that past and present are molded to consist the whole in the national ideal. 
My intention in this comparative study is to examine certain 
parameters in the evolution of nationalism in Europe. To delineate the limits 
and uses of history in constructing a plausible identity for the mass of the 
nation. To show that although history was widely used its applications varied 
and the national ideals depended on the existing political situation. To 
underline the gradual progress and fluidity of the identities under 
construction despite the assertions of official ideology. In the course of the 
work one will not fail to notice the limits of the comparative method in 
general. It is not merely the protean form of nationalism that obstructs us 
but the difficulty of reducing different cultural experiences to common 
denominators. The comparison then, without undermining the validity of the 
project, has a meaning up to a certain point. 
The most apparent question would be why these particular 
examples? Why specifically Scotland and Greece? Is there a patent 
connection, some common or uncommon characteristics that could possibly 
link these places? 
Small nations both, were indeed both latecomers to nationalism. 
Greece was an early new state in the rearranged nineteenth-century Europe 
4 E. Gellner, Nations and nationalism, p. 1. 
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while Scotland only developed a challenging nationalism almost a hundred 
years later. Presendy both touching the centre and the periphery of Europe 
owing to their geographical position and at the same time their participation 
in the European Union, they present challenging cases to the historian. Two 
historical nations with divergent courses in modem times, although not 
without ties: Greece in Scotland, through the heritage of classical antiquity 
that had strongly influenced Scottish education in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries and had turned Edinburgh into an 'Athens of the 
North'S; Scotland in Greece, through phifheffenism, the freedom fighters and 
historians of the Greek War of Independence.6 The character of both 
countries has been shaped in the not so remote past from the migration 
experience, albeit a product of different needs and social conditions. 
Although initially Scottish migration was a way out of poverty or an 
authoritarian state curtailing religious and civil liberties, it had later to do 
with filling the needs of administration in a vast empire in which their own 
stake gradually increased. The Greeks migrated in successive waves that 
reached their peak in the decades just before the Great War and right after 
World War II looking for better chances in the United States of America, 
Germany and Australia mainly: expectations of a better quality of life rather 
than politics were the determining factor in deciding to go abroad. 
Besides these characteristics however what catches the scholar's eye 
1S a certain insularity both societies continue to present today despite 
continuous interaction with neighbour European nations and their own 
respective diaspora cultures. Traces of introspection are obvious in the 
rhetoric of major political parties and the way tradition and culture are daily 
'flagged' to Scots and Greeks. This preoccupation with the local element as 
opposed to a more open-minded oudook is not so much a result of 
parochialism, which is often offered as an easy explanation, but reflects 
rather a fundamental instability concerning their respective identities: 
uncertainty of their status and position in the modem world has been a 
dominant feature of both Scotland and Greece in the past two centuries. 
5 See David Allan, "The Age of Pericles in the Modem Athens: Greek history, Scottish 
politics, and the fading of the Enlightenment", The Historical Journal 44, (2001). 
6 See below, ch.2, for a discussion of Scot historians of the Greek War of Independence. 
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The proximity of a model paradigm, physical or imaginary, has been 
crucial to that. Scotland's geographical place and political history practically 
forced a comparison with England, evident in a series of manifestations. The 
mid-nineteenth century grievances about heraldry and the name of Great 
Britain, Home Rule, the debates on university reformation, the repudiation 
of a Scottish focus in post-Union historiography were in fact reactions to 
that deeper discomfort. 7 English gravitational pull begat a persistent 
uneasiness at prospective Anglicisation. On the other hand, the imaginary 
entity of 'Europe' was what Greece has always measured itself against. The 
'Protective Powers' of Britain, France and Russia enjoyed a spectral existence 
in the Greek psyche, marking a community that never was. On the contrary, 
the neighbouring Balkan states remained in obscurity, actual reminders of 
what to avoid. In Greece "our proper honourable place in the European 
family" was always the spoken or unspoken constant. 8 
Despite these affinities or even more striking similarities, as for 
example, the high role of the Church in both societies until a rather late 
stage,9 this is a story of divergence. Social developments and political 
circumstances produced different results although the materials used to build 
a national identity were applied in much the same way. Scodand and Greece 
took varying paths in E.]. Hobsbawm's 'dual revolution': the former became 
the 'workshop of the world', the latter secured its political independence. 
They were certainly marked by what they failed to achieve. Nationalism in 
7 See I.G.C. Hutchison, A political history of Scotland, 1832-1924. Parties, Elections and 
Issues, (Edinburgh, 1986); Colin Kidd, Subverting Scotland's past. Scottish Whig 
historians and the creation of an Anglo-British identity, 1689-c.1830, (Cambridge, 
1993); George E. Davie, The Democratic Intellect. Scotland and her Universities in the 
nineteenth century, (Edinburgh, 1999). 
8 Georgios Martinelis, Aoyo, 1CavYfyvpIKO, el, T1JV EllYfVIK1jv nallyycveaiav avroaxebiw, 
a1Cayycl8ei, 1CpO, rov KepKVpaiicov laov U/V 5J.l.ji. wpav U/' 25 Ma{Yriov 1879 1CpO TrI' 
nAareia, rov eearpov V1CO Tewpyiov Maprlv£AYf, (Kerkyra, 1879), p.8. 
9 David McCrone, Understanding Scotland The sociology of a stateless nation, (London 
and New York, 1992), p.39, Hutchison, A political history of Scotland, Paraskeuas 
Matalas, E8vo, Kal Op80bo~ia: 01 1CGpl1cl:relG, jila, ax£aYf" A1CO ro «e.Uru5'KO» aro 
fJOVAyaplKO axiaJia, (Heracleion, 2002). 
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these countrles bears the mark of compensation for statelessness and 
underdevelopment. 
My present analysis of national ideology is build on the concepts of 
imagined communities and invented traditions. to These are used here in a 
complementary way. Essentially, I follow the process of constructing the 
model of a nation as presented by intellectuals. The multiplicity of possible 
approaches means the existence of various images. There are indeed many a 
'Scotland' and 'Greece' to be encountered later on among followers of the 
Burns cult or celebrators of the University of Athens. Matching however 
words with actions the propagators of a national discourse communicate 
with a wider audience. Thus we find that the nation is celebrated in rituals of 
identity confirmation - which constitute invented traditions. I focus then on 
communities of intellectuals and their rituals of confirming their national 
identity as they comprehend it. 
The study begins to examine common beginnings with a synopsis of 
the historians' quest for identity in the two countries. The debate on Scottish 
origins and the unification of the Greek past were a search for the proper 
continuities among more than one candidacies. The end product depended 
on political rather than scientific principles. In Scotland, the choice between 
Celtic or Saxon determined a stance towards England while the peculiarity of 
the Union created peculiar identities: 'what made Scotland Scotland' was 
frequently invoked by many but rarely described in detail without 
disagreement. In Greece the rift between an Enlightenment and Romantic 
view of history relayed to their claims of rightful partnership in 'Europe' due 
to a common ancient heritage. Greek nineteenth-century historians were 
faced with reconciling the dilemmas of a society looking to the West while its 
playground was still the Orient and the Near East. 
The extent to which historiography promoted national identity ill 
codifying symbols, providing periodisations and establishing patterns of 
consensus 1S apparent in treatments of Wars of Independence and is 
presented ill the second part of this work. The Scottish War of 
10 Benedict Anderson, Imagined communities. Reflections on the origins and spread of 
nationalism, (London, 1991), Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, The Invention of 
tradition, (Cambridge, 1983). 
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Independence formed a focal point of national consciousness and its key 
symbols - William Wallace and Robert the Bruce - were elevated to the 
status of icons. Nineteenth-century Scottish historians treated this period 
with exceptional care as a minimum of an identity consensus. Despite 
various religious, political or ideological dissensions, sometimes manifest in 
the works of Patrick Fraser Tytler, John Hill Burton or Andrew Lang, "all 
Scots could agree to be proud" of the Wars of Independence.II The Greek 
Revolution against the Ottoman Empire became a foundation myth full of 
romantic heroes creating a political and historiographical consensus that 
vindicated the conduct of both national and civil war winners and justified 
the raison d' etre of the new state. The failure of contemporary foreign or later 
Marxist critics to establish a credible alternative view to the primacy of the 
official Great Idea will be shown to have been a result of their own political 
interests, preoccupations or stereotypes. 
The third part deals with the development of images of Greek and 
Scottish identity through the eyes of intellectuals. The celebrations of the 
birth of Robert Bums, Greek Independence Day in the University of Athens 
and the creation of the Greek Literary Society of Constantinople 
demonstrate different options offered in the conception of national identity 
and the interplay between them. The range of views expressed in these 
instances transcends the patterns of official ideology and highlights the 
possible margins a discussion on the content of nationality could take in each 
society without straying from the mainstream. In Scotland, a Unionist-
Nationalist perspective did not eliminate the casual expression of views of 
Britain as a unitary state or its appropriation in the form of 'Scottish Empire'. 
The Greek state's ambition to provide exclusively national ideology in its 
interior and the 'unredeemed' communities of the Ottoman Empire did not 
appeal for long to those among Ottoman Greeks who believed that the 
interests of their element were better served by an Austro-Hungarian type of 
settlement or gaining cultural mastery inside the Empire. These 
developments however did not happen in the absence of society. The cases 
of Robert Bums and the University of Athens also tie the appeal of 
intellectual subjects to the general public. The respect and genuine interest 
t t Marinell Ash, The Strange Death a/Scottish history, (Edinburgh, 1980). p.l 03. 
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this public showed for these institutions was evident in the popularity of 
their celebrations. 
Thus, the interplay between history and identity is the common 
underlying theme in examining the influences between discipline and 
ideology. From this standpoint the first part traces the beginnings of Scottish 
and Greek national identities in historiography. The second part of the study 
focuses on the forging of a significant point of confidence where the 
presence of national historiography draws in elements stressing community 
and solidifies their paragons into a consensus. Finally, in the third part we 
follow one of the paths along which these emerged identities were 'applied' 
through historical schemes and cultural images and reached wider segments 
of society being disseminated by intellectuals. It is evident that in each of 
these instances the effect was two-way. It was not merely the case of Patrick 
Fraser Tyder writing the national history that shaped an identity, it was also a 
particular national identity that dictated the kind of history created, as Greek 
historians of the War of Independence clearly show. 
Studying Scottish nationalism is the essential search for "the secret 
causes, perhaps more felt than understood" that tie the people to their 
symbols and feelings. 12 The Rev. Andrew Wilson drew attention to this 
latent quality for his own reasons but his observation proves valid 
nevertheless. The Scottish nationality is precisely that: felt most of the time, 
not exacdy seen. From the letters of the 'North Briton' to the SNP a kind of 
'ghost' nationalism ebbs and flows always leaving a residue which some fail 
to discern while others prefer to dismiss. On the other hand, the case of 
Greece remains closer to the norm. Nation-building in one of the 'new' 
nineteenth-century nation-states followed the familiar patterns of 
standardisation and homogeneity, successfully turrung previously 
particularistic peasants into Greeks and Hellenising foreign-sounding names 
12 James Ballantine, Chronicle of the hundredth birthday of Robert Burns, (Edinburgh 
and London, 1859), p.365. 
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to restore their hidden ancient glory 13. Yet, in both cases national ideology 
appears very strongly as an everyday experience. In Michael Billig's terms 
history is 'flagged' daily to Scots and Greek citizens: statues of important 
personages and inscriptions commemorating key events can be met at every 
other step. 'Memory' and 'tradition' are highly estimated qualities expected 
both on a social and a personal level: significant historical dates are marked 
by state celebrations and designated as 'days of memory' in the media while 
the people are called not to forget these instances. Here, national ideology 
appears as an everyday experience. 
Woven through historiography, geography and educational purposes 
into daily routine, nationalism is a constant of everyday practice. 'Flagging' 
the obvious may at times be a way of celebrating, reassuring the public or 
simply attracting votes. In the case of Scotland and Greece however there are 
some subtle elements showing a latent disaffection. It seems that peace and 
prosperity coming in different degrees in the post-war era have not been 
enough for these two countries to adapt and achieve a confident self-image. 
Lack of confidence is apparent in a string of cases that periodically catch the 
public's eye and command its attendance. In Scotland, Braveheart, Robert 
Burns's DNA and the outcry over William Wallace's absence from the 
Museum of Scotland; in Greece, where in Paparrigopoulos's sharp evaluation 
history retains a 'more practical character than usual', the fascination with 
state names or resentment towards Martin Bernal's Black Athena. These 
attitudes cannot simply be attributed to parochialism as easily as journalists or 
even intellectuals would like.14 Although ostensibly different they echo similar 
uncertainties in the content of their respective identities. The weight of the 
past, essential in being Scot or Greek, cannot be laid to rest. 
13 «BaatAt1CQ bultayp,a m:p{ m>O'tUcrEroC; E1tttpOnE{ac; npoc; P,EAttt1v troy tonrovup,®v tTJC; 
EAAUbOC; Kat E~aKp{~roatV TOU tcrtOptKOU AOyOU autwv» in E<pYffJcpiC; rYfC; KvfJcpv~(J€OJC;, 
A', 125,31/5/1909. 








Past . in Scottish and Greek 
In this chapter my mam attn 1S to delineate the course of the 
beginnings for the search of a national identity in Scotland and Greece. In 
both cases this problem was viewed as a challenge to assumptions that had 
their origin in a more remote past, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
in Scotland, and the pre-Revolutionary eighteenth-century movement of the 
Greek Enlightenment in Greece. The Greek case underlines the importance 
of historical perceptions in the gradual construction of a 'usable past' as a 
firm foundation for a national identity. To accommodate a rising Greek 
identity intellectuals had to shift from a dominant historical paradigm to 
another more suitable to political and ideological practices. The Scottish 
case however seems to illustrate with greater clarity the element of selection 
in shaping a consistent canon of historical events on which this national 
identity is based. The debate on Scottish origins carried a range of political 
overtones that dominated the participants' intentions and choice of 
argumentative reasoning. In fact, this first attempt at a definition of the 
Scottish ancestry and identity was more an effort on the part of the scholars 
involved to underline their own vision of their contemporary Scottish 
political community. 
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The Origins of Scotland 
Most medieval European states cultivated a historical tradition that 
could be politically useful. Legitimacy was sought in a number of ways - and 
levels. The acceptance of the Church, Roman Catholic in the West, 
Orthodox in the East was of course the unmistakeable mark of a legitimate 
monarch for the greater part of the middle ages even after the fierce 
struggles of the Papacy with the German Emperors, or the Iconoclastic 
schism in Byzantium. However, this pertained personally to the king, 
certifying that he himself was God's elect. The state he ruled however, 
although admittedly also a personal possession, was in need of similar 
justification of its existence to strengthen its monarch's bargaining position 
in the frequent legal disputes and armed conflicts of the era. It was also to 
be a subde reminder of achieved or aspiring status among neighbouring 
principalities, as the use of tsar, Slavic form of Cesar, to denote medieval 
rulers of Bulgarians and Russians implied. 
A part of these founding myths was ancient or classical heritage. The 
Brutus myth of England's colonisation is a good example of forging a direct 
link to a desirable past lineage. To be included in the Homeric world, 
determining in this way their nation's extreme antiquity and noble ancestry, 
and since it would be considered absurd to put forward a link to the Greeks, 
the English chose the extinct Trojans as their progenitors. In other parts of 
the British isles there were voices among the Irish maintaining that Ireland 
was Homer's Ogygia while one of the alleged progenitors of the Scots was 
Scota, an Egyptian pharaoh's daughter. In another example both the 
Byzantine and Carolingian empires based their claims of precedence over 
other states in their status as successors of the Roman Empire. 
This insistence in classical heritage then, was an indication of 
ancestry that became necessary to mark a place in international relations. 
Indeed, a definition by faith would not be enough in this case. Religion 
being the linchpin of medieval society in theory, it was not an applicable fact 
in differentiating among the European kingdoms until the Reformation. 
Significandy enough, the sum of the continent to the west of the Ottoman 
lands continued to profess the same creed, and was known under the 
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collective name of Christendom. The presence of Orthodox Christians, Jews 
or even some Muslims - notably the Moors in Spain until the end of the 
fifteenth century - was not enough to alter this exclusive perception of 
European societies. The political clout of these arguments based on classical 
ancestry however was limited to a symbolic show rather than a realistic 
prospect, for it is quite obvious that the German Emperors never conceded 
primacy to English Kings, Brutus notwithstanding. 
Foundation myths however, are only one aspect of forging links 
between people of a given community. To form this sum of mutual 
characteristics that constitute a national identity is, in essence, to form an 
ideology: some variant of the idea that the Greek or the Scottish nation 
exists, always did and always will, following a certain heritage and claiming 
its own unique contribution to modem civilisation.! "Myths of national 
identity", says Anthony Smith, "typically refer to territory or ancestry (or 
both) as the basis of political community".2 Political community and 
national identity then come together to form a coherent whole. In the 
modem world, where the nation is a universally accepted ideological 
category, the myths buttressing and determining national or ethnic identities 
are at the same time promoting distinct 'imagined communities'. To create 
an order, however, to define, to articulate and to present a specific identity, 
is the work of intellectuals. 
Politics, ideology and intellectuals are three major elements acting in 
the debate over Scottish origins. Its roots lay in the later middle ages but it 
was mainly instigated from late seventeenth-century developments in the 
political and ecclesiastical field. The Restoration of the Stuarts to the throne 
in 1660 in the person of Charles II and the settlement that made it possible 
proved with the passage of time to be unstable. Differences in religious 
practices between Scotland and England and the enthroning of the openly 
Catholic James VII and II led to the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89. A 
suitable protestant prince was found in William of Orange, reigning 
1 See David Lowenthal, "Identity, heritage, and history" in John R. Gillis (ed.), 
Commemorations. The politics of national identity, (New Jersey, 1994), pp.46-7. Also, 
David Lowenthal, The past is aforeign country, (Cambridge, 1995). 
2 Anthony D. Smith, National Identity, (London, 1991), p. viii. 
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alongside Mary, James's daughter, but the threat of an exiled dynasty longing 
for return did not disappear entirely from the British political horizon until 
after the defeat of the 1745 Jacobite insurrection. The context of the early 
quest for Scottish identity is therefore one of political instabilitv and 
religious contention. 
One has to mark here that despite the earlier efforts of Hector 
Boece and George Buchanan, the debate on the origins of Scotland marked 
the first time there was a conscious effort of examining the past and 
determining the historical course of the Scots in order to shape them into a 
coherent narrative. In the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
this anxiety to produce a definitive text which would survey the past and 
represent the 'historical truth' almost achieved a life of its own, turning into 
a current finally interpolating various matters of Scottish interest: the War of 
Independence, the Reformation, the Union of 1707. In this sense what has 
finally been accepted as "the identity of the Scottish nation,,3 is the legacy of 
the debate we are about to follow. 
According to Richard Sennett the search for origins is an attempt at 
recovery, an effort to establish a clear line of events.4 The history of 
Boethius sought less clarity of events than a revitalization of the past in the 
manner of the ancient Roman historians who were his model. Hector Boece 
(c.1465 - 1536), a sixteenth-century scholar skilled in Latin, Principal of the 
University of Aberdeen, wrote Scotorum Historiae in 1526, a work translated 
in Scots in 1531. It would be tempting and easy to discredit Boece and reject 
him as another teller of tall tales. Certainly, the continuous recurrence of 
supernatural events and verbose language that the leading figures of his 
history use to explain and justify their actions would suffice for that. 
However, as A. A. M. Duncan has observed, to consider Boece a mere 
obscurantist with a humanist veneer would be wide of the mark. The fact 
3 William Ferguson, The Identity of the Scottish Nation. An historic quest, (Edinburgh, 
1998). Also, Edward 1. Cowan, "The Invention of Celtic Scotland" in Edward J. Cowan 
and R. Andrew Mcdonald (eds), Alba. Celtic Scotland in the Medieval Era, (East Linton, 
2000), pp.1-23. 
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that his work was quite quickly translated into the vernacular and enjoyed 
success shows that he wrote rather with the public than his fellow scholars 
in mind. 
The work also contained a political objective. Its basic target was 
Geoffrey of Monmouth and his claim that the Britons were the first to set 
foot on the British isles through Brutus of Troy. In order to properly show 
the ancestry of the Scots Boece had to breach a gap of information 
concerning their first kings: Fergus mac Ferquhart (or Fergus I), supposed 
to have reigned in c. 330 BC and Fergus mac Erch (or Fergus II), crowned 
in 503 AD were the only ones with less than shadowy existence according to 
the sources. Boece skilfully filled that gap relying on other sources a ohn of 
Fordun and Walter Bower's Scotichronicon among them) and interposing forty 
five kings between these two.s It seems that for the next 150 years Boece's 
adaptation of old traditions was the canon for Scottish history - and an 
admittedly popular one. 
The debate concerning the Scottish origins was triggered when the 
bishop of St. Asaph, William Lloyd, rejected this specific pillar of traditional 
Scottish history. William Lloyd (1625 - 1717), then bishop of St. Asaph was 
the first to raise the subject in 1684. Lloyd's aim was an ecclesiastical one: to 
prove Presbyterian notions of an ancient Scottish church government null 
and void. Boece became his main target. Pointing out John of Fordun's 
inconsistencies and Veremundus the chronicler's dubious existence, Lloyd 
managed to discredit Boece's basic sources and put in jeopardy the "forty 
kings". According to him, the Scots in Ireland were converted to 
Christianity in 432 by St. Patrick and those in Scodand by St. Columba, who 
although not being a bishop himself, he was still Lloyd assures us "for 
proper episcopacy". 6 As for the Culdees, those early monks who lacked a 
hierarchy of sorts in a conveniendy Presbyterian way, he considered them 
4 Richard Sennett, The Conscience of the Eye. The Design and Social Life of Cities, 
(London and New York, 1992), p. 194. 
5 Ferguson, The Identity of the Scottish Nation, pp. 56-76. 
6 Lloyd, An Historical account, pp. 78 - 88, 114 - 118. 
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only a "late fable" and failed to find any mention of them in the years before 
800 A.D.? 
Why would a staunch Episcopalian choose that particular moment 
to put forth these arguments? Lloyd wrote at a time when the royal line of 
Stuarts stayed under scrutiny as to their confessional practices. There was 
much anxiety about the probable succesion of James, the king's brother and 
duke of York, a known and declared papist. A Catholic prince could be 
tolerated under the present circumstances, provided that his conduct 
remained cautious and his religious profile low, but the prospect of a 
Catholic king would no doubt excite the Protestant majority. In any event, 
the existing settlement should not be touched. lloyd's message was a 
warning to the court that might think otherwise and to Presbyterians and 
other radicals who might wish to carry their Protestantism too far. 
A year later, in 1685, Roderick O'Flaherty (1629 - 1718) attacked 
Boece from another angle. O'Flaherty wrote to demonstrate the ancestry 
and glory of Ireland, in reality the Homeric Ogygia, Calypso'S enchanted 
island from Ocfyssry. Besides maintaining the Irish achievements in arts and 
arms, he used his sources to underline the inefficiency of Scottish historians 
whose "history is no more than a fabulous modem production, founded on 
oral tradition and fiction". 8 Comparing Boece's king - lists with Irish 
sources dating from the days of Malcolm Canmore (1058-1093) he decided 
that Fergus I was indeed fiction, therefore he began his account of kings in 
Scodand with Loam mac Erc, who preceded his brother Fergus II reigning 
for a decade.9 
Edward Stillingfleet (1635 - 1699) produced his Origines Britannicae 
with a double aim : to defend his friend William lloyd from the attack of Sir 
George Mackenzie and to establish the foundation of a Christian apostolic 
church in Britain by St. Paul. Boece's kings he also considered as obvious 
fictions and thought it was time for Scots " to follow the examples of other 
European nations, in rejecting the romantic fables of the monkish times, 
? Lloyd, An Historical account, pp. 139 - 147. 
8 Roderick o 'Flaherty, Ogygia, or a Chronological Account of Irish Events, (First 
edition: 1685, London. Edition used: Dublin, 1793), 2 vols, Vol. I, p. 226. 
9 Ibid, I, p. 230. 
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and at last to settle their antiquities on finn and solid foundations" 10. 
Besides, those forty kings Boece evoked were unacceptable as products of 
an elective monarchy, which was the same dogma that paved the way to civil 
war and the execution of Charles I. Thus Stillingfleet managed to tum the 
tables on Mackenzie who was talking of Jese mt!jeste on the part of lloyd. For 
his part Stillingfleet was content to show the British churches not having 
anything to do with Rome as accused by the Presbyterians.11 
Sir George Mackenzie in The Antiquity of the &yal Line of Scotland 
Farther Cleared and Defended shifted the weight to the political repercussions 
of such arguments. Mackenzie pointed out that Stillingfleet damaged both 
the Scottish past and the famous unbroken royal line of the kings of 
Scotland and England. He employed a complex argumentative logic to 
assert two goals: that the Scots were in Britain before 300 BC and that 
Christianity in Scotland was more ancient than the Roman Catholic 
authority. The implications of his reasoning were in tum to be understood 
in their entirety when he went on to accuse Lloyd of an intention to subvert 
Scotland's antiquity in order to accommodate Episcopalian arguments12• But 
Mackenzie, as the King's Advocate for Scotland, was essentially interested in 
defending the Stuarts in a difficult political moment. James VII and II had 
ascended on the throne and a Catholic king was found to be unacceptable 
after all. His prerogative on this throne however had to be accepted and any 
nuance to his representing a weakened royal line, thus lacking in authority, 
was vehemently denied. Mackenzie then sought to uphold the royal 
prerogative, not to offer an accurate interpretation of the early stages of 
Scottish history. 
Sir George Mackenzie however offers an insight into the way a 
historian treated his material in the late seventeenth century. In fact, 
Mackenzie is an interesting case in combining the properties of both 
historian and antiquarian - and in separating his methodologies according to 
10 Edward Stillingfleet, Origines Britannicae .. or The Antiquities of the British Churches, 
(First edition: London, 1685. Edition used: Oxford 1842), 2 vols., Vol. I, p.cxli - cxlii. 
II Ibid, I, p. 356. 
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which discipline he was currently servmg. Antiquarians exhibited proto-
archaeological and proto-geological interests in their surveys, sketches and 
collections of relics in a general spirit of preservation of the past. This 
interest was extended to documents which were collected and transcribed -
but not always studied. Partly this was the result of the nature of the 
antiquaries' intentions that were generally more akin to those of collectors 
than of researchers. However, this attitude was equally lacking in 
seventeenth-century historians as the paradigm focused on its literary 
qualities and didactic function. Thus, Sir George Mackenzie could as an 
antiquarian publish the Declaration of Arbroath in 1680 while as a historian 
he remained sceptical of documentary evidence considering it unreliable.13 
Mackenzie as historian determined his erudition by hearsay. Many 
Latin extracts could be found in his pages but quotes, annotations, 
footnotes, were missing. Sources were taken for granted as were the authors 
of several mentioned works. It would take a lot of time for a scholar to 
verify his accuracy even if he commanded extraordinary memory powers. 
Mackenzie's opponents were rarely stated by name; rather they were 
described for reasons of style or irony, not adding to clarity. The structure of 
his work and the content of his arguments remind the reader of a legal 
procedure : everything was linear, points were confirmed or refuted one by 
one and their discussion led straight to the next until a conclusion (or a 
verdict) was reached. Judging from this example only, one would indeed be 
in difficulty in assessing whether or not to count Mackenzie among the 
ranks of historians proper. However, this point-scoring approach was the 
dominant methodological paradigm for history until well into the next 
century. A text free of all the nuisances of corroboration and small print that 
are so familiar to modem-day historians was the format in which such 
figureheads of the Enlightenment as David Hume and William Robertson 
wrote. 
12 Sir George Mackenzie, The Antiquity of the Royal line o/Scotland Farther cleared and 
defended against the exceptions lately offer'd by Dr. Stillingfleet, in his Vindication of 
the Bishop of St. Asaph, (London ,1686), ch. v. 
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Father Thomas Innes (1662-1744) was also a personality of as many 
interests as Mackenzie: by turns antiquarian, historian and theologian. He 
was also Roman Catholic, a Jacobite and a man who, despite having been 
bom in and written excessively about Scotland, spent the greater part of his 
life in France. He worked with two ends in mind : extirpation of George 
Buchanan's (1506-1582) - and through him Boece and Fordun's - claims to 
an ancient Scottish institution of limited monarchy and demolition of 
Presbyterian views of a church founded without Episcopal or Roman 
intervention. His first goal would vindicate Jacobite claims to the crown, the 
second would discredit the views of Scottish Reformation as a return to a 
long gone pure apostolic church that had only been corrupted later by the 
agents of Rome. 
To achieve his goals he had to undermine certain beliefs that were 
counted among the paragons of traditional Scottish history. By examining 
and comparing the existing King - lists he concluded along with O'Flaherty 
that the 'forty kings' were later additions14• Their downfall made Buchanan's 
arguments on an ancient Scottish constitution of elective monarchy quite 
obsolete. Innes was probably right, but whether the blame should be shifted 
to Boece, Fordun or some obscure predecessor it remains doubtful. 
According to A. A. M. Duncan the 'forty kings' were concocted out of a 
marriage between the Scythian founding myth of Scota and the genuine 
king-lists in order for English arguments on the precedence of other 
elements than the Scots in Scotland, as were the Picts, to be refuted. IS 
However, for Innes, a staunch supporter of Divine Right kingship and the 
Stuarts, it was not enough that his opponents' views were discredited. His 
own actions should be accomplished under a proper pretext. His claim was 
to rid Scottish history of myths and legends, "to separate what seemed 
13 Thomas I. Rae, "The Scottish antiquarian tradition" in Scots Antiquaries and 
Historians. Papers read at the Silver jubilee conference of the Abertay Historical Society 
on 15 April 1972, (Dundee, 1972), pp.17-22. 
14 Thomas Innes, A Critical Essay On the Ancient Inhabitants of Northern Britain or 
Scotland, (First edition: 1729, London. Edition used: Edinburgh, 1879), pp. 122-149. 
15 A.A.M. Duncan, "Hector Boece and the medieval tradition" in Scots Antiquaries and 
Historians, pp.2-3. 
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fabulous and groundless from what appears more certain". 16 To observe 
here that this had also been the professed objective of Edward Stillingtleet 
would serve to underline the fact that this was not merely a matter of noble 
disputes on texts and sources between fellow philologists. 
What was more concrete a foundation to build an early Scottish 
history for Innes was the existence of the Picts. According to him they were 
the first inhabitants of Scotland, Celts, and were formerly known as 
Caledonians. He accepted their king - lists as genuine and argued that they 
had exchanged their language for that of the Scots after their union under 
Kenneth MacAlpine in 843 AD because of a "cultural affinity" between the 
two people.17 The advantage of the Pictish case was that in this way 
"we are under no kind of necessity to have recourse to the 
Scots, who came from Ireland, for maintaining either the 
antiquity of the royal line of our kings beyond any monarchy, or 
the ancient settlement of the inhabitants in Britain" .18 
In fact, there was nothing that would lead a serious scholar like Innes to 
favour the reliability of the Pictish king - lists in comparison with the 
Dalriadic Scots. On the contrary, very litde besides these lists were known 
about the Picts themselves, which, in later years were to become a constant 
point of controversy. Contradictory descriptions of Roman writers and 
some words salvaged from their language would be enough to turn them 
into a source of alternative perceptions of Scottish history - and a chance 
for Sir Walter Scott to depict the antiquaries' dilettantism. 
By showing the 'forty kings' to be a figment of the imagination 
though, Innes was able to discredit those Presbyterian views which persisted 
on the apostolic origin of the Scottish church. The intervention of the 
Church of Rome in the image of St. Ninian, St. Patrick and St. Columba 
could not be disproved.19 On the other hand the myth of the Culdees could 
not be sustained any more. Even if their existence could be verified, in the 
absence of kings before Fergus mac Erch their church would not have been 
16 Innes, A Critical Essay, p. 19. 
17 Ibid, p.61. 
18 Innes, A Critical Essay, p.l 05. 
19 Ibid, p.9. 
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legitimate. Thus the whole Whig system suddenly became irrelevant. Innis 
however did not press the point home at the time. Had he decided in favour 
of showing Catholic zea4 he would have risked his compatriots' rejection. 
And since in a letter of his to the Old Pretender he assured the latter of 
taking pains in order not to offend the Government, it is obvious he 
definitely desired to be read in Scotland.20 He dealt in length with 
ecclesiastical matters in The Civil and Ecclesiastical History of Scotland, a work 
that would have been his magnum opus had he been able to complete it while 
alive. When it was finally published, in 1853, Catholic emancipation had 
already rendered obsolete any possible controversy.21 
If there was an innovation that Innes ushered in his work it had to 
do with style and method. Although repetitive, his arguments were clear, 
precise and easier to follow than his predecessors'. His progress remained 
linear, like Stillingfleet or Mackenzie, but his prose was simpler and with 
more sense of purpose. Ferguson states that "in the strict sense, Innes did 
not make use of record scholarship".22 Beyond this strict sense though, he 
seemed to handle documents extremely well. Hardly anybody would argue 
that Innes was the first to incorporate documents in a work of history, but 
the comparative element and the examination to which he submitted them 
to, surely anticipated future historical techniques. Textual criticism was not 
an eighteenth - century novelty. Lorenzo Valla's (1407-1457) pioneering 
work that proved the Donatio Constantini a forgery was based on internal 
discrepancies, linguistic and other anachronisms.23 Towards the end of the 
seventeenth century Jean Mabillon (1632-1707) and Pierre Bayle (1647-
1706) developed techniques of palaeography and documentary comparison 
to other existing evidence. Thomas Innes knew Mabillon personally and 
incorporated his developments in his own approach.24 
Besides his revisionism Innes accepted that the Scottish past could 
be accessed and studied. On the contrary, one of the most famous names of 
20 Ferguson, The Identity of the Scottish Nation, p.191. 
21 Thomas Innes, The Civil and Ecclesiastical History of Scotland, (Aberdeen, Spalding 
Club, 1853). 
22 Ferguson, The Identity of the Scottish Nation, p.188. 
23 Rae, "The Scottish antiquarian tradition", p.19. 
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the Scottish Enlightenment, his contemporary Wil1iam Robertson (1721-
1793), did not hesitate in declaring that "the first ages of Scottish history are 
dark and fabulous".25 "An immense space [was] left for invention to 
occupy": the material in question consisted of "uncertain legends, and the 
traditions of their bards, still more uncertain".26 The whole debate on the 
Picts was dismissed in two lines.27 Robertson concluded that "the first 
period [ to the reign of Kenneth II ] is the region of pure fable and 
conjecture, and ought to be totally neglected, or abandoned to the industry 
and credulity of antiquaries".28 To our eyes Robertson's view looks 
thoroughly modem and justified. However, it was not the outcome of 
theoretical or methodological observations on history per se but a corollary 
of his dedication to Enlightenment articles of faith and attitudes. 
The worldview of Enlightenment intellectuals was shaped by their 
basic beliefs in the uniformity of human nature and its potential 
improvement. They recognised the value of scepticism towards perceived 
authorities and put their faith in the possibility of explaining the physical 
world by scientific knowledge beyond doctrines and superstitions. 
Robertson merely implemented these basic principles in the writing of a 
Scottish history. He rejected 'legends' and 'traditions' on philosophical 
grounds, on the basis of his scepticism and the absence of concrete proof, 
not in an attempt to delineate a specific canon for historians. Moreover, his 
work was, of its own nature, placed outside the circle of controversy on the 
Dark Ages of Scodand. Robertson did not stricdy engage in the debate for 
Scottish origins as this would have been a limited and poindess venture. He 
was prepared to leave all that to the "credulity of antiquaries". If this 
emphasises once more the perceived difference between antiquaries and 
historians, it also highlights the preoccupation of the Enlightenment with 
the near present rather than the remote past. Robertson's choice to write a 
24 Rae, "The Scottish antiquarian tradition", pp. 19-20. 
25 William Robertson, The History 0/ Scotland, (First edition: 1759, London. Edition 
used: London, 1809), p. 201. 
26 Ibid, p. 202. 
27 Ibid, p. 203. 
28 Robertson, The History a/Scotland, pp. 205 - 06. 
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Scottish history based on verified fact only had produced an admirable 
achievement that would not find many eager imitators in his century. 29 
James Macpherson (1736 - 1796), who formed a focal point in the 
debate for the Scottish past, was more representative of trends followed. 
Born a native Gaelic speaker of Inverness-shire, Macpherson should be 
understood in the frame of the aftermath of the 1745 rebellion. Not so 
much because he belonged to a strongly Jacobite clan but because he grew 
up in a climate of poverty and Scottophobia, evident in the early 1760s 
agitations of John Wilkes and the unpopularity of the Earl of Bute as prime 
minister. Macpherson managed to ride the wave of reverses in his youth, get 
a good education at the university of Aberdeen and acquire a place as 
schoolmaster in his native town, Ruthven of Badenoch. The influence of his 
teachers, especially Thomas Blackwell, a devoted Homeric researcher, was 
lasting, for a little later on he started collecting and translating traditional 
Gaelic material. In 1760 he was catapulted to fame with the publication of 
his Fragments of Ancient poetry, followed two years later, after an extensive tour 
of the Highlands in search of material, by Fingal Temords reception in 1763, 
took on a more subdued tone. The poems of Ossian, this sublime third 
century poet, had already began to create a great interest in Europe, 
introducing Scotland to a wider public to the point of becoming in later 
years Napoleon Bonaparte's favourite campaign reading.30 However, soon 
this mania with Ossian took a more sinister turn when serious doubts were 
aired on the authenticity of the epics and the existence of Ossian himself. 
Starting with Samuel Johnson (1709-1784) in 1775, the debate on whether 
Macpherson acted as a forger or not and to what extent raged for a long 
time and in some ways it still remains unresolved. It may be said however 
with some conviction that it obscured Macpherson's literary and 
documentary contribution to Gaelic studies. 
Whether he was in reality a perfect swindler or a totally innocent 
romantic is not something that a twentieth century scholar should much 
dwell on. Fiona Stafford sums it up by stating that 
29 Sir David Dalrymple, Lord Hailes, was the sole exception in producing his Annals of 
Scotland between 1776 and 1779 in relying on the verification of authentic sources. 
30 Ferguson, The Identity of the Scottish Nation, pp. 240-41. 
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"Macpherson's Ossian was by no means the work of a 
confidence trickster, bent on achieving fame and fortune 
through a clever hoax. Neither was it what it purported to be -
a literal translation of Gaelic poems which had survived 
unaltered since the third century".31 
The idea of a pure original, corrupted verS10ns of which were then 
circulating in the Highlands, and the duty of a translator to restore them to 
its "original purity',32 was an idea shared by many, Macpherson among them. 
What mattered was not what existed but what "ought to have been".33 We 
should keep that in mind along with the fact that Macpherson's were not the 
only traditional poetry in Europe to be tampered with or restored. Indeed, 
the circumstances and even the results of his effort, were not fundamentally 
different from those of others who went in search of popular culture and 
tradition in the last decades of the eighteenth and the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. 
The 'Ossian' affair created a surge of Celtic romanticism linked to 
the idea that ancient Caledonians were Celts, notably Gaels. Hugh Blair 
found that Ossian compared to Gothic poetry was "like passing from a 
savage desert, into a fertile and cultivated country".34 According to him, 
Ossian lived in a time where "the cares of men were few. They lived a 
roving, indolent life; hunting and war their principal employments".35 Blair 
then subscribed to the cult of primitivism, the natural condition of humanity 
before the coming of civil society that was eagerly praised in the works of 
J ean-Jacques Rousseau, and which was to be juxtaposed to the complexities 
and cares of the eighteenth century. Ossian's era was interpreted and 
relished as a pre - or proto-society radically different from the one of 
contemporary times: "everything presents to us the most simple and 
31 Fiona Stafford, The Sublime Savage. A Study of James Macpherson and the poems of 
Ossian, (Edinburgh, 1988), p.4. 
32 Ibid, p. 83. 
33 Ibid, p. 84. 
34 James Macpherson, The Poems of Ossian, (London, 1806), p. 60. 
35 Ibid, p. 65. 
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unimproved manners". 36 And Scots were Celts, "past all doubt", he assured 
us. 
But Macpherson's tender and sublime past was a romantic ideal, not 
the real Dark Ages of Scodand, as Fiona Stufford observes37. The fact that 
sometimes Blair seemed to take the historicity of these poems for granted 
and emphasised rather their historical importance than literary value was 
something that would later give rise to John Pinkerton's reaction - and 
rejection. In this aspect Ossian was as much Blair's and his associates' child 
as Macpherson's. What was seen as a chance for the elevation of Scottish 
history and literature in classical heights could not pass unexploited - even if 
Blair and his colleagues should be rather considered as wishful thinkers than 
instigators to fraud. 
In the end, as Fiona Stafford notes, the poems of Ossian offered an 
"imaginative escape" to those who found the climate of the Enlightenment 
"somewhat lacking".38 Their simplicity was most appealing throughout 
Europe since they made use of a leitmotif of the age, the natural condition of 
humanity before civil society. Jean - Jacques Rousseau had already depicted 
a similar kind of paradise beyond demands and conventions of age and 
class. Both Rousseau and Macpherson stepped out of time to draw simple 
alternatives to times perceived as complex. Macpherson's was an exotic 
utopia of green landscapes, batdes, death and passion, and a counterpart 
maybe to the more idyllic escape of Robinson Crusoe. 
Macpherson's contribution to the problem of the origins of Scodand 
rested in his defence of Celticism, not merely as a culture or a distinct way 
of life but as a usable historical past. Macpherson returned to Boece and 
Fordun in his professed Celticism but did this through a modified variant. 
Not only the Scots were the original inhabitants of Scotland, not only were 
they Gaels, but they had also peopled Ireland - Fordun's claim to the 
opposite only being a useful argument in repelling Edward 1's claims of 
Scodand being his fief. 39 The same views concerning Scotland were 
36 Macpherson, The Poems 0/ Ossian, p. 66. 
37 Stafford, The Sublime Savage, p.70. 
38 Ibid, p. 4. 
39 Macpherson, The Poems o/Ossian, pp. 19-20. 
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essentially expressed in the Introduction to the History of Great Britain and Ireland: 
Ireland was colonised by British Gaels "who in the after period were 
distinguished in Britain by the name of Caledonians". 40 These Gaels "who 
possessed the northern Britain by the name of Caledonians ... retained the 
pure but unimproved language of their ancestors".41 What Macpherson had 
achieved in this improbable reasoning was to bypass Thomas Innes's Pictish 
predominance. Indeed, his rather simple modification turned both Scots and 
Picts into Caledonian tribes of pure Celtic origin. It seems that a version of 
this view of Scottish history remained alive until recendy.42 
John Pinkerton's (1758 - 1826) career demonstrated the extent of a 
completely different conception of Scottish identity. Pinkerton started out as 
a disciple of the Enlightenment, then turned to a "Rousseauesque 
romanticism" only to end up as a follower of natural science.43 In his youth 
Pinkerton had also trod the road of the antiquary in collecting Scots Lowland 
ballads inspired by Macpherson's precedent. It seems he followed his 
footsteps so closely that he presented a 'restored' version of one of these 
ballads, only to be exposed by the English antiquary Joseph Ritson (1752-
1803). Pinkerton's erratic nature was to become more evident in the future. 
In his historical work he picked up just where Innes left in his obsession with 
the Picts. However, whereas Innes proposed a mild reform of Scottish 
history by giving precedence to the Picts, Pinkerton opted for more radical 
solutions. 'Piks', or "Pihtar, Pehtar, Peohtar" as Pinkerton believed their 
original name to have been before being Latinised by the Romans44, were the 
only true ancestors of the modem Scots, being the first to have arrived and 
colonised the country. Moreover, these Piks were not Celts but Goths from 
Scandinavia. 
40 James Macpherson, An Introduction to the History of Great Britain and Ireland, 
(Dublin, 1773), p. 54. 
41 Ibid, p.35. 
42 Ferguson, The Identity of the Scottish Nation, p. 239. 
43 Ibid, p. 250. 
44 John Pinkerton, An enquiry into the history of Scotland preceding the reign of Malcolm 
Canmore or the year 1056: including the authentic history of that period, 2 vols., (First 
edition: 1789, London and Edinburgh. Edition used: Edinburgh, 1814), vol. II, p.232. 
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In his Enquiry into the History of Scotland preceding the rezgn of j\1aicofm 
Canmore or the year 1056 Pinkerton replaced the already tangled web of 
Scottish history with another version of his own imagining. The Dalriadic 
Scots were wiped out by the Piks, who were fully Goths situated in Scotland 
at least 300 years before Christ.45 Despite their predominance, the Picts 
acquired the name 'Scoti' that was given to them by later Celtic writers. 
Responsible for this confusion were Irish churchmen of the eleventh and 
twelfth centuries. This Celtic version, although belonging to "the most 
ignorant strollers that ever graced a country" was nevertheless preferred 
because "their speech was a written one and more polished than the Pikish, 
an unwritten tongue". 46 The famous union between Scots and Picts did not 
happen in c. 843 after the latter were defeated by Kenneth MacAlpine; in 
fact, it was the other way around, the Piks had subdued the Scots as early as 
739 and Kenneth was by heritage in reality a Pictish king. Along with 
showing that the Piks, the "real people of this country", were paramount in 
ancient Scodand, Pinkerton argued in a strong line of racialism, determined 
to prove the absolute inferiority of anything Celtic compared to Gothic. The 
Highlands and their inhabitants featured prominendy in this, being "ever the 
ready tools of despotism", "indolent, slavish, strangers to industry".47 
To arrive at his conclusions Pinkerton saw fit to employ certain 
'scientific propositions'. The first one was that ancient authorities formed the 
only standard of history: "For he who denies ancient authorities, and prefers 
his own conjectures, is a fabulist, and not a historian".48 Sometimes his 
'authorities' were really vague, as in the case of his proof for the Gothic 
origin of the Greeks: "it is universallY allowed F!Y the learned that I1EAALrOI, 
Pelasgi, was the first name of the Greeks who afterwards bore the name of 
EAAHNEL, Hellenes,,49. More proofs as to the origins of Greeks and their 
45 Pinkerton, An enquiry into the history of Scotland, I, p. 196. He reached this 
conclusion from the Picts' absence of mention in several Roman texts, notably Tacitus, 
Ptolemy, Dio and Herodian. 
46 Ibid, I, p. 251. 
47 Pinkerton, An enquiry into the history of Scotland , I, p. 339. 
48 Ibid, I, p. 161. 
49 John Pinkerton, A Dissertation on the origin and progress of the Scythians or Goths ; 
being an introduction to the ancient and modern history of Europe, (First edition: 
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culture could easily be categorised as assertions but not as corroborating 
evidence in support of an argument. so In fact the citation of ancient texts was 
far from the absolute truth that Pinkerton seemed to affirm, for all of the 
scholars mentioned here, from Stillingf1eet to W.F. Skene, Pinkerton 
included, used exactly the same Roman authors and texts managmg 
nevertheless to produce striking variations in their interpretation. 
His second methodological proposition was the concept of 'Historic 
Truth' : 
"F or though the truth in historic research be far from 
mathematical, yet that highest probability, here called Historic 
Truth, consists in this, that though you cannot demonstrate it 
true, yet you can prove all opposite opinions to be false ; so that, 
as truth is one, and no two opposite opinions can be both true, 
this remains Historic Truth".sl 
Expressed this way it sounded rather deterministic and Pinkerton treated it 
accordingly. At the end of each chapter of the Dissertation on the origin and 
progress of the Srythians or Goths he attached an 'Historic Truth' supposedly 
proved during its course. But in many cases things were considered so 
obvious that 'historic truth' became merely another name for prejudice. 
Thus, the Goths were "a wise, valiant and generous race" while Highlanders 
remained "ever the ready tools of despotism"s2. 
Pinkerton's argumentative reasoning is not as straightforward as it 
might look at first. William Ferguson suggests plain racism as a possible 
alternative motivation to that of a show of erudition. He believes that 
although Pinkerton was an industrious worker, considerable scholar and able 
to form acute arguments, he also suffered from a succession of idees fixes 
which seriously impaired his work.S3 Ferguson calls into attention certain 
abstracts form the Enquiry and the Dissertation, especially these in which 
Pinkerton writes that "The Celts were so inferior a people , being to the 
London, 1787. Edition used: Edinburgh, 1814), [Appended to Vol. II of the Enquiry but 
with its own pagination], p. 63. My italics. 
50 Ibid, p. 74-78. 
51 Pinkerton, A Dissertation p. xvii. 
52 Pinkerton, An enquiry into the history of Scotland, I, p. 339. 
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S rythians as a negro to a European, that, as all history shows, to see them was to 
conquer them,,54 ; or that "a Tartar, a Negro, an American, &c. &c. differ as 
much from a German, as a bull-dog, a lap-dog, a shepherd's cur from a 
pointer. The differences are radical,,55. He considers these as evidence of 
scorn and hatred for the "lesser breeds" that goes beyond everything that has 
come before. Pinkerton comes close to be the author of the concept of the 
"master race", "a social Darwinist before Darwin,,56. 
Pinkerton was indeed a distinguished T eutonist racialist. However, 
even this was not the whole story, for his philological racialism was not a 
mere theoretical principle but was employed as a powerful weapon directed 
against the Celts. Pinkerton essentially split the Scottish people in two, 
praising the Teuton Lowlanders who were thus akin to the English, both of 
them being descendants of Scythian Goths, for their sensible and 
industrious nature while castigating the Celtic Highlanders for their 
indolence and slavishness. The latter were essentially not only stuck in a 
primitive stadium of civilisation but there were serious doubts on their ability 
to escape it some day because of their inferior inherent racial 
characteristics. 57 Here, the Enlightenment theory of human progress was 
linked to an "ethnic determinism" to cut across borders and undermine 
notions of a Scottish national community. 58 A side effect of these assertions 
would be their subversion of some pillars of common ancestry and 
development that a possible Scottish nationalism could have used to build 
upon. 
Pinkerton's objectives however were not projected in such a far future. 
In the context of his age we might point out that a differentiation between 
Highlands and Lowlands had started to appear - not necessarily one based 
on uniform contempt of the former towards the latter. Samuel Johnson had 
53 Ferguson, The Identity o/the Scottish Nation, pp. 250-251. 
54 Pinkerton, A Dissertation, p. 123. 
55 Ibid, p.36. 
56 Ferguson, The Identity o/the Scottish Nation, p. 254. 
57 Colin Kidd, "Teutonist Ethnology and Scottish National Inhibition, 1780-1880", 
Scottish Historical Review, LXXIV, (1995), 51-3; Pinkerton, An enquiry into the history 
o/Scotland, II, p.19. 
58 Kidd, "Teutonist Ethnology", 50-2. 
displayed a number of prejudices against the backward Highlanders but he 
abstained from pronouncing them racially inferior. Their savage manners 
were "rather produced by their situation than derived from their ancestors". 59 
The Highland Society was founded in London as early as 1778 and the 
highland dress was already disseminating in the Lowlands, as it contained the 
"radiance of disappearing authenticity".60 The culmination of this folklore 
interest for the 'authentic' or 'primitive', which was effectively the flipside of 
racialist denunciations, was undoubtedly Sir Walter Scott's impressive 
pageants that were enacted in the 1822 visit of George IV to Scotland. 
However, around 1770 a change in perceptions came with the radical 
opinions of Thomas Pennant and Sir John Sinclair that paved the road to 
Pinkerton's racialist views.61 In this light, Pinkerton's Enquiry and his 
persistent Gothomania was an effort to discredit the Celtic - Highlander 
tradition by exposing their backwardness, a reaction to the pan - European 
obsession with Celts that 'Ossian' Macpherson had precipitated. Pinkerton's 
own obsession had a wider pedigree than a mere denunciation of him and his 
works. In Pinkerton's version of Scottish history the debt to the Irish did not 
exist. The Gothic link established guaranteed that Scotland was a rightful 
Teuton partner to England and had been shaped by only the right influences. 
George Chalmers's (1742-1825) work was formulated as a direct 
answer to Pinkerton's Gothic allegations. Chalmers himself was rather a 
model antiquary in his passion for collecting than an impressive scholar or 
textual critic. He was an American loyalist, having migrated to Baltimore in 
Maryland and then returned in the wake of the Revolution, to publish a 
number of tracts justifying the actions of the British. He then went on to 
occupy a place in the administration and devote more time to his literary 
pursuits.62 In these he countered Pinkerton with equally sweeping arguments. 
59 Krisztina Feny6, " 'Contempt, Sympathy and Romance'. Lowland perceptions of the 
Highlands and the clearances during the Famine years, 1845-1855", University of 
Glasgow thesis, (1996), p.2l. [This work has now been published by Tuckwell Press, 
(East Linton, 2000)]. 
60 See T. M. Devine, The Scottish Nation 1700-2000, (London, 2000), ch.11. Quote from 
ibid, p.244. 
61 Feny6, " 'Contempt, Sympathy and Romance' ", pp.37-9. 
62 Ferguson, The Identity of the Scottish Nation, pp.276-77. 
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He regarded the Celts as "the aboriginal people of Europe throughout its 
ample limits". 63 The Gauls were the first to arrive in postdiluvian Britain. 64 
Next in line was Ireland, colonised from Britain '~y Celtic tribes".65 The 
population of North Britain came from the Southern parts of the island.66 As 
in the case of all preceding antiquaries his unquestionable sources were 
ancient writers, only he drew from them his own conclusions: for instance, 
"that the Picts were Caledonians, we thus have seen in the 
mention of classic authors during three centuries ; that the 
Caledonians were the North Britons who have fought Agricola at 
the foot of the Grampian, we know from the nature of the 
events, and the attestation of Tacitus; that the Northern Britons 
of the first century were the descendants of the Celtic 
Aborigines, who were the same people as the Southern Britons 
during the earliest times, has been satisfactorily proved as a moral 
certain ty" . 67 
As a line against Pinkerton this was a devastating argument. As an attempt at 
a consistent use of sources however, it was one of the examples that 
corroborated Sir Walter Scott's comment that the "slightest of authorities" 
were called upon to buttress disproportionably strong convictions. 
For Chalmers, the subject of the Goths was a lost cause. "More 
confidence than authority" guided those who recounted their progress. 68 He 
himself was unable to find scarcely anything but fable to be related of the 
ancient Scythians. Indeed, in a direct reference to Pinkerton's methodology 
he alluded to "scholars who formed their judgements from reading books" 
who treated Picts as Goths in contrast to those "who weighed circumstances, 
examined topography, and adverted to language" and regarded them as 
63 George Chalmers, Caledonia or a historical and topographical account of North 
Britain, 7 vols, (First edition: London, 1807-1824. Edition used: Paisley, 1887-1894), 
vol. I., p.7. 
64 Ibid, I, p.15. 
65 Ibid, I, p.18. 
66 Ibid, I, p.3 1. 
67 Ibid, I, p.192. 
68 Ibid, I, p.8. 
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Britons.69 But Chalmers was equally immune to James Macpherson's -v1sions 
of Gaelic Caledonians for the latter's object was to revive "the fabulous 
conceits of the ancient priority of Scots in North Britain which critical 
controversy had driven into obscure darkness".7o 
Sir Walter Scott (1771-1832) is of extreme importance to this debate 
not so much in his contribution to the subjects of the Scottish origins itself, 
but because of his influence in the way history was to be understood in the 
nineteenth century both inside and outside Scotland. With the publication of 
Waverlry in 1814, Scott embarked on a series of novels that would redefine 
Scotland in European eyes and would bring to the fore the Scottish 
landscapes as a romantic scenery par excellence. His inspiration was to have a 
more lasting effect than either Macpherson's Ossian or Robert Burns's 
poems that had first acquainted the European public with Scotland's natural 
beauties. However, Scott's sense of the historical did not stop there. His was 
a view of the past that linked it directly to the present - and the problems 
Scottish society faced in the wake of industrialisation and Anglicisation. The 
possibility of legal and economic reforms intervening in its fundamental 
institutions alerted him, as evident in the Letters of Malachi Malagrowther, to the 
point of issuing his famous warning on the idiosyncrasy of the country -
"what makes Scotland Scotland" - being on the verge of extinction. This, 
rather than being a show of conservatism or mere anti-Englishness, was a 
call to a different perception of national history altogether, obvious in Scott's 
association with the Bannatyne Club. 
What distinguished the Bannatyne Club, which was formed in 1823 by 
Scott, Thomas Thomson (1768-1852), David Laing (1793-1878) and other 
prominent members of Edinburgh society, from its predecessor, the 
Roxburghe, was the lack of dilettantism and its intention of being "in effect, 
a national body" despite its "exclusiveness of membership and 
publication". 71 Scott's presence as the first president of this publishing club 
69 Chalmers, Caledonia, I, p. 227. 
70 Ibid, I, p. 230. 
71 Marinell Ash, The Strange Death of Scottish History, (Edinburgh. 1980). p.67; 
Marinell Ash, "Scott and historical publishing: The Bannatyne and Maitland Clubs" in 
Scots Antiquaries and Historians, p.31. 
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not only endowed it with significant prestige, it also ensured that it would 
tum to practical objects and would find significant imitators among both 
intellectuals and wealthy representatives of the middle class. From an initial 
idea appealing to "collectors of rarities", it had evolved in 1826 as Scott 
observed to a project of "real utility" and called for an enlargement of 
membership which would in itself attract more publicity.72 
The 'utility' Scott referred to was the publishing of the original sources 
of Scottish history that was the Club's main feat and concern until its last 
products were released in 1867. It is possible though, that this direction 
towards the preservation and dissemination of documents did not constitute 
the Bannatyne's or its many imitators' - the Maitland, the Iona, the Spalding 
Club - sole contribution. Scott's aim, as we have already seen, was not 
merely that of an isolated reaction but aspired to the creation of a favourable 
atmosphere into which Scottish history could flourish and Scottish national 
consciousness could be strengthened as a consequence. Besides the 
attraction the Bannatyne's activities offered to intellectuals, Scott and his 
partners were eager to include in their ranks " 'working' historians and 
record scholars" such as Robert Pitcairn, Patrick Fraser Tyder, Francis 
Palgrave or Cosmo Innes.73 In the same frame we must look upon Scott's 
suggestion to Patrick Fraser Tyder in 1823 to undertake the writing of a 
history of Scodand: "something more was wanted than a popular romance; 
[ ... ] a right history of Scotland was yet to be written".74 
Scott's own efforts to that direction kept being hampered by other 
priorities. He was contemplating it since 1816 but a continuing demand for 
new novels did not let him modify or rework the small piece he had already 
composed. Later on, his whole efforts would be consumed by his bankruptcy 
and his subsequent attempt to repay his creditors. Not counting the Tales of a 
Grandfather then, what has remained from Scott's historical ventures are a 
series of snippets instead of a complete coherent text. In these, the debate 
for the Scottish origins could not pass without comment, since it touched on 
the point himself was trying to make: the past retained the essential 
72 Ash, "Scott and historical publishing", p.32. 
73 Ibid, p.3 1. 
74 Ash, The Strange Death, pp.87-8. 
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characteristics of Scotland, its peculiar qualities that should be preserved and 
studied. "The facts are indeed, numerous", he asserted; "but cleared of the 
hypotheses with which these have been defended, some account of Scotland 
from the earliest period is a chapter of importance to the history of 
mankind".75 He directed his criticism to many recipients. Thus, Boethius had 
"dressed up and adorned the rude fictions of early times, and gave wings to 
the bug which would otherwise have crawled unnoticed in its native 
obscurity".76 On the other hand, the "Highland antiquaries" were jusdy 
denounced "for the readiness with which they had reposed unlimited 
confidence in the sophisticated poems of Ossian and endeavoured to pass 
them as historical authorities upon their neighbours".77 His essential view of 
the whole debate however was that it had been allowed to deteriorate to a 
"contest of wit and ingenuity with research and learning".78 In the end there 
was disappointment in a case where "the most violent opinions were 
maintained on the slightest authorities".79 What was implied here was a 
double miss: a serious subject became depreciated to simple polemics and its 
scholarly treatment was found wanting. 
Some more subde comments to illustrate Scott's overall impression of 
the debate on Scottish origins can be found in The Antiquary. Here, the 
novelist had an ample opportunity to indicate his opinion on certain well-
known incidents and widely held views. The protagonist, Lovel, found out he 
was to be the judge of a dispute on the origin of the Picts between the local 
antiquaries and friends, Jonathan Oldbuck and Sir Arthur Wardour who kept 
evoking the views of the "learned Pinkerton" or "the indefatigable and 
erudite Chalmers" - and the outcome depended on "penval", the only 
surviving word of the Pictish language.8o In another incident, clearly implying 
the Macpherson controversy, Hector MacIntyre, a Gaelic speaker, native 
Highlander and hot-headed soldier, resolved to prove Ossian's authenticity 
75 Quarterly Review, XLI, (1829), 335. 
76 Walter Scott, Miscellaneous Prose Works, 28vols., (Edinburgh, 1834-36), Vol. Xx, 
"Ancient History of Scotland", p.303. 
77 Scott,"Ancient History of Scotland", p.323. 
78 Ibid, p.318. 
79 Ibid, p.319. 
80 Walter Scott, The Antiquary, (Edinburgh, 1995), pp.48-9. 
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by reciting a dialogue between Ossian and Saint Patrick, hilarious and 
illustrative in its absurdity: Ossian called the priest an ass and a "son of a 
female dog" and the Saint responded in equal tones. When Oldbuck 
remarked on the absence of these precise words from McPherson's 
translation, MacIntyre gravely replied that "he must have taken very 
unwarrantable liberties with his original".81 The negative but playful image of 
antiquaries that Scott painted in this novel was far from a hidden indictment. 
After all, he himself and many of his colleagues in the Bannatyne Club acted 
as antiquarians in their bibliomania and passion for collection. Henry 
Cockburn's assertion that "very few of us can read our books, and fewer can 
understand them, yet type, morocco, and the corporation spirit make us print 
on" and Scott's own attestation to their being Scots and bibliomaniacs in that 
order would be enough to show their respect for that form of scholarship. 
Antiquarianism however was gradually being superseded, like the 
problem of origins itself. At the time William Forbes Skene (1809-1892) 
presented a more consistent and disciplined approach to the question on the 
identity of the Scottish nation, this subject was already being debated at 
another level by Patrick Fraser Tyder, John Hill Burton, Andrew Lang and 
Peter Hume Brown, who employed a more consciously historical 
methodology to examine such key themes as the Wars of Independence, the 
Reformation and the Union. After almost two hundred years of continuing 
polemics the Scottish origins were beginning to look rather stale. Skene, who 
was of Gaelic descent on the side of his mother and had been pardy brought 
up in the Highlands, essentially maintained James Macpherson's old 
argument on the Caledonians being Gaels and "consequendy the later 
Scottish nation in embryo". 82 Indeed, the early Skene remained largely an 
amateur historian who held controversial views, as in advocating the poems 
of Ossian as "the oldest record of history of a very remote age".83 In that he 
probably indulged his own personal interests and possibly erred because of a 
81 Scott, The Antiquary, p.245. 
82 Ferguson, The Identity of the Scottish Nation, pp. 292-3, Cowan, "The invention of 
Ce ltic Scotland", pp. 1-4. 
83 William Forbes Skene, The Highlanders of Scotland, (First edition: 1837, London. 
Edition used: Stirling, 1902), p.139. 
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bias due to his Gaelic origin. In his later projects however, wider research 
made him revise some of the most questionable aspects, notably those that 
had to do with the descent of the Caledonians. In Celtic 5 cot land a , 
comprehensive study of the Dark Ages, he showed himself more cautious 
and composed, employing strict methods from the German schools of 
history and philology. His work had indeed some distinct methodological 
merits, notably his proposition "to lay a sound foundation" for a history of 
Scotland by taking into account "the more trustworthy authorities". 84 The 
flaws of the past, in his opinion, were due "first ... an uncritical use of the 
materials which are authentic; and second ... the combination with these 
materials of others which are undoubtedly spuriOUS".85 His consistent 
employing of textual examination and his faith in "trustworthy documents,,86 
put him into a Rankean nineteenth-century historical perspective in an age 
where Scottish history was undergoing radical change ill its 
professionalisation and acceptance as a distinct academic subject. 
Reviewing the whole origins of Scotland debate one cannot fail to spot 
that it was in effect a disjointed affair rather than a consistent discussion. For 
some it was indeed a matter that had to do with the Scots' self-image and 
their heritage. Scottish society was under continuous strains initially 
attributed to the religious and political controversies of the seventeenth 
century that pitted Protestants against Catholics and, later on, radical against 
moderate Protestants. In the eighteenth century, the consequences of the 
Union with England had complicated matters, inspiring resentment, evident 
in the Jacobite insurrections of 1715 and 1745, and fears of imminent 
Anglicisation. This instability called for extensive search of the past either to 
cement old interpretations or to disseminate new, adaptable to the era at 
hand. For the great majority of those who took part in the Scottish origins 
debate however, what mattered in the final analysis was not if the Picts were 
Gaels or Goths or if the Scots were indigenous or came from Ireland. Their 
84 William Forbes Skene, Celtic Scotland. A history of ancient Alban, 3 vols., 
(Edinburgh, 1876-1880), Vol. I, p. vi. 
85 Ibid, I, p.20. 
86 Skene, Celtic Scotland, 1, p.19. 
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deeper allegiance was to a personal cause they strove to further: an ancient 
Scottish constitution for George Buchanan; an unbroken royal line for 
George Mackenzie, to defend J ames VII and II's prerogatives on the throne ; 
a Pictish 'absolute monarchy' for Thomas Innes to vindicate Jacobite claims 
to the crown and the fiction of Boece and Buchanan's 'forty kings' destroyed 
to arrive at a Scottish church founded by Roman Catholic bishops. James 
Macpherson looked to uphold the antecedence of Celtic Scots in the British 
Isles and John Pinkerton used the Goths as a proxy for dissemination of his 
Teutonist racialism that linked the Lowlanders to the industrious English 
nation. Even Walter Scott's comments pointed towards his own vision of 
constructing a consistent Scottish history and reinforcing Scottish 
consciousness. It was after all an intellectual shadowplay that ended in 
Scottishness all but becoming a brilliant disguise, the perfect pretext and 
playground of pressure groups who sought to promote their own idea of a 
Scottish state and church. 
Was there a common thread then tunrung through this whole 
engagement, providing some focus ? Can the debate on Scottish origins be 
read also as a reaction to what was perceived as the Anglicisation of Scottish 
society? Not in so many words. The debate was technically initiated before 
the Union - but the questions revolving around the latter development were 
already aired in the end of the seventeenth century. There was, of course, the 
Ossian episode where Samuel Johnson virulendy attacked Macpherson's 
credibility and in a first phase at least Blair and many other Scottish literary 
figures sided with their compatriot. To put things in perspective we have to 
remember the 1760s and 1770s were an age of mutual distrust between 
English and Scots. Here, Scottophobia was the flipside of fear of 
Anglicisation north of the border. However, I would think the connection 
between fear of Anglicisation and the quest for origins to be subder. The 
debate did not revolve around law or education, the paramount pillars of 
Scottish society while the way the church was involved had more to do with 
matters of internal balance than anything else. In no contributor can we find 
an open attack on England or an imported way of life. But Anglicisation did 
influence an inward look concerning the past on the part of Scottish 
intellectuals. If we consider Scodand after the loss of her parliament as 
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undergoing an identity crisis, then the debate can be read as both a symptom 
and a more rational attempt at introspection, a premature attempt at 
structuring national time and space. 
In the end then the questions that seem to arise from this long search 
for Scottish identity in the Dark Ages are in hindsight more straightforward 
than their inceptors indicated at the time. 'W'hich of the possible histories 
should be propagated?' The answers here were two but with some variations: 
Scots were either Goths or Celts, but these could have been Scythians or 
Scandinavians, indigenous or migrant Celts, from Ireland or the European 
continent. But the fundamental question was as much about the past as the 
present: Which nation?' Undoubtedly, both, say, John Pinkerton and Walter 
Scott understood themselves to be patriots serving Scotland's interests after 
their fashion. Scott's record is unassailable while Pinkerton had published an 
edition of Barbour's Bruce in 1790.87 The road chosen however proved to be 
a dead end. To reach a consensus or even to force one was beyond both 
antiquaries and historians engaged in the discussion as their inadequate 
methodologies could not sustain successfully their political arguments, which 
deteriorated to personal rivalries. Although the foundations for the building 
of a Scottish identity were laid then, it would be the work of another batch 
of historians, following a more disciplined path to delineate the shaping of a 
unitary nation through the Wat of Independence. 
Changing the paradigm: the formation of a Greek history 
outline in the nineteenth century 
For someone who would study ideological developments in modem 
Greece the origins of the independent state do not display any convictions, 
rather a lack of certainty and precision. The turbulent course of Modem 
Greek history requires a preliminary discussion of some historical points in 
order to better understand the roots of the Greek state and identity. The 
Revolution that produced it went through a succession of phases, from an 
87 Kidd, ''Teutonist Ethnology", 54. 
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early string of spectacular successes for the revolutionaries to a considerable 
Turkish backlash and a late intervention of the Great Powers, turning into a 
time-consuming affair that lasted from 1821 to 1829. Between 1828 and 
1832 however, it was for the better part an exercise in European diplomacy, 
for a conference comprised by representatives of the Great Powers (plus the 
belligerent parties, occasionally) sat in London trying to come up with what 
was in effect another partial solution to the Eastern Question. The matter of 
Greek independence, remained a prolonged affair in terms of foreign policy. 
It was finally approved by the Sublime Porte in 1830 although the Treaty of 
London, which detertnined its borders, was only ratified in 1832. 
Statecraft being a less than easy task for those engaging in it for the 
first time, the Greek Kingdom's prospects were not considered great. 
Despite early signs of optimism from its intellectuals - a University to 
'enlighten the Orient' was founded in Athens in 1837 - the state's affairs 
went on in a poor way and disillusionment settled in even for those who had 
come a long way to support its cause: the historian George Finlay (1799-
1875), who had left Glasgow in 1821 to bear witness as a Philhellen to a 
nation reborn, was talking in 1861 of a "diminutive kingdom". 88 
Expectations were high for those not considering the huge amounts of effort 
needed to unify regions facing social dislocation, cultural disunity and 
suffering from the results of a ten-year war. Optimism was inherent in the 
Greek Enlightenment which, as its European counterpart that provided the 
example and fundamental principles of thought, stressed the splendour of 
ancient Greek civilisation and anticipated a suitable future once freedom was 
attained. 
The ancient past however did not prove a sufficient blueprint to the 
present since its foundations were only built in the world of ideas. From the 
beginning of its existence the newborn state was faced with serious political 
and financial problems asking for brisk attitudes and tangible measures. It is 
generally admitted that the political elite did not rise to the occasion. A 
continuing instability can be discerned in the murder of the first Governor, 
Ioannis Kap odis trias; the overthrow of the Bavarian Regency of underage 
88 George Finlay, History of the Greek Revolution, 2 vols. , (London and Edinburgh, 
1861), vol. II, p. 382. 
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King Otto; the Revolution of 1843, culminating in the King's granting a 
constitution; and his final dethronement in 1862. During the same period 
there were also continuous incidents of brigandage in the country and across 
the border with the Ottoman Empire, a general unrest during the Crimean 
Wat, strife in the Parliament between formations bearing the colourful 
names of the 'English', 'French' and 'Russian' parties. The Protective Powers 
of the Treaty of London were jostling for position in order to preserve and 
further their interests - and those of their subjects. Twice in the 1850s, in 
1850 and again in 1854, the United Kingdom sent its gunboats to blockade 
Piraeus in order to settle public or private disputes with the Greek 
government. 
The element of uncertainty in matters political was complicated further 
by ideological ambiguities. The citizenship affair of 1843-44 illustrated the 
connection between political struggle and the perception of Greek identity in 
the aftermath of the Revolution. The division between autochthones (native 
Greeks) and eterochthones (non-native Greeks) in eligibility for civil service 
showed in effect how a fight for spoils was conducted. The compromise 
between the two factions, which cut across particularistic and party lines, 
preempted stem measures against eterochthones civil servants. This was first 
and foremost a covert acceptance of the fact that the Revolution had created 
new elites that enjoyed power and others who were excluded and ready to 
challenge them. On the other hand, it confirmed existing rifts in society and 
pointed to a certain lack of agreement on the content of Greek identity. 
Remedies for that were sought immediately. It was during this debate that 
Ioannis Kolettis articulated for the first time the basic frame of the Megaii 
Idea. 89 
89 Elli Skopetea, To «1f:POW1f:O Baaf).£IO» Kal 11 Mey6l11 J~ta. 'O'l'el, rov dJv,KOV 
1f:pofJA~f.Laro, OVfV EMMa (1830-1880), (Athens, 1988), pp. 41-63; John A. Petropoulos, 
n oAmJOj Kal avYKPOT1'fU1'f Kparov, aro eMI1VIKO /3aaiklO (1833-1843), (Athens, 1985), pp. 
611-16; Jaropia rov EMI1VIKOV EBvov" vol. If', pp. 110-11. Also, a detailed analysis of 
the matter in Ioannis Dimakis, H 1f:OAlrelaJOj f.Lera.fJo~ rov 1843 Kal ro '~T1'fJ.la rwv 
«avroxBovwv» Kal «erepoXBovwv», (Athens, 1991). For Kolettis's address see 
Konstantinos Th. Dimaras. EMI1VIKO, PWf.Lavrlaf.LO" (Athens, 1994), pp.359-63 and 405-
18. 
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Questions on Greek identity however were at the same time also 
posed by Europeans. The historian Jakob Philipp Fallmerayer (1790-1861) 
created a sensation by denying any connection between ancient and modem 
Greeks. The impressions were such that they triggered the emergence of a 
great interest in folklore, thus leading to the development of ethnography in 
Greece90, while in the field of history it pointed to the need for a more 
foolproof national narrative by exposing the ambiguities the Enlightenment 
view posed. In this way the German historian became actually the conduit 
through which the Greeks crossed the road to historical romanticism and 
produced one of the finest buttresses of national identity in a pan-European 
scale. The need to provide an answer turned Fallmerayer's aspiring 
opponents to a systemization of their work thus producing the first examples 
of Greek historicism.91 Fallmerayer's example leads us to the heart of the 
matter, the content of Greek identity, and a brief discussion on his case and 
its repercussions seems in order. 
Jakob Philipp Fallmerayer was born in the Austrian village of 
Tschotsch, near Brixen in Tyrol in 1790 and spent his academic career being 
controversial. Indeed, his work proves its consistency only through a 
remarkable series of idees fixes. Anti-slavic sentiments and Russophobia 
permeate his thought as a universal constant in their threat against Germany. 
This was evident even in his contribution to the events of 1848, which lay 
not so much on the grounds of liberal government as to the need for 
German unity in the face of danger. Already in 1849 Fallmerayer favoured a 
smaller Germany under Prussia because the Habsburgs had opened the door 
to the Czar, who was the "modem-day Genghis Khan".92 As to the Greeks, 
whose eclipse he had announced to the world, they were not Fallmerayer's 
main target. These were merely a proxy. The real enemies his work was 
directed against were the Bavarian authorities and establishment. In fact, his 
rejection of ardent philhellenism, long-time part of the official Bavarian state 
90 Michael Herzfeld, Ours once more: Folklore, ideology and the making of modern 
Greece, (Austin, 1982). 
91 Georgios Veloudis, 0 Jakob Philipp Fa/lmerayer Kat '1 yf:vc071 rov EM"VIKOV 
IOTOpUJ/-lOV, (Athens, 1982). 
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ideology, was merely a way to get at them. In the end F allmerayer seems to 
have indeed spent his life being chased by ghosts: those of authoritarian 
Bavaria and its meddling Catholic clergy, critics who objected to his 
sweeping generalisations, Slavs and Greeks. 
To be sure, evidence on the eclipse of Greece was far from conclusive. 
His views on modem Greek degeneration however, stripped of their 
purported scientific proof - which in the final analysis only rested on 
Fallmerayer's interpretation of ancient sources - do not vary significantly 
from what was quickly becoming a norm among travellers and philheflenes.93 
His obituary on classical Greece retroactively put their moral lapse in focus. 
Everyone could see with his own eyes that these were not the descendants of 
Pericles or Plato; it was not the Turks' fault as the common explanation ran. 
Slavs and Albanians had accomplished this feat long before the Ottomans 
came. 
When Fallmerayer's book about medieval Peloponnese became known 
in Greece it was met with a general outrage.94 The majority considered his 
views an aberration, neither representing the sum of historians nor the 
Western European public in their opinion about Greece. But he was decried 
as a wanton enemy of Greece, illiterate and a dreadful historian. There is 
much doubt whether scholars or intellectuals in Greece actually read 
Fallmerayer's book before attempting to refute his arguments95• The extent of 
the outcry and incoherence in public opinion was such that many accused 
92 Elli Skopetea, lJ>aApepaVep. Texvaaf-lara rov avwuUov t5tov~, (Athens, 1997), pp.15-62, 
88-9, 105-6, 130-32. 
93 More accurately, it was becoming once again the nonn. British eighteenth-century 
travellers, for example, in the words of C. M. Woodhouse, noted how superstitious, 
factious, lazy, lying, filthy, greedy, robbing, degenerate and degraded modem Greeks 
were. Maria Todorova points out how their sympathies generally lay with the Turks and 
attributes it to an "almost unconscious reverence to political success". In Chris M. 
Woodhouse, The Phi/hellenes, (London, 1969), pp.31-7, 10; Maria Todorova, Imagining 
the Balkans, (New York, 1997), p. 91, 94. 
94 Even in the 1870s mention of his name was enough to raise "heaps of abuse" from a 
respectable University professor. Charles Tuckennann, 0, 'Ev.r,Ve~ U/~ a1ff-lepov, (Athens, 
1877), pp.279-80. Tuckennan was a fonner ambassador of the United States of America 
in Athens. 
95 The first volume was only translated into Greek in 2002. 
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him of panslavism.96 As Fallmerayer did not require travelling to Greece to 
comprehend it thoroughly, Greeks did not need to study his work to 
denounce him utterly. The majority of refuters turned to what was termed 
the 'comparative method', an early application of ethnography, and not to 
historical terms.97 The practical results of this sudden introduction of 
folklorism and ethnography were disappointing. It is rather ironic that in the 
end it was a famous Slovene medievalist, Bartholomaus Kopitar who sapped 
the etymological criteria, and the German Johann Wilhelm Zinkeisen who 
managed to express a suitable answer on the basis of historical terms.98 
The importance in the Fallmerayer incident was that he had 
unintentionally uncovered a deep anxiety on the part of Greeks regarding 
their relationship to Western Europe. The abstraction of 'Europe' was a 
hydra of many heads and faces: Europe as a model society, Europe as a 
debtor - on account of following in the steps of ancient Greek civilisation -, 
Europe as an all-seeing eye and supreme judge of each and every effort.99 To 
plainly state that "we have lost Europe's esteem" in a leading Athenian 
newspaper in 1862 or to emphasise in it the previous year that "if the Franks 
[popular designation of Europeans] have all gone pro-Turkish it is mainly 
our own fault for we have become unworthy of their sympathy, and continue 
to do SO,,100 are statements illustrative of an existing uncertainty for the 
country's international standing. The death of Philhellenism was lamented to 
display the unwillingness of the European Concert to concede to further 
96 Veloudis, 0 Jakob Philipp Falmerayer, p.46. 
97 Georgios Pentadis Darvaris, i1oKillIOV 7repi Uf~ (J7Covb~~ Uf~ Icnopia~, (Athens, 1842); 
Sophocles Oikonomos, JIepi M6.pKOV rov KV7r:piov Kal Uf~ V7r' avrov (JVyypwpeiuy/~ el~ UfV 
KOlV~V buikKWV ePIl"veia~ nov 17r7roKpo:r:ov~ AqJOPUJIlWV blarpl{J~, ev " Kal Ilia li(l~ 
7rpO~ rov lPoJ..llepaVepOV, (Athens, 1843). Emmanuel Bybilakis, Neugriechisches Leben, 
verglichen mit dem altgriechisen; zurErlauterung beider, (Berlin, 1840); Anastasios 
Georgiadis, A varpo~ rmv bo(aO"avrmv, ypal/favrmv Kal ro7rOl~ KOlVmO"avrmv, on ovbei~ 
rmv vvv UfV EAlaba olKovVTmv a7r6yovo~ rmv apxaimv EAl~vmv ecniv, (Athens, 1843); 
Kyriakos Pittakis, «YAT) iva XPT)crtl1eU<rT) 1tpo<; wt60E~tv, 6n 01 vuv KatOUCOuVLE<; 1:T)v 
EUaoa Etcriv wt6yovOl nov apxa{wv EUilvwv», EqJ"llepi~ ApxalOJ...oYI~ 30, (1852). 
98 Veloudis, 0 Jakob Philipp Falmerayer, pp.43-6. 
99 Skopetea, To «7rPOW7rO BaO"UeIO)}, pp. 163-171. 
100 Quoted in Skopetea, To «7rPOW7rO {JaO"UeIO)}, p.167. 
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Greek enlargement. 101 But this formed the flipside of impressions most of 
the Philhellenes had conveyed in their memoirs, where disillusionment settled 
in. They had almost said implicitly what Fallmerayer explicitly put forth some 
years later: could these people be in good faith considered Europeans? These 
"ambitious, intriguing, presumptuous" people who displayed "meanness, 
cunning, cowardice and dissimulation", who exhibited a "thousand petty 
passions and jealousies" or "ample traces of slavish character and moral 
d . ,,102 inl f: f th egenerat10n were certa y ar rom e model classical Greeks they 
knew. Closer association of two cultures was indeed putting earlier 
assumptions under strain. However, while Greek opinion of matters 
European was almost irrelevant, foreign acceptance was vital to modern 
Greek identity. 
The fundamentals of this identity rested on the incorporation of the 
Greek past into a national narrative. This procedure was initiatecr after the 
independent state was formed in 1830. To trace perceptions of the past 
during the times preceding the War of Independence is not the easiest of 
tasks. On the part of the elites we can only rely on the treatments of 
Adamantios Korais or Church officials, which are less systematic than we 
would have liked. As far as it concerns the subaltern classes it would be hard 
to hazard a guess. The silence however is a kind of evidence itself, according 
to Alexis Politis. Rural populations certainly adopted a Christian perspective, 
in which relations to the past were regulated by problems of faith and 
salvation. The common view would not be any different from that of the 
early eighteenth-century preacher Kosmas Aitolos who taught in his sermons 
that 
"the good God sent St Constantine and founded a Christian 
kingdom, and the Christians had this kingdom for one thousand 
one hundred and fifty years. Then God took the kingdom from 
the Christians and brought the Turk from the East and gave it to 
him for our own good ... For God knew that the other kingdoms 
101 Quoted in Skopetea, To «7rPOW7rO jJauiklO», p.166. 
102 Finlay, History, II, p.284; Thomas Gordon, History of the Greek Revolution, 2 vols., 
(Edinburgh and London, 1832),vol. I, p.33, 311; Karl Mendelssohn Bartholdy, Io-ropia 
r'1C; E)J.'1V1""C; E7ravao-raUeWC;, 2 vols., (Athens, 1895), vol. I, p.83. 
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do harm to our faith and that the Turk harms us not ... and God 
has the Turk as our guard dog".103 
Before the 1850s trends in Greek academia were set by scholars and 
intellectuals who had studied in early nineteenth-century European 
universities and were influenced by the way the European Enlightenment 
still dominated views regarding the historical process. Edward Gibbon's 
monumental synthesis became available in Greece in 1840104 and did so as 
part of the humanities' orthodoxy. lOS Delighting in Gibbon's views these 
early Greek philologists considered Byzantium to be nothing but a corrupt 
empire, a continuation of the Roman that had subdued both the ancient 
Greek states and spirit. George Pentadis Darvans, for instance, in an 
unsuccessful attempt to procure a philosophy of history, summed up in 1842 
the causes of the Byzantine Empire's downfall in "senility, theological 
dissension, the enmity of the Pope in Rome, but above all, the pusillanimity 
and moral corruption of most Byzantine Emperors" .106 A decade .later, 
Stephanos Koumanoudis (1819-1899), one of the most prominent 
philologists of his time and professor for forty years in the University of 
Athens continued to view medieval times as an interpolation in the course of 
Greek history, not recording any connection between Byzantium's downfall 
and the "rise of the Greek element" .107 And Michail Potlis, another academic 
professor, in his 1859 inaugural lesson in Church Law did not hesitate to 
deny all claims that could be laid on scientific progress on Byzantium's 
behalf: "lack of judgement, method and art form the general character of the 
103 Alexis Politis, "From Christian Roman emperors to the glorious Greek ancestors" in 
David Ricks and Paul Magdalino (eds.), Byzantium and the Modern Greek Identity, 
(London, 1998), pp.l-6. These views recall Tertsetis's mention of Byzantium as a 
"Christian Empire". 
104 Veloudis, 0 Jakob Philipp Fallmerayer, p.17. 
105 Konstantinos Papparigopoulos, who was later to present a diametrically opposed view 
of Byzantium, felt the need to praise him as late as 1857. In Veloudis, 0 Jakob Philipp 
Fallmerayer, p.75. 
106 Quoted in Konstantinos Th. Dimaras, «H avaOXECJT} TOU ~lCl<p(i)'ncrllou Kat 0 
Kwvcrtavr{vo<; TIwraPPlly6nouAo<;» in K. Th. Dimaras, NE:odl"VIKO<; AlaqJWTUJfJ0<;, 
(Athens, 1998), p.396. 
107 Stephanos Koumanoudis, Ao}'o<; E:KqJwv"Od<; TtT 2017 Maiov 1853, Kanl TtTV E:7rf:rE:IOV 
E:OpT~V TtT<; I~PVlIE:W<; rov flaw:1rlaT1ffJiov rov 'OOwvo<;, (Athens, 1853), p.24. 
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Byzantines in almost all the branches of science they took to" .108 In short, for 
all of the above Byzantium was lacking the moral fibre to stand along the 
formidable ancient Greek civilisation. 
Stephanos Koumanoudis, Efthumios Kastorhis, Konstantinos Asopios 
and other prominent historians and scholars more or less treated the state 
emerging from the War of Independence as a resurrection of an ancient 
Greek equivalent. This was achieved through the 'spirit' of ancient Greece, 
which, far from dead, was only dormant among the Greeks, waking up at the 
right moment. The nine-year struggle against an enemy far superior in 
firepower and resources along with the heroic conduct of many chief figures 
during the Revolution was, according to them sufficient proof for the 
modem Greeks' being direct descendants of the ancients.109 However, the 
most prominent fault this approach presented, notably the eclipse of a Greek 
element or people, was set aside. Where Greeks were, or what had happened 
to their language, institutions or culture in the meantime, did not matter. The 
lapse was even considered an advantage in demonstrating an insurmountable 
vigour and vitality welling up to perform something close to a miracle: the 
Phoenix myth, as Konstantinos Shinas had put it in his memorable address 
during the inauguration of the University of Athens.110 That this gap though, 
which excluded such a patendy powerful element of modem Greeks as the 
Christian Orthodox religion, could give rise to many assumptions had not 
occurred to them. The ardent phz"lhellenz"sm of the revolutionary era and their 
own adherence to accepted norms determined that. 
The 'old school of history' as Koumanoudis proudly named it, the one 
whose adherents "avoided the paradoxes" Paparrigopoulos was about to 
108 Michail Potlis, EluaywYl1c6v ~aer,~a eU; ro EOOrWlaarl1c6v L1 iKalOv, (Athens, 1859), 
p.lO. 
109 Even Georgios Tertsetis, the representative of an older generation and of a different 
approach to religion in his Catholicism, remained nevertheless surprisingly accurate on 
that aspect: in his celebratory addresses the Persian Wars were likened to the Revolution. 
In Georgios Tertsetis, Ti elba el~ UfV rerfJ6#rrvov 7rEPlr,Y1Uiv ~ov, (Athens, 1859), pp.34-
35. 
110 For Shinas' presence and the significance of the celebrations see Konstantinos Th. 
Dimaras, Ev A er,val~ Uf 3" Malov 1837, (Athens, 1987). 
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introduce, had nevertheless its own turns and amendments. 11 1 Towards the 
end of the 1830s, for instance, their creed could be sununed up in 
Konstantinos Shinas's words: 
"Greece having afterwards been subjected with merely a shadow 
of an autonomy to Macedonian domination, having finally been 
beaten by the Romans under Mommius, was subsequendy 
transferred by way of inheritance under the sceptre of the 
Byzantine emperors, heirs to the Roman Imperium, and four 
hundred years ago was subjugated to the hindmost and 
unendurable bondage" .112 
For Iakovos Rizos-Neroulos, president of the Archaeological Society in 
1841, Greece was the heir of the classical times and everything intermediate, 
Macedonians, Romans, Byzantine, Turks were foreign elements. Alexander 
the Great was not a hero but a catastrophe, and Byzantium was an "ahnost 
interlinked and incredibly long series of moronic actions and disgraceful 
violence".113 The two thousand years' 'chasm' was not a cause of fear to 
Nikolaos 1. Saripolos: it was 'bridged' by the modem Greeks. All they were 
. d d " th . " f th 114 reqU1!e to 0 was avert elt eyes rom e gap. 
In the 1850s however, something started to change. In 1856 
Konstantinos Asopios chose Alexander for the subject of his inaugural 
address as Dean of the University of Athens presenting him as a "symbol of 
unity" for Greeks in word and deed, while two years later Ioannis Soutsos 
asserted in his own address that his example urged Greeks to "rise to 
prominence in the Oriental world through our national unity".115 Georgios 
Tertsetis had also reserved a place for him and the Macedonians in his 
outline of Greek history: Alexander followed Agesilaus, king of Sparta, in the 
III Koumanoudis, Aoyo<; eKqJwW7{}ci<; U/ 20~ Mafov 1853, p.32. 
112 Konstantinos Shinas, Aoyfl5plOv eKqJwW7{}tv ez<; U/V 1'/f.Jtpav U/<; eyKa{}zl5pVUf:w<; rov 
JIavemaT1'/Jifov V{}wvo<;, (Athens, 1837), p.l. 
JJ3 Dimaras, «H tOEOAOYUCl) U1tooo~l)) in Ell1'/vZKO<; PWf.Javrz(Jf.Jo<;, p.339. 
114 Ibid, p.380. 
115 Ibid, pp.368-69. 
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same breath in a Greek heroic pantheon, thus being incorporated as an 
appendage to the history of classical antiquity.116 
These changes indicate that even the representatives of an older order 
were not exacdy blind to the necessities and challenges of their times. As a 
matter of fact, during the whole course of the nineteenth century history in 
Greece remained the only discipline continuously in touch with 
contemporary Western European trends. At the same time the political 
agenda was changing. Adamantibs Korais's approach that ga,~e 
preponderance to the organisation of a democratic - and republican - polity 
had proved useful while the country was waging a War of Independence. 
Some of these components, republicanism for instance, were dropped very 
early from the agenda. After the Revolution of 3 September 1843, however, 
and the introduction of constitutionalism, most of these aspirations were 
fulfilled according to the letter if not the spirit of the law, while new 
priorities seemed to take precedence and impose themselves. After years of 
bitter political strife "unity" was sternly demanded in all its possible guises: 
national, ideological, religious, historiographical. l17 Events in Western 
Europe could always provide examples to uphold these new demands. Victor 
Emmanuel of Piedmont was likened to Alexander in 1859, the year of the 
Ri·· 118 s01;gzmento. 
As it became apparent that the historiographical format of the 
Enlightenment could not serve the identity needs of Greece in an effective 
way a new approach was sought. The reformer was to be Konstantinos 
Paparrigopoulos (1815-1891), prominent historian, professor for forty years 
in the University of Athens, a complex and politically active personality. His 
family originated in the Peloponnese, and suffered much in the Ottoman 
reprisals in 1821. Paparrigopoulos and his mother took refuge in Odessa. 
Later on, in 1830, he was drawn to Greece. He entered the civil service in the 
employment of the Ministry of Justice, remaining there for a decade. In 1844 
116 Georgios Tertsetis, A6yo~ VJ~ 25 Mapriov J 857. Ta rnuJTPo<p1a €l~ rov e€OV, (Athens, 
1857), p.21. 
117 Dirnaras, «H OPJlll 1[pO~ TT\v €9vu<11 €V6nrra Jlscra mov EUllV1K6 P<OJlavncrJl6» in 
Ev.."VIKO~ POJJ1avrl(JJ10~, pp. 419-427. 
118 Ibid, p.426. 
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he was considered an eterochthon and was fired from his position. However, 
not all ways were closed to him. Paparrigopoulos had supported the leader of 
the 'French party', Ioannis Kolettis. Earning his trust, he found a job in 
Education as professor of History in the Secondary School of Athens in 
1846. Two years later he tried to secure a place in the University of Athens; it 
was the start of a three-year struggle with as much political as academic 
character. To begin with, Paparrigopoulos was not a doctor of Philosophy: 
circumstances had prevented him from completing his studies but his 
erudition could not really be contested. The University of Munich provided 
him with the said diploma in absentia after examining a memorandum stating 
his qualifications. Before that, a public argument on their respective formal 
qualifications would form a gap between him and Efthumios Kastorhis 
(1815-1889), recently appointed as lecturer in Latin. Finally, after a long wait 
and an abortive attempt to secure a chair in Law School, Paparrigopoulos 
was appointed to the Faculty of Arts in March 1851. The object of his 
teaching would be the "fortunes of the Greek nation from the most ancient 
. til th t" 119 t1me un e presen . 
In these early years there was no concrete evidence to suggest he was 
on the verge of a breakthrough. His work The last year of Greek freedom (1845) 
referred to Greek subjugation to Rome and implied that its author 
acknowledged the contemporary view discarding Byzantium. To further 
support the notion that Paparrigopoulos gradually formed a new plan in his 
mind there is his translation of Elements of General History by D. E. Levi-
Alvares. The book, which obtained a recommendation from the Ministry of 
Education for teaching in schools, decried Byzantium in the Gibbonian 
tradition. l20 When starting in 1850 to write regularly for fIav&Jea, a literary 
magazine he published along with Nikolaos Dragoumis, Alexandros Rizos 
Ragavis and others, Paparrigopoulos produced an article to refute 
Fallmerayer in which Byzantium seemed to be accepted as a state where the 
Greek element dominated. Yet, a systematic treatment or organisation of the 
subject was still missing. Paparrigopoulos however was already driven 
towards a unifying principle. He had noted in the past that everything in 
119 Dimaras, KwvOTavrivoc; flwcapP1fyb1roVA.OC;, (Athens, 1986), pp. 110-143. 
120 Ibid, pp.123-24. 
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classical times contributed in generating and preservIng division while 
modem Greece had achieved religious, linguistic and national unity and was 
"struggling to regain its political unity".121 The leap from unity in space to 
unity in time was not a great one. His 1853 History of the Greek Nation from the 
most ancient times to the present dtfy aimed to be used for teaching purposes and 
recalled the description of his university lessons. The same goes for his 
History of the Greek Nation (1860-1874) but the projected audience was 
different. The sub tide xdetv iCUV 7Z"OMu)V [for the benefit of the public] would 
accompany the tide unti1187 4 when it was finally dropped.122 
What Paparrigopoulos masterfully achieved in this great synthesis was 
the smooth integration within the national historical canon of what was 
previously an unusable past. On the eve of Paparrigopoulos's appointment 
Greek history as such was not taught in the University of Athens: Theodoros 
Manousis was teaching General History - that is, World History - and 
Konstantinos Shinas, Classical. There was no space in between for the 
cultivation of a subject dedicated to national history. The interest was lacking 
because the dominant paradigm did not recognise the continuous existence 
of a Greek state. However, we already mentioned that the gap was beginning 
to fill with Alexander and the Macedonians as an epilogue to classicism. 
Notions of an even more modified scheme could be hinted in Georgios 
Tertsetis's thought. Christianity, a vital link connecting modern Greece to the 
Middle Ages had been correcdy spotted: 'We are not related to the old 
Greeks? Who says so? What separates us from them? Just one person - Jesus 
Christ" .123 
There were others ready to take the point further. Skarlatos Vyzantios 
in his Constantinople in 1851 was engaged in an "untimely and overstretched 
plea of byzantine history", a history righteously scorned by prominent 
authorities according to Stephanos Koumanoudis.124 Vyzantios's reply was 
equally telling. He admitted the defects of the Byzantines and added that 
121 Dimaras, «H opl!ip> in E).1"VIK6~ P())J1avrl(lJ1~, pp.421-22. 
122 Dimaras, K())VOTavrivo~ nwrapp"y61roVA.~, p.223. Dimaras links the subtitle to 
Guizot's quotation on the "practical lessons" for the people in the first page. 
123 Georgios Tertsetis, A6y~ T71~ 25 Mapriov 1855, (Athens, 1856). p.22. 
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since "we already do this, as we should, with respect to the ancient Greeks, I 
consider it fair to act similarly towards the Byzantines".125 In 1852, Spyridon 
Zampelios (1815-1881) would publish a lengthy work on popular song and 
poetry, in which the theoretical part gready exceeded the actual collection, 
followed after five years by a volume entided Byzantine Studies [Bv(avrtvaf 
MSMrat]. Despite the fact that Zampelios had a head start and his work put 
forth a rudimentary philosophy of history along with a tripartite division of 
Hellenism - which was one and indivisible throughout its historical course-
his complicated phrases, hazy style, bordering at times on the inscrutable, 
and lack of systemization in his studies did not serve in securing him a more 
significant place among Greek scholars. 
Contrary to his predecessors then, Paparrigopoulos used his inherent 
literary and analytical powers to the utmost in order to produce a systematic 
and innovative work. His attention to detail and lively discussion of social, 
cultural and economic factors gave a sound background to his treatment of 
political history. No less sound was the structure underpinning the overall 
synthesis. In its first edition the History of the Greek Nation was divided in five 
volumes and fifteen books that examined the res gestae of a unitary 
Hellenism. 126 Paparrigopoulos discerned three periods: ancient Hellenism; 
Byzantine Hellenism; Modem (or Contemporary [xa8''lf1d~) Hellenism. 1bis 
oudine was not so precise from the beginning. Some of his terms were to 
prove awkward indeed. A distinct 'Macedonian Hellenism' has not survived; 
this period has been successfully incorporated into ancient Greek history. 
'Christian Hellenism' no longer exists because it essentially denoted the early 
Byzantine era. The initial format gradually evolved into a simpler and 
universally accepted form although in Paparrigopoulos's work some 
overlapping in terminology remained between 'ancient' and 'Macedonian' or 
'Christian' and 'Byzantine' Greeks. However, we owe these reductions to the 
writer himself, not to his followers. 
124 Dimaras, Kwwnavrivm; ITwrapPflY01COVAOC;, p.178. The lack of capitalisation is 
another indication of Koumanoudis' s contempt. 
125 Ibid, p. 179. Vyzantios properly capitalises. 
126 The term indicates the sum of all Greeks throughout the world or time, but also their 
whole culture or even civilisation of a certain era. Here it means the latter. 
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Paparrigopoulos's history rematns a lengthy and difficult book that 
should be handled carefully by those who would study it. In the age of 
Romanticism he produced a grand narrative in the manner of his great 
European counterparts, Treitschke, Michelet, Guizot, Ranke, Macaulay. It 
was not simply a historical but also an important literary work with a 
beginning, middle and ending, sound plot and a multitudinous cast. The 
observation that in his composition we cross the line from "the history of a 
period in time to that of its protagonist',l27, where Hellenism takes up the role 
of a "collective historical agent" according to P. M. Kitromilidest28, provides 
an insight and a key to the reading of the whole work. To become the 
'national historiographer' Paparrigopoulos called forth the spirit of the 
nation. He was also cautious enough not to turn history into propaganda. 
There is a sense of measure throughout the extent of his work. It is rather 
because his interpretation has become in the passage of time the gospel of 
Greek nationalism that the one responsible for its conception is under 
SUspicion. Even our having knowledge of Pap arrigop oulos , political 
initiatives concerrung the Greek element's welfare in Ottoman-ruled 
Macedonia, docs not make it any easier to pinpoint any transgressions. 
Because of his preoccupation with the contrast between his 'scientific' and 
'national duty' to be discussed later on, he was being careful himself. 
However, there exists a contradiction between the care m the 
methodological structure of the work and its popularising character. 
Although "composed for the benefit of the public", it was to be a guide to 
'national truth' for the many in Greece - and an introduction to it for the 
Europeans. In 1877 the Parliament voted for an amount of SL'lt thousand 
drachmas in order for a summary of the whole project to be translated in 
French. Under the title Histoire de la dvilisation hellenique it was published the 
following year, designed for European purposes: an exercise in cultural 
foreign policy in the midst of the Eastern Crisis. The emphasis on civilisation, 
127 Antonis Liakos, «npos £1Il(J1(£UTJV OAoIlEA.£1as Kat £V61T\tOs. H Ll61l1l0ll IOU £9vlKOU 
xpovou» in E7rl(Jif/J.iOV1K~ LDVcivTf/(J'I (Jif/ J.iv~J.i'l TOD K. B. J'IPapa, (Athens, 1994), 
pp.183-84. 
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ill contrast to history as read in the original tide, is self-explanatory: 
Paparrigopoulos's work was offered as evidence, both of a glorious past and 
an active present. It was acting, in other words, as a cultural argument. In the 
conjuncture of the Congress of Berlin and an expected solution of the 
Eastern Question Greece was not to resort to Fallmerayer's "empty-handed 
beggary" 129. 
But what about the content of Paparrigopoulos's work? What tools did 
he use to accomplish his breakthrough and in what way the unification 
achieved was proved exceptional? 
The keys to understanding Paparrigopoulos's argument are the 
concepts of metaplasis [transformation]13o and entoli [mandate]. The former 
term fluctuates between 'transformation' and 'mutation' without being 
exacdy one or the other. In this particular context it means a modification in 
which the original, although quite unrecognisable, is still there. The essence 
of metaplasis was this: the Ancient Greek and Roman elements fused into the 
Byzantines. These three components, plus Ottoman and Western influences 
were then crystallised into Modem Greeks. This theory of continuity through 
the ages became an avenue linking Modem Greece with Classical Antiquity, 
thus also with Modem Europe, without the merest gap. If another 
Fallmerayer was ever to question the validity of contemporary Greek 
heritage, he would be referred to, through metaplasis, to previous periods of 
Greek history all the way back to ancient Greece. The tripartite format acted 
as a safety net for an identity. 
Entoli on the other hand went hand in hand with 'mission'. The ancient 
Greek nation losing its own political progeny 
"adopted in tum the works of Alexander the Great, of 
Christianity, of Constantine the Great and transformed 
[P£TaJrAaOO-op£vov] according to the needs and occasions of each 
128 Paschalis M. Kitromilides, "On the intellectual content of Greek nationalism: 
Paparrigopoulos, Byzantium and the Great Idea" in Ricks and Magdalino (eds.), 
Byzantium, p. 28. 
129 Skopetea, if>aJ..pepa.vep, p.171. 
130 To be noted that Paparrigopoulos does not use the exact counterpart of 
'transfonnation' - which would be metal/axis. 
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new historical mandate ... had a leading role for a long time yet in 
this world".131 
'Hellenism' was endowed with a mission as an agent of Providence - or to 
be precise, with a variety of missions. I t had to propagate and defend 
Christianity, sow the seeds of the Renaissance and the Reformation and , 
finally, supplant the Ottoman Empire among European Powers in order to 
fulfil the prophecy the Duke of Wellington and Lord Aberdeen had uttered 
in 1829.132 It was plain to see that "naturally the Greek nation has not 
disappeared from the face of the earth, as some have professed" .133 
The ubiquitous presence of Fallmerayer, implied in Paparrigopoulos's 
last phrase, leads us back to politics. Certainly Paparrigopoulos was aware of 
the possible dichotomies and contradictions between history and politics. 
There are matters "both scientific and national" and the historian may find 
himself in a place of conflicting loyalties as he did in a confrontation with the 
fellow scholar Konstantinos Sathas: "as a scientist I am not denying it; as a 
Greek however I do confess I would like somebody else to undertake the 
disclosure of this pitiful truth, a foreigner rather than a fellow 
countryman" .134 However, a threshold existed between these two activities 
that he was not prepared to cross. Paparrigopoulos was already a known 
contributor and member of patriotic clubs as the Society for the Propagation 
of Greek Letters, essentially run by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or the 
National Defence [EOVtX1 J1pvva] which was supporting Greek interests in 
Macedonia in 1877. He did not hide his political convictions: in the past he 
had publicly supported Ioannis Kolettis and King Otto in times of trouble by 
publishing newspapers. Nevertheless, he conceded that "we are writing 
history, not political programmes".135 
Paradoxically, the only way out of this dilemma Paparrigopoulos 
permitted himself was through the nation and this goes only to prove he was 
not without contradictions himself. He advised caution, yet believed in a 
131 Dimaras (ed.), KcvwJTavrivo~ flmrapp"yo7rOv).o~: flpo).eyo,ueva,(Athens, 1970), p.116. 
132 Ibid, pp. 125-163. 
133 Ibid, pp.153-54. 
134 Dimaras, W"VIKO<; PCV,uavrIU,uo<;, p.605. 
135 Dimaras, Kcvv(JTavrivo~ nmrapp"yo7rOv).o~, p.367, 376. 
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'national truth' that he was prepared to defend and articulate from his 
University chair for as long as he could remain standing.136 His students and 
followers in matters historiographical opted to neglect his caution, finding no 
fault in merging history and national propaganda. Surprisingly enough we 
find Spyridon Lampros to copy word for word 137 his saying on the scientific 
and national duties only to turn it on its head, from word of caution to 
activist cry. But then again, Lampros's balance visibly tilted to one side: in 
1896 he was writing political programmes for the ardent nationalists of the 
Ethnikc Hctaireia [National Society] and acted on them toO.138 
It is not our purpose to judge Paparrigopoulos's intentions, to be sure, 
so to pronounce him a nationalist or not would be beside the point. 
However, we have to underline the general atmosphere in which he worked 
for the better part of his life. The University of Athens has already been 
shown linked to politics - not merely academic ones but those with a capital 
P - almost from its inception. The respect intellectuals commanded in 
nineteenth - century Greece can be demonstrated in the poets' popularity, 
in the great audiences university professors drew in their public lectures and 
the frequency with which the Press reported their speeches, in the students' 
activities both inside and outside the campus, and finally, in the close 
connection between academics and political parties, evident in their political 
careers. Instead of merely preparing cadres for administrative careers in the 
civil service the University was endowed with a clear cultural mission from 
its establishment. It had transcended it in producing ideology and securing 
for itself the place of the nation's conscience. Spyridon Lampros, Neoklis 
Kazazis (1849-1936), and the rest of the late nineteenth-century dons, were 
not exacdy trying to carve a niche for themselves in political life as Efi Gazi 
maintained139. They had already their place and a pedestal to spread their 
pp.466-67. 
137 Dimaras, EMllV1KOr; PWJia.vrUJJiOr;, p. 606. 
138 See below, ch.5 for details on Lampros's political activities. 
139 Eft Gazi, «:El>Il~OAtK6C; A6yOC; Kat 1tOAtttKil 1tp<lK'tlKil K<lTU t11v 1tf:pio~o TOl> 1tOA£1l0l> 
TOl> 1897: cr\ryKAlaTl, wr6KAlaTl, m'Yy1cPOl>aTl» in the Abstracts of Historical Conference in 
Moraitis School, 0 7rokJior; rOD 1897, (Athens, 1999). 
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opinions from. What they actually tried to do was broaden their base and 
their interests' range. 
Reactions to Paparrigopoulos's proposed format were not free from 
the intrusions of politics. Konstantinos Dimaras has drawn attention to the 
significant amount of time it took for it to achieve an unassailable place. l40 It 
will be shown below, however, that the state quickly recognised the 
ramifications of his work and authorised the incorporation of its outlining 
format into school curricula. In my opinion this not only signals its 
acceptance into official national ideology but also forms the prerequisite for 
a wide dissemination throughout Greek society. Among intellectuals and 
University dons, on the other hand, it was not always a matter of ideas. 
Certainly, Stephanos Koumanoudis or Efthumios Kastorhis disapproved of 
Paparrigopoulos's dogmas out of principle and on ideological grounds. The 
former, as early as 1853, had spoken ironically of those who professed that 
"almost no evil had descended among the wretched Greeks during medieval 
times; it was fortunately moving from less to more perfect transformations 
that they were suddenly subjugated by the hordes of craven Asia!,,141. But 
there was also the reality of power play and rival factions on campus. 
Paparrigopoulos having sought in the early 1870s, when nearing the History's 
completion, to be elected Dean of the University of Athens was defeated 
twice, in 1870 and 1871, before securing the position in 1872. In the first 
case there were hints of foul play, as King George I refused to sign his 
appointment. The second time round the contest was won by Efthumios 
Kastorhis, a close associate of Koumanoudis's.142 Other attacks were of a 
more personal character, as the one in an anonymous newspaper article in 
1879 which denounced the historian as an "international beggar" .143 
140 Dimaras, «H avUOXE<JT) '[01) .!\taq>c.oTI<JflOU», p.407. 
141 Koumanoudis, A6yo~ eKqJ{J)V,,()ei~ T1l 20~ Malov 1853, p.32. 
142 Dimaras, K{J)wnavrivo~ nwrappTfY61rov).o~, pp.249-257. P. Moullas in «H OtaflUX'l n. 
~om<Jo1) - K. Am:01t{o1) (1853) Kat 11 t(J'toptKtl <:ruylCUp{W> suggests it was also a case of 
particularism: Ionians (Kastorhis) against Constantinopolitans (paparrigopoulos). In P. 
Moullas, P~'el~ Kal OTJVtxele~. Me)J;re~ yla rov 1Cf alwva, (Athens, 1993), pp. 273-74. 
143 Dimaras, «H avUOXE<JT) L01) Otaq>c.on<JflOU», p.409. Dimaras attributes it to Nikolaos I. 
Saripolos, yet another upholder of the Enlightenment and frequent opponent. 
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Another facet of the constant interplay between politics and academic 
life may be demonstrated in the early endorsement by the Greek state which 
meant that Paparrigopoulos's work entered the canon. As early as 1861 the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs recommended that the book be obtained by the 
wealthier municipalities and used as a prize for prominent pupils. In 1872 the 
parliament compensated Paparrigopoulos with two thousand drachmas for a 
trip to Europe. We have already mentioned another funding in 1877 that 
permitted the publication of the History's French version in one volume. The 
University of Athens also emerged as a significant contributor, not only in 
the salary raises that the author received in 1862-63 and again in 1867-68 but 
in sustaining the whole publishing effort: five hundred volumes were 
purchased between 1861 and 1876 while fifty complete series were 
commissioned in 1889, after the second edition was completed. l44 
It was rather recognition of a simpler fact than patronage necessities 
that commanded their attention. Achieving unity of a national timeline could 
also serve other expectations, closer to home. The importance of history for 
the nations as an "infallible guide to progress and happiness,,145 formed a 
basic argument in the 1861 Ministry of Education reasoning for purchasing 
volumes as presents to diligent students. Indeed then, history in Greece had 
a "more practical character than usual" in the astute Paparrigopoulos's 
aphorism.l4<i As an instrument of ideology the tripartite format provided the 
means to give shape to those vague claims that formed irredentism as a 
foreign policy: a 'Greek Empire' until the 1850s, Union with Crete in the 
1860s, anti-Slavism from the 1870s onwards.147 
The airiness of territorial demands at the time of Paparrigopoulos 
cannot be discerned so much in foreign policy directions, for diplomacy 
imposed its own necessities to Greek politicians. We can better follow the 
quest for the limits of Greek expansion in the thought and writings of 
144 Dimaras, Kwvo-cavrivo<; JIwrapPrrl6rcovloC; , pp.229-231. 
145 Ibid, p.229. 
146 "History in Greece is of a more practical character than usual". Konstantinos 
Paparrigopoulos's observation in JIaw5chpa, vol. [',65, (1865),397. 
147 Skopetea, To «7rponJ7r:o fJauiklO», pp.273-346. In 1834 Kolettis seriously proposed 
that the Greek Kingdom should not settle on an official capital since Constantinople was 
the real one anyway. 
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individuals. It is only a sample indicating the variety of opinions. "Greek 
Empire or death" was Spyridon Karaiskakis's - son of the famous 1821 
revolutionary Georgios Karaiskakis - keynote in an 1854 proclamation 
issued from his camp. In it he called for a struggle where mainland Greeks, 
Serbs and Bulgarians would fight along Asia Minor Greeks to fulfil his 
slogan.l48 The concept of a Greek 'mission' was not always identified with 
the sum of the dominions of the Ottoman Empire. For A. D. Kappotas, for 
instance, it was merely the "liberation of Greeks everywhere", for A. 
Despotopoulos the "rehabilitation of an oriental Greek civilisation".149 N. 
Katramis exercised some restraint in depicting a blueprint for a future 
expansion of the Kingdom: it should contain 
" the heroic Epirus, mother of the Muses - the fertile Thessaly, 
land of able men - warlike Macedonia - Crete of a thousand 
gates, and the rest of the lands of our forefathers up to the 
Bosphorus sea in Thrace" .150 
K.N. Ieroklis proved rather more demanding: "Greece extends from the 
extremes of Pontus to the coasts of Adriatic and [the banks of the] 
Danube" .151 There was absolutely no question on the ability of the state or 
army to put any of these fanciful plans to execution. In the space of almost 
sixty years two episodes clearly emphasize the disparity between means and 
desires. In 1839 on the word of sultan Mahmud's death King Otto gave 
voice to his plan to go to Constantinople and get crowned as Emperor, only 
to discard it when informed that the Kingdom's only steamship was under 
repair; in 1897 a brief Greco-Turkish war in the wake of a Cretan Revolution 
demanding union with Greece ended in a Turkish triumph. 
148 Skopetea, To «7rPOW7rO /3(J.(JiklO», pp.277-78. 
149 A.D. Kappotas, Aoyo~ 7ra:vT/yvPl1CO~ (J.7r(J.yycl()ei~ EN roo I£pW v(J.w rov Ayiov Nl1COAaOV 
r'f/ 8IKO~ 7rt#7r'f'f/ #(J.priov, r8Aov#tv'f/~ 'f'f/~ 8()vl1al~ r8A.en7~ V7rO rov YVj.lV(J.(Juipxov A. 11. 
Kamrwrov, (Lamia, 1867), p.5; A. Despotopoulos, H 25 Mapti01) 1867 EV Atyiro, 
(Aigion, 1867), p.8. 
150 N. Katramis, AOyo~ 8KqJOOVT/()ei~ EN roo v(J.w 'f'f/~ e. lPa.v8poo#~~, (Zakynthos, 1862), 
p.6. 
151 K. N. Ieroklis, Aoyo~ 7r~PIKO~ 87ri 'f'f/ 1C8VTI'fKovr~pi~1 'f'f/~ EAl1{VI""~ 
AV8'OP'f'f/(Ji(J.~, 8opr(J.(J()eilJ'f/~ lbi(J. V7rO rov lPzlOA.OYIKOV .EvUOyov "flopv(J.(J(Jov" V7rO rov 
rrucrlKov #tA.ov~ K. N. 18poKliov~, evroh1 rov avnOyov 81apOOVT/fkic;, (Athens, 1871), p.15. 
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Questions of boundaries, warlike addresses and visions of an Empire, 
r "d I Kin d ,,152 th '. . o even a mo e g om to at extent, were essent:1ally exerC1ses ill 
rhetoric. Rhetoric, however, could also be of importance if based on 
consistent arguments and 1t was this kind of consistency that 
Papattigopoulos offered. Eliminating the two thousand year gap between 
Classical Antiquity and his contemporary times meant that the 'lands of our 
forefathers' could be claimed in a more effective way, backed by respectable 
scientific opinion. Thus, the Greek Literary Society of Constantinople could 
send a memorandum asserting the 'historical rights' on behalf of 'Hellenism' 
to the Congress of Berlin and demand "in the event of an irrevocable 
political solution all the land beyond the great mountains [Balkans] from the 
Ionian Sea to the Thracian Bosphorus" .153 
Both 'Hellenism' and 'Byzantium' grew from mere representations to 
embody and evoke whole ideological and cultural categories. 'Hellenism' 
used in a Paparrigopoulean context made irrelevant any attempt of 
approaching the content of 'Greekness'. After its integration Byzantium 
could play an important role in denoting possible future Greek borders. 
Throughout its long existence the empire waxed and waned. Now its 
unstable and indeterminate boundaries could easily become those of an 
imagined Greek Kingdom by default, at least as far as it concerned the 
Balkans and the Near East; for nobody staked any claims to Ban or any 
other Italian cities the Byzantines had only left in the eleventh century.154 
Finally, while Byzantine borders were legitimised as an ideal claim, possible 
152 "It is the aim of my ambition, as far it depends on me, to render Greece a model 
Kingdom in the Orient" read King George I's proclamation to the Greeks on his 
ascendance to the throne in October 1863. In Imopia rov Ell1'{VIKOD EBvovc;, vol. Ir', 
p.231. 
153 Georgios Giannakopoulos, «0 EUTJVtK6~ <DtAOAoytK6~ ~uUoyo~ 
K(Ov<rt(lVttvol>1t6A£(o~ (1861-1922). H EUTJVtKi) nUtbEia Kat E1tt<ITi)~TJ (O~ cOvtKi) 
nOAtnKi) <JTI1V oe(O~avtKi) AU'toKpu'topiu», [unpublished Ph.D thesis, (Athens, 1998)], 
pp.132-133. 
154 Spyridon Zampelios had already stated that the proper bounds of the 'Neohellenic 
Fatherland' were those defined by the emperors Nikiforos Fokas and Ioannis Tzimiskis 
back in the 10th century. Quoted in George Huxley, "Aspects of modem Greek 
historiography of Byzantium" in Ricks and Magdalino (eds.), Byzantium, p.16. 
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inclusion of non-Greek populations received a plausible justification. An 
expanded Greece could be viewed as a Byzantium restored, a multi-national 
Empire.1ss 
We conclude then that Paparrigopoulos's influence worked on a 
number of levels. With regard to historiography he was providing an internal 
element of cohesion: the national narrative, as far as it represents memory, 
cannot accept gaps. Conceptualisation of national time then presupposes the 
existence of a historical discourse converting the selected past into it, leading 
to the creation of foundation myths. Thus Antonis Liakos has explained the 
successive incorporation of different periods into the canon of Greek history 
to the inherent deeper needs required by the process of nation-building, 
noting at the same time the interplay between Greek and European 
historiography.1s6 On another level Paschalis Kitromilides has noticed the 
function of Paparrigopoulos's work as ideological infrastructure, investing 
national identity with an arsenal of concepts and examples enough to 
transcend past insecurities and offer legitimation to the unifying measures 
and political aspirations of the nineteenth-century Greek state; in other 
words, ground enough for the Megafi idea to seem sound as foreign policy.1s7 
On a final note Konstantinos Dimaras has questioned the way Greek 
intellectuals opted for in their reading of the History~ as a "misinterpretation" 
that in the final analysis "flattered modem Greek national pride". It was his 
conviction that Paparrigopoulos was not essentially looking to flatter modem 
Greeks but to criticise both society and state.1S8 In my opinion, the fact that 
155 Political realism would eventually limit in the 1870s Greek 'historical rights' to areas 
with significant Greek population - hence the educational interest in Macedonian Greeks. 
These matters are discussed in detail in ch.5. 
156 Liakos, «TIpo<; E1tt<TKEUllV», pp. 174-190. Liakos places K. Th. Dimaras at the end of 
this process in integrating the period of 'Greek Enlightenment', essentially the eighteenth 
century, into our followed historical outline. 
157 Paschalis M. Kitromilides, «To lmoploypaq>lK6 E1CKPEl1~ Kat 0 KOlvmavrivo<; 
TIanaPPlly6nouAoq>, Nf:a EOTia, 1991, pp. 1571-78; "On the intellectual content ", pp. 
25-33. 
158 Konstantinos Th. Dimaras, "Krovmavrivo<; TIWtapprrYooouAo<;: EKU1:6 XJ>6vta l1ELU", 
Nf:a EOTia, 1991, p.1568. On the relationship between Paparrigopoulos and Dimaras see 
Elli Skopetea, «0 Krovmavrlvo<; TIWtapPrrYOOOUAO<; 'tou K.EL~lll1apU Kat llEP1K~ 
crKE'l'Et<; ItEP! E9vlKi]<; tmOplOypaq>{aq>. I6YXfJova ef:j-lara 35-37, 1988, pp.286-294. 
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Paparrigopoulos's format carried the day in a relatively short period of time 
practically in the space of roughly ten years - and with negligent resistance _ 
before gaining entrance to school texts renders all such speculation obsolete. 
It was not a matter of interpretation but appropriation. 
The emergence of the new paradigm was to have a considerable 
ideological impact in primary and secondary education. The vision of a 
'national education' building strong character and forging national identity 
would endow the past with special interest: "the legitimacy of possessing 
areas claimed as Greek depended on their antiquity" while 
"definition of 'boundaries' for Hellenism, which points to a clear 
delineation of national claims determines at the same time the 
actual aims of national education[ ... J After 1880 schools are 
considered as the Greek nation's 'gunsmith's workshop"'.159 
The role of history in its capacity as school lesson was clear. Here, the 
situation mirrored the one in historiography, even if we allow for a certain 
divergence of needs. Until 1853 Byzantium in Greek education was an alien 
factor, another link in the long chain of bondage. Sometimes texts of Greek 
history would stop just after the Roman conquest while those of General 
history would devote only few paragraphs to the Byzantine Empire following 
Gibbon's outline in considering it as a "period of decline and darkness in 
civilisation" .160 In other places the disapproval would become evident in 
denouncing the "two thousand years of slavery" .161 These rigid views 
however had already started to be mitigated with the acceptance of 
Macedonians in the canon of classical antiquity: "the Macedonians, despite 
their not being referred to in the most ancient times of Greek history, were 
nevertheless Greeks". 162 Already in 1845 Theodoros Manousis and 
Konstantinos Asopios, representatives of a late Enlightenment, were 
suggesting an alternative view in "the perspective of the 'long history of the 
159 Christina Koulouri, Imopia Kal rEwyprupia ma EMr,VIKa Exokia (1834-1914), 
(Athens, 1988), p.77. 
160 Ibid, p.36. 
161 Ibid, p. 150. [Thomas Keightley, Imopia rrtC; Apxaiac; EMMOC;, , ~E"ta<ppnOTJ ~. 
AvtWVulbll yw Tn EUllV11Ccl ~X.oAEta (1850)]. 
162 Ibid, p.162. [Imopia rov EM1'/VIKOV f:Bvovc; TOU K nwtuPP1lY61toUA.oU Y1U TU <J,(oAEiu 
(1853)]. 
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Greek nation"'.163 K.S. Xanthopoulos in 1873 noted that the mosdy foreign 
works in use then did not develop Byzantine history at the desired length, 
while D. E. Kyriakopoulos in 1879 in a work intended for secondary 
education presented Constantine I as the "assistant of Greek national 
regeneration in political terms" and his era as the "most illustrious of the 
Constantinopolitan Greek state" .164 
Three years later Paparrigopoulos's tripartite format was formally 
introduced in education. This did not include any of his works as teaching 
material. However, the debts to his thought and theories were evident in a 
great number of people who wrote history textbooks.165 But certainly, what 
was more significant was the fact that the ministry of education was ready to 
issue its analytical programmes, containing the structuring of lessons and 
instructions to teachers, endorsing his format and basing the entire tutoring 
of history on it. The 1884 programme was to introduce the concept of a 
history of the Greek nation as the core of the lesson, with the content being 
appropriately defined for each grade in ascending order: in primary schoo~ 
for example, the subject was ancient history in the fourth grade, to be 
followed by Roman and Byzantine in the fifth and Modem Greek in the 
sixth. The structure was to be repeated in the 1894 analytical programme and 
we find it again in the 1913-1914 ones for both primary and secondary 
education.166 It remained the model through which my own generation was 
to be introduced to history for the first time in the 1980s. 
The fabrication of continuity in Greek history was crucial to the 
development of nationalism. Not that its absence had forestalled it; its 
cultural counterpart had been proclaimed as early as 1837 when during his 
address in the inauguration of the University of Athens its first dean declared 
"the enlightenment of the Orient" as Greece's foremost raison d' eire, to be 
163 Koulouri, Imopia!Cal Tewyparpia, p.37. 
164 Koulouri, Imopia !Cal Tewyparpia, p.34. Quotes from [flpwUJ !Cal Me07'/ E1C1fait>wUl, 
'tOU K.~. 8av861touA.oU (1873)], p.234; [Imopia EM1'/VI7dt wro rwv apXalorarwv xpovwv 
/JeWI Kwwt>lmpiov 'tou!::J.. H. KUPW1C61tOUA.oU (1879)], p.253. 
165 See for example, ibid, [..[W1XelWt>'1' [mopia PWfiaiial !Cal BV(avrlVr, 'tou K. Zaxapul<>T'l 
(1884)], pp.295-96. 
166 Koulouri, [mopia!Cal Tewyparpia, pp.565-577. 
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achieved by the University.167 The Megali Idea as a verslOn of political 
programme was stated for the first time in 1844 by prime minister l. Kolettis, 
forming the basis for the development of Greek nationalism as ideology and 
irredentism as Greek foreign policy.168 But Paparrigopoulos's interpretation 
gave to the official national ideology both an edge and an ability still 
unsurpassed today, notably to move the population according to the so-
called (national interests'. It has been often observed that Paparrigopoulos 
did not have an heir, in the historical sense, and did not therefore create a 
school in historical interpretation. In a manner of speaking then, his inheritor 
was the Greek state itself. 
Certainly, recognition by the state of the fact of his theory's advantages 
was not only on an abstract level. The tripartite format was soon employed 
in education in order to enhance national sentiment and buttress a sense of 
national identity in the frame of a desired (national education' [cOVtU1 aywY'll 
The consolidation of Paparrigopoulos's concepts was a gradual process that 
gained momentum when his project, History of the Greek Nation, was 
completed. In the space of roughly twenty years between 1882, the date of its 
introduction in educational programmes and school curricula, to 1900 when 
we trace its frequent mention in the University of Athens celebratory 
addresses for Independence Day169, it became dominant, if not the norm.170 
Challenges and disputes existed but they lacked a comprehensive frame and 
persuasive power. At the same time recurring Byzantine themes in literature, 
from Alexandros Papadiamantis's works in the 1880s to Kostis Palamas's 
and Penelope Delta's in the early 1900s show on the one hand the 
ideological needs and on the other the appeal a rehabilitated Byzantium 
167 Dimaras, «H tOEoAoYU(tlU1[OOOlltl» in E}J.'lVlKOC; Pmf1avTluf1oC;, pp. 349-350. 
168 Ironically enough, during the debate in Parliament to decide the prerequisites of 
eligibility of Greek citizenship for those joining the civil service, unarguably too prosaic 
a subject for lofty ideals. 
169 See below, ch.5. 
170 It is noteworthy that the date of the Paparrigopoulos format's introduction in the 
school curriculum coincides with the first competition for uniform textbooks that in 
Skopetea's words "gradually ascertains homogeneity in historical knowledge". In Elli 
Skopetea, "BaAK(lVtKEC; EevlKEC; I<rtOptE9> in EBvoc;-Kp6.roc;-EBvIKIUf10C;. E7rluu/f10V1KO 
};Vf11COUW, (Athens, 1995), p.309. 
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d . 11 171 exerte to contemporary lDte ectuals. Those who were to fulfil a foreign 
policy aspiring to a 'model kingdom in the Orient', to supplant the Ottoman 
Empire or even to a plainer still "proper honourable place in the European 
family',l72 were in need of a safety net, to justify and legitimise intentions, 
words and actions. 
For that part, the national historiographer's structure and arguments 
have never been really recalled to reserve. It has been stated that as far as it 
concerns Greek historiography, we are still following the cognitive categories 
of Paparrigopoulos.173 The observation is more than sound. Today school 
history books do not even mention him nor is there a clue that alternatives 
to these views ever existed, a fact that plainly states that names are 
expendable when titles are sufficient. History of the Greek Nation was the title 
selected for the most recent and comprehensive Greek history, a collective 
work comprised, in its most recent incarnation, by seventeen volumes and a 
time range from prehistory to the twenty-first century. But recent 
developments both in historiography and reality in Southeastern Europe 
show, I believe, the national narrative to be a little too airtight. The question 
is, as always, what to replace it with when "for us Greeks it has been useful 
171 See Ricks and Magdalino (eds.), Byzantium, especially Robert Shannan Peckham, 
"Papadiamantis, ecumenism and the theft of Byzantium", pp. 91-104; Anthony Hirst, 
"Two cheers for Byzantium: equivocal attitudes in the poetry of Palamas and Cavafy", 
pp.105-118; Marianna Spanaki, "Byzantium and the novel in the twentieth century: from 
Penelope Delta to Maro Douka", pp.119-130. 
172 Georgios Martinelis, A6yo, n:avl1YVPlKo, el, VfV EM.l1v1K1lV flaMYYCVemav 
avroUXebiw, an:aYYeAlJei, n:po, TOV KepKVpaiicov A.aOV VfV 5, . .1./1. ciJpav T1'f' 25 Mapriov 
1879 n:po T1'f' fl)"areia, TOV eearpov vn:o Tewpyiov Mapnval1, (Kerkyra, 1879), p.8. 
173 Kitromilides, «To tcrtoptoypaq>t1<o E1(1(PE~~}), p.1575. The first person plural does not 
strictly refer to Greek historians. Not only Paparrigopoulos's format remains the accepted 
international norm concerning Byzantium, but his overall conception of Greek national 
history found imitators in Nicolae Iorga and Vladimir Zlatarski's quests for a suitable 
Romanian and Bulgarian pasts respectively. In Kitromilides "On the intellectual 
content", p.30. 
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as a bridge ... or as a link through which the history of the descendants is 
attached to the history of the ancestors".174 
Conclusion 
The appeal to history served different functions in Scotland and 
Greece. In the first case, where the discussion of Scottish identity was 
thorough and drew at length, it preserved the interests of several parties. 
Indeed, political necessities detennined the Vlews of many of the 
protagonists in the debate on Scottish origins which did not manage to 
create a consensus on a national identity. Greek identity, on the other hand, 
did not become the object of a general political discussion neither before nor 
after the emergence of an independent kingdom. Here, a consensus was 
taken for granted and when political parties touched on it as in the 
autochthones case politicians and intellectuals were cautious enough to avoid 
disputes. Since the Greek national identity was not under any internal 
scrutiny the question lay to the ways that could be found to bolster it and 
contribute to an effective foreign policy. History became the common thread 
to legitimise both the renascence of a Greek polity and its future course of 
action. 
A final question must address the extent of dissemination of the views 
discussed in this chapter among the Scottish and Greek public. It is evident, 
I think, that the debates followed here did not make an impact beyond the 
middle classes. Both Scott's bibliomaniacs in the Maitland Club and 
Paparrigopoulos's friends or adversaries could not have been popular among 
the great mass of the subjects because their concerns were more complex 
than the ordinary citizen's educational level. Their general influence however 
was wider. What did come down to the subaltern classes in an undeniable 
way was the general feeling of Scottishness or Greekness these intellectuals 
were propagating. The mass gatherings in Stirling for the Wallace monument 
174 Koulouri, Iuropia Kal HXJ)yparpia, [Iuropia PruJ.laiial Kal Bv(avrMj nov S.B. 
BEVt~tA.O\) Kat A.K. 1:1tu9aKT\ (1894)], pAl3. The author refers to the Byzantine 
achievements. 
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or the riotous assemblies in Athens on the eve of every national cnsls 
essentially denote the course from 'national theory' to 'national sentiment' 
that Pantelis Lekkas has described. 175 Walter Scott and P.F. Tytler or 
Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos and Spyridon Lampros, besides their 
popularising interests, wrote for a limited public who could afford and 
understand their complex works and their theories appealed to a certain 
circle of academics, intellectuals and learned individuals that formed the 
political and financial elite of their times. As it will be illustrated in the 
following chapters, history in the nineteenth century remained mainly the 
interest of the better classes - until translated into meaningful symbols. 
175 «EBvl,a, Oe())pia» and «eBvl1CO rppoVT/pa» in the original. Pantelis E. Lekkas, H 
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Chapter Two 
'Common people', 'extraordinary individuals': The 
Scottish Wars of Independence and the nineteenth-
century national narrative, c.1830 -1900 
In the course of the present chapter and the one that follows we will 
consider historiographical conceptions of the Wars of Independence in 
Scotland and Greece. What I intend to explore here is the process of 
building a consensus and the subsequent canonisation of a period in the past 
conceived as a caesura - a milestone in the history of the nation. I propose to 
focus on the nineteenth century and if this sounds natural for the Greek 
case, as that was the time a new state was established, further explanation 
might be needed as far as it concerns the Scottish one. Here, the conflict was 
not so recent, in historical terms. Indeed, Scottish independence was 
consolidated in the later middle ages, dating from the end of the thirteenth 
century. A gap of five hundred years separated the actual events from the 
period of our interest. Why should we be concerned then with paying 
particular attention to nineteenth-century perceptions instead of some 
different point in time? 
Although the Wars of Independence did enjoy an exceptional place in 
Scottish collective memory through the cultural heritage provided by Blind 
Harry's and Barbour's works\ it remains doubtful if they were ever 
conceptualised as such in early modem times. As central a document as the 
1 As seen in Ian Ross and Stephen Scobie, "Patriotic publishing as a response to the 
Union" in Thomas I. Rae, The union of J 707: its impact on Scotland, (G lasgow, 1974), 
pp. 2-3, 118. 
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Declaration of Arbroath remained forgotten until the seventeenth century 
but even its discovery cannot be said to have rekindled the historians' 
interest. As late as the age of Enlightenment the Wars were far from treated 
as a coherent whole. During the eighteenth century Whigs and Jacobite 
historians still fought over parts of the story that could be exploited as useful 
political arguments, notably where legitimacy lay in the Bruce - Balliol 
controversy.2 However, it is between 1800 and 1900 that the Wars of 
Independence underwent intense study and scrutiny and became an 
indispensable part of monographs and general histories. Belief in the 
'objective existence of the nation,3 was an article of faith for those 
nineteenth-century historians who constructed a consistent image of the 
conflict and shaped the Scottish national narrative. Both the sense of a 
historical course and the canon of Scottish history effectively followed to the 
present are the products of this era and mentality. They cannot be conceived 
separately from such a paragon as the Wars of Independence. 
Such archetypes of national identity however sometimes turn the 
historical canon into a burden for the historian. The unassailable importance 
of the Refonnation and the Union in Scottish history may have obscured 
other significant aspects pending clarification.4 Insofar as the Whig 
interpretation in the eighteenth century denied any intrinsic meaning to 
Scottish history, it was responsible for neglecting a whole area of study. The 
recent flourishing of political history in Scotland was hailed as a welcome 
departure from its old norms which incorporated and hid Scottish aspects 
behind an Anglo - British frame. 5 A re-evaluation of past views, without the 
weight of the canon pressing down on us any more would seem to be in 
order. We still tend, however, whenever confronted with the ideological 
implications of eighteenth or nineteenth-century historians' works, to 
2 See Colin Kidd, Subverting Scotland's past. Scottish Whig historians and the creation 
of an Anglo-British identity, 1689-c.1830, (Cambridge, 1993), pp.86-8. 
3 Michael Biddiss, ''Nationalism and the moulding of Modem Europe" in History 79, 
(1994), 413. 
4 The course of canonisation of Scottish history is depicted in Colin Kidd, "The canon of 
patriotic landmarks in Scottish history", Scotlands, 1, (Edinburgh, 1994), 1-17. 
5 Michael Fry, "The Whig interpretation of Scottish History" in Ian Donnachie and 
Christopher Whatley (eds.), The Manufacture of Scottish History, (Edinburgh, 1992). 
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automatically fall back on the established political and religious categories of 
Whigs and Tories, Presbyterians and Episcopalians. The critique of major 
general Scottish histories of the time rested there to show major fault lines in 
the development of historiography. This did not mean that these political 
and cultural rifts they expressed were the only significant segment of their 
work. I would argue here, in borrowing Rosemary Mitchell's words, that "the 
presentation of the national narrative is always ambiguous and essentially 
protean" but what has to count is the existence or not of a common motif _ 
a "structure beneath the surface content".6 
The old aphorism, particularly appropriate to history, favours the 
forest over the tree and with good reason, for in the narrative woods wolves 
may lurk. However, at times something may be said for the tree too; for 
favouring the part over the whole, giving it a second look and thought. The 
Scottish fourteenth century thrives in our time in an admittedly condensed 
and commercialised form loosely based on the great works of past masters. 
An altogether different picture appears when we detach the Wars of 
Independence from the whole oeuvre of Patrick Fraser Tytler, John Hill 
Burton or Peter Hume Brown, especially when linked to the fortunes of 
Scottish national identity in the latter part of the nineteenth century. I 
propose thus to explore nineteenth-century views of the Wars of 
Independence through the eyes of its historians focusing on their attitudes 
on just that particular part, keeping the professed links to the Union in the 
background. In the end, when summing it all up, we shall see if, and to what 
extent, their embracing of diverse political and ecclesiastical principles 
direcdy influenced their stance on the subject of our enquiry. 
In following the representation of the Wars of Independence7 in the 
nineteenth century we stand to gain a wider knowledge as to the facts of self-
6 Rosemary Mitchell, Picturing the past: English history in text and image 1830-1870, 
(Oxford, 2000), p.286. 
7 For details on the Wars of Independence see J.D. Mackie, A history of Scotland, 
(London, 1978); Rosalind Mitchison, A history of Scotland, (London and New York, 
1982); Michael Lynch, Scotland. A new history, (London, 1991); Ranald Nicholson, 
Scotland: The Later Middle Ages. The Edinburgh History of Scotland, vol. II, 
(Edinburgh, 1974); Alexander Grant, Independence and Nationhood Scotland 1306-
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image and professed national identity the Scots were building, through what 
was effectively the apogee of the British Empire. Scottish historiography, as 
has been amply demonstrated by Colin Kidd and Marinell Ash in their 
seminal studies for the eighteenth and nineteenth century, had been 
labouring since the Union under the latter's plain implications and 
consequences for its practitioners.s The adoption of the Whig interpretation 
of history essentially meant that an individual treatment of Scottish history 
through the ages was to be abandoned and its subsequent tie to that of 
England would always endow unequal comparisons and criticisms.9 In the 
British context Scottish history looked increasingly redundant and Scottish 
historiography did not have a raison d' etre anymore; lacking that, it was to feel 
the full impact of ecclesiastical splits, political factions and class divisions and 
regress in the course of the nineteenth-century into a "succession of 
historical kailyards".l0 
Nevertheless, history did not cease to be written in Scotland. It went 
on under a changed political frame and a new set of parameters insofar 
regarding its principal aims. Union and its benefits being real and 
unassailable, the question would be how they could be justified without 
giving away claims to a special relationship Scotland had been enjoying since 
1707. A second prerequisite would be to confirm this privileged status 
avoiding the danger of relinquishing their peculiar identity - to a general 
'Britishness' or a special 'Anglicisation'. To serve this purpose the Wars of 
Independence offered a unique advantage: they could be used to both bolster 
a sense of national identity in existence since the Later Middle Ages and 
underline the element of balance in the relations with their southern 
neighbours. Throughout the period under study mentions of the importance 
1469, (Edinburgh, 1984); Geoffrey Barrow, Robert the Bruce and the community of the 
realm of Scotland, (Edinburgh, 1988). 
8 Kidd, Subverting Scotland's past; Kidd, "The Strange Death of Scottish History 
revisited: Constructions of the Past in Scotland, c.1790-1914" in The Scottish Historical 
Review, LXXVI, (1997), 86-102; Marinell Ash, The Strange Death of Scottish History, 
(Edinburgh, 1980). 
9 Kidd, Subverting Scotland's past, pp.268-80; Kidd, "The Strange Death ... revisited", 
87. 
10 Ash, The Strange Death, p. 152. 
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of this conflict's outcome for the future of these two countries abounded. At 
the same titne strands of a national history were woven to create a consensus 
for at least this particular era. Despite the fragmentation in political views 
expressed, Whigs, royalists, Jacobites, Episcopalians, nationalists, moderate 
liberals and Tories seemed to be of the same mind as far as it concerned 
symbolic representation, social cohesion and national consciousness. William 
Wallace and Robert the Bruce, the people as opposed to the nobility and a 
distinct Scottish patriotism emerging as a direct corollary of the said conflict 
were to form cornerstones of national discourse until well into the twentieth 
century. They pose equal problems for historians today and they are to 
provide our outline for the analysis at hand. 
National histories would disclaim themselves if they did not hail 
the nation as a primary ideological category. Even today most of them trace 
its beginnings to some remote past, appropriately shaped in order to provide 
a convenient continuity: the French employ leurs antetres les Gaulois, Italians 
the heritage of the Roman Empire. The Scottish Wars of Independence 
thrust the national past well into the Later Middle Ages. To search for an 
accomplished nation so far back is not the privilege of many. The Greek case 
is an exception: as we have seen already in Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos's 
History of the Greek Nation ancient city-states, the Byzantine Empire and the 
modem Greek kingdom emerged as variations on a theme, tracing an 
identity in the depths of antiquity. Fragmentation of its ancient past in the 
influx of different tribes and a rather turbulent and unclear course after the 
Romans withdrew, denied Scottish historians the privilege of resting their 
national identity on a scheme of unbroken continuity. Instead, as in England, 
legititnacy was sought in the middle ages. Religious discontinuity posed 
another problem. In England it was bypassed by redress to constitutional 
and institutional history whereas in Scodand it seems to simply have been 
bypassed in the course of writing. l1 After the Union the existence of a 
II Historians either avoid the subject or do not seem to perceive a contradiction: Wallace 
had a 'gift' from the Almighty, Divine providence had raised up Bruce according to 
James Taylor in The Pictorial History of Scotland from the Roman invasion to the close 
of the Jacobite Rebellion, A.D. 79-1746,2 vols., vol. I, (London and New York, 1859), 
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former Scottish state was not just a nostalgic sanctuary for those who 
opposed it. It was also a safe haven for the confirmation of a nationality that 
at times was felt to be threatened by the sheer magnitude of its political 
partner. 
Accepting Walter Scott's effort in creating a historical consensus 
we may notice that he did not begin from an obvious point no great novel 
of his is associated with the Wars of Independence. Apparenrly, he was 
beaten to it by Jane Porter whose The Scottish Chiefs and the Heroism of Sir 
William Wallace appeared in 1810 with such tremendous success that 
prevented Scott from venturing in the same territory.12 But Scott remained a 
powerful force in matters historical. The Bannatyne Club was the precursor 
of a whole array of imitators engaging in the noble pursuit of rare books and 
documents for collection and publication. Moreover, the Bannatyne's 
activities were initially conceived as much satisfying the personal interests of 
its members as contributing to the development of historical studies.13 In 
remarking "we were Scotsmen before we were bibliomaniacs" Scott defined 
his objective. His suggestion to Patrick Fraser Tyder for the writing of a 
history of Scotland and his own promise to deliver one - abandoned at first, 
then later fulfilled, mainly due to financial reasons - are telling enough in 
themselves. However, Scott "had done nothing to rebuild a plausible 
framework for a self-confident Scottish history".14 The chance to achieve it 
remained for his successors. 
No one may say they did not try to fill the void. Tyder's contention 
in 1838 that his was the 'onlY history of Scotland' was repeatedly challenged 
and by the end of the nineteenth century Hill Burton's work was already 
complete while Andrew Lang and Peter Hume Brown had their own 
pp.93-94, 139, 164. E.Cowan mentions earlier efforts to protestantize Wallace. In "The 
Wallace factor in Scottish history", Images of Scotland 2, (1997),12. 
12 Graeme Morton, William Wallace. Man and myth, (Stroud, 2001), p.61. Porter's work 
was first published in 1810. Walter Scott disapproved of the way she had cast Wallace 
into a "fine gentleman" but he nevertheless refrained from trying his hand at a similar 
venture. (Scott's opinion quoted by E.1. Cowan in "The Wallace factor. .. ", Images 2, 
15). 
13 Ash, The Strange Death, pp.59-69. 
14 Kidd, Subverting Scotland's past, p.266. 
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undertakings under way. James Taylor had come up with a Pictorial History in 
1859 and William Burns was to present his own contribution to Scottish 
history in 1874 concentrating on the War of Independence. A little later, 
between 1878 and 1888 John Mackintosh would provide an attempt at a 
great synthesis concerning himself not only with political history but also 
society and culture in his History of Civilisation in Scotland. Most of these works 
were based not just on a perusal of previous works - although Lord Hailes's 
Annals were still a standard reference work - but also research on original 
documents and sources. It was an altogether impressive body of work even if 
we do not take into consideration the variety of popular histories and digests 
in circulation at the same time. To paraphrase David Hume, if Scotland was 
to be a historical nation, this had to prove its historical age. 
Compared to others, this was a relatively unproblematic area for a 
historian of Scotland. 15 The great dividing gaps of Reformation and Union 
which could rally partisans of numerous factions in heated discussion or the 
quagmire of post-Roman times where scores of antiquarians had been locked 
in battle to detennine the origins of Picts and Scots were far more 
troublesome. Certainly, there was a lot to be said for or against the Scottish 
variety of feudalism but more than enough ground for accord existed. Lang 
and Brown, for instance, agreed that the age of the Alexanders was the 
"golden age of Scotland".16 None would attest to the opposite, just as none 
was about to attempt justification for English attitudes and conduct in the 
course that led to war. The Wars of Independence represented in essence the 
struggle of one nation against another; the right to indigenous government 
and the pursuit of freedom from foreign powers; the consolidation of 
15 A critique of Scottish nineteenth-century history and its practitioners can be found in 
Ash, The Strange Death; Kidd, Subverting Scotland's past; Kidd, "The Strange 
Death ... revisited"; Fry, "The Whig interpretation"; Ronald Gordon Cant, The Writing of 
Scottish History in the Time of Andrew Lang, St Andrews University, St John's House 
Papers, (St Andrews, 1978); Richard J. Finlay, "Controlling the Past: Scottish 
Historiography and Scottish Identity in the 19th and 20th centuries" in Scottish Affairs 9, 
(1994),127-142. 
16 Andrew Lang, A history of Scotland from the Roman occupation, 4 vols., vol. I, 
(Edinburgh and London, 1900), p.159; Peter Hume Brown, History of Scotland, 3 vols., 
vol. I. (Cambridge, 1899), p.ll O. 
- 77 -
national independence. On their way to demonstrating the above Scottish 
historians were required to provide credible answers to a series of reasonable 
questions. Who constituted the nation? How was national independence 
achieved? What was the significance of its major symbols, Wj]]jam Wallace 
and Robert the Bruce? 
The 'people' and 'the nation' 
The first problem identified itself as a cleavage between 'the nobility' 
and 'the people'. To begin with, the attitude of the nobles was generally 
described as 'vacillating' and, truly enough, nobody can fail but notice a 
general fluidity in the conduct of Robert Wishart, Bishop of Glasgow, the 
Comyns or the Bruces. For Patrick Fraser Tytler (1791-1849), who first 
entered the fray - his first two volumes appearing in 1828 and 1829 - it was 
a matter of selfishness and jealousy. A "corrupted part of the Scottish 
nobility" 17 with its eyes either on their English lands or the Scottish crown 
were eager to compromise with Edward I in order to secure their goals: "the 
patriotic principle ... seems at this time to have entirely deserted the highest 
ranks of the Scottish nobles, whose selfish dissensions had brought ruin and 
bondage upon their country". 18 Tytler periodically returned to this 
throughout his account of the initial phases in the conflict. In fact, his 
persistence almost makes it the leitmotif of the War of Independence. Wallace 
was brought down by "the dissensions of a jealous nobility,,19 that "deserted 
their country and, refused to act with the only man whose success and 
ual th " 20 Th .. military talents were eq to e emergency . e patnottsm necessary to 
fight a war against English aggression the nobles lacked was to be found in 
ample quantities in what Tytler labelled as 'the nation'. However, this was 
more scantily depicted and leaves a lot to be imagined. From Tytler's 
17 Patrick Fraser Tytler, The History of Scotland from the accession of Alexander III to 
the Union, 4 Yols., (First edition: Edinburgh, 1828-1843. Edition used: Edinburgh, 1892), 
Yol. I, p.32. 
18 Tytler, The History of Scotland, I, p.48. 
19 Ibid, I, p.123. 
20 Ibid, I, p.60. 
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description we understand that it did not exhaust itself in the estates and the 
nobility. It fundamentally consisted of "these broken men and rebels as they 
, . 
are tenned by Edward. The lesser barons, being less contaminated by the 
money and intrigues of England preserved also the healthy and honest 
feelings of national independence".21 It is in describing Wallace's followers 
that Tyder proceeded to that distinction, which was to be reiterated after 
Bannockburn: what kept Scotland afloat was the "strong hand of free-born 
men ... and the spirit of indignant resistance to foreign power".22 
Tyder's history, although a prototype in the treatment of 
protagonists, basic themes and structure for all who were to follow, also 
posed questions that were left unanswered. It is true that whether 
Presbyterian, Episcopalian, Christian Orthodox or Roman Catholic 
nineteenth-century historians acted basically as judges of morals. Tyder's 
Edward, for instance was not exacdy a villain, but less than a paragon of 
virtue: a quick, bold and determined king, also prone to ungovernable rages, 
paroxysms of wrath, great oaths, scheming and double-crossing. His main 
features were "a union of sagacity, boldness and unscrupulous ambition".23 
His policy "towards Scotland and its new king [Baliol] was at once artful and 
insulting".24 V engeful and warlike, vain and duplicitous, Edward was the 
commander of an army that pillaged Berwick and turned its churches into 
stables for the English cavalry25, a monarch who divided and conquered by 
"arraying their private and selfish ambition against the love of their 
country".26 To be sure, Tyder was not the one who wove this personality out 
of thin air. He followed others, Fordun, Walshingham, Prynne, Innes, to 
name but a few. His material restricted him up to a point, especially since he 
was methodologically committed to pnmary sources and original 
documents27 - but he was known to exerClse his judgement without 
misgivings when he deemed it right. In this case the English king's ultimate 
21 Tytler, The History oiScotland, I, p.48. 
22 Ibid, I, p.123. 
23 Ibid, I, p.30. 
24 Ibid, I, p.39. 
25 Ibid, I. p.43. 
26 Ibid, I, p.46. 
27 Ash, The Strange Death, pp.l 09-110. 
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failure, along with the brevity with which the historian saw fit to handle his 
death, cannot but suggest a connection between motives and results. 
This code of morality though seems less than enough to explain the 
nobility's conduct. Plain selfishness is not enough to account for lack of 
patriotism in a plurality of complex episodes such as the compromise of the 
competitors and Edward I, Wallace's lukewarm support, Robert the Bruce's 
civil strife with the Comyns. We need a stronger argument, so it is time to 
tum to another example. With John Hill Burton (1809-1881) a number of 
insightful hints begin to emerge. Burton remains, in all probability, the most 
readable nineteenth-century historian of Scotland because of his concise, 
clear and informative style - one that would have passed for drab in his own 
time. 28 In presenting his History of Scotland between 1853 and 1870 he 
introduced a set of arguments not wholly dissimilar to those of Tytler - but 
with a twist. The dichotomy in attitudes still rested between a nobility and 
the Scottish 'people' - but this nobility was an 'alien' one, incapable of 
manifesting any patriotism since they did not belong to Scodand. Moreover, 
they were "peculiarly offensive" to the latter, populated by "a fierce, self-
willed people, nourished in independence and national pride,,29, the real 
caretakers of the country's spirit. Normans, even those with "strong Scots 
connections" like Bruce, Balliol and Comyn, were presented ahnost as 
Englishmen in their interests and calculations.3D To placate the Scottish 
Estates "the Norman courtier must make himself, as nearly as he could, a 
patriotic Scotsman", said Burton.31 The Scottish Estates then represented the 
patriotic Scots, forming an element of the 'people'. This concept however 
28 Probably because he is "devoid of all those which exalt historical composition to the 
sphere of poetry and drama" and his "absence of imagination". The accusations come 
from Richard Garnett, his biographer in the Dictionary of National Biography, a man 
who has been called "the ideal librarian" and was the keeper of books in the British 
Musewn for forty-eight years. 
29 John Hill Burton, The History of Scotland from Agricola's invasion to the extinction of 
the last Jacobite insurrection, 8 vols., (Edinburgh and London, 1897), p.152. 
30 "Their taste and training, in many cases their interest too, attached them to the brilliant 
court of the King of England". Burton, The History of Scotland, II, p.186. Also see II, 
pp.124-25. 
31 Ibid, II, p.124. 
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continues to vex the prospective reader in its vagueness. His portraying of 
Wallace may offer a partially open way out: he was "certainly the 
representative and champion of the Saxon or pure Norse inhabitants of 
Britain, who had not yet been subjected to the southern yoke".32 The answer 
may not be as illuminating as we would have liked but at least it supplies us 
with some names. Burton however, more fortunately provided finer 
distinctions concerning the ranks of nobles although he refrained from 
giving in to the common notion of jealousies and power struggles that 
undermined Wallace's authority.33 The case of Wallace presented him with 
the chance to underline the integrating abilities of the Scottish people and 
apply them to the nobility. Saxons and Normans being kin, extraction did 
not mean much after a while and the latter were assimilated to the Scots. 
Ultimately, those who could not be trusted with national interests' were only 
those Normans that held lands outside Scotland: William of Douglas, for 
instance, did not, and thus he was pronounced one of "the few great landed 
lords who could be truly called Scotsmen". 34 In refining his initial position on 
an 'alien' Norman nobility then, Burton now claimed that "social position 
was of more weight in this matter than mere origin".35 The basic argument 
though stands reinforced: the closer to the people the more patriotic, the 
more Scot. 
However, what comes out of this is a tautology. The Scots were the 
'people' and the 'people' were Scots. We may obtain some further 
clarification from James Taylor (1813-1892), a minister of the United 
Presbyterian church, and an equally capable preacher, debater and historian. 
He was also convinced of the basic dichotomy of Scots during the Wars of 
Independence. The nobles were rather mercenaries who "served for pay", 
than patriots fighting for their land, the place of their fathers' sepulchres.
36 
Their conduct, "selfish and vacillating" cannot have been otherwise, 
determined by the fact they were "foreigners - Anglo-Normans and Anglo-
32 Burton, The History o/Scotland, II, p.179. 
33 Ibid, II, pp.20 1-202. 
34 Ibid, II, pp.180, 185. 
35 Ibid, II, p.179. 
36 Taylor, The Pictorial History, I, p. 93. 
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Saxons - who felt no patriotic attachment to the country in which they had 
settled, and were not bound to it by those strong ties that connect a people 
with a land which has been for ages the abode of their fathers". InsteacL they 
were subjects of both kingdoms and "as they had no peculiar affection for 
either, their allegiance was made to depend almost entirely upon personal 
considerations" - which accounts for the "frequency and shamelessness with 
which they changed sides, according as their private interest dictatecL without 
the slightest regard to the public welfare". 37 In fact, then and afterwards they 
were "the pensioners of England".38 Predictably enough, the "Scottish nation 
at large" exhibited a totally different attitude. Taylor though resolved to fill 
this 'nation' with a more concrete content: "the middle and lower class of 
proprietors especially, whom were sprung of the native race of Scotland, felt 
keenly their national degradation, and the loss of the independence of their 
country". Moreover, "animated by an ardent spirit of patriotism and a 
determined hatred against their oppressors, they burned with impatience to 
throw off the English yoke". 39 
Things were even clearer in Andrew Lang (1844-1912), the "last great 
man of letters of the old Scottish tradition,,4Q who summarily dealt with 
N orman nobility of the Scottish kingdom early in his chapters on the War : 
"even when they had a strain of Celtic blood through heiresses, lords holding 
lands in England and in Scotland both, could have little or no national 
sentiment. 'Patriotism' must inevitably be a meaningless word to them ... ".41 
However, he noted at another point that "patriotism, new born in his 
[Bruce's time], was then, in a great degree, attachment to such a king, as well 
as to country".42 Lang's use of a phrase linked to modem connotations of 
patriotism is significant as his notions of a clear 'national sentiment' that 
permeated the kingdom - although not shared by nobles. It existed 
nevertheless, and we are about to see to whom it should be attributed. The 
important thing to mark presendy is that the gap Tytler had originally 
37 Taylor, The Pictorial History, I, p. 93. 
38 Ibid, I, p.lll. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Dictionary o/National Biography. 
41 Lang, A history o/Scotland, I, p.163. 
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pictured between nobles and commons gained ethnic proportions in Lang. 
Not only was resistance directed against 'England' but also it formed 
"essentially a popular and clerical movement, at the head of which, later, the 
Anglo-Norman Bruce only placed himself in stress of personal danger,,43 - a 
movement encompassing churchmen, lords of mixed blood, even Celts.44 
However, where Lang proves himself invaluable indeed is in his 
detennination to define this elusive subject, the common people, the 
communitas : consisting of free-holders, it was comprised by "Scots (in the 
modem sense),,45 who "man, woman and child, were ready to die than bow 
the neck to England".46 It is to this people that Lang repeatedly turned to 
establish the feeling of a national community when patriotism was in short 
supply. For instance, in the years of David II, a period where "in place of a 
united resistance to a powerful neighbour, we have to observe a mass of 
selfish intrigues, redeemed by gallant persistence on the part of a few of the 
nobles, and of the people".47 And again: ''Patriotism, national sentiment, 
among the conspicuous Scottish leaders, almost disappeared, though it 
survived in the hearts of the people".48 
William Bums (1809-1876) forms the perfect bridge to pass from the 
question on the content of a fourteenth-century Scottish nation to the one 
on the possibility of actual nationhood and its significance for nineteenth-
century historians. Bums differs from all authors on the Wars of 
Independence examined so far in a number of reasons. For one, he was the 
most patently nationalistic, to which his career stands proof. His 
involvement in the National Association for the Vindication of Scottish 
Rights, his sparring with Viscount Palmerston and The Times on the proper 
name for Great Britain, his involvement in the propagation and construction 
of the Wallace Monument at Abbey Craig, are evidence of his significant role 
42 Lang, A history a/Scotland I, p.236. 
43 Ibid, I, p.163. 
44 Ibid, I, p.165, 179. 
45 Ibid, I, p.171. "Communitas" seems a "tenn of rather vague import" to Hume Brown. 
In Brown, History 0/ Scotland, I, p.13 7. 
46 Lang, A history a/Scotland, I, p.237. 
47 Ibid, I, p.242. 
48 Ibid, 1, p.251. 
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in the mid-nineteenth century 'nationalist' movement. As a matter of fact he 
declared that the idea to write on the Wars of Independence was first 
suggested to him 
"by witnessing the singularly conflicting Vlews expressed in 
consequence of the movement for the erection of a National 
Monument to the memory of the Scottish hero, WILLIAM 
WALLACE" .49 
For Burns, history has a point. He did not profess to have achieved 
any breakthroughs in it as a discipline: he had no "new discoveries or original 
documents" to offer. 50 His work was stricdy to act in popularising already 
known facts and help in clarifying points of contention, a lesson to 
contemporaries so that the "conflict of views" in the case of Wallace be 
removed. 51 For history should act as agent of truth and bringer of justice: "it 
seems to be time that some pen however feeble, should endeavour to point 
out the fallacious character of the statements and views they propound". 52 
In providing this true view of Scottish history that would rectify mendacious 
allegations and mistaken assumptions Burns rejected Burton's contention of 
Scottish and English being "kindred peoples" and looked for the 
distinguishing Scottish national characteristics in a different population 
composition which definitely made for two separate nations53. Otherwise, 
"the stirring annals of her [Scodand's] struggles for independence or 
integrity ... and the WAR OF INDEPENDENCE itself ... was an unfortunate 
blunder, or, at best, a splendid specimen of wrongheadedness" .54 
In pointing out that "tradition fully believed exercises precisely the 
same kind of influence as the best authenticated history,,55 Burns makes an 
acute and still more than valid observation. Its condensed version, to be 
found in a political tract, shows he was ready enough himself to put it in 
49 William Burns, The Scottish War of Independence. Its antecedents and effects, vol. I, 
(Glasgow, 1874), p.l. 
50 Ibid, I, p.5. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid, I, p.21. 
53 Ibid, I, pp.l0-17. 
54 Ibid, I, p.17. 
55 Ibid, I, p.28. 
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good use: "tradition believed has all the effects of established truth". 56 
Knowing his penchant for identifying history with truth we can understand 
the way he proceeded to draw conclusions from his professed motto. 
According to him we should not always exercise scepticism towards the 
"fables" of the past for sometimes this is worse than credulity. This 
moralistic argument professed that without these neither individuals nor 
peoples achieve "great actions" and "landmarks of history". 57 What does this 
aspire to? Faith unto chroniclers, quite possibly, in general- as we are to see 
later on in discussing the reception of Wi11jam Wallace. In particular, that 
"the faith, or belief, of the Scottish people, whose individuality 
Edward I attempted to destroy, was that they and their 
predecessors had heretofore been an ancient, free and 
independent nation, and that the maintenance of this 
independence was worthy of any effort or sacrifice". 58 
What was this 'free and independent nation' composed of? "The small 
proprietors, the free tenantry, the burghers and peasantry, chiefly of the 
native races, who were not either bent or broken".59 The Normans were not 
a part of it nor did they have any influence on its shaping: "we have no 
evidence of their having been accompanied or followed, by such numbers as 
could materially change the general population of the country".60 He used the 
Declaration of Arbroath to determine that "the S coltish nation here referred 
to" did not consist of Norwegians, Danes, English or indeed any of these 
later additions.61 Burns accepted E.W. Robertson's "old Scottish nation" or 
"original Scots" to be the predominant element among fourteenth-century 
Scotsmen.62 New elements have been introduced at intervals but 
56 William Burns, Scotland and her Calumniators: her past, her present and her future. 
Remarks suggested by the strictures of the London press, (Glasgow, 1858), p.15. 
57 Burns, The Scottish War, I, p.29. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid, I, p.395. 
60 Ibid, I, p.285. 
61 Ibid, I, p.303. 
62 Ibid, I, p.288. E.W. Robertson's work to which Bums refers to is Scotland under her 
early kings: a history of the kingdom to the close of the thirteenth century. (Edinburgh, 
1862). 
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"these have been assimilated, without breaking the continuity of 
traditions and ideas ... [and] each body of new comers has, in 
tum, been baptized into the traditional faith of the or:igina.1 people 
and the result is, that even before passing through the furnace of 
the great war, they have become a nation, made up, more or less, 
of different materials". 63 
These people having been "combined and moulded" underwent however 
unconsciously ... a course of training calculated to inspire, and mature, the 
leading ideas which we attempted to explain at the outset".64 Hill Burton's 
treatment was faulty on this point, Burns declared. "Inconsistencies" existed 
in admitting the reality of a "fierce, self-willed people, nourished in 
independence and national pride", only to pronounce them of the "same 
race" as the English.65 This latter view, shared by the author of the Pictorial 
History of Scot/and, James Taylor, had to be renounced on methodological 
grounds: "Such are the inconsistencies into which historians must necessarily 
fall, when they adopt some conventional theory which cannot be reconciled 
with the current of actual events".66 
Finally, Burns confronted the matter of race and homogeneity and 
gave a definition as to the factors that, in his opinion, designate a nation. 
Race, or common extraction, was not an indispensable prerequisite of 
nationality: "we scarcely find such thing as a homogeneous people, certainly 
not in Europe, at all events".67 Common origin and common language may 
be powerful factors, however, he maintained that 
"a common history, identity of memories and associations, of 
institutions and interests, of ideas and aspirations, are even more 
efficient in producing that sympathy which is the essence of 
nationality: and if to these has been superadded some common 
63 Burns, The Scottish War, 1, p.316. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid, 1, pp.484-486; Burton, The History olScotland, II, p.194. 
66 Ibid, 1, p.486. 
67 Ibid, I, p.305. 
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struggle against outward aggression, mere racial affinity seems 
really of minor importance".68 
There were nevertheless limits to the integrating abilities the Scots were 
displaying - or in their motivation to employ them. The Norman nobility lay 
outside the Scottish nation as "one unassimilated element, dangerous to the 
health, and even the life of the community... holding lands in England, and 
thus owing allegiance to a foreign and ambitious power".69 But the author's 
line wavered significandy. At times the Normans were identified with the 
English as the foreign servants of a foreign power or were summarily 
dismissed as "mere adventurers without a country,,70. In other places this 
totally negative stance was moderated by implying the "alien nobility" in 
Burns's mind referred only to those "having lands or other connections in 
England". 71 
'N ational sentiment' and 'national independence' 
In this brief review of the aspect of national content in the times of the 
Wars of Independence from a nineteenth-century standpoint we have until 
now concerned ourselves with delineating the limits of a certain consensus 
which included a professed belief in a basic distinction between a perceived 
as indifferent, and sometimes downright treacherous, nobility and a patriotic 
'common people' - the Scots - who formed the real 'nation'. Having 
detennined the general acceptance and sketched the variations of this 
dichotomy, it is now time to check whether this picture retains its validity or 
not, and what might have been its function in a Scottish nineteenth-century 
national narrative. 
The apparent divisions of the nobility render all efforts to determine 
their patriotism inconclusive. The sources refer to the parties of Bruce and 
Comyn as established factions, each with their own following and claims to 
the crown, locked in perpetual conflict and only uniting in their common 
68 Bums, The Scottish War, I, pp.305-06. 
69 Ibid, I, p.3 16. 
70 Ibid, I, p.369. 
71 Ibid, I, p.443. 
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interest to bring down Wallace. 72 These and the rest of the barons engaged in 
a shifting hodgepodge of alliances with themselves and with Edward 
depending on their feudal interests and the military moment. We have noted 
before the ambivalent conduct of the Bruces until 1306. The victorv over the 
English at Roslin in 1302 is attributed to "the Comyn party".73 When Bruce 
proclaimed himself King in 1306 it took him almost three years to overrun 
the country, not just by the English but also by those who should be counted 
among his vassals and chose instead to hang on to their allegiance to Balliol 
- or to him and themselves, as the Comyns.74 He achieved his goal and won 
the battie of Bannockburn with "scarcely a knight ... who had not served with 
Edward".75 Thomas Randolph, one of his best lieutenants, had been in the 
service of Edward and was imprisoned by Bruce himself before transferring 
his allegiance while Wishart, bishop of Glasgow, had a long record of 
changing sides. Alexander Grant quotes the colourful case of Alexander 
Seton who changed sides no less than six times between 1306 and 1334 
backing the Bruce, the English and Edward BallioL 76 In assuming a society 
functioning with the same categories as modem ones, where empires and 
nation-states could appeal to subjects and citizens and mobilise them in the 
name of a common identity, again either imperial or national, the debate on 
patriotism would have a valid point. Nineteenth-century historians evidendy 
made this assumption: Lang and Burns explicidy used the ideological 
categories of nationalism to speak about 'national sentiment' and 'national 
independence'. Whether this interpretation was close to the mark or not will 
become clearer if we consider it in the context of fourteenth-century society 
and culture. 
Is there a more convincing case to be made for parallel developments 
at the same time on the level of the subaltern classes? An affirmative answer 
could be offered in the 1296-1297 resistance movement of Andrew Moray 
72 Tytler, The history of Scotland, I, p.66. 
73 Mackie, A history of Scotland, p.71. 
74 Mackie, A history of Scotland, pp. 73-74; Mitchison, A history of Scotland, pp.46-47; 
Grant, Independence and Nationhood, pp. 9-12; Nicholson, The Later Middle Ages, 
pp.75-80. 
75 Lang, A history of Scotland, I, p.225. 
76 Grant, Independence and nationhood, p.25. 
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and the intrepid Wj)]jam Wallace. The problem with this view is that it 
proves very convenient. The period of Wallace was a short intennission to 
begin with; it did not produce any standing results or long-term influences in 
the conduct of the war. It did not bring a permanent rift between nobles and 
peasants nor did it signify the emergence of an enduring popular movement 
aiming to drive out the English. It actually petered out after Falkirk when the 
nobles returned to hold the reigns as Guardians of Scotland. For this period 
Fiona Watson writes that "Edward's regime was finding increasing 
acceptance among the people of lowland Scotland" so long as it provided for 
strong, efficient and not especially encroaching government. These 
conditions were more or less met in 1301-1302. Evidence also shows that 
'common people' were not averse to spying for the English in order to 
collect rewards.77 
If we cannot argue convincingly on a fixed national consciousness on 
the part of the nobility then, it is also hard to make such a case for the 
subaltern strata. For we should remember that throughout the middle ages 
we encounter examples where these people raised and took matters into their 
hands whenever the elite failed to carry on the obligations the moral 
economy of the age required of them: good government, justice and peace. 
In fourteenth-century Byzantium, when a significant part of the country was 
ravaged in a civil war between John V Palaeologus and his grandfather John 
VI Cantacuzenus, a local party of political and religious dissidents, the 
Zealots, defied both, took hold of Thessaloniki, second city of the Empire, 
and put into practice a communal system with considerable success. The 
revolt that turned the city into a de facto independent republic managed to 
maintain this regime for seven years, between 1342 and 1349, before 
submitting to the joint authorities of the now reconciled co-emperors.78 The 
downfall was precipitated by another popular insurrection when the Zealots' 
intentions to surrender the city to Stephen Dushan, King of Serbia became 
77 Fiona Watson, Under the Hammer: Edward 1 and Scotland, 1286-1306, (East Linton, 
1998), p.162, 193. 
78 John Julius Norwich, Byzantium: The Decline and Fall, (London, 1996), p.297, 302, 
314. 
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known. Allowing for the proper margins in this parallel, we may conclude 
nevertheless that Wallace was not a unique case. 
Since the lesser Scottish nobility took a verified stand against English 
aggressiveness we cannot possibly apply cultural reasons to the case and talk 
about rifts between Anglo-Normans, Celts and Saxons in later medieval 
Scottish society, with the former apprehensive to engage in war with their 
southern kin and the latter clinging to old notions of independence. The 
Anglo-Normans certainly formed a significant part of the higher nobility 
since the time of David I and his successors: the Bruces Comyns , , 
Umfravilles, Balliols and Stewarts had acquired Scottish lands through ceding 
of holdings and marriages but old Celtic families like the Lennoxes still 
retained their earldoms.79 The fact that some of these magnates maintained 
lands in England - and Balliol even held extensive estates in France too - did 
not necessarily mean a contradiction in their allegiances. After all, Edward I 
himself was a vassal of Philip the Fair without that encroaching on his 
sovereign rights as King of England - although legal disputes in matters of 
homage were frequent. Neither did it mean they exhibited lack of patriotism 
in supporting the English king or the rebels for relations then were governed 
by a complex hierarchical network of personal ties that took precedence over 
abstract concepts. Service was owned to the king as the personification of 
authority - not to the country as an imagined community or even as a 
recognised territorial state.80 Indeed, Wallace in his trial reportedly did not 
justify his actions as stemming from his duty to the Scottish state, he 
underlined his freedom to act because he had not sworn fealty to Edward -
which rendered him innocent of the accusation of treason.81 Or take John 
Balliol who, after the fall of Berwick, did not complain of violations of the 
country's rights but renounced his allegiance to Edward I instead. 
79 Mackie, A history olScotland, pp.48-49; Mitchison, A history olScotland, pp.22-24. 
80 For the Scottish case see Grant, Independence and nationhood, pp. 24-31; Fiona 
Watson, "The Enigmatic Lion: Scotland, Kingship and National Identity in the Wars of 
Independence" in Dauvit Broun, RJ. Finlay and Michael Lynch (eds.), Image and 
identity: The making and Re-making 01 Scotland through the ages, (Edinburgh, 1998); 
Morton, William Wallace. 
81 Tytler, The history olScotland, I, p.82. 
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The more pressing question then at this point concerns the status of 
a national identity in Scotland during the Wars of Independence and the 
place it was assuming inside the nineteenth-century national narrative. Tytler 
and Burton, the oldest examples, whatever their shortcomings may haye 
been are generally accepted as diligent historians - to the point of caution. 
Where the sources become sparse or cross-examination raises doubts on the 
authenticity of an incident Hill Burton's description condenses itself to bare 
necessities: the actual description of Wallace's trial merely covers a page -
while William Bums manages to extend it to fifteen. 82 They both mention 
the "nation", "national sentiments" or even "national independence" in 
Tytler's case83 but it is not yet a grand theme. It does not pervade their whole 
work or form a pillar to support the whole edifice. Andrew Lang is far more 
straightforward. A distinct "national character" emerges, a "popular and 
clerical movement" arises to fight for "king and country" in a struggle 
involving Scotland and England, not in fact two plain kingdoms, but 
essentially two nations. "The Scottish people, man, woman and child were 
ready to die rather than bow the neck to England" from these times until the 
Reformation proceeded to change an already existing national sentiment.84 
Until then "the History of Scotland is inspired by one national idea, 
Independence, resistance to England". 85 
Peter Hume Brown (1849-1918), the first professor to hold the 
Edinburgh chair of Scottish History in 1901, managed to supersede Lang 
and trail him at the same time - by both accepting and rejecting Scottish 
nationhood in the Later Middle Ages. This is not to be entirely unexpected 
of him: he was considered as "too cautious, or unduly respectful to his 
public".86 His narrative permeated a remarkable ability to smooth all possible 
82 Burton, The History of Scotland, II, pp. 226-27, Burns, The Scottish War, II, pp. 137-
151. Of course Burton does not entirely reject chroniclers' stories. Blind Harry is at least 
partially credible since "little morsels of evidence have turned up, serving curiously to 
confIrm the fundamentals of some of his stories". In Burton, The History of Scotland, II. 
p.183. 
83 Tytler, The history of Scotland, I, p. 48. 
84 Lang, A history of Scotland, I, p.237. 
85 Ibid, I, p.269. 
86 Dictionary of National Biography, 1912-1921. 
- 91 -
points of contention. For instance, no hint of the clashes among the Scots 
appeared in the first years of the war and there was also no mention of 
conflicting allegiances. Wallace merely "put heart" into the presumably 
merely disheartened nobility.87 Brown's categories however seemed to be 
definitively on the modem side. "Scottish barons" who battled the "English 
army" since Edward, harsh and impervious, had "evoked a truly national 
hate".88 In the end, Brown went as far as claiming nationhood for Scotland 
before even the times of the Wars: 
"it has been constandy said that, through their long struggle with 
England, the Scots were fashioned into national unity: it would 
be nearer the truth to say that, had not Scodand been a nation 
before, it must inevitably have gone to pieces in the ordeal 
through which it had passed". 
However, there is an almost immediate retraction smce Brown did 
acknowledge the impossibility of "truly national consciousness": "in the 
modem significance of the word, indeed, a nation could not then exist". 
With the standards of the times, though, his argument runs on, Alexander 
Ill's Scodand was as much a nation as any other in Christendom - with the 
sole exception of England. All the significant elements for that were in 
existence: "a dynasty of centuries' standing, a national church, a national 
council, and national laws" . 89 Despite this explanation the argument remains 
muddled and less than persuasive. 
In contrast to Brown, whatever else might be said of Wil1iam Burns it 
is quite certain he never wavered in pronouncing his views and, once having 
pronounced them, he could be trusted never to retract them. We have 
already noticed that Bums proposed to have a comprehensible idea as to the 
matter of Scottish nationality and its components. However, what he was 
actually interested in demonstrating was the predominance of the national 
idea among Scots, not just at the time of the Wars of Independence or 
afterwards, but since Scodand's conception and for all eternity. In fact, 
looked at on an ideological level, it actually formed the raison d' etre of 
87 Brown, History o/Scotland, I, p.147. 
88 Ibid, I, p.152. 
89 Ibid, I, p.180. 
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Scotland. Each nation possessed "some leading idea, or, it may be, ideas"') I _ 
revelation for the Jews, commercial development and civil liberty for 
England, political equality for the United States of America. As for Scotland, 
"her leading idea seems to have been, all along, that of resistance 
against foreign control or aggression, in other words, 
NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE. But, interwoven with this, so 
intimately that to leave it out of view would mar the picture, 
there has been another governing idea, - namely, that of 
RELIGIOUS or ecclesiastical FREEDOM".91 
Scotland's 'leading idea' through the centuries expressed itself in the 
fourteenth century through the 'common people' that Burns took such pains 
to defme. Wallace's army formed "the first example of a military force 
composed of the common people, fighting, independendy of the feudal 
lords, for a purely national idea and object".92 Dedication to the national 
principle was bound to supersede all other loyalties: "what did it matter to 
them [the people of Scotland] whether a Baliol or a Bruce occupied the 
throne?,,93 Of course, the question was rhetorical. To confirm the hegemonic 
role of the 'nation' the author had to downplay all other allegiances, 
especially dynastic ones. Hence, the repudiation of any possible interest of 
the people in something carefully presented in terms of nineteenth or 
twentieth-century party power play. 
This stance did not ensue from unearthing contemporary evidence. It 
was a projection supporting Burns's whole concept of Scottish nationality 
and at the same time a direct corollary of his own subjection to it. Fiona 
Watson has persuasively shown the complications that such a simplistic 
view fails to consider. To arrive unquestioningly at the conclusions Burns 
drew someone would have to disregard completely the medieval 
identification of kingdom with king. Balliol's prolonged absence in captivity 
proved that a war sustained in order to secure independence instead of 
restoration, had its limits in bringing uncertainty as to its actual final aims. 
90 Bums, The Scottish War, I, p.25. 
91 Ibid, I, p.26. 
92 Ibid, I, p.444. 
93 Ibid, I, p.357. 
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Moreover, even restored kingship would not be enough by itself. The King 
could not just march in and declare his right to the throne in the name of the 
nation. He should present a legitimate claim to the crown, something that 
puts into perspective the difficulties Bruce faced after his coronation in 1306. 
His prospective subjects would think twice before pledging their allegiance 
to an unproved man, who had a little while before committed sacrilege, while 
their lawful ruler was still alive. Had Bruce not been successful in his war 
pursuits he would not, in all probability, have received their trust. Despite 
later propaganda of a national call to arms, which Bruce put into circulation 
in order to justify his unprecedented - by fourteenth-century political theory 
- actions, independence of the kingdom "above all else" could not have been 
the foremost concern and primary objective of the conununity of the 
realm.94 Bums's feudal nationalism was anachronistic. 
Naturally, there is not much left to point us with accuracy towards 
the exact feelings of the subaltern classes at the time and information about 
the nobility's conduct sometimes leave us with things to be desired too; it is 
more than certain that dynastic allegiances would guarantee devotion to the 
royal line of Scodand or, failing that, the closest descendant - something the 
King of England apparendy was not considered to be. Early acceptance of 
Balliol, when he had yet to show his hand at government, suggests that. But 
as for patriotism and national sentiment being the prerogatives of a definite 
segment of fourteenth-century Scottish society - Tyder's 'lesser nobles', 
Lang's churchmen or Hill Burton's 'people' - who formed in this way a sort 
of outpost of nationalism in the Later Middle Ages we have to remain 
sceptical. Alexander Grant has pronounced all above interpretations unlikely 
and notes that "detailed analysis shows that none of these, nor any other 
element of society, was significandy more patriotic".95 The situation he 
described is not one of broad resolutions and clear-cut lines but one where 
various associations have to be weighed and loyalties considered before a 
decision is made. In the end individuals ended up fighting for - or against -
94 Watson, "The Enigmatic Lion", pp. 23-32. However, the argument on the "existence of 
a nationalism which looks uncannily like the modem version" would be called into 
question from the rest of the article. 
95 Ibid, p.24. 
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independence for diverse reasons: "patriotism, natural rebelliousness, 
personal feuds, or simply because they had little more to lose".% All the 
trappings of a feudal conflict were apparent: arguments and justifications 
based on ancient constitutions, alliances of interest, and the payment or not 
of homage. This was not a war between England and Scotland per se. It was a 
war mainlY between English and Scottish nobles. For the latter also squabbled 
between themselves, two generations of Bruces against Balliols, even in the 
face of foreign threat. If we admit Rosalind Mitchison's argument, we deal 
with a war between two states only at a later stage, after 1355, when Edward 
III left aside Edward Balliol's claims to the Scottish crown to replace them 
with his own. But even then we may talk about a conflict between two 
polities but not between two nations in the modem meaning. 
Some reflections on the Declaration of Arbroath and its significance 
for both nineteenth-century and contemporary historians may further 
illustrate this last observation. Andrew Lang paved the road considering it as 
"the classic note of national freedom,,97. He was not alone in holding this 
view. Tytler and Burton in a show of caution only pronounced the document 
"memorable" but the fact they quoted it at extensive length hints at their 
basic acceptance of its language.98 Bums called it a "manifesto" and 
employed it in many ways, not the least of which was to prove it displaying 
the "belief of the people as to their origin and position, as a nation". 99 John 
Mackintosh marked its "historical and constitutional importance" and kept 
his comments to a minimum, confining himself to the original text.
loo 
However, he had already hailed the 1309 declaration of the clergy as a virtual 
rehearsal to Arbroath, one that ''boldly asserted the constitutional rights of 
the people even in the choice of the King".lOl In the words of a modem-day 
96 Watson, "The Enigmatic Lion", p.26. 
97 Lang, A history 0/ Scot/and, I, p.230. 
98 Tytler, The history o/Scotland, I, pp. 140-41; Burton, The History o/Scotland, II, pp. 
283-87. 
99 Bums, The Scottish War, II, p. 382. 
100 Mackintosh, History o/Civilisation, I, pp.296-98. 
101 Ibid, I, p.288. 
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historian the Declaration of Arbroath is heard "ringing down the 
centuries" .102 Can it be accepted in that spirit and in good faith? 
The note rang was probably thought as off-key then in its hints at 
popular sovereignty. Its foremost function however was to achieve a political 
goal, not to proclaim a new ideology. The Barons and Estates of Scotland 
acted in an effort to persuade the Pope to recognise the Bruce and involye 
himself in the peace process between the Scottish and English kingdoms. 
Moreover, the Declaration was also a political text, drawing inspiration from 
the Bible, Roman historians and medieval political theorists, in order to serve 
the interests of Robert the Bruce's foreign policy.103 It was not drafted to be 
the Declaration of the Rights of Man but a tool in a war of words, 
accompanying the one in deeds. Certainly anti-English feelings were running 
high after thirty years of war between the two countries but to take this 
important document as anything more than indication of the early stages of a 
process leading to national consciousness would be carrying a significant 
risk.104 The fact that it remained in obscurity for three hundred years to re-
emerge in the rhetoric of anti-Union proponents when the prospects of a 
Union came under consideration should be enough to cast sufficient doubt 
on any claimed continuities. lOS Without doubt, Arbroath is indicative of 
national directions but it does not mark a full-blown consciousness. We may 
retrospectively view it today as the root of Scottish national identity or the 
beginning of a theory of constitutionalism but we also have the gift of 
102 Mackie, A history o/Scotland, p.77. 
103 A detailed discussion of the Declaration from different points of view is to be found in 
Grant G. Simpson, "The Declaration of Arbroath revitalised" in Scottish Historical 
Review LVI, (1977), 11-33 and E. J. Cowan, "Identity, Freedom and the Declaration of 
Arbroath" in Broun, Finlay and Lynch, Image and Identity, pp.38-69. Simpson 
emphasises that it must be seen as an "essentially diplomatic document". 
104 It is significant for the integration of nationalism in social and institutional structures 
that the interest of historians is attracted to such documents as the Declaration of 
Arbroath in contrast, for example, to the letter sent to Edward in 1291 in the name of the 
community of the realm stating that they could not reply in the place of their absent king. 
The former implies popular sovereignty while the latter does not. Inasmuch, of course, 
both are to be taken at face value instead of political moves. 
105 David McCrone, Understanding Scotland The sociology of a stateless nation, 
(London and New York, 1992), p. 19. 
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hindsight: with this in mind we should exercise caution and ask what was its 
purpose then, how was it meant to ring at its own time? 
This actually brings us to the crux of the whole subject. Nineteenth-
century historians have been looking to the Wars of Independence 
attempting to portray a feudal society, yet they were unable to suppress an 
urge to judge it based on ideas and values of their own time. Finding it 
difficult to detach themselves completely from the norms of Victorian 
Britain they were eager to project to the past attitudes and ideologies peculiar 
to their era; it was a map where the blank spaces of uncharted history could 
be colonised by geographers of purpose and explorers of ideology. As has 
been previously shown loyalties and identities in fourteenth-century 
Scotland, indeed all around Europe, were more complex and less inflexible 
than originally thought and could not be so easily reduced to trouble-free 
'patriotic/unpatriotic' patterns. Analytical tools and ideological categories 
employed in this way would eventually lead to false routes and run the 
danger of producing artificial results: the case of Robert the Bruce is 
instructive of such interpretations of facts. As will be shown later on, to 
account for his overall conduct his career is split to two distinct parts, before 
and after his claiming the crown. The early Bruce's performance is 
pronounced as "inconsistent", "vacillating", "not very creditable", belonging 
to a class showing "dubious movements and uncertain . " atms , 
"unscrupulously and perfidiously self-seeking,,106 while at the end of his 
career he is a perfect knight, the "restorer of the freedom of his country", the 
man who carried out his mission in the "independence of his country, and 
the restoration of the Scottish monarchy" .107 This was not so much a result 
of a radical change of character on Bruce's part as a consequence of the 
attempt to place him on a patriotic/unpatriotic axis. 
With this in mind we have to be quite careful in employing the terms 
'nation' or 'national identity' if we want to avoid projection of contemporary 
106 Tytler, The history of Scotland, I, p.50; Mackintosh, History of Civilisation, I, p.281; 
Burns, The Scottish War,I, p.435; Burton, The History of Scotland, II, p.186; Lang, 
History of Scotland, I, p.236. 
107 Burton, The History of Scotland, II, p.251; Tytler, The History of Scotland, I, p.47: 
Burns, The Scottish War, II, p. 419. 
- 97 -
norms and concepts to an era in which their modem content and patterns 
would not be recognisable. Would an "emotional nationalism"l08 be enough 
to describe Scotland's case? Precedents exist, as in the case of the accepted 
term 'sentimental Jacobitism'. However, from the later Middle Ages on we 
can safely speak of the rise of a sovereign territorial state - in contrast to 
city-states and other fonns of medieval polities. "Territorial states" equal 
"territorial identities" and this term would probably be closer to the 
standards of the time while permitting us to avoid the quagmire between 
accuracies and inaccuracies inherent in the course of continuing processes.I09 
Was there anything else besides the current paradigm of historical 
discipline that compelled accomplished historians as Tytler and Hill Burton 
to tread this road? One cannot help but feel that here a patent need for 
strengthening the concept of political continuity appears. There were reasons 
in the Scottish nineteenth century that called for a definite link with medieval 
times, a connection proving not only the existence of a Scottish state but the 
beginnings of a nation-state at least. A national consciousness in advanced 
stage was accepted, insofar as it provided the pedigree for that development. 
Walter Scott's observation in the introduction to Wavedry that Scodand had 
undergone the most 'complete change' of every European nation in the 
space of sixty years could be taken both in an optimistic and a pessimistic 
light. The benefits of the Union nobody could deny in good faith - and did 
not, as we are about to see below. The whole point of Unionist-nationalism 
rested exacdy there, in Scotland's recent prosperity and participation in the 
Empire. llo But Scott's remark had also another side: "what made Scotland 
108 Grant, Independence and Nationhood, p.26. 
109 On reasons why the rise of a sovereign state in Western Europe does not necessarily 
entail a rise of the nation state, see Hugh Seton-Watson, "On trying to be a historian of 
Eastern Europe" in Dennis Deletant and Harry Hanak (eds.), Historians as nation-
builders, (London, 1988), pp.l 0-11. 
110 On unionist-nationalism and its functions in mid-century Scottish society see Graeme 
Morton, Unionist-nationalism. Governing Urban Scotland 1830-1860, (East Linton, 
1999); Morton, "What if ? The significance of Scotland's missing nationalism in the 
nineteenth century" in Broun, Finlay and Lynch (eds.), Image and Identity: The ,\faking 
and Remaking of Scotland through the ages, pp.156-176; Morton, "Scottish Rights and 
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Scotland" - culture, language, mentality - was seriously threatened. 111 ~\ 
growing fear of Anglicisation, evident in the calls for reform in Scottish 
universities, in William Bums's defence of 'Great Britain', in the campaign 
for Scottish grievances the National Association for the Vindication of 
Scottish Rights waged between 1853 and 1856 show that a certain kind of 
malaise was affecting Scotland. A common characteristic definitely exhibited 
in all its aspects was a renewed search for Scottish identity. Without 
challenging the Union, for the most part, Scottish intellectuals were grasping 
for a definite space where Scotland could be placed. This was where the 
Wars of Independence might fit and help secure a distinct comer. 
What is striking about their treatment of the Union setdement is the 
unanimity in which they consider it as a natural or necessary measure. Hill 
Burton pronounced it "the happy climax of the great romance of our 
history ... Those who should never have separated are firmly united at last".112 
A linear progress led inexorably to that "natural flower of evolution", to 
borrow Andrew Lang's words. Divine Providence may have not been the 
author of this particular act but it was undoubtedly a pre-determined 
development: "nature designed the inhabitants of the isle of Britain to be 
citizens of a single state".113 Taylor, Mackintosh and Hume Brown lagged 
merely a step behind in their admission of the Union's necessity. Being an 
"essential measure" for peace and prosperity, or perhaps a product of "the 
uneasy conviction [of both nations] that union meant self-preservation", it 
was nevertheless an exercise in reading history backwards.114 Having the 
benefit of hindsight they could maintain that "the consenting testimony of a 
later time has approved the far-sighted wisdom of their [the advocates' of the 
Union] policy" or that "the least of all possible evils, was, in the process of 
'centralisation' in the mid-nineteenth century" in Nations and Nationalism, 2, (1996), 
257-279. 
III Marinell Ash, "Scott and historical publishing: The Bannatyne and Maitland Clubs" in 
Scots Antiquaries and historians. Papers read at the Silver jubilee conference of the 
Abertay Historical Society on 15 April 1972, (Dundee, 1972), p.29. 
112 Burton, The History o/Scotland, VIII, p.2. 
113 Lang, A history o/Scotland, IV, p. 522. Previous quotation by Lang in ibid, p.llO. 
114 Taylor, The Pictorial History, II, p.830; Brown, History of Scotland. Ill, p.8t. 
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time to become the greatest of all possible goods in this imperfect world,,115. 
The later confidence and sense of security in the majesty of Empire were 
employed to show that "politically it was best that the Island should be 
under one supreme government".116 Finally, the concluding years of the 
Scottish kingdom were nothing but a sham, since Scotland was already 
governed by the English "with royal commissioners and backstage 
methods", whereas the new arrangement restored true independence. For 
Lang, 
"there was actually more real independence and much less 
corruption in the country when it came to be represented in the 
open air and light of the Parliament of Great Britain, than when 
fighting against English Court influence, with an Opposition 
made up of hostile groups, in the Parliament House of 
Edinburgh". 117 
There was no disagreement then in the Union of 1707 being an auspicious 
event. But what was the significance, if any, of the War of Independence in 
it? 
For most of Scottish historians, unionist-nationalist and plain 
nationalist alike, prosperity lay inside the British Empire, so a comparison 
with the sorry status of Ireland was to ensue. It can be argued that in these 
remarks the United Kingdom's duality was pragmatically appraised. It may 
have been constituted by three partners in name but it was apparent to 
anyone that England and Scotland led and Ireland trailed. To explain this 
divergence a persuasive argument had to be put forward. Scottish historians 
chose to regard Ireland as an essentially conquered country, lacking the rights 
the War of Independence had secured for Scotland: 
"we have only to think of the most obvious consequences which 
must have resulted from Scotland becoming a conquered 
province of England; and if we wish for proof, to fix our eyes 
on the present condition of Ireland, in order to feel the reality 
115 Brown, History o/Scotland, pp.101-2; Lang, A history a/Scotland, IV, p.lIO. 
116 Mackintosh, History 0/ civilisation, III, p.23 1. 
117 Lang, A history 0/ Scotland, IV, p.l 09. 
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of all that we owe to the victory at Bannockburn and to the 
memory of such men as Bruce, Randolph, and DOuglas".118 
Whether somebody expected it or not, Wi111am Bums was prepared to take 
the same road: 
"the question at once suggests itself, whether such a union [one of 
equals] could ever have taken place by means of coercion on the 
part of England; and the case of Ireland answers that 
question ... and if so, then the actual union between England and 
Scotland was one of the "effects" of the War of 
Independence". 119 
More moderate nationalists than Bums, as Lord Elgin would attribute the 
Union's "great results" to the Bannockburn factor: indeed, they were "due to 
the glorious struggle which was commenced on the plain of Stirling and 
consummated on that of Bannockburn". 120 This was the final destination that 
Tytler and the rest were driving at. The Wars of Independence had made a 
continuous independence possible and that independence finally secured for 
Scotland the special relationship it was to enjoy in the Treaty of Union. The 
subordinate state of Ireland, on the other hand, was effectively attributed to 
its capacity as a loser in the wars with England. The terms of this 
comparison may look rather cynical by contemporary standards but they 
reinforced a constant in Scots' political rhetoric, that of a Union of equals. 
F or some, however, these were not the only terms in which a 
relationship with England could be expressed. Burns's resolution in 
exorcising homogeneity of race from a desired panel of national qualities, as 
we have previously noticed, related to attitudes and conceptions that sought 
to define a Highland/Lowland division in more than mere terms of culture. 
Teutonism functioned as a peculiar warp, drawing the Lowlander component 
118 Tytler, History of Scotland, I, p. 123. Taylor follows suit: "there cannot be a doubt 
that the proud position which Scotland now occupies, is, in no small degree, owing to the 
great deliverance achieved by the exertions of Bruce and his gallant compatriots". In 
Taylor, The Pictorial History, I, p.139. 
119 Bums, The Scottish War, II, pp.498-99. 
120 Quoted in Graeme Morton, "The Most Efficacious Patriot The Heritage of William 
Wallace in Nineteenth-Century Scotland" in The Scottish Historical Review. LXXVII. 
(1998),243. 
- 101 -
to England and pushing the Celtic even more to the fringes. Continuity and 
change in opposing opinions among the public concerning Highland Gaels 
in mid-nineteenth century has been the subject of detailed study by Krisztina 
Fenyo.121 Fenyo has shown how conflicting perceptions of a "hardly and 
gallant race" or a "people in a semi-barbarous state", in short 'contempt, 
sympathy and romance', were to be found side by side among the 
Lowlanders, even in the same newspaper.122 A curve may be traced though 
from the mid-1840s to the mid-1850s where largely contemptive views were 
replaced with largely sympathetic ones - although both were characterised by 
overlapping elements.123 The rehabilitation of the Gaels, if one may term it 
this way since differing opinions were indeed expressed both before and 
after the period under study, became possible in the context of the 
clearances, the famine of 1846 and the Crimean War. It coincided then with 
a form of integration in the British Empire, expressed in the creation of 
Highland regiments in the army, and the recurrence of a common European 
theme, that of the discovery of a traditional popular culture in the process of 
dying out during the transition to industrialisation. 
Underlining the attitudes discussed above, however, the rehabilitation 
of the Highlanders notwithstanding, were notions failing to undergo any 
marked change during that time: the persisting view of their being, all things 
considered, a different race from the Lowlanders 124 showed the 
pervasiveness of Robert Knox's and Herbert Spencer's ideas. Especially 
Knox's racial determinism that prescribed to it "literature, science, art - in a 
word, civilisation,,125 and was accompanied by offhand aphorisms of the 
Celts' ignorance of meaning of independence and their distinctiveness from 
the Lowland Saxons "as Negro from American" or "Hottentot from Caffre", 
121 Krisztina Fenyo, " 'Contempt, sympathy and romance'. Lowland perceptions of the 
Highlands and the clearances during the Famine years, 1845-1855", University of 
Glasgow thesis, (1996). [This work has now been published by Tuckwell Press, (East 
Linton, 2000)]. 
122 Fenyo, " 'Contempt, sympathy and romance' ", p.254. 
123 Ibid, pp. 67-154, 198-250. Common ground where the Highlanders were pictured as a 
doomed people is discussed in pp.263-283. 
1~4 Ibid, p.9. 
125 Ibid, p.58. 
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proved influential to figures which belonged by way of their affiliated 
institutions, if not their status as individuals, to the mainstream of British 
society and scholarship.l26 David Wilson (1816-1892), the founder of 
Scottish archaeology and James Hunt (1833-1869), president of the 
Anthropological Society of London formed two poles of acceptance of racial 
anthropology, one in mild, the other in radical form. It was implicit in the 
writings and conduct of the explorer Henry Morton Stanley (1841-1904) who 
thought of Africa as "a primeval place, untouched by history". It was also to 
be found in the admiration of the Saxon element's achievements at the 
expense of the Celts in the Scottish histories of Patrick Fraser Tytler and 
John Hill Burton.127 
This was precisely the course William Burns was trying to banish 
from Scottish historiography recognising in it a subversive element for 
Scottish nationality. It has been shown how Teutonism functioned in some 
among the Scots literati as the flipside of an institutional Anglo-Britishness. 
Expressed in the representation of Teutons as a people 
"distinguished for their love of freedom, the preservation of their 
ancient constitution and cornmon law throughout the vicissitudes 
of their political history, and, more recendy, for their commercial 
and manufacturing superiority" 
and contrasting them with the vicious, indolent and slavish Celts made an 
evident case for the English nation and their Lowland Saxon kin. 128 This 
professed "natural community of Saxons" found its institutional expression 
126 Colin Kidd, "Teutonist Ethnology and Scottish national inhibition, 1780-1880" in 
Scottish Historical Review, LXXIV, (1995), 58-9. Knox himself was a respected enough 
member of Edinburgh society and "influential Fellow of the Edinburgh College of 
surgeons" until a case of cadaver-procurement (the Burke and Hare scandal) put an end 
to his career and led him to engage in theoretical projects in which he casually expressed 
the necessity of the Celts' being "disposed of' for the sake of English safety. See Fenyo, 
" 'Contempt, sympathy and romance"', p.58-61; Kidd, "Teutonist Ethnology", 57. Also, 
Owen Dudley Edwards, Burke and Hare, (Edinburgh, 1993). 
127 Kidd, "Teutonist Ethnology", 49, 59-60; Felix Driver, "Henry Morton Stanley and his 
critics: Geography, Exploration and Empire" in Past and Present 133, (1991), 140. See 
also Christine Bolt, Victorian attitudes to race, (London, 1971). 
128 Kidd, "Teutonist Ethnology", 48. 
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in the British state and its manifest destiny in the imperial mission.129 The 
inherent dangers this view held for a Scottish national ideology were 
obvious, for stressing the preponderance of either the Saxon or the Celtic 
element in Scotland's past would mean failure to emphasise unity, thus 
undermining continuity. Constructing a potent national identity was not 
compatible with such fissures and Burns, for one, had grasped so. This is 
why he was so keen on refuting Hill Burton's attestation of Scottish and 
English being 'kindred peoples'. The latter's insistence in promoting the 
Saxons and m highlighting their affinities with the N onnans was 
accompanied by derision and criticism towards the Celts. Not only, 
according to Burton, "the days were long past when the Celt was a leader in 
civilisation" and the Goth was now "far ahead of him", it had also become 
the practise of the latter "to till the soil and enrich himself' while the fonner 
chose "to live idly and seize upon the riches of his Lowland neighbour when 
he could get at them" .130 In the beginning of his work Burns had issued an 
explicit warning to all those taking this line: "Pictish advocates" and 
"Saxonist racialists" were both undermining Scottish nationhood.131 Clearly, 
one of the aims of his work was that all these dissidents should stand 
corrected and fall into the patriotic line. The 'conflict of views' should be 
turned into unanimity. 
'Wallace' and 'The Bruce' 
Furnishing Scodand with a portion of the past on which a general 
consensus was achieved effectively meant this consensus needed symbols of 
129 Kidd, "Teutonist Ethnology", pp.61-2. 
130 Burton, The History of Scotland, II, pp.389-390. 
131 Bums, The Scottish War, I, pp.9-1O. However, Bums was accused himself of racialist 
attitudes against the English. Charles Rogers, with whom he was not on the best of tenns, 
charged him with "fomenting racial disharmony between Scotland and England, of 
hating England and of developing a theory of Scottish racial superiority". In H.J. 
Hanham, "Mid-century Scottish nationalism: romantic and radical" in R. Robson (ed.). 
Ideas and institutions of Victorian Britain: Essays in honour of George Kitson Clark, 
(London, 1967), p.162. 
- 104-
expression. These were already cast and the Scottish historians' responsibility 
was simply to disentangle the traditional figures from the literary webs 
centuries had spun and bring them back to reality. William Wallace and 
Robert the Bruce were to be recast and built again in an image contemporary 
society could recognise. Blind Harry's Wallace was in circulation from the 
later fifteenth century and what was good for a pre-reformation society could 
not presumably prove as popular in a more sophisticated one.132 The 
acceptance of Robert the Bruce, on the other hand, who as a kingly figure 
could provide for modem connotations - favourable or not - had to pass 
intact from the crooked path his many voltefaces during the war had opened. 
Having been properly depicted and embedded in their historical context 
Wallace and Bruce could be safely used by a wider public: nobles, 
commoners, civilians, agriculturists, merchants, churchmen, volunteers and 
masons133, all could be proud in the national figureheads - according to their 
favourite views. 
The first step would be to establish their respective characters. Since 
from this point of view the Bruce presents more of a challenge let us begin 
with him. As we have already pointed out the Bruce has been in a way a 
victim. of nineteenth-century methodology. To account for his stance in 
comprehensible language historians had to split his biography in two parts, 
before and after his espousal of the "national cause". For Tytler the earlier 
personality was "vacillating and inconsistent" but his sympathy towards 
monarchy and his protagonist's later conduct conspired to present quite a 
lenient verdict on him. Besides the mild reproach noted above he did not 
have anything else to tax him with. Bruce was just being "selfish" as all 
nobility in Tytler's interpretation, so he was not actually standing out by 
much. By contrast, the later Bruce was a leader of men. He was presented as 
a gallant knight134, accepting challenges, making speeches, encouraging his 
132 Morton notices the decline of Blind Harry's editions in the nineteenth century and 
shows the hero's continued existence in fashion through "shortened and paraphrastic 
versions". Morton, "The Most Efficacious Patriot", 226. 
133 Charles Rogers, The Book o/Wallace, 2 vols., (Edinburgh, 1889), vol. II, p.277. 
134 "He excelled in all the exercises of chivalry, to such a degree, indeed, that the English 
themselves did not scruple to account him the third best knight in Europe", Tytler, The 
history o/Scotland, I, p.159. 
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army as an accomplished generaL showing martial prowess 135 and military 
talent, giving quarter to his vanquished enemies: after Bannockburn in the 
place of slaughter and retaliation "we find a high-toned courtesy, which has 
called forth the praises of his enemies" .136 In the course of the war he 
managed to raise the spirit of his people and its successful conduct depended 
on him to such a point that Tyder declares he "stood alone and shared the 
glory with no one".137 Accordingly, his symbolic stature made him a giant 
among men: ''We only see through the mists which time has cast around it, a 
figure of colossal proportion 'walking amid his shadowy peers'" .138 
Burton's Bruce led a shadowy existence for the most part of his pre-
royal days. His changes of allegiance were reported and won him no praise -
but not severe blame either. With him as a pretext it was that Burton put the 
call to "follow the course of their [the nobles] actions in a spirit of 
indifference towards the personal motives at work" .139 Later, he was the 
model of chivalry: 
"a tall, strong man, of comely, attractive, and commanding 
countenance .. , he is a thorough paladin, dealing with sword or 
mace the doughtiest blows going in his day ... he can take to the 
ways of the half-naked mountaineer - can make long journeys on 
foot, scramble over ragged ground, and endure cold and hunger. 
He is steady and sanguine of temperament; his good spirits and 
good humour never fail, and in the midst of misery and peril he 
can keep up the spirits of his followers by chivalrous stories and 
pleasant banter. To women he is ever courteous, and he is kindly 
and considerate to all less able to bear fatigue and adversity than 
himself". 140 
\35 Tytler, The history a/Scotland, I, p.92, 99. At some point he kills "three soldiers who 
attacked him at the same time and at a disadvantage" Tytler reports. 
136 Ibid, I, p.122. One of his prisoners, Sir Mannaduke de Twenge he kept in his 
company for some time and then released him without asking for ransom, giving him 
presents instead. 
137 Ibid, I, p.156. 
\38 Ibid, I, p.159. 
139 Burton, The History a/Scotland, II, p.186. 
140 Ibid, II, p.251. 
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He died a hero, the "Good King Robert", whose reign was "success after 
success" .141 
It is possible that Andrew Lang read the younger Bruce's attitude in a 
more adept way than his predecessors discussed here. It is also possible this 
merely shows at play the bipolar relationship of a 'proletarian Wallace' and 
an 'opportunistic Bruce', in Graeme Morton's words, which seems to shape 
the nineteenth century national narrative around these two figures. Lang was 
careful to point out all the circumstances where the Bruces displayed "un-
patriotic" behaviour from the elder Bruce's feud with Balliol at the beginning 
of the interregnum to Robert the Bruce's going over to Edward in 1302.142 
At another point, just before Wallace's arrest he mentions that "Wallace was 
lurking about the Forth, when Bruce was doing Edward's business with zeal" 
and lets the reader judge by himself whose conduct was most acceptable.143 
Another implicit comparison was made between the two when Lang 
remarked that Edward's opponents were not fighting in 1306 "as Wallace 
fought, for king and country: they were fighting, at this moment, 'for their 
own hands'" .144 However, Lang too followed the rule in distinguishing two 
divergent eras in Bruce's life, before and after the death of Comyn: an 
"unscrupulously and perfidiously self-seeking" person turned after 1306 into 
a man of "unflinching resolution, consummate generalship, brilliant courage, 
perfect courtesy, consideration, reading, humour and wisdom".145 
Although these descriptions are heavily indebted to medieval 
chroniclers there is no doubt that they quickly took root in a process of 
symbolic representation that we are to follow later on with William Wallace 
as our guide. For the moment a passage from William Burns suffices to alert 
us to the existence of a tradition, running parallel to the official version of 
facts, that sought to present the Bruces as consistent defenders of the 
country's rights. The reference is to a "popular account" in which the elder 
141 Burton, The History a/Scotland, II, p.308. 
142 Lang, A history a/Scotland, I, pp. 163-64, 192. 
143 Ibid, I, p.194. 
144 Ibid, I, p.207. 
145 Ibid, I, p.236. Contrast this view with Hume Brown's work which shows a remarkable 
ability to smooth all possible points of contention and largely exonerates Bruce from his 
dubious past. In Brown, History a/Scotland, I, pp. 147, 151-169. 
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Bruce instead of asking for the partition of the kingdom in 1291, in order to 
receive his share, he rejected outright Edward's offer of the crown" 'unless 
he held it in freest royalty as his elders before him"'.I46 Unfortunately the 
author does not quote his source, possibly thinking it a matter of common 
knowledge; it nevertheless shows a tendency towards removing any lingering 
shadows to the past of a national hero and an intention to redeem the Bruces 
from the consequences of their doubtful early conduct. Both James Taylor 
and John Mackintosh tried to come up with plausible justifications of Robert 
the Bruce's initial inconsistencies and later commitment to the country's 
cause. Taylor's explanation involved an elaborate scheme on Bruce's part in 
which the "seeming inconsistencies" were in fact "the movements of a 
cautious and far-seeing policy ... [paving] the way for the establishment of his 
own claims and the restoration of his country's freedom".147 Mackintosh's 
argument follows his interpretation of the Declarations of Bruce's time as 
laying claim to popular sovereignty. Since this remained with the people, it 
was for them he had fought, not for the shake of himself or the restoration 
of kingship: "Robert I had now secured to the people of Scotland the full 
acknowledgement of their national independence and liberty" .148 The attempt 
to smooth the rough edges of a turbulent early rcign appeared vividly in the 
treatment of the campaign against Comyn in 1306. Far from pronouncing it 
a civil strife he purports it had been conducted in the name of ridding the 
country from one who "upheld the English authority in this quarter of the 
kingdom". 149 
Not fabricated out of nothingness or materialised out of thin air, 
William Wallace is nevertheless a figure concocted with a greater percentage 
of creativity than the Bruce. From the beginning of his career he is a myth 
for documentary evidence is scarce. "There are only... four writs and 
charters, a note guaranteeing safe passage for three monks and the trading 
letter produced in the name of Wallace and Murray while they were stationed 
146 Burns, The Scottish War, I, p.357. 
147 Taylor, The Pictorial History, I, p.114. 
148 Mackintosh, The History of Civilisation, I, p.302. 
149 Ibid, I, p.287. 
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in Haddington on 11 October 1297".150 Contrast this paucity of reality with 
Blind Harry's description of the man where Wallace became the proverbial 
giant of fairy tales: "Nyne quartaris large he was in lenth indeed/ Thryd part 
lenth in schuldrys braid was he/ Rycht sembly, strang and lusty for to se"lSI. 
Historians are most of the time in debt to their sources. As it was not 
conceivable that such a distinguished person as Wallace could remain in 
obscurity details had to come &om somewhere. They were only to be found 
in the chronicles of Blind Harry, Fordun and Wyntoun. It was not just that 
Tyder or Burton were caught on the "patriotic/corroboration nexus".IS2 A 
man's life, especially one that was crafted into a symbol of national 
inspiration and proportions could not be based on merely six documents. 
Therefore Wallace became a man of hasty and violent passions that 
turned out the extraordinary individual of Tyder's description.1s3 He upheld 
honourable causes, protecting the monks of Hexham from being harmed by 
his own soldiersls4 or trying to render the army disciplined.1ss Single-handedly 
he brought Scodand to the point of victory, only to be stopped by an 
obstructing nobility. Wallace managed while "not only unassisted, but 
actually thwarted and opposed by the nobility of his country" to render "the 
iron power of Edward completely broken, and Scodand once more able to 
lift her head among free nations" .IS6 This hostile attitude is &equendy 
underlined: his public measures as Governor of Scodand were taken in spite 
of the "jealousy and desertion of a great majority of the nobility".157 The 
greater barons "had envied his assumption of power" and acted in "selfish 
. I ." 158 Jea ousles . 
In Hill Burton Wallace was "the idol of the people", "a man of vast 
political and military genius", "the champion of the remnant of the 
150 Morton, William Wallace, p.19. 
151 Quoted in Morton, "The Most Efficacious Patriot", 233. 
152 Morton, William Wallace, p.51. 
153 Tytler, The history of Scotland, I, p.48. 
154 Ibid, I, p.57. 
155 Ibid, I, p.58. 
156 Ibid, I, p.55. 
157 Ibid, I, p.58. 
158 Ibid, I, p.60. 
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Saxon,,159. His Norman family had integrated with the Scots after living 
among them for so long that differences became almost nonexistene60: 
"They were all in a common adventure, and he was but the chief 
adventurer" .161 As the "representative of popular nationality" he was the real 
danger Edward faced after Stirling.162 It was implied though that what 
Wallace expressed was somehow out of the current set of rules and feudal 
regulations and therein lay Edward's "real difficulty" .163 
Taylor being a minister, his Wallace was raised as a gift from the 
Almighty, an Anglo-Norman, but neither rich nor noble - a status that 
somehow redeemed and excluded him from his 'mercenary' compatriots. As 
the author followed closely the chronicles, his Wallace was probably the 
most fabulous figure of all. This became apparent both in the narrative of his 
youth exploits164 and his trial. In the latter Taylor followed Tytler in stating a 
purported answer in which a defiant Wallace rejected accusations of treason 
on the grounds of never having sworn fealty to Edward I. He also saw fit to 
put into his mouth an acknowledgement of everything having been done in 
the discharge of the "duty to his country". 165 Consequendy, the author 
remained a subscriber to the view that Wallace was in away, sabotaged by 
the nobles, who being in opposition to him, did not bother to help after 
S tirling.166 
Preconceptions seemed to guide Lang's view of Wallace too. Lang's 
attempt to parry one of the English charges of theft levied against him is not 
based on hard evidence but conjecture founded on his moral character. The 
fact that an Englishman was also involved made the case appear even shakier 
to the historian: "it is most improbable that the heroic Wallace bilked a 
tavern-keeper with an Englishman for his accomplice".167 To pronounce the 
159 Burton, The History olScotland, II, p.179, 181, 198. 
160 Ibid, II, p.179. 
161 Ibid, II, p.180. 
162 Ibid, II, p.225. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Taylor, The Pictorial History, I, pp.93-94. 
165 Ibid, I, p. 110. 
166 Ibid, I, p.97, 99,102. 
167 Lang, A history olScotland, I, p.180. 
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incident true or false is beside point. What draws attention 1S Lang's 
conviction on the projected attitude of a shadowy figure. It did not matter 
how Wallace acted in reality but how he should have acted in order to live up 
to his myth and conform to the historian's standards. Conceding that many 
facts about his life were the stuff of legend, he still used the language of 
legends to depict him "ruthless and strong, like some sudden avenging Judge 
of Israel" .168 The comparison to Jeanne d' Axc, although "not gende and 
winning like the maid" 169, is in fact telling enough of the mythical 
proportions Wallace was gaining as a national symbol. 
An "ordinary Scotsman's highest ideal of patriotism" is how William 
Burns chose to introduce his version of Wj]]jam Wallace.170 Lord Hailes' 
account not being able to "satisfy any intelligent mind,,171 the author took it 
upon himself to fulfil that duty in proceeding to conjecture, to imagining 
"how it must have been" for Wallace. In this way Burns refuted Hill 
Burton's conjectures about Wallace's birth and family with his own, 
attributed his purported gigantic stature to the way war was waged in his 
time and his strong character and prowess to the simple fact that besides his 
lowly origin he rose to become a leader of men. l72 To discover this leader's 
origins Burns relied to chroniclers, including such obscure figures as 
"Master Blair", schoolfellow of Wallace and Thomas Gray, a parson from 
Ubertoune. These were put in the same league as nineteenth-century 
historians and were for the most part, more leniendy treated. In the eyes of 
Burns they represented an established tradition which he revered and 
equalled to 'accepted truth'. In national matters he was prepared to put away 
scepticism and recognize the importance of creative credulity. Suspending 
unrelenting reason and attention to sentiments, this was the way to 'great 
actions' for individuals and nations.173 National history, as Burns wrote it, 
sanctioned the use of imagination in the absence of facts. 
168 Lang, A history of Scotland, I, p.196. 
169 Ibid. 
170 Burns, The Scottish War, I, p.397. 
171 Ibid. 
172 Ibid, I, pp. 397-405. 
173 See above, pp.89-90 for Burns's views on the function of history. 
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Wallace forms another case of a fabricated symbol. He may not have 
been an invention of historians but the scarcity of sources on his person 
cannot fail to amaze. The little known facts about his actual life before his 
involvement in Scotland's War of Independence are reiterated by every 
historian, without exposing his transparency. On the contrary, by 
encountering the same facts everywhere one gets a sense of authenticity as 
lack of variations must equal truth. However, there are times when this 
presence grows too ghosdy even for a symbol. The only incident from his 
childhood Tytler recounted had to do with his education, attributing his love 
of country to the teachings of a priest, uncle of Wallace, who "deploring the 
calamities of his country, was never weary of extolling the sweets of liberty, 
and lamenting the miseries of dependence" .174 Significant as it may be for the 
course of the historian's argument, it remains a mere snippet of information 
for a figure of the historical proportions Wallace was given. 
On the other hand, the amount of information may be just right, if 
we think of Robert the Bruce, the other great Scottish symbol. We know far 
more about Bruce than we may even wished for: details of his questionable 
dealings with Edward prevent him of securing first place in national symbolic 
imagery. Wallace can be the man of the people, because there is little else we 
have on him. But Bruce is not a spectral figure and can be held accountable 
for blame or praise in almost all the crucial instances of the War. Therefore, 
Robert the Bruce appears only too real to become good myth material. Not 
that there has been no effort for his life to be accommodated to certain 
norms: his initial conduct towards Edward I was properly downplayed.175 
Yet, without the appropriate mythical elements no effective and satisfying 
national symbols can be proclaimed. 
/ b · ,,176 ~n Blind This is why there is a "patriotic corro oratlve nexus .ll.< 
Harry's half-hearted acceptance by Tyder and Hill Burton; the "role of 
patriotic belief to sustain unwarranted and dangerous assumptive arguments 
174 Tytler, The history a/Scotland, I, pA8. 
175 Tytler's treatment is quite lenient: "The conduct of the younger Bruce, afterwards the 
heroic Robert the First, was at this period vacillating and inconsistent'". Tytler, The 
history a/Scotland, I, p.50. 
176 Morton, William Wallace, p.5l. 
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made to sit alongside more reasoned judgement and usually within the same 
text"l77 is something every national historian has to face. It is a matter of 
"both scientific and national duty" in the apt phrase of Konstantinos 
Paparrigopoulos. In appreciating the bipolarity of Bruce and Wallace we 
meet an axis pointing to different directions: patriotism/opportunism 
coupled with popular/aristocratic dichotomies. "Wallace was the man of the 
people to Bruce's ennoblement, the outlaw to the monarch, the loyal Scot to 
the political opportunist" .178 I would add that sometimes and to some extent 
he was the Scottish to the Norman-English as well. However, many times 
and in the course of the same text, when Wallace quits the stage Bruce 
undergoes a transformation that makes him thoroughly acceptable as 
continuing the former's work in drawing all classes into a "community of 
the realm". The process follows a double course: to proceed in this move it 
is implied that Bruce casts away his aristocratic/Norman characteristics and 
comes nearer to the people too. Finally, it all comes down to what William 
Burns had noted with exceptional precision in the end of his Scottish War of 
Independence. Wallace and Bruce, far from being disjointed by some 
fundamental rift, were there to act as complementary figures. The former 
was a kind of link, "standing between the past and the future", ready to "pass 
onwards to a new generation the idea of an unbroken nationality" while the 
latter "accepting the trust, should carry it to a successful issue ... As the one 
departed, his mantle fell on the other ... Had there been no Wallace, there would have been 
no Bruce; had there been no S tiding-bridge, there would have been no Bannockburn" .179 
The culmination of this relationship eloquendy presented itself in the 
building of the National Wallace Monument in Stirling. Although the 
monument was situated at Abbey Craig the laying of the foundation stone 
was scheduled for the 24th June 1861, the anniversary of Bannockburn. That 
morning 50,000 people, over 200 Masonic lodges and 40 bands playing 
"Scots wha hae" swarmed there to commemorate the day. Henry Glassford 
Bell, although the tower was yet to be built, declared he looked upon it as a 
reflex of the spirit of the age; a place where "the living pulse of Scotland 
177 Morton, William Wallace, p.5l. 
178 Morton, "The Most Efficacious Patriof', 239. 
179 Burns, The Scottish War, II, p.521. My italics. 
- 113 -
beats ... In its architecture it is simple, national and appropriate".I80 Bruce and 
Wallace were the "deathless two". And Scottish nationality was "not 
weakness, not jealousy, not dissension, but one of the main pillars and 
supports of the whole British Empire" .181 
Conclusion 
The Scottish national narrative in the Victorian age may not have 
provided us with nationalists, as Morton maintains, but it certainly displays a 
group of national historians. That said, it must not be thought it designates a 
team or implies any affiliations resting on disciplinary principles and political 
ideas. In this respect the Scottish historical context would reveal a 
fragmentary picture.182 Categorisation is not an easy task once more. A 
negative view of the Scottish past may have been indeed the centrepiece of 
Tory historians such as Tytler - while he, Hill Burton and Andrew Lang also 
promoted an Episcopalian view of Scodand - but in the course of the 
nineteenth century there were others who took pains to re-establish 
Scodand's reputation by way of the middle ages. William Burns, James 
Mackintosh and Peter Hume Brown focused their interests in stressing 
Scottish national independence in the wake of the Wars of Independence 
and reinforced Scottish nationality and identity. Tytler, Burton and Lang did 
not lag far behind in that aspect, each with his own variations and 
peculiarities. Lang and Tytler were noted for their royalist and aristocratic 
sympathies and the latter showed something of it in protecting Bruce and 
allowing him much the spotlight. William Bums may have attempted to put 
everything under a nationalist light but in his basic assumptions concerning 
the Wars of Independence he found himself less an aberration - actually well 
within the norm. Criticism of these historians' work did not touch their 
handling of the Later Middle Ages- with the possible exception of Burns, 
who, never mind the tide Tyder had laid claim to in the 1830s, was writing as 
if his was not just the only, but the only possible history of Scodand. E,ren 
180 Rogers, The Book a/Wallace, II, p.277. 
181 Ibid, II, p. 287,292, addresses of Sheriff Bell and James Dodds respectively. 
182 See Kidd, Subverting Scotland's past, especially pp.247-280. 
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when Tytler came under fire it was as "the grandson of the zealous 
vindicator of Mary' and the "Episcopalian historian of a Presbyterian 
country', not as the defiler of Wallace and Bruce's memory.183 
They all presented an essentially common view of Scotland in the 
Wars of Independence in denouncing English aggression, praising Wallace 
and more or less Bruce and finding the "common people" as true 
representatives of the nation and real protagonists of the struggle; as Ash 
puts it "all Scots could agree to be proud" in the War of Independence.184 It 
was not to be a replay of a consensus of Whig historiography in Scottish 
guise though, since its protagonists lay on either side of the Whig spectrum. 
Furthermore, the effort in tracing freedom, independence and nationality did 
not celebrate Scottish constitutional history and achievements but was 
influenced by the comparative example of England to which it had to 
185 measure. 
It also culminated in a sort of preparation and anticipation of the 
Union which Mackintosh considered as "one of the most beneficial events in 
the history of the country" .186 Andrew Lang, John Hill Burton and James 
Taylor in his Pictorial History of Scot/and significandy opted for concluding their 
works not in bringing them up to their contemporary times but stopped just 
after 1745. Not necessarily because they were Jacobites - although it was told 
of Lang that "his chance of politics was gone with Culloden,,187 - but 
because in this timeline they had reached their own inevitable end of story. 
The consolidation of the Union was unassailable and its beneficial influence 
was there for everyone to see. lSS Furthermore, their work provided 
183 Kidd, "The Strange Death ... revisited", 97. Ash, The Strange Death, p.1l8. John 
Steill's attack in P.F. Tytler called to account for his misrepresentations of the life and 
character of Sir William Wallace, (Edinburgh, 1846) is the sole exception. 
184 Ash, The Strange Death, p.103. 
185 See Kidd, Subverting Scotland's past; Kidd, "The Strange Death ... revisited". 
186 Mackintosh, The History of Civilisation, III, p.209. 
187 Dictionary of National Biography, 1912-1921. 
188 Practitioners of nineteenth-century history regarded it as a linear process and 
subscribed to a cult of progress: John Macintosh's History of Civilisation in Scotland 
attests to that in carving a course from "the mists of far-gone ages" to the "light of 
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justification for the special relationship the Scots felt their country enjoyed-
or was entitled to enjoy - since the Union. The Scottish Wars of 
Independence had secured the continuing presence of Scotland, thus maJcing 
certain that it was only in a Union of equals that the two states would unite. 
This argument put forward a distinct place for Scotland and provided it with 
a usable past. Unionist sentiments were not challenged to a significant degree 
in Scotland, yet a certain feeling of Scottish national identity was evident and 
on the rise. Meanwhile, the Wars of Independence threw a lifeline for the 
forging of a common identity as a counter-argument to those who, treading 
in the footsteps of Pinkerton, Chalmers, Cosmo Innes and W.F. Skene, were 
putting in danger the common past by maintaining the distinctiveness of 
racial elements. Nevertheless, there were threads in this past that could be 
exploited to sustain arguments in diverse ways as we are to see later on: in 
celebrating a thoroughly British, a markedly Scottish or even dual identities _ 
plus a nwnber of variations. Several ideological undercurrents were at play 
and there was potential for the "white dwarf of Europe,,189 to break off 
further gravitational collapse into neutron star. 
In the end, developing a national consensus resting on a fixed point 
in the past was a prerequisite for the subsequent emergence of nationalist 
rhetoric. Nationalists, however, in the nineteenth, and to a far greater extent 
in the twentieth century, were preoccupied with other matters. Their sights 
were set upon diverse aspects of Scotland's relations with England and 
especially on the amount of influence exacted in Scottish culture and society. 
Tracing back this problem to its roots intellectuals such as Andrew Dewar 
Gibb were, as we shall see below, to focus on the Union as the turning point 
par excellence. In underlining its questionable aspects they brought to the fore 
a theme forming the core of similar perceptions since the 1850s : Scotland, 
instead of enjoying an equal partnership was on the receiving end of 
contempt befitting a subjugated province. To solidify their arguments on 
English attitudes they had to rely in part on examples from the pre-Union 
days - and this is where the consensus built around the Wars of 
consciousness dawning" to the achievements of industry and culture in his times, 
Mackintosh, The History o/Civilisation, I, pp.17-21. 
189 Kidd, Subverting Scotland's past, p.280. 
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Independence proved handy. The medieval past did not pose a problem 
because it had been rendered stable and tangible. Its more tricky points that 
considered Scottish feudalism could be conveniently consigned to obscurity 
while the stage was being taken by the appeal and legitimacy that William 
Wallace and Robert the Bruce conveyed. Having entered the canon of 
national history, the Wars of Independence could be finally reduced to the 
figures of their two protagonists and provide the much-needed foundations 
of nationalist ideology. The nationalists are winning indeed, but with Tytler's 
and Hill Burton's Wallace. 
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Chapter Three 
'High hopes, meagre results': Perceptions of the 
Greek War of Independence in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, 1853-19391 
The Greek War of Independence (1821-1830) may not have been 
stricdy the first independence movement in Southeastern Europe - the 
Serbs preceded it in 1804 - but it was certainly the first one to generate 
widespread concern and a whole romantic movement, that of philhellenism. 
Correspondence of ideas and reactions towards the Greek Revolution 
illustrate a dividing line of European interest in the Balkans since the Age of 
Enlightenment. Although the nineteenth century bred a whole wave of 
romantic philhellenes, eager to fight alongside Greeks or donate money for 
their cause, today the circumstances of this age are largely forgotten. This is 
not surprising, of course, since the Eastern Question has been succeeded by 
the Middle-Eastern and other riddles of diplomacy. In this light a brief 
summary of facts and phases of the Greek Revolution and its ideological 
context should be carried out before proceeding to examine how it was 
perceived in the last two centuries by historians both foreign and Greek. 
1 Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos's final verdict on the Greek Revolution was that 
although it was instigated with "high hopes" it concluded in "meagre results". In 
Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos, [UTopia TOV EMr,vIKOV FJJvovC; wro raw apxalO'raTWV 
xpovwv /Jexpl rwv Ka(}' '1/JaC;, 7 vols., (First edition: 1860-1874, Athens. Edition used: 
Athens, 1932), vol. ~T', p.196. Paparrigopoulos's hint here was a subtle comment on the 
inefficacy of the independent kingdom. 
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The Greek movement clearly derived from the heritage of the 
French Revolution and exhibited all the characteristics of a national uprising. 
There was a previous flourishing of a merchant element inside the Ottoman 
Empire and the Greek communities in Europe2, a general interest in 
education, an intellectual movement mainly carried out by Greeks of the 
diaspora, known as the 'Greek Enlightenment', influenced by its European 
counterpart and seeking to emphasize ties to the renowned ancient past.3 
The War of Independence can be viewed as part of an 'age of Revolutions' 
with similar causes and demands both in Europe and the Americas that 
heralded the start of a 'long nineteenth century,.4 The fact that Greek 
delegates in the Congress of Verona in 1822 denied any possible ideological 
connections between their insurrection and current rebellions in Italy and 
Spain was a desperate political move to avoid being branded as '} acobinists' 
or carbonari by the Holy Alliance. This attempt to mollify an initial negative 
inclination among European monarchs and at the same time not to alienate 
the Great Powers, who could in all probability guarantee their independence 
at a later date, did not necessarily echo the Revolutionaries' authentic 
political stance. Evidence on the latter can be seen in the influences from 
2 For a Greek merchant class in Europe and the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth 
century see T. Stoianovich, "The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant", Journal of 
Economic History, XX, (1960); George D. Frangos, "The Philike Hetaireia: A premature 
national coalition" in Richard Clogg, The Struggle for Greek Independence. Essays to 
mark the I50'h anniversary of the Greek War of Independence, (London, 1973). For 
Greek commercial activity in general, see Nikos Svoronos, Le commerce de Salonique 
au XVIlle siecle, (paris, 1956); Vassilis Kremmydas, To e/i1U5plO UK llclmrovw7uov urov 
I SO alwva, (Thessaloniki, 1972). 
3 For more on the subject see Konstantinos Th. Dimaras, NeOeMTfVIKOC; Ala.qJ(J)T1U/iOC;, 
(Athens, 1985); Paschalis M. Kitromilides, NeOeMYfVIKOC; A laqJ(J)TIUf-lOC;, (Athens, 1998); 
Kitromilides, Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy: studies in the culture and 
political thought of Southeastern Europe, (New York, 1994); Kitromilides, The 
Enlightenment as Social criticism Iosipos Moisiodax and Greek culture in the 
eighteenth century, (New York, 1992). 
4 EJ.Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolutions 1789-1848, (London, 1962). 
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the French revolutionary constitutions that may easily be traced in the first 
constitutional documents of the War of Independence. 5 
However, it has to be admitted that in many cases the path leading 
from the Greek to the French Revolution, despite constitutional guarantees 
of equality and fraternity or even some local social movements, was more 
narrow than straight. The distance was far indeed, the culture and necessities 
different. When in 1798 Christoforos Perraivos, a friend and follower of 
Rigas Velestinlis, celebrated as forerunner of the Greek Revolution, wrote an 
enthusiastic 'hymn to general Bonaparte', he set it on the tune of r;;a ira. The 
choice highlighted Greek hopes and priorities because at the time of the 
Directoire a song of the Terror would be much too radical in France.6 The 
ilipside comes from 1824, when in the midst of the Revolution there was a 
French plan to secure a contemplated throne of Greece for the Duke de 
Nemours, grandson of Philippe Egalite. George Kountouriotis, one of the 
most prominent island primates, vehemendy denied it on the grounds of his 
being a descendant of one of the murderers of Louis XVI.7 Here, the French 
Revolution was already presented as a threat to the status quo. 
From the start of the war European assistance was sought and there 
was a conscious effort to appeal to the Great Powers to intervene and make 
the Ottoman Empire accept Greek independence. This effort was backed by 
serious military successes during the fitst two years and a stabilisation of 
supremacy in the Peloponnese until 1823. In the first phase of the war the 
virtues of the guerrilla tactics of the armed bandits known as klephts had 
5 On the constitutions of the Revolution see A. Mamoukas, Ta Kara UfV avaytvvrwlV Ufe; 
EMaboe;, 1jTOll1VMOylj rmv m;pi UfV avayevvmJ.lfnnrv EMMa l1Vvrax{}tvrmv 1CollTfmJ.larmv, 
vOJ.lmv Kal illmv rnuJ11J.lmv 1Cpa'emv a1Co rov 1921 J.lBx.P' rov rilove; 1832, (Athens, 
1839-1852). The first Greek constitution, drafted in 1822, was modelled on the French 
constitution of 1795 according to Paschalis M. Kitromilides, "European political thOUght 
in the Making of Greek Liberalism: The Second National Assembly of 1862-1864 and 
the Reception of John Stuart Mill's Ideas in Greece" in Enlightenment, Nationalism, 
Orthodoxy. Studied in the culture and political thought of south-eastern Europe, 
(Aldershot, 1994), p.12 
6 In Apostolos Daskalakis, Ta airla Kal 01 1W.{Xi:yOVTE:e; Uf<; EJ..hfvl1dfe; E1Cava(]Taocme;, 
(Paris, 1927), p.24. 
7 In Panayotis Pipinelis, nolm1df [(]Topia Ufe; EV..r,vl1dfe; E1CavaOTaocme;, (Paris. 1927), 
p.185. 
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secured a string of local victories in Roumeli and the Peloponnese. The 
principal castles, where the Turkish element sought shelter after the 
outbreak of the Revolution, were forced to surrender and in some cases as 
, 
in Tripolitza, massacres were reported. A full retort from the Ottoman 
Empire was hampered by the fact that Ali Pasha of Epirus, probably the 
strongest regional prefect, who was practically running his pashalik as a 
virtually independent state, had rebelled in 1820 and the war against him 
kept significant forces occupied. Reprisals followed however in the Ottoman 
Empire when news of the outbreak of the Revolution reached 
Constantinople. The Ecumenical Patriarch, whose place in the Ottoman 
administration as millet bashi, leader of the community, rendered him 
responsible in the eyes of the Sultan for the disobedience of his subjects, 
was executed although he had promptly denounced the initial stage of the 
Revolution, Alexandros Hypsilantis's movement in the Danubian 
Principalities of Wallacma and Moldavia. Several bishops, Primates and 
other Greeks were also killed throughout the Ottoman Empire. When 
Sultan Mahmud II managed to mobilise his forces in 1822, Mahmud 
Dramali Pasha and his host of 20.000 were brought to ruin by Theodoros 
Kolokotronis's guerrilla war in the Peloponnese.8 
What was build up in this time though was almost lost after a series 
of bitter rivalries for power and civil strife brought on by particularistic 
tendencies. Wealthy Primate families, as those of Zaimis or Kountouriotis, 
klepht chiefs turned popular military captains, as Theodoros Kolokotronis 
and Odysseas Androutsos, men educated in Western Europe and eager to 
follow a career in politics, as Alexandros Mavrokordatos and Ioannis 
Kolettis vied for the right to exercise authority in the liberated areas. 
Rivalries were exacerbated because of severe particularism between 
Rumelians and islanders on the one side, and the Peloponnesians on the 
8 See Douglas Dakin, The Greek Struggle for Independence, (London, 1973), pp.41-1 03. 
For Ali Pasha's significance, see Dennis N. Skiotis, "The Greek Revolution: Ali Pasha's 
last gamble" in Nikiforos P. Diamandouros, John P. Anton, John A. Petropoulos and 
Peter Topping (eds.), Hellenism and the First Greek War of Independence (/821-1830): 
Continuity and change, (Thessal on iki , 1976). For Hypsilantis's movement in the 
Wallachia-Moldavia, see E.D. Tappe, "The 1821 Revolution in the Rumanian 
principalities" in Clogg (ed.), The Struggle for Greek Independence. 
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other. These rifts that led to civil war in 1824-1825 diminished the fighting 
capability of Greeks to a critical point. While in 1826 and 1827 the 
revolutionary forces desperately hang on in the Peloponnese, locked in 
uneven battles with the well-trained regular troops of Ibrahim Pasha, 
European intervention came in the form of a naval battle at Navarino where 
British, French and Russian ships destroyed an Ottoman fleet and 
determined the outcome of the War of Independence. In January 1828, after 
a preliminary treaty in London and with the agreement of the Great Powers, 
Ioannis Kapodistrias arrived at Egina to assume the powers of Governor of 
Greece. The remaining years until the recognition of an independent state in 
22 January/3 February 1830 were times of negotiations between the Great 
Powers and the Ottoman Empire and political troubles inside Greece 
between supporters and opponents of the newly appointed Governor that 
finally led to his murder in 1831. An end to the Revolution though did not 
come until 18/30 August 1832, when a London protocol determined the 
borders of the new state.9 In January 1833 the designated King Otto I, son 
of Leopold, King of Bavaria, reached the capital of Nafplion, where an 
enthusiastic crowd awaited him. His reign however was to prove less 
auspicious than its expectations. 
In the rest of this chapter I propose to exatnme major general 
histories dealing with the subject of the Greek War of Independence from 
the 1850s to the 1930s, written by both Greek and foreign historians. On 
the part of the latter it has to be remarked beforehand that the impact of the 
Greek War of Independence in European historiography has been felt more 
then than now. There exists an array of French, German and British 
histories of the Revolution spanning the nineteenth century, most of them 
having been written by people like the Scots Thomas Gordon and George 
9 For developments in Greece in 1824-1832, Dakin, The Greek Struggle for 
Independence, pp.l23-312. On the events of the Revolution in general see Dakin, The 
Greek Strugglefor Independence, (London, 1973) and The Unification of Greece, 1770-
1923, (London, 1972); Clogg (ed.), The Strugglefor Greek Independence. Also, Iuropia 
rov EJJ.r,VIKOV E()vovc;, vol. IB', (Athens, 1975). A brief summary of the Revolution in 
Charles and Barbara lelavich, The Establishment of the Balkan national states, 1804-
1920, (Seattle and London, 1977), pp. 38-52. 
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Finlay and the American Samuel Gridley Howe, keen observers involved in 
the events, with personal experience of time and place. I have tried to keep 
some balance between nationalities, political affiliations and also between 
these observers turned historians and later academic historians who wrote 
with the benefit of distance from time and place. The sample is 
representative of major trends but not exhaustive. I have focused on some 
of the most popular and acclaimed works and tried to avoid repeating 
similar sets of arguments: one might opt for, say, G.G. Gervinus instead of 
Mendelssohn Bartholdy to underline the German viewpoint, or Amvrosios 
Frantzis instead of Ioannis Philimon to explain the defence of the 'Russian' 
party, without altering the final picture. 
What I am interested in is the interpretation of this era from a 
historian's point of view, so memoirs, speeches and short sketches of 
individuals are not included, although they undoubtedly illustrate the facts 
and were the primary material historiographers built upon along with official 
documents. However, in approaching the Greek War of Independence in 
this frame we have to keep in mind the possible purposes the works 
presented here could be serving. As far as it concerns our Greek 
representatives what comes to light is not so much an early flourishing of 
history as a discipline but as an extension to memory. Even the most 
ambitious efforts, the one of Spyridon Trikoupis or Ioannis Philimon, lack a 
strict methodological character and consequently do not make for a striking 
difference to the array of memoirs that freedom fighters - Theodoros 
Kolokotronis, Nikolaos Kasomoulis, Ioannis Makrygiannis to name the 
most informative and interesting works - produced either themselves or 
with the help of contemporary scholars. 
Justification of their actions was necessary for a number of reasons. 
The War of Independence had generated a number of internal rifts: social 
ones, between kotzabashis (primates) and the popular element; political ones, 
between military and administrative authorities at first, later on among the 
'parties'; territorialist ones, between Rumeliots and Peloponnesians. Politics 
did not vanish when Greece was declared an independent Kingdom and the 
generation taking part in the struggle did not disappear from stage in one 
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night. to On the contrary, its representatives would claim their right to 
participate in decision making and remain active until fairly late, Antonios 
Kriezis being prime minister in 1849-1854, Konstantinos Kanaris until even 
later, in 1877. 
To justify their decisions then, both present and past, those who 
essayed to establish a history of the Greek Revolution did so in defending 
their personal interests and ideological convictions. Two examples will 
suffice: Spyridon Trikoupis could not avoid criticism on his being biased 
since he was a long time companion to Alexandros Mavrokordatos, 
favoured the 'English' party and had played a crucial role in the 1825 appeal 
to Britain to protect Greece. He was also quite sympathetic to the primates, 
being himself one of them. Amvrosios Frantzis, on the other hand, had 
written in 1839-1841 to vindicate Kolokotronis and refute all the arguments 
of the Anglophiles.11 Ioannis Philimon had concluded at an early time his 
contribution on the Phifiki Hetaireia but one of its most significant founding 
members, Emmanuel Xanthos, strongly disagreed with his views and 
presented his own version in 1845.12 In the end, the quest for a universal 
truth on the facts of the War of Independence, vividly expressed as the aim 
of these works, turned out to a series of partial and individualistic ones. Tbis 
however only applies to what in the long run amounts to historical snippets. 
In ideological matters, the line these works formed was impenetrable. 
The judgemental frame of mind nineteenth-century historians 
exhibited means that these works may frequently exhibit an air of challenge 
and polemic. It does not necessarily guarantee innovations or new lines of 
10 See Christos Lyrintzis, To rt).o~ rcvv «rt;axlwv».KolVcvvia Kal1CoAmKf! U"C1fV Axaia 'COv 
19°0 alwva, (Athens, 1991) for continuities in Greek political elites before and after the 
Revolution. 
11 See Nikiforos P. Diamandouros, "Bibliographical Essay" in Diamandouros, Anton, 
Petropoulos and Topping, Hellenism and the First Greek War of Liberation (J 821-
1830), pp.205-9. 
12 Amvrosios Frantzis, E1Cl'COf.i~ UK l(nopia~ Uf~ avaycvv'l(kia1!~ EllMO~ apX0f.iev'l a1CO 
'COv trov~ 1715 Kal hTYovua 'CO 1835, 4 vols., (Athens, 1839-1841); Ioannis Phi limon, 
J01df.iIOV I(}"COPIKOV 1Cepi Uf~ cpa'Kf!~ Er:alpeia~, (Nafplion, 1834); Emmanuel Xanthos, 
A1C0f.iV'l/.loveV/.lara 1CE:pi Uf~ cpalKf!~ Eralpei~, (Athens, 1845); Spyridon Trikoupis, 
l(}"Copia Uf~ Ell'lVIKf!~ E1Cava(}"Co.uecv~, 4 vols., (London, 1853-1857). 
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sight. I hope to show there is a certain general image of the War of 
Independence emerging from these works, especially those of Greek authors 
: a kind of beautified approach that blunted certain edges to sharpen others, 
throwing light on specific comers and darkening those that could prove 
difficult to tread on. Foreign historians were less prone to such tailoring but 
most of them could not easily shed stereotypes and labels that circulated 
freely in Western Europe considering the Orient. Finally, through this 
proposed discussion I will attempt to focus on the fine line between politics 
and history and underline the interplay between history and nationalism. 
Building the consensus: Greek historians 
Spyridon Trikoupis : History as an exercise in morals 
Spyridon Trikoupis's (1788-1873) History of the Greek Revolution was 
an ambitious work in its conception and scope. We may determine the 
measure of Trikoupis's ambition if we consider that he saw fit to begin this 
work with a declaration of objectivity, evoking Thucydides' methodology as 
his primary guide in his investigations.13 This preoccupation with the ancient 
historian was not entirely unexpected. Not because the author was Greek, 
but because he was a product of the Enlightenment that favoured the topoi 
of ancient Greece and its magnificence. After his initial studies in Patras, 
Rome and other European cities he took part in the War of Independence in 
various administrative positions. Twice prime minister and foreign minister 
during the Revolution and the Bavarian Regency, but in brief tenures, he 
spent most of his political life as an ambassador in London, holding this 
place in 1838, 1841-1843, and again between 1853 and 1862, before his 
failing health forced him to resign. He was praised in both his capacities, as a 
diplomat - Viscount Palmers ton was said to trust and respect his views in 
Oriental affairs - and as a historian. 
It is rather difficult though to detect in this work the Thucydidean 
objectivity he aspired to. Trikoupis was eager from the start to exonerate the 
13 Trikoupis, /(]Topia, vol. A', np0A£y6JlEVU. 
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nation. He ascribed to the "bloodthirsty Asians" the first massacres, which 
covered sixteen pages in volume A' .14 Then he went on to condemn the 
killings of Turks in Greece but remarked that this conduct was merely the 
result of the Ottoman reprisals and indignation from the Patriarch's 
execution in Constantinople. Moreover, the revolutionaries committed these 
crimes during a state of anarchy, as a result of "Turkish lessons".15 It was 
also a matter of historical necessity for "whenever a people overthrow a long 
and heavy yoke they always move against their despots in a beastly way" .16 
To those who would condemn such conduct he reminded that civilised 
nations had recently acted in a similar way, notably the French in Jaffa. The 
Greeks then were justified, either by the forces of historical determinism or 
by the vendetta reasoning absolving reprisals or by a comparative study of 
European incidents. To be sure, on the other side, the Turks represented 
each and every grade of barbarity. Thus, Trikoupis succeeded in building a 
basic disparity between the two sides, which although receding later on, 
would set the tone for the whole work. 
Despite these deplorable acts, Trikoupis viewed the Revolution itself 
ill the most positive light. This was a national revolution which greatly 
differed from its English, American and French counterparts. All of the 
above were not premeditated whereas the Greeks "declared before God and 
men from the start of its struggle that they took arms to crash the foreign 
yoke and raise their nation and independence".17 The second noteworthy 
characteristic of this struggle was its strong moral basis. The struggle was 
both "sacred and just,,18 as proven by its final acceptance by the Great 
Powers. This argument also worked in the opposite way. The European 
states "listened to the redeeming orders of morality and the sacred voice of 
14 Trikoupis, Io-ropia, A', pp.98-II4. "Constantinople looked more like a brigands' den 
or a bloodthirsty beast's lair than the capital of a King and residence of European 
ambassadors". And "in one word every idea of shame disappeared and every spark of 
mercy was put out". Trikoupis, Io-ropia, A', p.lIO, 192 respectively. 
15 Ibid, A', p.277 and p.9 respectively. 
16 Ibid, A', p.l 00. He also noted that "the Greeks seemed they wanted in the space of a 
day to pay back for four centuries' of injustices". 
17 Ibid., A', p.3. 
18 Ibid. 
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humanity under oppression".19 The Greek War of Independence was 
rewarded because of its deeply moral character.2o 
The essence of history according to Trikoupis was spectacle and 
morality. History was a kind of theatre, directed by Divine Providence to 
guide the people towards the right way of living. In this theatrum mundi "the 
brightest, most sacred and full of meaning of the spectacles History presents 
on the stage of the World is the rise of a fallen nation,,21 - instigated by 
Divine Providence. The course of the Christian states in Europe was at first 
"insecure" and "ill- advised"22. It was implied that this was changed by the 
Greeks' perseverance and public sympathy throughout Europe - but only 
because their cause was just and thus favoured by Divine Providence. 
Morals, patriotism and good intentions, were concepts Trikoupis 
endorsed in his depiction of individuals. Personal virtue guaranteed the 
general outcome of a situation. Note his attitude towards admiral Cochrane 
after the defeat at Phaliron, a botched affair that cost the lives of 1000 
Greeks and Philhellenes in 1827: these were "the results of Cochrane's folly, 
who was meddling in affairs that were not of his responsibility".23 Cochrane' 
s character fault was arrogance, which along with personal interests were the 
downfall of men. Pride and arrogance were ascribed to Kapodistrias, first 
governor of Greece, who in Trikoupis words' despised virtually everybody, 
primates, klephts, Phanariots and scholars24 and was assassinated in 1831 by 
opposition members. "His measure in politics was always his personal 
interests,,25 was his comment on Odysseas Androutsos who played a double 
game with Greeks and Turks, coveting high military offices and ended up 
killed by order of the Greek government. On the contrary, Andreas Zaimis's 
19 Trikoupis, Iuropia, A', p.3. 
20 This does not mean that the author cannot contradict himself. In vol. B', pp. 145-6 he 
assures us that "the revolution in Greece did not erupt on principles other than to throw 
off the Ottoman yoke and raise the Greek nation". 
21 Trikoupis, Iuropia, A', p.5. In vol. r' , p.349 the siege of Messolonghi was "the great 
drama". 
22 Ibid, A', p.125. 
23 Ibid, 6.', pp. 157-58. 
24 Ibid, A', pp.285-86. 
25 Ibid, r', p.236. 
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arrogance did not weigh as much as his patriotis~ good character and social 
virtues which finally preserved his fame. 26 Good intentions, an amiable 
character and polite behaviour were redeeming features malring individuals 
worthy of reconsideration in Trikoupis's opinion. 
Morality's impact on history and the works of Divine Providence 
guaranteed the inevitability of the Revolution. "A struggle of a higher 
nature,,27, as the historian remarked, could be nothing other than 
preordained. But as for its practical causes, the Revolution was a natural 
consequence of the Ottoman Empire's crumpling structure and the 
characteristics of its dominant element. The rulers stagnated while the ruled 
progressed.28 The Turks in contrast to the Greeks, had no real taste or 
passion for commerce, industry or culture while the Greeks had the benefit 
of a real spiritual religion, a natural tendency to arts and letters, a glorious 
past and a special link to Western Europe.29 So, the Greek War of 
Independence was presented as both the work of a Divine Providence 
according to the laws of morality and a natural process abiding to the laws 
of society, a double inevitability. 
Trikoupis's main fault rests with his handling of key concepts in the 
light of his political stance. His hazy picture of the 'nation' is a good 
example. In contrast to Finlay, as we shall see later on, Trikoupis merely 
declared the national character of the war, using the term independently of 
any frame of reference. On a number of occasions he even voiced negative 
Vlews about the 'people': they were "the armed rabble, shame of every 
government and mortal wound of every society,,30, or the "inordinate 
rabble" whose shouts a government could not obey openly without 
committing suicide.31 However, in downplaying the significance of the 
people his attitude should be compared to his opinion of the primates. 
Trikoupis worked closely with the aristocracy during the war years and 
wrote in their favour in his account. He essentially attributed to them the 
26 For Zaimis, see Trikoupis, Imopia, /),,:, pp.8-9. 
27 Ibid, r', p.97. 
28 Ibid, A', p.15. 
29 Ibid, A', p.17. 
30 Ibid, A', p.115. 
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freedom of Greece and its political existence during the war. They did abuse 
power but only 'lighdy'. They were to be praised for not getting richer out of 
the war but barely gaining their living. Even the liberal constitution voted in 
the First National Assembly in 1822, Trikoupis ascribed not merely to the 
need for pan-European attention, but to the primates' prudence and 
goodwill.32 In some aspects Trikoupis actually composed an apology for the 
kotzabashis who emerged from his work with far more rights to representing 
the nation than the 'people'. 
It is most striking that one would treat a case of civil war in the 
midst of national struggle as a small affair. Trikoupis justified his opinion on 
the assumption that the different factions did not seek absolute power or 
complete destruction of their opponents, but only vied for governmental 
authority in the existing frame of the constitution.33 In taking this view 
Trikoupis undoubtedly thought that he performed a service to the nation in 
diffusing any possible accusations of stirring passions. It was also a way for 
him not only to justify the conduct of his party by diminishing the 
importance of their actions, but also to shed any and all responsibilities for 
military defeats in the following year (1825-1826). Another major factor, in 
spite of the author denying it, would be the rifts opened between not mere 
persons, but whole provinces: the clashes between Rumeliots and 
Peloponnesians bred enmities34 showing up in years to come generating an 
atmosphere of wide-ranging suspicion and dire particularism. The clashes 
and looting between different factions of Rumeliots and Peloponnesians at 
N afplion in 1827 were proof enough of mutual suspicion and hard feelings 
lingering after the civil war.35 Viewed at length and in perspective, the civil 
strife of the years 1824-1825 could be interpreted as a clash among diverse 
elements: between politicians and military, the old primate order of the 
Ottoman era and the new revolutionary powers, Westernisers and 
31 Trikoupis, Imopia, B', p.52. 
32 Ibid, B', p.147. 
33 Ibid, B', pp.l 08-110. 
34 Peloponnesian military leaders treated their province as their 'homeland' and warned 
the Rumeliots, employed by the government to stay out of it. In Trikoupis, /mopia, r', 
p.180, 382. 
35 Ibid, B', pp.166-170. 
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conservatives, native Greeks and newcomers from A;" Min Suo. or, 
Constantinople and Europe. Therefore, Trikoupis was right in pointing out 
that alliances were unstable, unclear and shifting as in a power play with the 
slowly emerging independent state as stake. 
In assessing the influence of foreign powers in revolutionary Greece 
Trikoupis used a scale to weigh their attitude but the results were again 
determined by his own political beliefs. Austria emerged on the bottom due 
to its despotic rule over various people and its Turkophile foreign policy that 
ran contrary to Greek interests.36 Russia and France were a step above 
because of a certain favour towards the Greeks. On top of them all came the 
British : "The British people always proved themselves even more liberal 
than their liberal politicians, showing great sympathy to the Greek 
struggle.,,37 Trikoupis was prepared to treat their diplomatic manoeuvres 
with a certain leniency. He regarded the Act of Submission, for instance, a 
move of the Anglophiles in 1825 to win independence from the Sublime 
Porte by petitioning the British government to make a protectorate out of 
Greece, as a useful gambit on its propagators' part that positively motivated 
the other Great Powers to Greek gainS.38 Nonetheless, he condemned the 
Treaty of London of July 1827 as "a unique example of eternally self-
. d li" 39 mtereste po cy . 
This latter insight on the role of the Great Powers from a Greek 
point of view would become clearer in the matter of the new state's border 
demarcation. Political necessity determined their decisions: 
"No acute mind, nor sound policy, nor good will led those 
comprising this council in delineating the Greek border ... Had 
they pursued a more acute and bolder policy, the Greek 
Revolution would have solved the Eastern Question, thus 
endorsing safety instead of a constantly endangered balance and 
in the benefit of an unduly suffering humanity". 40 
36 Trikoupis, luropia, f', p.264. 
37 Ibid, f', pp. 266-267. 
38 Ibid, [', pp.272-276. 
39 Ibid, /),.', p.197. 
40 Ibid, /),.', p.331. 
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The above abstract clearly shows the Greek tendency of viewing the Eastern 
Question in terms of their 'unredeemed brothers' only. What Trikoupis 
implied here was that, had the new state incorporated Thessaly, Macedonia 
and Crete, the Eastern Question could be considered as closed. This rash 
view certainly ignored the reality of the Ottoman Empire's complex 
structure, society and institutions. To a nineteenth-century Greek however 
to supplant or displace the Ottoman Empire was merely a matter of time, 
the outcome already determined and sealed. To Trikoupis then, the Eastern 
Question was practically an altogether Greco-Turkish matter that ought to 
be resolved preferably by others, notably the Great Powers. Their failure to 
do that was a violation of morality, a case of 'self-interest'. 
This presumed responsibility of the Great Powers, through their 
actions or inactions, for crucial subjects or aspects of Greek concern in the 
field of foreign affairs, was a recurring theme, a leitmotifin Greek nineteenth-
century politics and historiography. Trikoupis wrote and published his 
History during the Crimean War, an era in which King Otho's foreign policy, 
consisting chiefly of belligerent rhetorical boasts in the line of the recently 
articulated Megali Idea, was backed by revolts in Thessaly and Epirus. 
However, this rhetoric gambit functioned perfectly as a deterrent of 
criticism on the home front, especially as the Great Powers, not seeking 
further complications in an already precarious situation strongly advised 
against Otho's advances of rearguard actions. Also predictable was the 
public reaction: Great Britain and France were portrayed as the ever 
Turkophiles, the only obstacle between the nation's cavalry, Constantinople 
and the toppling of the Sultan.41 
This erratic behaviour definitely depicts the complex relationship 
between Greece and Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
which has many times before been noticed in bibliography, amply described, 
but not adequately explained.42 One does not get too many insights on what 
41 The atmosphere and ideological repercussions of the Crimean War in Athens are 
presented in Elli Skopetea, To «TCPOroTCO pauiJ.£lO» Kal" Meyon, J~ta. D'I'w; lov 
dJvlKo/) TCpoP)'.f'fJalOC; aT1fV EMMa (/830-1880), (Athens, 1988), pp.277-286. 
42 See Skopetea, To «ilpOroTCO BauiJ.£IO», especially pp.217-230 for the years 1830-
1880. Interesting insights on Greek image abroad during the nineteenth century can also 
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was really meant by this perception of Europe as the sturdy follower and 
careful watcher of all things Greek. The absolute measure to compare with, 
the definer and final judge of rights and wrongs, ~urope' remained for a 
long time a presence to aspire to or a partner that held the country back; it 
was a handy excuse for the faults or responsibilities of the political elites that 
administered power in the Greek state. This growing under the shadow of 
Europe - of which Britain, or simply 'England' as still widely known in 
Greece, was a more than essential part - has to be compared to Colin Kidd's 
observation of English things being for a long time the measure for Scotland 
and Scottish society.43 Certainly, the ripples the industrial nations made went 
further away than their inhabitants, even their statesmen, expected. 
Trikoupis' work may not have been on a par with Thucydides after 
all but it provided an adequate view of the War of Independence, possibly 
the most thorough work achieved by a nineteenth-century Greek historian. 
His success might be gauged by the fact that he was to provide source 
material for later histories. As to his objectivity, his merits and limitations 
have already been discussed. Finlay blamed him for failing to report the 
massacres of Muslims in the Peloponnese. His defects in defending the 
primates and presenting his fellows of the 'English Party' in the most 
positive light, have also been noted. He used however his central place in 
revolutionary administration to gather a wealth of information valued for its 
precision. His attention to morals and morality as important factors in 
history was a widespread nineteenth century trend for the employing of 
which George Finlay again, would be an even better example. Overall, the 
work of Trikoupis offers to a careful reader plenty of notions and insights 
on his contemporaries' mentality and attitude towards the War of 
Independence. In this guise his effort still remains both significant and 
valuable. 
be drawn fonn Jenkins, The Dilessi Murders; Edmond About, 0 pauuc()(; rwv Optwv, 
(Athens, nd). 
43 See Colin Kidd, Subverting Scotland's past. Scottish Whig historians and the creation 
of an Anglo-British identity. 1689-c.1830, (Cambridge, 1993) for a convincing view of 
the changing image of Scottish historiography after the Union of 1707. 
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Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos: a brief recapitulation 
Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos (1815-1891), cannot be considered 
as effective a historian of the Greek War of Independence as T rikoupis, 
Gordon or even Mendelssohn Bartholdy. It was not a matter of having 
arrived late, for distance from actual events is not a particular disadvantage; 
it was rather a matter of goals and intentions. The author of a monumental 
work, as History of the Greek Nation has been considered for a long time, 
could not shy away from depicting the circumstances leading to the 
development of the Modem Greek state, much as he would have liked to. 
Paparrigopoulos was unwilling to enter into an extended treatment of the 
independent Kingdom and its life and times thereto. 
Post-revolutionary nineteenth-century Greek thinkers usually 
emphasised how the War of Independence remained inconclusive as to 
liberating a fair part of national territory and presented the new state as a 
weak and diminutive one, unable to hold its own in the scene of European 
affairs or live up to the Revolution's legacy. The giants of old were 
succeeded by pygmies in Alexandros Soutsos's aphorism.44 Paparrigopoulos 
shared these reservations, which grew with the political entanglements of the 
Eastern Question in the 1860s and 1870s. He had also noted his reluctance 
to be the chronicler of contemporary events. The War of Independence 
stood at the inception of contemporary rivalries insofar as the political 
atmosphere remained tainted by past conflicts. Careful in matters politicaL 
Paparrigopoulos declared it "extremely hard for the historian to pass fitting 
. d th'" 45 JU gement on ese tlmes . 
Thus, particularistic tendencies, questions of authority, 
constitutions and their implementation were his key themes. He argued that 
44 See Panayiotis Moullas, P,g81~ Kal };vvf:x818~. Mcltre~ y,a rov I Cf alCOVa, (Athens, 
1993), p.50. 
45 Kostis Papagiorgis, Ta KaJr(jxla.BapvaKIWU1~, Kapafm((j.KT/~, Aw5poVTfJoc;, (Athens. 
2003), p.184. He was referring to the civil strife. 
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"throughout this struggle there never was a government caring for the real 
interest of the nation ... ".46 Constitutions and governments were the sum of 
compromises between second-rate chieftains and whenever somebody tried 
to exercise real authority, civil wars ensued. Constitutions were voted in 
order not to be implemented47 while the "imaginary panacea,,48 of the 
National Assemblies led to actual disorganization and anarchy that was 
government only in name. "The principles of the Epidavros' constitution", 
Paparrigopoulos observed, " [ ... ] had as their primary goal to form the most 
infirm of governments in order for the primates to rule their provinces as 
they saw fit".49 The primates according to him opposed a centralized 
government so they could continue playing the vital part they had during the 
Ottoman times. In many cases during the Revolution this attitude reduced 
Greece to the sum of its provinces instead of a united nation. Other groups 
and individuals coming to the front during the Revolution did not manage 
to form a policy based on concrete political values and ideas. Thus their 
struggle for power and consequent civil strife was the result of personal 
interests and gains to be had, not a clash of principles. 50 
Paparrigopoulos deplored this spectre of anarchy and its inherent 
dangers for social stability. Through the whole run of the History we meet 
two recurring themes that are stressed continuously: the importance of the 
nation and its superiority over all social ~oups, in conjunction with the 
necessity for strong leadership. The nation's interests overrode all others, 
individual or collective, and powerful guiding hands formed a prerequisite to 
fulfilling them. It was the desirable thing for a state, even in the case when 
the authorities initiated controversial measures. That was the reason why 
Paparrigopoulos condoned the actions of the Hydriot primates who clashed 
with a "crowd difficult to lead" 51 and praised Kapodistrias's government. 52 
46 Paparrigopoulos, Imopia rov Ell1/V1KOV EBvovc;, LT', p. 35. 
47 Ibid, LT', p.41. 
48 Ibid, LT', p.44. 
49 Ibid, LT', p.lOO. 
50 Ibid, LT', p.76 for Mavrokordatos and Kolokotronis. Paparrigopoulos stresses the 
personal character of these clashes discounting the notion of existing interest groups 
vying for power. 
51 Paparrigopoulos, Imopia rov EJJ..J,VIKOV EBvovc;, LT', p. 80. 
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Paparrigopoulos made these comments in looking back to his own era, 
which remained one of lost chances and unfulfilled hopes. The average run 
of governments in power during the 1860s and 1870s was no more than a 
year and widespread accusations of nepotism, favouritism and incompetence 
saw light in the press on a daily basis. Political instability then stood out as 
the common denominator between the Revolution's failures and the 
inability of the Greek state to achieve its lofty goals In liberating the 
'unredeemed brothers' and elevating its status in the Orient. 
Weak leadership, however, did not mean that the public was 
exempt from responsibility in Paparrigopoulos's view. Leaders and 
institutions in a parliamentary state, he wrote, mirrored the people's conduct 
and enhanced, in fact, the public's responsibility for their functioning: 
"[institutions and leaders] are not quite innocent nor absolutely 
evil but show, like mirrors, persons acting and things happening. 
If these things and persons do not function in an acceptable 
manner, it is not the mirrors' fault; in vain we would break them 
because our new ones would present us with the same image". 53 
The matter of responsibility was touched once more, significantly enough 
while discussing foreign powers and their intervention in things Greek: 
"There is among many of us a tendency to hold others 
responsible for our own misfortunes, a tendency unfitting for a 
people who many times in the past took their fate in their own 
hands. [ ... ] But while we maintain that always others are in fault 
and we alone of all people are right, it is difficult to stop making 
. tak ,,54 nus es. 
Paparrigopoulos was slow to succumb to mass hysteria or gIve In to 
explanations out to satisfy the hoi polloi. He may have written his History for 
the benefit of the public but in many cases he was not the one to tell them 
what they might have liked to hear. 
52 Paparrigopoulos, Iaropia rov EJJ.."vl1wV EBvovc; , l:T', p.194. 
53 Ibid, :ET', p. 43. 
54 Ibid, l:T', pp. 145-146. 
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In what was essentially a brief account of a more than eventful 
period, Paparrigopoulos managed to drive home some interesting points. 
His work is valuable for his comments and observations but does not hold 
any innovative answers on any of the questions the subject of the War of 
Independence posed. The author felt that since modem-day Hellenism had 
not yet completed its historical course as the ancient Greek city-states or the 
Byzantine Empire it would be premature to judge its successes or failures. 55 
With the benefit of hindsight, criticizing Paparrigopoulos for deciding not to 
apply his considerable abilities of synthesis in order to delve deeper into a 
subject of great significance would be easy. At first it strikes us as a lost 
chance to put particular emphasis on his own groundbreaking concept of a 
tripartite scheme for Greek History, culminating in the formation of an 
independent state. Nevertheless, the author's arguments and structure of the 
History of the Greek Nation were effective enough to permit him to abstain 
from a longer treatment of the War of Independence on grounds of politics. 
Finally, no contemporary would think to counter his succinct closing 
statement that managed to summarize in a few words the feelings of a whole 
generation: "The Revolution, having started with high hopes, concluded in 
ul ,,56 meagre res ts . 
Philimon's abortive effort 
Contrary to Paparrigopoulos, who envisaged from the beginning 
his foray into the history of the Greek Revolution more as a liability than an 
integral part of his work, Ioannis Philimon (1798-1873) had in mind a 
project of wide scope and range. Philimon, like Paparrigopoulos was a 
Constantinopolitan. Unlike him though, he was fortunate enough to escape 
the Ottoman reprisals completely and came to mainland Greece in October 
1821. Having studied in Constantinople, he did not find it difficult to secure 
a high position as secretary to one of the leaders of the Greek movement, 
55 Dimaras, K. llwr:app7f'l01rOVA.~, llpoAcyopt:Va. p.155. 
56 Paparrigopoulos, [UTopia rov Ev.."VIKOV EOvov<;, LT'. p.196. 
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initially working for Pettobey Mavromihalis, the most prominent primate in 
the Peloponnese, and shortly after for Demetrios Hypsilantis, commander in 
chief during the first year of the Revolution. After the end of the war he 
distinguished himself as one of the most prominent journalists. 
As a historian, what Philimon set out to do was write a 
comprehensive history of the Greek War of Independence, including the 
development of the Philiki Hetaircia,57 the secret society that prepared the 
Revolution, precedents in Wallachia - Moldavia where this was first 
proclaimed, and a complete account of its proceedings in majnland Greece. 
If realised, this would have been a work of titanic proportions and an 
unparalleled achievement for its era. Unfortunately, Philimon was not able 
to move past the end of the first revolutionary year in Greece and his work 
is mainly cited today for its methodological merits, notably his ample use of 
official and private documents, and therefore his important contribution to a 
nascent Greek historiography. 
According to the author, documents are useful in the narration of 
contemporary events as they render the historian innocent of accusations of 
being subjective. On the other hand their use is not without perils. Philimon 
suggested caution in accepting intentions described as genuine and stated 
that the historian should have personal experience of the events in order to 
be an accurate judge of documentary evidence. 58 Interestingly enough, he 
opted for narrating events in a chronological order, moving from place to 
place to examine simultaneous incidents, a narrative mode that broke the 
flow of his text and made for a tiring read. He employed detailed military 
descriptions and paid particular attention to certain personalities whose 
involvement he considered crucial. The second volume, for instance, dealt 
exclusively with the history of the family of Alexandros Hypsilantis's, the 
57 On the Philike Hetaireia, see Frangos, "The Philike Hetaireia" in Clogg (ed.), The 
Struggle for Greek Independence, pp.87 -103; C.M. Woodhouse, "Kapodistrias and the 
Philike Hetaireia, 1814-1821" in Clogg (ed.), The Struggle for Greek Independence, 
pp.l04-134. 
58 Ioannis Philimon, t1oKiJ.ilOV IOTopl1(oV TCepi T11~ EMrrvl""~ ETCaVaOTa(J8(j)~, 4 vols, 
(Athens, 1859-1861), pp. xx-xxi. His previous work, dealing with the origins of the 
Philike Hetaireia, t1oKiJ.iIOV IOTOPIKOV rcepi T11~ q>Ul""~ Eralpei~, (Nafplion, 1834), 
should also be mentioned here considered as the first part of the whole projected work. 
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former officer of the Russian army and military leader of the Revolution in 
the provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia, while Philimon also devoted a 
chapter from the third volume to Demetrios Hypsilantis's coming to Greece 
in 1821.59 This was consistent with his belief that "things are related to 
persons, and the historian through penning the former, portrays the latter". 60 
It was also a tribute to his being a notorious Russophile who 
intended to vindicate the czar's policies. The Greeks under the guidance of 
religious mores and the divine providence showed no "enmities, discord, 
jealousy, anger, murder,,61 and any rifts or conflicts were the results of 
foreign hands. Philimon was not even-handed though. In a covert attack to 
Britain and France he attributed the continuous civil strife and discord in 
1824, 1831 and 1854 to "foreign spirit, foreign proliferation and 
machinations".62 The allusion was easy to detect since in each of these case 
Britain and France were at loggerheads with Russia as to their Greek policy. 
It is interesting to note for the author's reasoning however that his faith on 
the future never wavered: the sultan's sovereignty over any Greek 
population should be considered "temporary" and "merely a matter of 
tun· " 63 e . 
This mere 'matter of time' however might have taken a long time 
indeed to settle if Philimon's appreciation of the Greek state was to prove 
accurate. His disenchantment was evident when he contrasted Revolutionary 
and post-Revolutionary Greece. His train of thought was characterised by 
contempt towards the independent kingdom and society: 
"Our fathers proved themselves greater than the era they were 
bom in, but the sons are smaller than the times they live in; the 
former [represented] the spirit and self denial for the homeland's 
sake, the latter [represent] material gain and cruelty towards the 
59 Philimon, iJoKijJlOV /(JTOPIKOV 7T:8pi U/C; EMl1Vl1ajc; E7T:ava(JTa(J8wc;, vol. r', ch. 13. 
60 Ibid, A', Legend on the first page. 
61 Ibid, r', p. ix. 
621b"d [' .. , I, , p. XliI. 
63/b"d [' "" f, , p.XXVlI. 
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country; the former sacrificed themselves for the country, the 
latter sacrifice the country to themselves".64 
Philimon's pessimism recalls George Finlay, who, writing at the same time, 
spoke of a 'diminutive kingdom' in a view many Greek intellectuals shared 
from the moment the high hopes the Revolution had raised, were not 
realised. Philimon, in contrast to Paparrigopoulos, preferred to shift whole 
responsibility for this failure to certain of the Great Powers, than to the 
Revolution's inherent discords and liabilities. 
The way Philimon dealt with the subject of the legitimacy of 
massacres during wartime was illustrative of the will to justify a series of 
events that cast doubt on the Greek cause: 
"while the revolutionaries only fought armed Turks, the Turks 
massacred, plundered and destroyed unarmed Greeks, 
Bulgarians, Montenegrins, Croats and others. The Greeks never 
burned Turks on the stake or tortured or hung them on their 
ships in triumph as the Turks did. The Greeks never sold in 
bustling markets Turkish prisoners of all ages and gender, forced 
them to convert, or desecrated whatever they held sacred and 
moral as the Turks did. [ ... ]For all these the moral superiority of 
the revolutionaries over their tyrants is incontestable".65 
It is not easy to reconcile this train of thought with the events at Tripolitza 
that Philimon himself depicted later on.66 Despite however having 
mentioned the sack of Tripolitza, the author in his introduction thought it 
prudent to imitate Trikoupis in declaring massacres of Turks an aberration. 
Therefore, these were not to be considered a permanent stain for such a 
glorious moment as the birth of a nation. 
64 Philimon, L1oKil1IOV IurOPIKov, r', p. xi. 
65 Ibid, ~:, pp. xix - xx. Philimon devoted pages 209-266 of volume r' to describe 
Turkish atrocities in detail and establish Greek moral superiority. 
66 Ibid, ~:, p. 102. He held that the sack of Tripolitza and the subsequent massacre of a 
great number of its Muslim popUlation were the result of Turkish resistance and 
subsequent lack of a treaty. At p. 225 he mentioned that "the love of the homeland 
turned into an unstoppable passion and this made the Greeks stoop to tragic actions" 
while at pp.228-229 he reminded his reader that the Turks perpetrated massacres first 
and that relations of their victims were among the Greeks. 
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Philimon's particular way of exorostng events, in shifting 
responsibility to external factors or reducing the magnitude of questionable 
moments remains a vivid example of constructing a mythos. Remarkably 
enough, and in contrast to similar experiences in other European countries, 
historiography in Greece has treated the Revolution in a surprisingly 
uniform way. Suffice it to say that such was not the legacy of revolutions, 
either in France or in Britain. In French historiography and politics there 
was a clear distinction between monarchists and republicans who 
documented their own radically different views of the Revolution.67 In 
Britain, Whigs, Tories and Jacobites used the Glorious Revolution's 
inheritance to consolidate political gains, with the Whigs securing the lion's 
share. 
In Greece the arguments advanced did not concern a theoretical 
plane. The 'English', 'French' and 'Russian' parties, despite their consecutive 
existence for roughly thirty years, from the 1820s to the 1850s, were not 
concrete political formations expressing the country's social realities. 
Consequendy, they were not able to generate and defend an exclusive 
interpretation of the Revolution for their own benefit. There was not to be a 
'constitutionalist' or 'monarchist' view of the Greek War of Independence 
either. Constitutionalism in its first incarnation was a vehicle for the anti-
Kapodistrian policy of the 'English' party68 while its finest hour in 1843, 
when it managed to also rally the 'French' party and significant popular 
support, was marred by subsequent inefficient government on the part of its 
beneficiaries.69 The quicksand of Greek politics did not favour the creation 
of a united and unwavering monarchist faction until the dissension between 
the prime minister Eleftherios Venizelos and King Constantine I on the 
country's foreign policy regarding the Great War. Greek historians then 
constrained their analytical faculties in writing for or against persons and 
political groups: for or against the Philiki Hetaireia, for or against 
67 See Maurice Agulhon, Marianne into battle: Republican imagery and symbolism in 
France, (Cambridge, 1981). 
68 Dakin, The Greek Struggle for Independence, pp.293-4. 
69 For the revolution of 1843 and its significance, see Petropoulos, Politics and 
statecraft· 
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Kolokotronis, for or against the primates. The national aspect of the 
Revolution remained an unassailable constant. 
The War of Independence attained very early on the status of a 
founding myth, being canonized as a public holiday in 1838. This swiftness 
in sanctifying a generation that still commanded the political scene besides 
being a bold political move on the part of the King and his advisors, 
demonstrated the popular feeling. The first years of the celebrations were 
marked by great crowds and general merriment.70 The element of unity was 
stressed by the press in the wake of these celebrations and contrasted to the 
usual particularistic stance that formed the day-to-day Greek reality. 
However, this narrow territorialist view of Greece was in large part due to 
the attitudes of that exalted generation who had exacerbated these tensions 
in their personal political struggles for authority. Moreover, despite the fact 
that most of the leading figures who had participated in the civil wars were 
not politically active, those that remained, as Alexandros Mavrokordatos or 
Ioannis Kolettis, along with second-stringers as Ioannis Makrygiannis and 
Demetrios Plapoutas, still exchanged verbal blows in the Greek Parliament 
in the debate on autochthones and eterocthones. Of course, these rather than 
being the results of some hereditary disposition to discord on the part of the 
Greeks or signs of inadequate government, were indications of political life, 
albeit at an admittedly nascent stage. 
The Greek state may have been born a fragile entity, but it was 
nevertheless modelled and structured on its Western European counterparts. 
The Bavarian Regency, governing in the name of underage Otto I between 
1833 and 1838 created a kingdom imitating the "centralized absolute 
monarchies favoured by the conservative powers of Restoration Europe".71 
The initial efforts to curb particularism and fashion a homogeneous nation-
state were followed by successive governments throughout the nineteenth 
century with special attention being paid to the institutions of education and 
the army. It was in such a context that Philimon, Trikoupis, Paparrigopoulos 
and the other historians of the Revolution wrote. The construction of the 
administrative apparatus of the kingdom went hand-in-hand with the 
70 See below, ch.5, for some contemporary descriptions. 
71 Kitromilides, "European political thought in the Making of Greek Liberalism", p.12. 
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formation of its ideological infrastructure. For as we shall see later on, the 
eulogising of figureheads and instances of the Revolution, along with 
comparisons to heroic precedence from classical antiquity would constitute a 
key concept of Independence Day celebratory addresses sketching the 
outlines of a national identity.72 Finally, Jakob Philipp Fallmerayer's early 
challenge to the link between ancient and modem Greeks reinforced the 
value of the War of Independence as a founding myth, insofar as his attack 
was perceived as vilifying to the sum of the Greek nation. 
In the end, most of the Greek historians who wrote ill the 
nineteenth century on the War of Independence were personally connected 
to it in a number of ways. Ioannis Makrygiannis and Theodoros 
Kolokotronis, who wrote probably the most interesting memoirs, were 
significant figures - indeed the latter still remains the symbolic icon of the 
Revolution par excellence. Spyridon Trikoupis, Ioannis Philimon, Amvrosios 
Frantzis had taken active part in it. Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos was 
largely a spectator but had suffered the loss of his father and brother in the 
Ottoman reprisals in Constantinople. They cannot be accused in good faith 
of having deliberately misrepresented facts in order to shift the blame to the 
side of the Turks. Some foreign historians, as Francois Pouqueville, who we 
shall examine later on, wrote in a far more propagandistic spirit. Greek 
historians did not hesitate to castigate their compatriots' behaviour, even if 
in most of the cases these were their political or personal rivals. However, 
they all remained eager defendants of their romantic construct of the 
Revolution and their emphasis on the heroic aspects of the conflict reflected 
the growing necessities of an official national ideology. For to tum peasants 
into Greeks, the vision of unity in a national uprising was an indispensable 
element. 
72 See below, ch.5, for the significance of celebratory addresses. 
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Building the consensus: Foreign historians 
George Finlay: History as morality 
George Finlay (1799-1875) was born at Faversham in Kent. He 
came from a Glasgow family and when his father died in 1805 he returned 
to Scotland, eventually growing up at the home of his uncle, Kirkman 
Finlay, at Castle Toward in Argyllshire. His early studies in Glasgow and 
Gottingen set him on a course for a career in law but his liberal 
preoccupations and involvement in liberal societies facilitated his travel to 
Greece to experience the Revolution in 1823. With the exception of a small 
absence he remained there for the duration of the War of Independence. He 
did not take part in actual fighting, being on the whole a keen observer. 
Deciding to permanently reside in Athens in 1829, he took active interest in 
the creation of the new state by assisting in rehabilitating the city in 1834. 
His most valued contribution though, was his History of Greece, especially the 
part on the Greek Revolution, which even today remains one of the key 
sources to the period.73 By all means an exceptional personality, Finlay 
showed in his history an even-handed attitude towards both his native and 
adopted countries, retaining all the while a European kind of aloofness to 
certain aspects of a society in the Orient. 
Finlay proved himself a thorough historian, in covering a broad 
range of subjects, in promptly organising the course of clear and precise 
arguments, and in presenting an overall satisfying structure. Douglas Dakin 
commended Finlay on his "great insight into the importance of economic 
factors, a thorough grasp of administrative history, and great subtlety of 
73 The British School at Athens, George Finlay, A celebration of the Bicentenary of his 
birth. An exhibition Guide, (Athens, 1999), pp.l-18. 
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treatment of the relationships between ideas, social changes and the actions 
of individuals".74 "Comment and generalisation" were his force, producing a 
"more stimulating and vigorous study" than Gordon.75 There can be found 
however in Finlay'S work a trace of irony and hints of condescension 
concerning the Balkan nations. Greeks were "ambitious, intriguing, and 
presumptuous, and few were restrained by any moral principle in seeking 
self-glory and self-advancement". 76 His idea of the klephts, armed bandits and 
prominent revolutionaries, was not a high one. He regarded them as 
"highwaymen and sheep - stealers". 77 His views on the character traits of 
the people in Greece bordered on the exotic and he showed a tendency 
towards anecdotes stressing the peculiarity of places and customs.78 
Finlay discerned various causes for the outbreak of the Revolution, 
the chief one of them having been the failure of the rule of law. "The utter 
want of any judicial organisation" was considered as "the most striking 
feature in the Ottoman administration". 79 On the part of the Greeks, an 
"appetite for revenge" and a "passion for liberty" were the main instigators 
of the uprisings.80 The educational factor was mentioned, along with the 
dues to the English, French and American Revolutions in terms of 
circulation of ideas concerning nationality, civil liberties and independence. 
It was the expression of an "advancing civilisation", inspiring to political 
74 Douglas Dakin, British and American Philhellenes during the War of Greek 
Independence, 1821-1833, (Thessaloniki, 1955), p.21O. 
75 Ibid, p.212. His defects were not small, either. According to Dakin he overrated the 
contribution of the masses, underrated that of the klephts and mistook particularism as 
evidence of democratic principles. 
76 George Finlay, History of the Greek Revolution, 2 vols., (London and Edinburgh, 
1861), vol. II, p.284. 
77 Ibid, I, p. 32. A detailed study of the klephts to be found in Ioannis Vlahogiannis, 
JO.1rpmc; rov MwpuJ. (1715-1820), (Athens, 1935). An interesting article also in B.P. 
Panagiotopoulos, «Ntu motXdu 1tEpi TOU 9EOIlO1> nov 1CWt<OV EV nU01tovviJo<o», Llt:Ariov 
TrlC; Irnopl""C; Kal EOvOAOYI""C; Eralpeiac;, IX, (Athens, 1956), pp.78-85. 
78 Ibid, II, pp. 186-7. Cf with Pouqueville, where such incidents form the body of the 
work. 
79 Ibid, I, pp.118-9. 
80 Ibid, I, p.1 18. 
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independence. 81 Furthermore, it was also a matter of Providence: "the 
fullness of time had arrived,,82 for the Greeks to lead a national and political 
existence. Morally, they were on the ascendant: "prepared to climb the 
rugged paths of virtue and self - sacrifice,,83 as opposed to the Turks, a race 
in moral and physical decline. 
However, the Greek Revolution was not a mere insurrection of 
some few disaffected individuals or factions. It was a mass movement, "a 
movement of the people" as Finlay observed. The author stressed the 
endurance and courage of the people in comparison to the inadequacy of 
their leaders: "Greece at this conjuncture was saved by the constancy and 
patriotism of the people, not by the energy of the government or the v310ur 
of the captains".84 "Never in the records of states did a nation's success 
depend more entirely on the conduct of the mass of the population", he 
asserted.8s Therein "the true glory of the Greek Revolution lay". 86 To this 
popular movement all the lasting achievements of the war should be 
ascribed. Contrary to almost all other historians then, who solely attributed 
the revolution's salvation to the Great Powers' intervention, the author 
made it clear that the Allied powers themselves "merely modified the 
political results of a revolution which had irrevocably separated the present 
from the past". 87 
Separation from past practices was not absolute however. Those 
same people whose energy and perseverance the author commended, could 
turn into a "turbulent population" whose passions were "excited instead of 
being restrained".88 Finlay reported the massacres at the start of the 
revolution: in the space of a month that "it is estimated that from ten to 
81 Finlay, History, I, p.204. 
82 Ibid, I, p.127. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid, p. 355. The latter, combining "heroism and fraud, ought to be praised only in 
French novels", Finlay wrote in vol. II, p.43. 
85 Ibid, II, p. 381. 
86 Ibid, I, p.283. 
87 Ibid, I, p.283. 
88 Ibid, I, p.2 16. 
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fifteen thousand Muslims perished in cold blood". 89 The chief instigators of 
this conduct were the advocates of the Philiki Hetaireia although no further 
evidence than his word seems to support that. Their motive was lack of 
influence: "and, like men who believe their merits have been overlooked, 
they were irritable and violent". 90 Moreover, Finlay went on to assert that 
"the extermination of the Turks by the Greeks in the rural districts was the 
result of a premeditated design" brought on by the spirit of vengeance the 
Hetaerists and certain men of letters propagated among the peasants.91 As he 
considered the Hetaireia a Russian design, Finlay was probably more severe 
than just in his contempt of Russian autocracy. But this did not change the 
fact that the Greeks had ''by long oppression been degraded into a kind of 
Christian Turks".92 Moreover, their historians "have recoiled from recording 
the crimes which the people perpetrated", ignored the spirit of truth of 
Thucydides and Tacitus and violated the laws of morality.93 
Morality was Finlay's central theme and the one he perceived as the 
driving force of history. Divine Providence, Finlay implied, did not act in an 
arbitrary manner. People's deeds carried a certain weight; they had 
consequences and repercussions that could not be ignored. When moral 
standards were upheld, individuals and whole nations were proportionally 
rewarded, as was the case in the Greek Revolution. The Greeks were 
morally superior to the Turks, having to put up with impermissible excesses 
and lawlessness. This superiority coincided with a year of ascendancy, 
followed by a difficult season after the Greeks violated the moral code and 
perpetrated massacres. Because of these crimes, which lowered them from 
their initial moral high ground, in the end " [the Revolution's] success was 
th f uli · " 94 e consequence 0 pec ar cltcumstances . 
89 Finlay, History, I, p.188. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid, I, p.187. 
92 Ibid, I, p.235. 
93 Ibid, I, p. 187. Probably an allusion to Trikoupis who professed writing in the spirit of 
Thucydides. To the extent of my knowledge massacres were reported; there was 
however a conscious effort to exonerate the nation of any responsibility. 
94 Ibid. I, p.118. 
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There was a whole array of incidents throughout Finlay's work that 
revealed individual moral standards to determine the outcome of events. 
Take for instance Alexandros Hypsilantis and his lieutenant Karavia, who 
conducted themselves disgracefully and dishonourably. Their end, and that 
of their efforts in Wallachia-Moldavia could not have been an auspicious 
one: "rash ambition" brought "great calamities to the people".95 Conduct 
showed character, Finlay professed. "An insatiable rapacity of honours" 96 
was Mavrokordatos's guide to catastrophe although his fate was not tragic as 
Hypsilantis's or Androutsos's. The latter, renowned klepht and major player 
during the first year of the revolution "pursued his own interest... without 
submitting to any restraint from duty, morality or religion".97 As a result "in 
trying to overreach everybody he overreached himself and was easily 
overpowered".98 His political opponents killed him after he was arrested for 
treason. 
Finlay described the way in which the public became gradually 
interested in the Greek case. Before the war in Greece "all questions relating 
to the East were then beyond the domain of public opinion, and very little 
was known in England concerning the condition of the modem Greeks". 99 
The travellers' tales remained inconclusive and Finlay's final judgement was 
that "the condition of the Greeks presented many anomalies".lOo The 
European public opinion became increasingly interested as the case was 
found to touch on a number of important subjects: "Mohammedanism and 
Christianity, tyranny and liberty, despotism and law".101 Moreover, the press 
had a chance, by bringing up the subject, to engage in political discussion 
"proc1aiming that principles of political justice were applicable to Greeks 
95 Finlay, History, I, p.165. 
96 Ibid, I, p.323. 
97 Ibid, I, p.305. 
98 Ibid, II, p.92. 
99 Ibid, I, p.7. 
100 Ibid, I, p.8. 
IOI/bid, 1l,p.3. 
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and Turks which they dared not affum to be applicable to the subjects and 
rulers in Christian nations". 102 
This affair was seen through a distorting mirror. Finlay's testimony 
on Mavrokordatos's reception in Britain where he was thought to be "the 
head of a powerful constitutional party" is evidence to that.103 The nebulous 
ideology and shifting alliances of the 'English party' were far from the stable 
and responsible image Finlay's phrase might have conveyed. In modem 
terms the 'English', 'French' and 'Russian' parties were rather factions 
comprised by loose groups dominated by charismatic individuals and their 
policies were directly influenced by the respective powers.104 It is plain in this 
example that the political circumstances in Greece were being assessed in 
current European terms and paradigms and this train of thought could not 
possibly promote any real understanding of the situation. Of course, it 
would not be realistic to expect the European public to realise the particulars 
and peculiarities of an Oriental society. Nevertheless, this kind of approach 
did not facilitate things, something that Finlay did not fail to notice in his 
criticism on the Phi/hellenes. 
Cautious as he was towards the Phi/hellenes Finlay showed an 
acceptance that was guarded at best. He spoke favourably of the regular 
infantry regiment that fought valiantly at Petta and gave their lives almost to 
a man, but commented unfavourably on their leaders' decisions. lOS He did 
not hesitate to criticise Church, his long time friend, on his military 
abilities. 106 Indeed, Finlay believed that 
"the interference of foreigners ill the affairs of Greece was 
generally unfortunate, often injudicious, and sometimes 
102 Finlay, History, II, p.162. These projections of international questions to internal 
problems in the United Kingdom has been noted for the nineteenth century by Maria 
Todorova in Imagining the Balkans, (Oxford, 1997), p.l00. 
103 Ibid, II, p.33. 
104 For the foreign intervention in the War of Independence, see Dakin, The Greek 
Struggle for Independence, chs.5-6. 
105 George Finlay, A history of Greece from its conquest by the Romans to the present 
time, B. C. 146 to A. D. 1864, (London, 1877), vol. VI, pp.264-270. 
106 Dakin, British and American Phi/hellenes, p.219. 
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dishonest. Few of the officers who entered the Greek service 
did anything worthy of their previous reputation.".107 
Disapproval of foreign intervention became evident in Finlay's treatment of 
the Great Powers' foreign policy, where he chastised Russian ambition, 
instigating bigotry and the violation of moral principles among Greeks in 
their conduct of the war. lOS However, those who were most severely 
castigated were individuals, the English Philhellenes who took part in the 
construction of two frigates for the Greek navy:· Finlay accused them for 
nothing short of embezzlement.109 
If the conduct of foreigners had been at times reprehensible, that 
of revolutionary leaders and notables proved even worse.l10 The clash of 
interests regarding power between politicians, chieftains and klephts was 
noticed from the early stages of the war. Already in early 1822, Finlay 
observed the different schemes being worked out by the leaders adding that 
"every subaltern officer and secondary politician had his own ends to 
gain" .111 He profoundly disliked the klephts, who formed the bulk of the 
military. Theodoros Kolokotronis, for example, then as now the foremost 
popular icon of the Revolution, was portrayed as selfish, confusing justice 
with injustice and disliking law and order.112 However, Finlay conceded he 
was a fitting person to be leader of irregulars being "ignorant of tactics and 
insensible of the value of discipline".l13 For Finlay the essentials of effective 
leadership were simple: political competence, experience and good 
intentions. Klephts and primates, military and political leaders, although being 
patriots, they lacked all that - and created more problems than they solved. 
The way all these exercised authority and administrated 
revolutionary Greece, however, was not any different from the one they 
107 Finlay, History, II, p.154. 
108 Ibid, II, part V, ch.l. 
109 Ibid, II, pp.155-157. 
110 Finlay had written after the war that "the Greeks would infallibly become a great 
nation, if they had no government and no great ideas". Cited in Dakin, British and 
American Phi/hellenes, p.213. 
1 \1 Finlay, History, I, p.345. 
112 Ibid, I, p.189. 
I \3 Ibid. I, p.193. 
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conducted their affairs under the Ottomans. A short time before the War of 
Independence, for instance, between 1812 and 1816, the rival factions of the 
primates Londos and Deligiannis did not hesitate at all in cooperating with 
the Ottoman governor of the Peloponnese in order to smash their 
opponents.114 This was not an isolated incident but far from being evidence 
of innate incompetence or moral degeneracy, it merely proved a realistic 
assessment of a situation where factiomsm and intrigue were legitimate 
political weapons. When the Revolution in 1823 seemed to have succeeded 
after two years of continuous victories, the matter of political authority 
remained unclear, as more than one groups now laid claim to it. It was 
continuity with past practices rather than a radical break with tradition that 
led Greeks to civil strife in 1824-1825. 
To Finlay things concerning the civil strife were quite simple: 
"factious madness and shameless expenditure ... rendered the English loans 
the prize and aliment of two civil wars".llS The object of the wars was clearly 
pecuniary, no matters of principle or even differences in policy ranked as 
significant causes. The English loans were used to buy alliances and shift the 
balance of power between three main parties: those of the Hydra 
shipbuilders, the Peloponnese primates and the Rumeliot klephts. The author 
did not hold any of them in high estimation. To the Hydriots he ascribed 
sheer incapabilityl16, to the primates "unprincipled selfishness"l17, while the 
Rumeliots hired their services to the highest bidder.118 Consequences to the 
fighting capability of the Greeks were disastrous; the islands of Kasos and 
Psara "were abandoned to be conquered by the Turks" and neglect of the 
Peloponnese "prepared the Morea to be subdued by Ibrahim Pasha" .119 
In the end, the success of the Revolution was considered as a 
balanced affair. The Greek independent state that came out of the war in 
1832 did not grow according to the Philheffenef expectations: "it has not 
114 See Michail B. Sakellariou, H llclmrovvrflJo<; Kat'll UfV Af:Vrepav TOVPKOKpaTiav 
(1715-1821), (Athens, 1939), pp.247-252. 
115 Finlay, History, II, p.26. 
116 Ibid, vol. II, p.3l. 
117 Ibid. 
lIS Ibid, II, pp.31-32. 
119 Ibid, II, p.28. 
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created a growing population and an expanding nation"l20 but remained a 
"diminutive Kingdom".121 Finlay shared this idea of an inconclusive War of 
Independence with most Greek nineteenth-century thinkers, either because 
of the numerous Greeks still under Ottoman rule or because of the failure 
to establish a modem state by European standards. But the glass could be 
seen as half-full too. For Finlay the unassailable independence of the 
country, the establishment of popular institutions in monarchy and 
parliament and the growth of a national identity could be ascribed as the 
overall positive achievements and the lasting heritage of the Revolution. 
Significandy enough, the War of Independence kept being assessed 
on the basis of expectations created, not results rendered, and was 
thoroughly identified with the independent state's future course. "The 
struggle is not yet at an end, do not accept foreign customs" was a famous 
poet's counsel to the young people, showing both the contemporary interest 
in lands considered as Greek patrimony, and his own anxiety over the 
Westernising process under way in the Kingdom.l22 It was in this gap 
between imagination and reality, so common in the period of Romanticism, 
that the Megali Idea flourished. Irredentism and a 'model kingdom' became 
fuel for Greek national ideology in the rest of the nineteenth century. 
Disenchantment with the results of the War of Independence 
among the inhabitants of the new state followed initial elation. The playful 
mode of Alexandros Rizos Ragavis, who thought aloud in 1839 which 
Constantinopolitan public buildings could be put to what use, was 
succeeded by Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos's resentment in 1871. The 
historian speaking at a memorial service, would recall a time when ''vigorous 
and hopeful thirty years back, now old and stooping, we mourn on the grave 
of those contemporaries who have preceded us there, and sadder still, we 
mourn on the grave of our own hopes" .123 It was not due to the sombre 
120 Finlay, History, II, p.382 
121 Ibid. 
122 Dimaras, Kwwrravrivoc; IlwrapP1fY01rOVAOC;, p.67. The verse belongs to George 
Zalokostas. 
123 In Dimaras, «H lbEOAoytlCi] 'U1tObO).lT] TOU Ntou EU1lVlKOU KpaTOU<;. H d1lPOVO).lul 
nov 1tEPUO).ltvwv, Ol VEE<; 1tpuY).lUnK6T'r]TE<;, Ol vtEC; UVUyKEC; (1830-1880»> in E)J.'1VIKO~ 
PwpaVT1(JpOc;, p.340 and Dimaras, Kwwrravrivoc; IlwrapP'lY01rov1oc;, p.377, respectively. 
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surroundings that Paparrigopoulos's address sounded this desolate tone. 
Alexandros Soutsos, the archetype of the Greek romanticists in poetry, if 
not in life, wrote that "a coward and lazy Greece succeeds the Greece of 
Heroes and the Giants of old are followed by pygmies" .124 In such a 
disillusioned atmosphere George Finlay lived out his mature years and 
composed his History of Greece. Having taken part in the struggle to the extent 
of his powers and considering his adoptive country as "the scene of my 
boyish enthusiasm and the hopes of my matured years" 125 we can 
understand why a late reappraisal of his labour tasted bitter, "severe and 
cold, like the work of a disappointed enthusiast".126 Of the latter, he was 
merely one of a host. 
Thomas Gordon: A balanced approach 
Thomas Gordon (1788-1841) was born at Cairness, the eldest and 
only surviving son of Charles Gordon of Buthlaw and Cairness in Lonmay, 
Aberdeenshire. A diligent soldier and an adventurer, he started his military 
career in the Scots Greys in 1808-1810, then travelled extensively in the 
European and Asiatic parts of the Ottoman Empire after inheriting a 
substantial fortune until 1813, when he served as a Staff Captain in the 
Russian army. Before Waterloo he applied for an appointment ill 
Wellington's army but was turned down. He formed an initial bond to 
Greece by getting married to a half-Greek in 1816. In 1821, when news of 
the Revolution reached him in Paris, he did not hesitate to rush to Marseille, 
charter a ship, hire a few French officers and sail to Greece. He campaigned 
with the revolutionaries in the Peloponnese and took part in the siege of 
Tripolitza but retired from service after his remonstrations against the 
massacres following the fall of the city were not heeded. He was active in 
the London Greek Committee and founded another one in Aberdeen but 
124 Moullas, P~'t:l~ Ka.l Evvf:xt:lt:~, p.50. 
125 Dakin, British and American Philhellnes, p. 209. 
126 Ibid, p.21 O. 
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did not return to Greece until 1826. Gordon campaigned again, leading the 
1827 expedition to relieve Athens before Lord Cochrane's tactics brought 
the contingent to disaster. After the war, Gordon served in the Greek army, 
reaching the rank of major-general a la suite. He died in 1841, leaving one of 
the fondest memories among his contemporary Greeks. 
As a historian, Gordon early on clarified his intention on writing a 
general history of the Revolution to fill the void left by hastily written 
accounts laden with "strong prejudices,,127 that had seen the light of day until 
then. This was probably the first work on the War of Independence to come 
out since the Treaty of London was ratified. It was therefore a text lacking 
any journalistic pretensions that characterised a whole array of books 
circulating in Europe while the war was still being fought. Its author was 
careful to make that distinction himself: commenting on Pouqueville's work, 
among others, he pointed out the latter's persistence in the relaying of local 
events and lack of painting the broad picture along with his writing for a 
"political purpose".128 Indeed, contrary to Francois Pouqueville, there is little 
here that could disprove Gordon's objectivity. His own authority sprang 
from experiencing places, people and events firsthand, as he played an 
important part among the Phi/hellenes. As to his overall view of history, it was 
but a simple one: "to represent the Greek Revolution as it really was,,129 in a 
phrase that reminds one of Leopold von Ranke's aspirations. 
'Gordon's strong points were not insight or generalisation. He did 
not keep a constant overview of the field as Finlay did and, his noble 
intentions notwithstanding, the broad picture eluded him as well. Extremely 
detailed and well structured, his work was mainly a straightforward political 
history, recounting facts, not prone to generic comprehensive explanations 
of events. Gordon refrained from venturing into discussions on social or 
econOffi1C matters and, consequently, their influence on the Revolution's 
course 1S missing from his narrative. His military descriptions were lucid 
and precise. Gordon has to be credited with a marked tendency to view 
127 Thomas Gordon, History of the Greek Revolution, 2 vols., (Edinburgh and London, 
1832), vol. I, p. ii. 
128 G d H' I" or on, IstOry" p. H. 
129 [b'd 1 ... I , ,p. HI. 
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things in more shades than black and white that permitted him to present 
the most finely balanced account of the war. It seems though that Gordon's 
wish, expressed as a kind of epilogue, to conclude some day his effort by 
chronicling the final chapters of the war after N avarino and the reign of 
Otho I never had a chance to materialise before his death. 
What easily strikes the reader is the trouble Gordon went to, as 
Finlay before him, to establish an image of Oriental morals as the 
fundamental basis of understanding Greek society. The "weak moral 
perception in Greece,,130 was one of the milder expressions one encounters 
among foreign historians, travellers and correspondents but it still illustrates 
a world of perceived difference between the Balkans and Western Europe. 
Greek character, Gordon asserted, bore great similarities to that of the 
ancients but centuries of Turkish influence had dulled the people, making 
modem Greeks show "meanness, cunning, cowardice and dissimulation".131 
"Factious and intriguing spirit .. .is the curse of the Greek character,,132 in 
this 'orientalised' version. Consequendy, Greeks showed a narrow and 
selfish patriotism which "seldom glanced further than to the limits of their 
own province, island or canton" .133 Their tainted patriotism and other moral 
transgressions were the results of the tyranny they had to endure. 
No matter how brute and unjust the government under the Turks 
though, it could be no excuse for all the "massacres and excesses" 
experienced in the course of the war. Despite his obvious discomfort, 
Gordon managed to present the reader with a relative view of things, 
avoiding in a great deal the vehement moral condemnation common in most 
of his colleagues. Moreover, he suggested such events should not be 
examined only in an Oriental but also a European perspective: 
"at whatever period undertaken, the war must necessarily have 
been attended with massacres and excesses; which however 
culpable in themselves, or declaimed against by party zeal, were 
not, in fact, of a deeper dye, than deeds perpetrated in hundred 
130 Gordon, History, I, p. 231. 
I31 Ibid, I, p.33. 
132 Ibid, I, p.ll? 
133 Ibid, I, p.3l3. 
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times in the civil wars of Great Britain, France and Germany, as 
well as in the recent Spanish struggle against the ambition of 
Napoleon" .134 
Indeed, "every civilized nation has, in its tum committed equal 
barbarities" .135 But his own purpose was not to write for "rendering 
exclusively odious one nation or party".136 His avoidance of a moral high 
ground did not make Gordon a cynic: "authority acquired and maintained by 
perfidy and cruelty", he informed us, stands "on a frail basis".137 Nor did it 
mean that he condoned or justified actions of cruelty. "Dark spots" did exist 
and should be addressed and discussed in due course - but not inflated to 
the point of overshadowing all else. 
Gordon had spotted these dark places early enough. In describing 
the state of Greece in the end of 1821 he did not feel that there was really 
much to inspire optimism. The revolutionaries were already divided "by a 
thousand petty passions and jealousies" .138 The people expected "a panacea 
for their ills from the meeting of the National Assembly"139. The ambition of 
the movement's leaders had precipitated a constitution totally unfit for the 
existing state of the country, not so much out of their conviction to build a 
solid republic as out of a desire to secure a place for themselves in it. l40 It 
was with obvious regret that he observed that 
"revolutions, like the one of which we are treating, although 
bright and dazzling when contemplated from a distance, disclose 
to a close and scrutinizing regard many dark spots, especially in a 
nation contaminated by long misrule and pernicious example".141 
He persistendy noted that while "the Greeks are fond of asserting that few 
political crimes tarnished their revolution ... they ought rather to affirm that 
134 Gordon, History, I, pp.76-77. 
135 Ibid, I, p.3 13. 
136 Ibid, I, pp. 185-194,246-249. Quote from Gordon, History, vol. I, p.192. 
137 Ibid, I, p.80. 
138 Ibid, I, p.311. 
139 Ibid, I, p.321. 
140 Ibid, I, p.325. 
141 Ibid, I, p.311. 
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little publicity was given to such delinquencies, for we could easily draw out 
a long and black scroll".142 Gordon was not afraid to draw the scroll himself. 
The 'thousand petty passions and jealousies' the author discerned 
in the beginning of the Revolution were to unfold later on in internecine 
hatred. According to Gordon, pre-existing divisions and aspirations to 
power were to be held accountable for the civil strife. It was actually 
particularism, the 'narrow and selfish patriotism' mentioned earlier, and 
power play, evident in the manipulation of the constitution, that facilitated 
the conflict. Personal character faults among those who constituted the 
government merely accentuated the problem. Count Metaxas was "a vile 
intriguer" and Petrobey Mavromichalis, while always having "the word 
'patriotism' in his mouth, busily gratified his cupidity at the expense of his 
country',.143 The members of the Executive branch of the govemmene44 
"were no better than public robbers".145 As a rule, though, Gordon preferred 
to treat the civil war as a mainly political affair, recounting major events and 
their dire consequences to the Peloponnese, refraining from branding it an 
example in Oriental morals. 
Although Gordon did not follow any late developments of the War 
of Independence in their fervent diplomatic labyrinths, his presence in 
Greece at the time guaranteed his continuing familiarity with the subject. 
Hindsight and knowledge of backstage procedures permitted him to see that 
while he concluded his history after N avarino and the "virtual 
emancipation ... through formal recognition"l46 of Greece, the end of the 
Revolution was still far away because of foreign policy entanglements. Five 
years after the sea battle that had heralded the fortunate outcome of the 
insurgents' efforts, Greece remained "a football for diplomacy,,147 in the give 
and take of the Eastern Question. Had he lived to see the tum of events in 
142 Gordon, History, I, p.482. 
143 Ibid, II, p. 23. 
144 Greek government during the Revolution consisted of two chambers (Legislative and 
Executive) before the arrival of Governor Kapodistrias in 1828. Their small numbers 
meant they functioned more as committees rather than a parliament. 
145 Gordon, History, II, p.73. 
146 Ibid, II, p.503. 
147 Ibid, II, p.503. 
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the era of the Crimean War and beyond, he would have probably also joined 
the ranks of disillusioned romantics that most of his friends and colleagues 
had by then become. 
Pouqueville and the journalist's feeling of history 
It is fitting for Francois Pouqueville (1770-1838) to follow Thomas 
Gordon as it permits us to contrast two radically different approaches to 
history by two quite opposite characters. Contrary to Gordon's distinguished 
and resdess soldier, Pouqueville was emphatically a traveller. After studying 
medicine in Paris he followed Napoleon's scientific detachment in Egypt. 
On his return to France during convalescence he was captured by Algerian 
pirates and sent to the pasha of the Peloponnese and later on to jail in 
Constantinople from where he was released in 1801. He made his reputation 
with his 1805 work Travels in Morea, Constantinople, Albania and ma'!Y other places 
of the Ottoman Empire in 1798-1801, which became a great success. He 
returned to the Ottoman Empire in the same year as French agent in the 
court of Ali Pasha of Epirus and remained there for ten years. Drawing 
from information his brother, French consul in Patras at the beginning of 
the Revolution, procured him, he wrote a history of the Greek Revolution 
that enjoyed an appeal to the European public and provided inspiration to 
many philhellenes. 
Despite its early fame Pouqueville's work suffers from basic flaws 
owed to the way it was conceived. Pouqueville offered neither new material 
nor a reappraisal of a certain period within the Revolution, as Mendelssohn 
Bartholdy did for the Kapodistrias era, or as Finlay in his account of the 
Bavarian Regency and the first years of Otho I's reign. Still, Pouqueville may 
very well be an example, and a very good one at that, of a contemporary 
historian: his History of the Greek Revolution was published in France in 1824in 
the midst of the war. Pouqueville's haste to deliver a work on an ongoing 
dispute recalls to mind present attitudes concerning hot spots around the 
globe. Pouqueyille and a whole stream of others reporting from Greece and 
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later on, Italy, were the pioneers of a journalistic approach that presents us 
with purportedly informed and acute analysis soon after the most recent 
crisis. But Pouqueville's approach more than a series of dispatches from an 
embattled area. It did revolve around a central theme that returned 
periodically to the narrative like a leitmotif, adding an air of literary romance 
to the whole project. 
To arrive at that in due course though, we have to examme 
Pouqueville's ideas on history first. His credo recalls Herodotus: "My duty is 
not to hide anything said but also not to believe in everything" .148 This 
professed impartiality would presumably leave the reader to decide himself 
whether the facts presented resemble the truth or not. It would be a 
straightforward enough principle, to be judged by its application, if the 
author would not seek to complicate matters and contradict himself in the 
process. Although he had declared that he would stay aloof from the conflict 
and present his case in an appropriate manner, his religious stance greatly 
influenced his opinion. A historian was like a prophet: "a higher voice 
commands me: 'If you fail to show evil, you shall have to answer for this 
sin"'.149 Accordingly, he presented his main theme, the antithesis between 
the Greek/Christian and Turk/Muslim element, with the fervour of a 
crusader. 
Pouqueville discerned between the 'barbarous Turk' and the 
'suffering Christian'. The Turks beheaded, raped, tortured, converted at 
sword point and bathed "in the blood of the people and ministers of the 
One True God"lso. Even the gentle and courageous ones, as was the case 
with one Ahmed Din, easily shed this semblance of civilisation and 
"reverted to the Turkish nature by impaling and roasting in slow fire some 
Christians" who fell into their hands. lSI Although Greeks were most of the 
time viewed in an equally stereotypic way, Pouqueville treated them with 
leniency. In Greek massacres the style remained explicit enough, but the 
148 Francois Pouqueville, hnopia Tr/C;; EU'lVIK1jC;; E7rava(JTaacOJC;;, 2 vols., (First edition: 
Paris, 1824. Edition used: Athens, 1901), vol. A', p.20. 
149 Ibid, A', p.50. 
150 Ibid, A', p. 110. 
151 [bid, A', p. 122. 
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tone changed, abandoning verbose denunciations and giving the impression 
that only Turkish actions should be considered an affront to humanin". After 
.I 
all, it was in Turkey, not in Greece that "an honest man could not go 
. h d" 152 unpurus e . 
In this journalistic view of history, elements of inconsistency often 
crept up. Pouqueville was the sole historian of the Revolution to support the 
existence of the Hagia Lavra incident, a symbolic act that purportedly 
announced the revolt. The widespread popular belief on the Metropolitan of 
Patras raising a banner in the monastery to proclaim the revolt was not 
corroborated by any of his contemporaries. Most historians accept today 
that the Revolution did not start simultaneously along the Peloponnese on a 
prearranged date, but developed in a series of skirmishes going back to 
March 21.153 Pouqueville's description in which the metropolitan Germanos 
"had the colours of the Cross flown on the church,,154 has to be considered 
fictitious in its entirety. Dramatic or climactic moments were the author's 
specialty since he was not, after all, merely writing a historical work but 
presented to his readers the romance of a war. 
As a proper romance Pouqueville's work seemed to display clear 
and precise limits: a beginning at Hagia Lavra, an end at Navarino and a 
middle filled up with stirring action scenes. 155 In his rush to follow 
Pouqueville exhibited lack of any reasonable structure. Take for example the 
siege of Patras during April 1821. Pouqueville's view remained limited, no 
broad picture of the Revolution was attached, and the whole affair 
resembled a chronicle of individual cases and events where his brother 
featured prominendy. Despite the great length devoted to the siege, 
estimations on essentials, as numbers of victims, or accurate dates did not 
appear in the narrative. 156 His preference for a subjective view of 
152 Pouqueville, Iuropia, A', p. 127. 
153 See Iuropia rov EMr,VIKOV 'EOvovr;, vol. ill', (Athens, 1977). 
154 Pouqueville, Iuropia, A', p. 14. Curiously, Douglas Dakin accepts this widespread 
myth without questioning it at all. See Dakin, The Greek Struggle, p.59. 
155 Vol. 8' of the 1901 Greek edition actually contains Mendelssohn-8artholdy's text on 
the relevant events after 1824. Apparently the early twentieth century editor saw fit to 
complete in this way a work that did not follow the story to its end ... 
156 See for example Pouqueville, Iuropia, A', pp. 23-26. 
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developments over a spherical one was not a momentary lapse but was to 
appear throughout the work. When the Ecumenical Patriarch in 
Constantinople, Gregory V, was executed as a traitor by order of the Sultan 
along with other primates and members of the Church the author relied on 
the dramatic impact of the event, not its exact facts or context. Minute 
details carried the day instead of hints on its overall significance and this 
disjointed picture implied more a Christian saint's martyrdom than anything 
else. Pouqueville made his intentions clear in likening the circumstances of 
Gregory's death to those of Christ.1S7 Sensational history rested on vivid 
images, not accuracy of details. 
The great list of defects upon which we have focused does not 
mean Pouqueville's work is totally devoid of insightful moments. His long 
stay in the Orient, his experience of the people and culture were of obvious 
help in explaining the Westerners' conception of an ideal Greece and their 
disappointment in the actual one. According to him, the Philhellenes were not 
up to the task they had undertaken, because their civilised background and 
romantic aspirations rested on a nonexistent image of classical Greece. As a 
result instead of founding Plato's Republic they "damned the day the idea 
occurred to them to undertake the dangers of a people who wanted to 
regain their country before engaging in debates over state government" .158 
Disillusioned, they left "damning the barbarity and ingratitude of the 
Greeks" .159 A third reason for their failure to achieve more was that some of 
them expected to draw profit from this situation: "they wanted to be 
appointed generals or colonels and... only few among them did not expect 
to get out of it wealthy" .160 Pouqueville however remained prone to 
generalisations not based on solid facts and could not have a comprehensive 
view of the conflict since he left early himself. Many philhellenes may have 
indeed quit Greece after the battle of Petta in 1822, but others returned 
157 Pouqueville, IOTopia, A', p.70. 
158 Ibid, A', p.154. The unsuccessful efforts of Colonel Stanhope, a Benthamite, towards 
freedom of press and a model constitution were criticized by his friend, Lord Byron. See 
Finlay, A history o/Greece, vol. VI, p.327. Thomas Gordon in his History, vol. II, p.108 
also refers to Stanhope and notes the inadequacy of certain Phi/hellenes. 
159 Pouqueville, IOTopia, A', pp.264-265. 
160 Ibid, A', p.264. 
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later, as Thomas Gordon, and others still, as Lord Byron, started involving 
themselves at a fairly late date for Pouqueville to record it. 161 
Nevertheless, these useful insights were most of the time lost into 
the tide of a narrative rife with crusading tones. Pouqueville was addressing 
his history to 'Christian Europe' and took care to show the conflict in terms 
of a religious war, with the intention of making his readership identify with 
the Greeks, the 'suffering Christians'. The dichotomy remains unique among 
the historians of the Greek Revolution, including Greeks. Indeed, neither 
Trikoupis nor Paparrigopoulos or Philimon made the stereotype of the 
'barbarous Turk' against the 'suffering Christian' into their major argument. 
Pouqueville's uniqueness raises the question of its possible motives. He was 
a traveller with immense knowledge of Greece and extensive understanding 
of the culture and functioning of Ottoman society. He had lived in it for a 
long time and served as Napoleon's consul in the court of one of its most 
powerful functionaries, Ali Pasha of Epirus for ten consecutive years. Was 
his previous personal experience and imprisonment in Constantinople 
enough to make him so sensitive and instil these prejudices or were there 
other reasons? 
A phrase of Thomas Gordon may offer a hint of a partial 
explanation. In his introduction he accused Pouqueville of writing to serve a 
'political purpose', which with genuine nineteenth-century reticence he then 
refrained from revealing. To an informed contemporary reader the 
connection with party strife in Greece and the jostling between the Great 
Powers to exact more influence would not have been lost. Even a quick look 
through Pouqueville's work would suffice to establish his distaste for Great 
Britain: it was pictured as predominantly pro-Ottoman162, and thoroughly 
anti-Catholic (and thus, anti-French), in the custom of burning the Pope's 
effigy on Ash Wednesday. 163 "British policy never worked towards 
161 See William st. Clair, That Greece might still be free. The Philhellenes in the War of 
Independence, (London, 1972), pp. 173-184 for 'Byron's Brigade'. 
162 Pouqueville, Iu-ropia, A', pp. 20, 56 respectively. Further examples of anti-
Britishness in ibid, A', pp. 284-5, 440. 
163 Ibid, A', p.55. 
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humanity's interest as an end but only as means",l64 Pouqueville proclaimed. 
At this point, between 1823 and 1825, two distinct factions operated in 
Greece, the one seeking its alignment with Britain, culminating in the 1825 
Act of Submission, the other looking for connections with France in 
attempting to establish de Nemours, son of the Duke of Orleans, as King of 
a Greek state.165 In this particular context, although Pouqueville was never 
cited as a major player in the game of influence, one cannot help but 
reconsider his professed impartiality. Implicit in the polemic tone of his 
work, in his blend of journalism and romance was a tip of the hat towards 
Catholic France, hinting at a crusade to save a suffering Christian Greece 
from both Muslim Turks and unscrupulous British. As both romantic 
traveller and French citizen Pouqueville would have seen this as his duty. 
Mendelssohn Bartholdy and the Greek Revolution 
Karl Mendelssohn Bartholdy (1838-1897), professor of history in 
the University of Freiburg, offered in the 1870s an example of academic 
history on the War of Independence, as a part of a greater composition 
examining Greece from the fall of Constantinople until his contemporary 
times. Mendelssohn Bartholdy's work would prove a useful guide for a 
reader who would like to obtain an extended view of the last years of the 
War of Independence and Otho 1's reign until 1835. The German historian's 
work stands out for a number of advantages due to the author's academic 
background. It should be commended on the important context he provided 
on Austrian and Prussian perceptions and foreign policy towards the 
Revolution. Mendelssohn Bartholdy's detailed and vigorous description of 
Kapodistrias's period as governor of Greece probably forms the best part of 
his labour although his treatment of the Governor himself can be 
164 Pouqueville, [OTopia, A', p.270. 
165 See Konstantinos Rados, flcpi TO OT€f-lf-la rrtC; EMMOC;. H wr07rclp<J. rwv Opkavu5wv, 
1825-1826, (Athens, 1917). Also Dakin, The Greek Struggle, pp. 156-166; Dakin, 
British and American Phi/hellenes. pp.98-9. 
- 162 -
considered as rather scornful and prejudiced.l66 To his credit also must be 
ascribed an introduction that gives a lot of information considering the 
literary and ethnographical background, a necessary context that other 
histories were lacking .167 A rich store in anecdotes and an analysis of Greek 
society based on a repetition of stereotypes backed by widely circulated 
rumours and cautionary tales should be considered his most obvious 
deficiencies. 168 
Mendelssohn Bartholdy's overall impression was that Greek 
independence was the result not so much of moral superiority - because he 
considered Greeks to show still "ample traces of slavish character and moral 
degeneracy,,169 - but a combination of Turkish decline, will to freedom, and 
the mediation of the Great Powers. True to this view he described the 
massacres as a "race war that would stop only when one of [the opponents] 
was destroyed or separated from the other for ever" .170 Moreover, he 
attested that this idea of a 'race war' in Greece prevailed throughout Europe 
after the Chios massacres in the summer of 1822 when "the Osman tribe 
provided once more clear evidence of its incompatibility to European 
·viti· . " 171 Cl satlon. 
Bartholdy subscribed to the idea that internal discord in subsequent 
years should be attributed more "to personal interests than disagreement on 
principles".172 The military leaders, especially Theodoros Kolokotronis, 
professed representing the nation and expected to share political 
administration with the primates. The author described the factions and 
alliances between the primates, klephts, Phanariots and Greeks arriving from 
Western Europe. He showed in exceptional detail the lack of trust on the 
part of native Greeks towards their fellow countrymen returning from 
166 He might have decided after all to take Finlay's advise when they met in Athens: ''Ne 
dites pas trop de bien de lui". In Karl Mendelssohn Bartholdy, IOTopia ute; EM.1'{VIK1je; 
E1CavaOTa(J8(J)e;, 2 vols., (Athens, 1895), vol. B', p.1255. 
167 Ibid, A', Book I, Ch. II and III. 
168 Ibid, A', Book I, Ch. III. 
169 Ibid, A', p.83. 
170 Ibid, A', p.341. 
171 Ibid, A', p.392. 
172 Ibid, A', p.3 71. 
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Western Europe. This stance was the result of a traditional peasant and 
mountaineer attitude towards city people, especially intellectuals. 
Mavrokordatos or Negris were men of letters, not fighters, and many 
considered that a disadvantage in a society where honour conferred by arms, 
as in war or brigandage, was the highest praise. Sturdy klephts like 
Kolokotronis, found it very difficult to understand why a person clearly 
unable to bear arms like Mavrokordatos should rise to high political offices 
and dictate the conduct of war; it was far more easier for the old klepht to 
mock the latter's European dress and express his uncontrollable urge to 
throw lemons at him.173 
To Mendelssohn Bartholdy it was obvious that while Greeks were 
grateful for any and all moves that contributed to their independence, they 
still relied on their own stereotypes determining their attitude towards the 
Franks and their habits. Regular infantry, for instance, a Western European 
innovation the philhellenes introduced, never won the military chiefs' 
confidence, who were warriors, not soldiers. To them it was a ludicrous 
novelty and they showed more than once a genuine aversion to pitched 
batdes: guerrilla tactics were the only reasonable method of fighting. The 
defeat of the Philhellenes Battalion at Petta, although owing more to logistic 
and leadership problems than to their tactics, reduced the popularity of 
regular troops even more.174 As a result, other philhellenes, as Charles Fabvier, 
who tried to form such a corps later on were respected for their courage but 
considered somewhat out of touch with reality. But the Franks, in the 
generic and rather pejorative term used to describe Westerners, were in any 
case thought inconsistent and certainly not resilient enough to endure the 
hardships of war: Georgios Karaiskakis expressed it eloquendy enough 
before Thomas Cochrane's lost ballie - and his own death - at Phaliron in 
1827.175 Of course, these stereotypes gained weight by the inability of certain 
Europeans to adapt in a society that gready differed from their own. 
173 Mendelssohn Bartholdy, /mopia, A', p.410, 486, B', p.1008. 
174 For the battle of Petta and the Philhellene Battalion see St.Clair, That Greece might 
still be free, pp.82-102. 
175 "These Franks and their impatience will be the death of us". In Trikoupis, /mopia, ~:, 
p.142; Paparrigopoulos, /mopia, I:T', p.177. 
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Thomas Gordon brought up the example of Colonel Stanhope, a staunch 
Benthamite, who urged towards forming a constitution in the American 
model at a time the revolutionaries were in dire need of gunpowder.176 
Mendelssohn Bartholdy came rather late into the historiography of 
the Greek revolution, publishing his History of Greece between 1870 and 1874, 
without the ambition to break the mould in which it was cast. His 
contribution had more to do with his own German origins and the source 
material he used than with any intentions to produce an innovative work. 
Unlike most of the historians we have encountered so far, he was an 
academic, not a man of action. He was in fact born after the end of the War 
of Independence, not having any direct relation to it. The results of his 
research showed a determined and diligent scholar who dedicated much 
energy in clarifying the diplomatic entanglements and repercussions of the 
Greek Revolution, paying less attention to internal political affairs. In 
Mendelssohn Bartholdy we may detect the development of components 
common to both Greek and foreign historians of the War of Independence: 
the will to national freedom on the part of Greeks, their questionable 
morality, the cultural gap between them and the Westerners. What was 
missing, not just from him, but from all his late nineteenth-century 
colleagues was a rethinking of the forces behind the movement for 
independence. Such an interpretation would not appear until well into the 
next century. 
What comes out most forcefully in foreign historians' conceptions 
of the Greek War of Independence is its dimension as a romantic myth all 
around Europe. This attitude may in part be regarded as having been 
prepared since the age of Enlightenment. Classical Antiquity was then 
identified with Greece - and it was Greece that had revolted in these early 
Romantic times. Most of the European volunteers then were not merely 
arduous early Romanticists but also products of a late Enlightenment 
movement in having been indoctrinated in the splendours of ancient Greece 
before departing to fight alongside modem Greeks in a peculiar Grand 
'1 'our. There were also those left behind who organised Greek committees 
176 Gordon, History, II, p. 108. 
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and raised money in a double imaginative feat, that of the glory of the 
ancient civilisation next to the modem glories of the battlefield: Charles 
Krazeisen's sketch of Greeks defending the ancient ruins of Corinth plainly 
illustrates this view.177 Whether these were the first to be disillusioned or the 
volunteers themselves it is difficult to ascertain: in 1826 these committees 
were thought as nests of corruption.178 
The reality of Oriental culture and society remained for the most 
part inaccessible to most Philhellenes, even those who spent a great amount of 
time there, as evident in the moralistic tales that Finlay, Gordon, Pouqueville 
recounted in their histories. True, they were not prepared for such a radically 
different cultural context but they also brought with them their own 
representations and prejudices. There was indeed admiration and 
comradeship between the klephts and the Philhellenes but both retained their 
own customary worldviews, as evident in Georgios Karaiskakis's distrust of 
the 'Franks' quality in the field or Colonel Stanhope's insistence on the dire 
need of a constitution. In the end, Philhellenism created its own romantic 
myth of modem Greece - almost as a counterpart to the founding myth the 
Greeks made of the Revolution themselves - only to demolish it later on 
when its inaccuracies became evident. 
The foreign historians of the Greek War of Independence wrote 
for the most part in this gap between the ideals of their youth and the reality 
of their matured years. Most of them had fought on the side of the Greeks 
and some even chose to make their abode there after Independence. 
However, their historiographical efforts to approach the Revolution 
remained inconclusive insofar as they failed to produce an alternative 
historical model. Finlay, Gordon and Pouqueville, all accepted a national 
revolution as an unassailable reality without juxtaposing it effectively with 
the phenomenon of particularism. As a result their interpretations of the 
civil wars did not proceed to a deeper level, exacdy as in the works of their 
177 Plate 2 in st. Clair, That Greece might still be free, facing p.39, originally from 
Krazeisen Charles, Portraits des Grecs et des Philhellenes, (Munich, 1828-29). 
178 See Plate 9 in St. Clair, That Greece might still be free, facing p.l83, where faith, 
hope and charity have been turned into a money-making machine with numerous 
recipients in Britain. 
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Greek counterparts. Despite their great experience of the Orient they were 
not able to make use of this knowledge to get an understanding of the 
fundamental functions of society. They continued to look at it under 
western eyes, through the lenses of the dichotomy between civilisation and 
barbarity and the undemanding solution of moral degeneration. Finlay, who 
was probably the most perceptive of them all, reserved indeed a much more 
positive approach to Greece and the Greeks in his private conversations and 
opinions.179 Publicly though he remained his always acerbic self, incensing 
Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos to the point of pronouncing him a ('weird 
Philhellene". Let us remember that in his History, Finlay retained a rigid view 
that regarded Greeks as (Christian Turks' in their decline of the Ottoman 
times. 
In the end, Thomas Gordon was right in his observation on the 
'dark spots' of events that may seem as bright and clear only from afar. The 
War of Independence was not indeed such a bright event, as both Greek 
and foreign historians demonstrated. However, their inherent merits and 
limits determined the way they portrayed it: the former in building on it a 
consensus as a symbolic beginning for a modern Greek national identity, the 
latter as a partial failure, stripped from its initial romantic background that 
had drawn many Europeans to it. As far as their efforts are to be considered, 
many of the dark places they had spotted remained dark even after they had 
tried to throw some light on them. 
The breach of the consensus: Ioannis Kordatos 
Writing in the 1920s, Ioannis Kordatos (1891-1962) was the first 
propagator of Marxist historiography in Greece. Socialist ideas had a rather 
short history until then, their first adherents emerging in the second half of 
the 1870s, an era of attempts at industrializing which generally went awry.180 
179 Dakin, British and American Phi/hellenes, pp.213-4. 
180 For the development of Socialist ideas in Greece and the circumstances leading to the 
fonnation of the Communist party. see Panayiotis Noutsos, H IO(JwllOTIIOj aKElfI'l OT'!\' 
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Kordatos, who was active ill the socialist cause since the early 19OOs, 
especially in the intellectual debates on demoticism - the official adoption of a 
simpler type of language - became the first Secretary General of the 
Communist Party in 1922, elected some months before being arrested and 
sent to jail for the next year. On his release, he disagreed with certain aspects 
of party policy and resigned, making his presence felt only occasionally 
during the following decade. Despite his acknowledged deficiencies, the sum 
of his work provided new lines of interest and otherwise stimulated the 
Greek historical discipline with the rudimentary conceptual tools of an 
alternative approach. 
Kordatos' language, structure and goal were equally simple. His 
main point was to procure a Marxist narrative on the Greek Revolution as a 
counterpoint to bourgeois historiography. Ambitions notwithstanding, the 
work lacked a detailed prologue dealing with theory and methodology and 
charting the argumentative course of the text. The simplicity and lax 
discipline of it gave a clue not only to the author's capabilities but also to his 
public. Like Paparrigopoulos, Kordatos was a gifted amateur, not prone to 
weigh his work with careful footnotes or bibliography for further reading. 
He wrote 'for the benefit of the public', for the spreading of new ideas and 
different ways of thinking. It was "grammar school pupils and teachers" 
who "were persecuted by the police,,181 for reading his book. Written by the 
Secretary General of the Communist Party it was not merely a historical, but 
to a greater degree a political text. 
As a popularising book, fit for challenging established 
historiographical opinions and authorities, it still stands out today. It did 
exercise a similar function to Paparrigopoulos's history, although it is true 
EM.Ma; George Leontaritis, To eM.1fVlKO epya1:IKO Kw"j.la OLOV A 'Jla:yKOUI-'IO JlOA£I-'O, 
(Athens, 1978); Rena Stavridi-Patrikiou, 0 r.D<l'lPoC; 0T1fV Aiyv7ITo, (Athens, 1988). A 
case study of early socialist formation can be found in Lito Apostolakou, " 'All for one 
and One for All': Anarchists, Socialists and Demoticists in the Labour Centre of Volos 
(1908-1911) in Philip Carabott (ed.), Greek Society in the making, 1863-1913. Realities, 
Symbols and Visions, (Aldershot, 1997). 
181 Ioannis Kordatos, H KOlV(J)vIKfl UTfl-'auia Tf/C; EJ.ltfvIKflc; E1T:avaOLaUG(J)C; rov 1821, 
(First edition: Athens, 1924. Edition used: Athens, 1946), p.l0. See also Kordatos, 
NeoeM.'1VIKfl llolmKflIOLopia, (Athens, 1925). 
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that in rigor, discipline and erudition it could never be its par. However, not 
the least of its functions was to provide the newly founded Communist 
Party with past examples of reform struggles: to seek classesl82, partiesl83 or 
"popular-democratic movements" in the Byzantine Empirel84 was a 
deliberate effort of mythologizing the present, looking for straight lines and 
avenues in history from pre-modem to modem times in order to justify 
contemporary social attitudes with calculated interpretations. But Kordatos 
was not a refined Marxist historiographer. Anxious to follow the lines of a 
certain theory he did not pay due attention to facts and remained more of a 
copier than an original thinker. There was even a certain poverty of theory 
evident, for instance, in pronouncing Ali Pasha of J annina, a rather dark and 
contradicting figure, as "the representative of the rising bourgeoisie".185 
The overall scheme of Greek history that the author presented 
demanded to tackle the subject of national continuity before proceeding in 
his analysis of the Revolution. Among Marxist historians this matter still 
remains unresolved. Paparrigopoulos's format makes them uncomfortable 
but there is no satisfying alternative. Their interests revolve around Modem 
Greece and they seldom venture into the pre-modem period to underline 
their distrust of a full continuity they deem unconvincing. Kordatos though, 
being at the start of the track, followed another trail, turning back to the 
Enlightenment interpretation of Greek history for support.186 In his opinion 
the Byzantine Empire was hardly a Greek polity and Greek nation existed 
before industrialisation.187 Continuity as described by Paparrigopoulos and 
Zampelios in the familiar tripartite scheme was not valid : "this distinction is 
unstable and, moreover, a figment of the imagination" .188 
182 Kordatos, H KOlVWV1KiT fI11J.Lauia, pp.36-37. 
183 Ibid, p.47. Kordatos distinguished three parties: 'a feudal-aristocratic', a 'bourgeois' 
and a 'plebeian' one. 
184 Ibid, pp.39-40. 
185 Ibid, p.92. 
186 See above, ch.2, for an analysis of the Enlightenment version of Greek history in 
conjunction with Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos's proposed format. 
187 Kordatos, H KOlVwvlKiT fI11J.Lauia, p.52. 
188 Ibid, p.28. 
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Kordatos borrowed the idea but failed to acknowledge his debts. 
Although he described the old scheme word for word, he neither mentioned 
the Enlightenment nor any of its numerous nineteenth-century propagators. 
Rigas Velestinlis and Adamantios Korais were called in as respectable names 
to prove that no historic memory of Byzantium as Greece had survived 
among nineteenth-century Greeks189 - but Kordatos failed to observe their 
denial was due to the Gibbonian tradition that branded the Byzantine 
Empire as declined and degenerate. In a way then, Kordatos's approach on 
that matter was Enlightenment turned on its head. 
In his actual account of the War of Independence his main concern 
was to prove that it was mostly an affair of class warfare between peasants 
and the great landowner class. On the nature of the revolution Kordatos 
generally remained unclear. He proclaimed it a "national uprising"t90 only to 
observe a little later that most Phanariots lacked "national consciousness"191, 
the clergy and the primates favoured the Turks and the bourgeoisie, after 
preparing and instigating the revolt betrayed the cause.192 Rounding up the 
arguments, this left only peasants as patriots par excellence and the main 
revolutionary force. Did this make the War of Independence similar to the 
French Revolution when the troisieme etat declared themselves fa nation in the 
Convention leaving out the aristocracy and clergy? Not really, because the 
Greek "national uprising" was rife with what Kordatos termed "peasant-
popular revolts,,193 : the "popular masses" revolted but "along with national 
liberation the people wished for a social one too. The shackles of national 
and social oppression should be tom down".194 Whereas conventional 
historiographers stressed the concordance of Greek people and the receding 
of social or particularistic tensions before a common enemy, Kordatos 
argued on their dissimilar standing and interests that affected their uprising. 
The idea seemed intriguing and one would expect it to give rise to a lively 
189 Kordatos, H KOlVWVlKi! U11llauia, p.62. 
190 Ibid, p.100. 
191 Ibid, p.IO}. 
192 Ibid, p.213. 
193 Ibid, p.156. 
194 Ibid, pp.157-158. 
- 170-
discussion of the civil strife. However, the author decided to give it an 
altogether different twist. 
Thus, Kordatos viewed the civil war in 1824-1825 as class struggle. 
However the only evidence he cited on that was the people's eager 
participation: 
"these were clearly class struggles which in many cases resembled 
party antagonisms and although seeming rather more serious 
than most, they were for the most part class affairs; this is why 
the clashes took a massive character" .195 
This kind of analysis is as much flawed as Trikoupis' attempt to downplay 
the civil strife's significance. While both of them professed to accurately 
interpret their sources, each with his own conceptual tools, they both 
produced results rather fitting certain political necessities of the moment 
than doing justice to the material at hand. 
The 'peasant -popular revolts', for one, were not on the whole 
convincing. It is true that during the War of Independence sentiments 
against the primates and the merchant class were at times runnjng high. 
Most historians of the revolution related the incident at Vervena, where the 
people threatened to kill the primates because they had strongly disagreed 
with Demetrios Hypsilantis196. The same holds for the revolution's outbreak 
in Hydra, where primates and great naval merchants procrastinated, having 
second thoughts for the whole project, and the inciting role of Antonios 
Oikonomos in rousing the people. 197 Both instances were seen in the 
account of Kordatos not as disjointed, random events in the revolutionary 
process, but as a conscious attempt on the part of the subaltern classes to 
wrest the initiative and power from the hands of the primates.198 What the 
author chose to ignore was that the same people who backed Oikonomos, 
later sided against him motivated by the primates, and Kolokotronis easily 
mollified those gathered at Vervena. In both cases, it was hardly the way 
195 Kordatos, H KOlVWVlKi! O11J.Jauia, p.210. 
196 See for example, Trikoupis, /mopia, A', pp. 351-52. 
197 Kordatos, H KOlVWVlKi! O11J1auia, pp.179-184. 
198 Ibid, pp.181-186. 
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social revolutions go. The fault of Kordatos was to identify from the 
beginning mass participation with social revolution. 
This misconception brings us to his terminology and its relation to 
the nature of the Greek Revolution. The following excerpt is probably one 
of the most lucid the author provided on the subject: 
"Surely the revolution of 1821 turned out to be a social one too. 
Unfortunately, the bourgeoisie proved to be its traitors. As time 
moved on they allied themselves with the kotzabashis [the 
primates], thus diluting the struggle's content and rums and 
preventing it from realising its potential in full".199 
Here, Kordatos's position seems quite simple and straightforward although 
the type of alliance he described fits more the 1848 'springtime of the 
people', particularly its second, 'law and order' phase. However, the text's 
greatest difficulty is terminology. In most other cases, preventing us from 
gaining a full understanding is a number of terms for which the only 
explanation is their presence in the text: 'peasant-popular', 'bourgeois-great-
landowner', 'oligarchs', 'the people'. Their content not only remained vague 
throughout the narrative, but the author saw fit to use them as 
interchangeable. 'Oligarchs', 'primates' and 'bourgeois-great landowners' 
were considered as signifying the same social strata and employed for variety 
reasons only. Who exactly these 'people', 'oligarchs', 'reactionaries' were, and 
what was the relationship between them, if any, we never get to know. 
Kordatos rendered his own case opaque, turning terms into mere words and 
arguments into unsophisticated slogans. 
Fragmentary and undisciplined, at times even sloppy, Kordatos's 
work is more valuable today as a differing perception than as a noteworthy 
piece of historiography. Even in his day it was seen more as a challenge than 
a significant alternative of established views and ideas.20o However, this was 
to be its foremost contribution and lasting inheritance: the choice of a 
differing opinion on a crucial subject of identity and the ability of viewing 
history as a field where social, economic and cultural aspects, not just 
politics, diplomacy and biographies, could and should be examined. Of 
199 Kordatos, H KOlVWVIKit a77/1auia, p.213. 
200 See below, pp.214-221 for its short-tenn impact on historiography. 
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course, Kordatos himself did not achieve this. It was rather his legacy, 
bequeathed to people who followed in his footsteps and worked in these 
fields. 
The breaching of the consensus among the Greek historical 
community over the nature of the Revolution, though, cannot be considered 
as serious a turning point as Paparrigopoulos's recasting of Greek history. 
F or years to come the Communist party would lead a hazy existence at the 
borders of legality, so the works of Marxist historians would either be 
discouraged or persecuted. The impact of the Great War in Greece shattered 
the political scene. The bitter chasm between Venizelos and King 
Constantine was topped by the consequences of military defeat in Asia 
Minor. Socially as well as politically, the Greek 1920s stand as a watershed 
between the belle cpoque and the disenchantment of the 'short twentieth 
century'. Seen in such context the appearance of a Marxist historiographer 
could only be a sign of changing times. 
The challenge accepted: Daskalakis, Pipinelis, Sakellariou 
and the refutation of a 'bourgeois revolution' 
Insofar as Kordatos's books were a bold statement on both 
ideology and historical discipline one could expect a swift denunciation and 
considerable backlash from its opponents at all fronts. Kordatos and his 
willing refuters wrote in the aftermath of the War in Asia Minor and the 
ensuing downfall of the Megali Idea. Along with feelings of despair caused by 
the magnitude of the defeat and destruction came indignation and anger 
directed against those who were thought responsible. The 'revolution' 
proclaimed by returning army units, sought out a quick catharsis and in the 
trials that followed, six of the highest cadres in army and government, the 
Commander-in-Chief G. Hatzianestis and the former prime minister 
Demetrios Gounaris among them, were found guilty and executed. 
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Constitutional monarchy was abolished by referend~ replaced by a 
Republic in 1924, the year of the first edition of Ioannis Kordatos's work on 
the War of Independence. It is significant that a re-evaluation of the Greek 
Revolution and the subsequent debate on it took place in such troubled 
times. Older certainties and a whole way of thinking indeed, had been swept 
away and it was a moment to tum inwards, examine and appraise the past to 
indicate possible faults, responsibilities and propositions on a future course. 
What had failed were not merely a military campaign but key aspects of 
national ideology. 
Nevertheless, there were many who were far from prepared to 
acknowledge Marxism as either a preferred political alternative or a useful 
tool for historical analysis. Common ground between Apostolos Daskalakis, 
Panayotis Pipinelis and Michail Sakellariou is certainly their adherence to, 
indeed, the sacrosanct of the nation. Otherwise, their intentions, objectives 
and methods vary demonstrably, from Pipinelis's monarchist interpretations 
of history to Sakellariou's clarity and consistency of discipline. Daskalakis's 
work was an amateurish effort while Sakellariou's was a thesis prepared for 
the University of Athens only to be turned down for obscure reasons.201 
Pipinelis wrote a political history of the War of Independence, Daskalakis 
examined the causes and factors leading to the conflict itself, while 
Sakellariou chose to present a case study of a selected province in the 
century preceding the Revolution. More or less, all made clear their belief in 
a pre-existing Greek national consciousness, with Sakellariou being the most 
reserved and Daskalakis the most militant, to the extent of propagating the 
reality of a Greek state-within-a-state in Ottoman times. It was their 
fundamental antithesis to Kordatos's suggestions though, clearly if not 
always explicitly stated in their introductions202, that justifies exploring them 
under the same heading. 
201 In his introduction the author hints at political motives. Sakellariou, H flclO1COVVTfUOr;, 
p.l;. 
202 Daskalakis, Ta aiTla Kal 01 1rapa:yovu::r; U/r; EMr,vlKi!r; E1ravaOTamxvr; rov 1821, 
(Paris, 1927), p.5; Pipinelis, [Jo).mKi! IOTopia Trfr; EM11v1Ki!r; E1raVaOTaUCWr;, (Paris, 
1927), p.S; Sakellariou, H flclo1roVV'1(Jor; Kara U/V &;Vrf:pav roVPKOKpaTiav (1715-1821), 
(Athens, 1939), pp.35-6. 
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Daskalakis vehemently denied any claims on the Greek Revolution 
having any social overtones from the very first sentence: "The Greek 
Revolution of 1821 is neither a 'social movement', as the great French 
Revolution, nor an 'independence movement', as the one of the American 
states, but remains clearly and unassailably a 'racial movement'".203 However 
confusing this may sound, he was not a racialist. As it was going to appear a 
little later, when he stated that "it is natural for the slavery of a race ... to 
procure an unwavering and unalterable cause of national revolution" ,204 he 
belonged to an older tradition of Greek intellectuals that used 'race', gens 
[rtvo~] and 'nation' to denote the same concept. This initial mishandling of a 
major statement, although not crucial at the time of the publication, can be 
seen today as an example of the awkwardness of arguments that proves to 
be the most consistent quality of his work. 
The basic contentions of Kordatos that Daskalakis set out to undo 
were three: the absence of a national identity in the Ottoman era, the 
instigation of the Greek Revolution by a bourgeois class and the primacy of 
economic factors in history on which the previous suggestion rested upon. 
To counter the argument of the absence of a Greek nation before the 
industrialisation Daskalak1s asserted that a Greek national consciousness was 
already in place right after the fall of Constantinople. Byzantium was a 
"Greek empire" containing a Greek nation that never considered its 
captivity as permanent or "lost the idea of its independence".205 The tools 
used to corroborate that remind one of the anti-Fallmerayerists of the 
previous century, as ethnography proved a key component in his approach. 
Daskalakis invoked popular songs, which he considered as "popular sagas of 
historical value", traditions and even prophecies, as evidence of a national 
consciousness and its diffusion among the populace.206 Those who acted on 
its existence were the klephts and a17l1atoloi, armed bands of bandits living a 
hard life according to the mountaineer ethos, sometimes being hunt down, 
203 Daskalakis, Ta airla Kal OI1rapayoVTr:x;, p.5. 
204 Ibid, p.8. 
205 Ibid, p. 7. Also in p.8, more forcefully: "The Greek national consciousness existed in a 
continuous and unbroken way from the abolition of the Greek empire from the Turks to 
the recreation of a Greek state". 
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sometimes employed by the state. In Daskala1cis's view however they formed 
a mountain "armed society" and "a state within a state,,207, a ghost Greek 
polity during Ottoman times that was the equivalent of the professed 
compact national identity. 
On the ideological front matters did not look so well. Kordatos 
had used the pre and post-Revolutionary obsession with ancient Greece and 
the absence of any positive identification of Byzantium as Greek to maintain 
that such a notion, and consequendy, any concepts of a nationality spanning 
the ages, did not exist in the Ottoman era. Daskalakis countered with the 
absurd contention that all this was a brilliant ploy on the part of late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth-century intellectuals in order to secure 
European endorsement for the War of Independence. Otherwise, "they [the 
Europeans] would not hesitate to abandon the Orthodox subjects of the 
Turks to their fate, if the latter emerged as 'descendants of the 
Byzantines,,,.208 Finally, to discredit the materialist view on the primacy of 
economic factors, he put forward the significance of national ideals 
(homeland, religion, will to freedom) and the "personal factor" - the 
contribution of exceptional individuals to the historical process. After all, it 
was the people who were the pioneers. The bourgeois may have been more 
conscious of their Greekness, but they invariably followed in the wake of 
developments, they did not lead.209 Therefore, it was not the war of some 
regions or certain classes but it belonged to "the Greek race as a whole". 210 
Panayotis Pipinelis had also realised that to argue from the facts 
and events of the War of Independence itself would not result in a strong 
case for a national revolution. Not necessarily because Kordatos was right -
Pipinelis condescendingly hinted at his work as "enthusiastic creative 
fancy,,211 - but because, as Sakellariou was to point out a decade later, these 
matters could not be decided upon without detailed research of new primary 
materials. Despite the tide professing it to be a political history of the Greek 
206 Daskalakis, Ta airla Kal 01 n:apayoVTcC;, pp.l 0-16, 63-4. 
207 Ibid, pp.59-60. 
208 Ibid, p.38. 
209 Ibid, pp.20-1. 
210 Ibid, p.90. 
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Revolution, almost half of Pipinelis's book was devoted in tracing the roots 
of different social strata and groups (kotzabashis, clergy, bourgeoisie and 
klephts) in pre-Revolutionary Greece.212 Insofar as the main social, economic 
and ideological factors contributing to the War of Independence were 
developed in these times it could be said that "the political history of the 
Revolution is above all the history of the Turkish domination"213. 
Meanwhile, the existence of an early Greek national consciousness predating 
the emergence of a bourgeois class, as evident in the numerous revolts 
during the Ottoman era and the klephts activities214, was for Pipinelis the 
essential proof of the "historical inaccuracy" in which Marxist analysis had 
embarked on.215 His alternative to Marxism however, was merely a return to 
the Rankean principles: to avoid all complicated schemes as unnecessary and 
reject in effect any philosophy of history.216 
Pipinelis's answer to Marxism then was essentially a retrogression 
to an ideal constitution of ideology and society that unfortunately existed 
only on a theoretical plane. This became especially clear in what underlay the 
structure of his whole work. Leading the reader through the meanderings of 
a pre-Revolutionary Greece and Revolutionary politics, Pipinelis never lost a 
chance to trumpet the benefits of monarchy for a given society217, but kept 
looking for political legitimacy to the Revolution and, indirectly, even further 
back, to Byzantium. He employed Pavlos Karolides's argument, that at the 
time a monarch was not valued so much for political reasons but "for 
reasons of deeper national moral significance" in linking the Revolution to 
the Byzantine Empire.21s Indeed, Revolutionary Greece was, according to 
Pipinelis the "natural successor of the old empire".219 Royal authority then 
was a powerful traditional institution in Greece, "superior to social classes 
211 Pipinelis, IlOA1T1JCli IUTopia. p.8. 
212 Ibid, chs.I-4, 6. 
213 Ibid, p.8. 
214 Ibid, pp.86, 101-9. 
215 Ibid, p.87. 
216 Ibid, p.90. 
217 At the time he was writing the Greek royal family was still in exile. 
218 Pipinelis, llolmJCli IUTopia. p.188. 
219 Ibid, p.190. 
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and tapping its power direcdy from the national consciousness,,220, the only 
real warrant for a solution to the "social question". Even though his 
arguments on the monarchy as selflessly intervening among the social classes 
to restore social balance, were less than persuasive Pipinelis was to devote a 
whole chapter in analysing the advantages of the "royal solution", apparendy 
as an alternative to the communist one.221 His ending, more than re-enacting 
the atmosphere of the end of the War of Independence in Otho I's 
triumphant disembarking in Nafplion in 1833, was in all probability an 
imaginary rendition of a glorious return of the royal family in his present-day 
Athens. 
Sakellariou, on his part, as shown in his extensive introduction, 
attempted to offer a way out of the conundrum not stemming from a sterile 
confrontational ideological disposition. Kordatos's work remained 
vulnerable from a theoretical point and this was something Sakellariou used 
to his benefit as his own work was built on solid ground. Despite his 
praising the works of his predecessors, Daskalakis and Pipinelis, it is 
doubtful if they had succeeded in raising any serious methodological doubts 
on Kordatos. Far from wallowing in the quagmire of ideological 
developments during the long ages of Turkish domination, Sakellariou 
started from the beginning. He pointed out the safest and most reasonable 
way to corroborate or discredit the Marxist position: the testimony of 
primary materials. Here, his mastery over Kordatos is unmistakable for his 
procuring and handling a wealth of previously unpublished evidence would 
be enough to put any of his contemporary scholars on the defensive. Poor 
in theory and lacking in substantial confirmation from sources, Kordatos's 
work could only stand on its pioneer oudook and suggestions.222 Faced with 
a study of sound theory and considerable factual support, its weaknesses 
were revealed. 
The great merit of Sakellariou's analysis is probably its rigorous 
methodology. Reluctant to pronounce judgement on matters not direcdy 
220 Pipinelis,110A.1T1K17 /(JTopia, p.136. 
221 Ibid, ch.9. 
222 Something Pipinelis, somewhat grudgingly, accepted. Pipinelis.floA.lTlK17 /(JTopia, 
p.19. 
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related to his material and area of study he offered a measured portrait of 
the Peloponnese up to the eve of the War of Independence. He treated the 
province as an organic entity and carefully observed the social and economic 
background from which the revolutionary ethos stemmed. Instead of relying 
on national consciousness only - which he basically accepted and affirmed -
he introduced the question of the existence of a 'political consciousness'. 
The lack of it among both Klephts and primates was the primary cause of an 
abortive revolt in 1770, instigated by the Russians. The development 
however of a political consciousness between 1770 and 1821 as a result of 
the self-government granted by the Ottomans in the interceding years led to 
maturity expressed in the first revolutionary political institutions that sprung 
in 1821.223 Where there was no self-government, as in Asia Minor, there was 
no Revolution at all.224 In the areas where the latter flourished political and 
national consciousness was not the prerogative of a bourgeois class. Indeed, 
a bourgeoisie in the complete sense of the word did not really exist then. 
Throughout the eighteenth century, the population of the Peloponnese, 
which was to form the main seat of Greek power and the hotbed of 
resistance in the War of Independence, remained predominandy agricultural. 
The initiative in eighteenth-century trade did not emanate with some 
ascending bourgeois class but was the product of Greek and Turk 
landowner activity: the primates invested in merchant ventures.225 A Greek 
bourgeoisie would finally emerge in the far end of this process but not 
before the creation of a suitable frame in the guise of an independent Greek 
kingdom. Sakellariou's way may have been an indirect one, but successful 
nevertheless: without the existence of a bourgeoisie Kordatos's ambitious 
scheme of a social revolution in 1821 was toppled. 
223 Sakellariou, H IlclO1covvrfUoc;, p.98. 
224 Ibid, pp.137-8. 
225 Ibid, pp.218-220. 
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Conclusion 
Ample source material for the Greek War of Independence can be 
found in memoirs, sketches and official documents and an impressive 
volume of secondary bibliography has piled since the formation of the new 
state. Still the general impression is, like the revolution itself, one of 
unfinished business. The best pieces work adequately on some levels but fail 
on others, notably on matters of perception. It would be fair enough for an 
unfinished revolution to end up as history unfinished. However, there seems 
to be a kind of reluctance in taking up a subject declared to be the 
cornerstone of Modem Greek history. Overindulgence in political and 
diplomatic history during the past century and a half means that there is in 
reality little to be told anymore concerning the facts of the Revolution itself. 
These are determined in a surprisingly accurate way, not even contested by 
those who profoundly disagree on matters of ideological interpretation. Also 
surprisingly, a consideration of the social content and repercussions of the 
revolution is either missing from the majority of studies or taking up a very 
small part, always giving the notion that the Greek society probably enjoyed 
an admiring stability and unbreakable continuity either as when a part of the 
Ottoman Empire or an independent kingdom. Compensating for that, 
Marxist analyses offer their suggestions, tainted by a tendency to reinterpret 
the political element. 
What reasons might there be for neglecting important facets of an 
otherwise much talked about subject? Surely, the Greek War of 
Independence cannot carry in the present circumstances the magnitude it 
had at its inception. In the nineteenth century the subject increasingly turned 
into an exclusive playground for Greek historians - to the point of detecting 
a slight apprehension towards foreign attempts.226 Accepting 
Paparrigopoulos's remark that history in Greece presents a more practical 
character than usual, we may see why a consensus on the significance, aims, 
226 Paparrigopoulos referred to Finlay as a "weird Phi/hellene" who loved Greece 
"according to the biblical writing: whomever God loves he puts on trial". See Dimaras, 
(ed.), Kwvuravrivoc; flwrapp"YOn:OVAOC;, flpoN:yopeva. p. 41. 
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meaning and morals of the Greek Revolution was reached so quickly. The 
new nation-state was in need of a foundation myth and the historical 
discipline was there to provide it. This view actually gave the historian (a 
member then of a highly esteemed academic community) a pivotal role in 
acting as the nation's memory keeper, who should be by turns both a 
reminder and a gadfly, according to the circumstances. What is more, there 
was nothing unscientific in such a stance. The trends of nineteenth - century 
history pointed to a romantic vindication of the rights of nations, founded 
on a central idea of morality governing the acts and detennining the 
consequences of both sole individuals and whole societies. Reading the most 
distinguished Greek nineteenth - century historians (paparrigopoulos, 
Lampros, Karolides) one can almost feel the weight and palpability of 
history for contemporaries. It was through it that the nation lived. 
Greek historians of the War of Independence should be considered 
in this frame. Trikoupis, Philimon and Paparrigopoulos asserted the right of 
a revolution on both moral and national terms. The boundaries between 
these were generally indistinguishable. So noble an undertaking, an 
equivalent to ancient achievements, could not be pictured as anything but a 
series of courageous and heroic incidents. Since the formation of a national 
identity requires the building of a consensus over perceived critical moments 
and the absence of points of contention, an explanation should be found to 
reconcile known facts clearly in contrast with the bright picture mentioned 
above. Massacres perpetrated, party strife, civil wars, were all presented in a 
low profile and moral excuses were sought. Were these facts to be brought 
under scrutiny and viewed with serious consideration, discord and 
disagreement were bound to appear, as their examination by foreign 
historians had shown. 
Foreign historians did not shy away from depicting or commenting 
on controversial events despite their phi/he/lenic sentiments. George Finlay 
passed scathing judgment on prisoners' massacres without being 
handicapped by the fact that he had left his mother country at an early age in 
order to reach Greece. Thomas Gordon, one of the earliest volunteers, did 
not hesitate in underlining and decrying all sorts of political power games. 
This does not mean they did not carry their own prejudices into the field. 
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Most of them approached their subject with a certain twin preconception 
towards Greece and Oriental societies: an image heavily influenced by classic 
ideals and notions of exotic mores. None of them failed in spotting moral 
degradation, rife in the Orient, and common in both Turks and Greeks. In 
describing the latter, one discerns disappointment, if in muted tones, for 
seeking a place among 'civilized nations' without adhering to their values. 
Even the more perceptive like Finlay, or those who emphasized neglected 
aspects of the conflict, like Mendelssohn Bartholdy, could not detach 
themselves from a basically Euro-centric approach. It does not come as a 
surprise then that foreign historians' works gained praise in their respective 
countries while going largely unnoticed by the public in Greece. Their 
inability to grasp and reflect on the peculiarities of Greek society prevented 
them in the end from delivering a radically different interpretation from the 
one the Greek historians produced. This failure in a way contributed to the 
establishment of a beautified view of the Greek Revolution. 
In the twentieth century, this traditional view of a morally just, 
national and unitary revolution was both challenged and reinforced by 
Greek historians. Ioannis Kordatos and his followers, Tassos Vournas, Takis 
Stamatopoulos and other Marxists, mounted a sustained attack against the 
idea of a strictly national and unified movement, an attack that suffered 
from inability to piece together all known facts about the rebellion. Their 
thought was to provide eventually new conceptual tools and enlarge the 
interests of the historical discipline in Greece, bringing economic, 
demographic and social factors to the attention of scholars. Trying to base 
the history of Modem Greece on more concrete foundations, they proposed 
different readings of the Greek War of Independence, either as a rural 
uprising or as a bourgeois revolution without, however, destroying in the 
process its affirmation as expression of national will. The nation was still 
there, only this time it was constituted by the subaltern classes who fought 
elements of the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy alongside the Ottomans. The 
Marxist approach carried along a certain poverty of theory and unwillingness 
to take in the impossibility of existence of general schemes to be 
unquestionably applied to all cases. In the end, these narratives remained 
fragmentary, being able to pro,;de adequate answers onh' to certaln 
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interpretational problems of both the Revolution and Modem Greek 
History in general. 
The answer to this early challenge was swift and looked to heal the 
threatening breach. Socialism in Greece came into its own at a late date 
compared to its Western European counterparts. Politically, it ensured that 
while maturing at the time of the great schism between socialist and 
communist parties, Greek socialism was not to be considered as a viable 
alternative until the end of World War II. Trust in communism remained in 
short supply among Greek intellectuals and politicians: Eleftherios 
Venizelos, a modernizer and an undoubted liberal would nevertheless 
introduce anti-Communist legal measures in 1929. In this atmosphere, 
enhanced by defeat in Asia Minor, subsequent refugee problems and 
political instability, Kordatos's work was not considered an exerClse ill 
theory or a welcome addition to the historical discipline, but a blow to 
national ideology and the established polity. Those who attempted to refute 
him did so in the name of an unbroken national continuity and identity. 
When Michail Sakellariou exposed the basic methodological weakness of 
Kordatos's Marxist analysis, the traditional ideological consensus on the 
history of the War of Independence was restored to a point but remained in 
need of a convincing reply. 
Efforts to provide for an updated version of the traditional view of 
the War of Independence in the twentieth century were actually hampered 
by the impact of reality. Modem historians devoted their time in coming to 
terms with the end of the Megali Idea and the passing of the 'long nineteenth 
century' that brought many burdens and strains to Greek society. It was 
more reasonable to deal with the bitter outcome of an ideology that was in 
fact a child of the Revolution than with the Revolution itself. Moreover, the 
Revolution had produced acceptable results, if meagre according to 
Paparrigopoulos, while the second and third quarters of the parting century 
had offered two World Wars, a Civil War, a military dictatorship and periods 
of repression and incessant political passions in Greece. Amidst all that the 
War of Independence could not function as a point of contention anymore. 
Beautified versions remained the norm while recent evaluations of the 
subject tnay have provided multi-faced options but little insight on the part 
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of images, perception and ideology. Certainties pertain to symbols and the 
War of Independence has been elevated to symbolic status as soon as the 
fights were over. However, when whole historical subjects are turned to 
symbols, considered as untouchable by nature, certainties cannot avoid 
bearing the trademark of latent nationalism. 
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PART THREE 
Images, identities and cultural memory 
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Chapter Four 
'A perfect union' and a perfect symbol: Robert Burns 
and Images of a Scottish identity, 1859-1930 
In early 1894 when Earth's North Pole was still proving itself elusive 
to explorers, Dr Fridtjof Nansen's expedition provided a focus for publicity. 
The Norwegian explorer had set off for the Pole from Kristiania, Norway, in 
the previous summer aboard a ship designed by him to withstand the 
pressure of ice. Although many contemporary Arctic explorers criticized his 
plan to let his ship freeze and drift northward N ansen proceeded reaching 
78°50 N, 133°37 E in 22 September 1893 where his ship was caught by ice. 
From this point on information on his whereabouts must have slowed to a 
trickle, yet his expedition's progress remained the talk of the day. Indeed, it 
found itself the object of a small funny picture at the back of an annual 
dinner menu in which the explorer, after enduring his share of dangers and 
having finally mastered the forces of nature, arrives at the North Pole only to 
find himself already beaten to it. The 'proverbial Scotsman' stands before 
him, kilted and bearded, carrying the invitation to 'Greenock Burns Club, 
North Pole Branch' where a glass and bottle await to put up a warm show of 
hospitality to a naturally startled guest. If we relied on his expression and not 
on the caption accompanying the picture we would hardly agree that "Dr 
Nansen finds himself forestalled at the NORTH POLE by the proverbial 
Scotsman but is consoled by an invitation to the local BURNS CLUB 
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DINNER". 1 Certainly, Nansen's countenance is far less amiable than his 
Scottish host's and tends rather towards outrage ... 
However, we are interested in the implications, and what is implied 
here is that an annual dinner in the memory of Robert Burns (1759-1796), 
national poet of Scotland, was an honour rivalling that of being the first one 
to set foot on the North Pole and certainly an event of no less a magnitude. 
Robert Burns is shown here to be as much a household name in 1894 as 
N ansen' s mission, or the northern extremity of the planet itself. Moreover, 
the poet, unable to be himself there in actuality, has nevertheless left a 
worthy substitution in his stead: the proverbial Scotsman. The poet and the 
genius of nationality complement each other so well that become 
interchangeable symbols. 
What we shall try to determine in the course of this chapter are 
relations and connections between Robert Burns as a symbol and Scodand as 
the object of this representation. Burns as a poet is actually just a starting 
point since his literary career and merits will only set the scenery and will 
form an altogether peripheral part of the discussion. Perceptions of Burns, 
the way his work and himself have been appropriated in the past in order to 
give credit to diverse ideologies and worldviews shall form a first part. There 
will follow considerations on the poet's function as a symbol in general and a 
national symbol in particular. These will show how a series of images 
concerning the meaning and content of Scottishness formed in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Taking Burns clubs in both the United 
Kingdom and abroad as an example of literary communities we can trace 
certain currents of thought and ideological developments at the time and 
establish a fairly good idea on the discourse concerning Scottish national 
ideology. The participation in Burns's celebrations of a wide range of 
voluntary societies from Temperance and Abstinence societies to Victuallers' 
and Drapers' guilds will bring to the fore the measure of diffusion of 
national discourse in civil society. 
I Greenock Burns Club, Souvenir and menu of the annual dinner: 25'h January, 1894, 
(Greenock, 1894). 
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The bulk of my material consists of texts and addresses of the latter 
part of the nineteenth century used in celebrations to honour Robert Burns. 
Most of them are associated with the annual Burns Club dinners traditionally 
held on the poet's birthday, the 25 th of January. What is striking to the reader 
is the close association between poet and nation and, above all, the variety of 
possible nations the celebrants seem to have in mind. It would be in all 
probability quite hard for the 'Scotlands' perceived in these addresses to be 
successfully grouped for any other reason than convenience. These 
perceptions, accumulated with time, at least do seem to correspond to the 
great gallery of images painted for Robert Burns. Despite, however, the 
order previous models from Whig historiography to Unionist-Nationalism 
have imposed on perceptions of Scottish national identity, what we 
encounter here is a series of splinters and partial images. We shall attempt 
then in the course of the chapter to explain and account for these 
inconsistencies in tracing the many layers and interactions connecting these 
'imagined Scotlands' with the United Kingdom and the British Empire. 
We shall begin with our conduit to these various attitudes, Robert 
Bums. I would like to emphasize once more that I focus not upon Burns's 
career, but upon his perception, and, in particular, upon the various ways his 
legend has been appropriated to bolster the national ideal. For our purpose 
what matters is his ideological interpretation and treatment during the period 
under consideration, therefore we shall avoid entering into details about his 
life and work.2 We need however to examine the credibility of various claims 
made by supporters of different groups, associations and political parties and 
show how the poet's image developed into an "everyman's Burns", a symbol 
of remarkable versatility and national appeal. 
2 Through an array of works on Burns's life, most helpful have been those of Ian 
MacIntyre, Dirt and Deity: A life of Robert Burns, (London, 1995); Thomas Crawford, 
Burns: A study of the Poems and Songs, (Edinburgh, 1994); William Donaldson, The 
Jacobite Song: Political Myth and National Identity, (Aberdeen, 1988). 
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Symbols and Interpretations: Robert Burns in the Scottish 
. tnlrror 
The range of opinions on who Burns actually was and what his 
poetry signified is lengthy and wide. To start with an all-encompassing note, 
he was "the poet who embraced all mankind,,3 according to Hugh 
MacDonald. Belief in his belonging to the world was widespread and his 
sympathies towards international causes duly noted: Lord Rosebery detected 
his sympathy to the French Revolution although he only considered it an 
"abstract one".4 For James Taylor, in the poet's person and teaching there 
can be found "a splendid union of Nationalism and Internationalism"s. But 
at the same time and for a great number of persons he was considered "the 
poet of the people - the poet of the working man,,6, "the poet of the poor,,7 
- a "peasant-poet" befriending the little man and opposed to aristocracy. 
Robert Turner at Keith turns to his Scottishness: "the poet is emphatically 
our poet. Scotland, her story, her people, is his theme".8 Robert Langholm 
tags him as "the national poet".9 He was celebrated and hailed as an 
upholder of the Liberal legacy in Gladstone's Midlothian campaign in 1879.10 
3 James Ballantine, Chronicle of the hundredth birthday of Robert Burns, (Edinburgh and 
London, 1859), p.84. Cf an anonymous address in Manchester: "the heart of Burns was 
too large and his genius too universal to be confined to Scotland". In Robert Burns, Poet 
and Liberator. An address delivered to the members and friends of the Manchester and 
Salford Caledonian Association, 16h November 1900, by One of the Members,(np, nd) 
p.12. 
4 Robert Burns. Two addresses delivered at Dumfries and Glasgow on the Centenary of 
the Poet's Death, 2r' July 1896 by Lord Rosebery, (Edinburgh, 1896), pp.27-28. 
5 James Taylor, Robert Burns, Patriot and Internationalist, (Vancouver, 1926), p.l. 
6 Ballantine, Chronicle, p.82. Quote by Hugh Macdonald. 
7 Ibid, p.83. 
8 Ibid, p.294. 
9 Ibid, p.318. 
10 MacIntyre, Dirt and deity, p.424. In a poster from the 1880 election Gladstone is 
indicting Disraeli before a crowd of voters while the ghosts of Burns and Wallace 
dutifully support him with their presence. From Carol McGuirk, "Burns and Nostalgia" 
in Kenneth Simpson (ed.), Burns Now, (Edinburgh, 1994), pp.56-57. 
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His patriotism was clear and unassailable: D.T. Holmes pronounced that 
"with Burns, patriotism was a passion".l1 
The distance between patriotism and nationalism would not take 
such a big step to cross and therefore to John Buchan he was a nationalist 
although one of a "reasoned, spirited and sane nationalism" - quite contrary 
to the creed of "so many modem progressives - a love of every country but 
their own"12_ so much then for James Taylor's 'splendid union'. Charles 
Sarolea, a Belgian occupying the chair of French Language and Literature at 
the University of Edinburgh agreed with Buchan and outbid him in pointing 
out that "the historical significance of Burns lies in the fact that he is the 
greatest and most inspired prophet of Scottish nationalism".13 Just a little 
ahead we meet those who found fault with certain aspects of the poet's 
representation - and proposed their own evaluations. David Dickie took 
exception in Burns's actual representation in art: "they are too Parisian - too 
suggestive of a dandy and a foreigner", 14 two presumably objectionable 
qualities in a person, that the Bard certainly could have never possessed. 
Arthur Kay, Esq. offered his own, slighdy jingoist point of view. He did not 
think Burns "would have wasted much time in being the champion of 
foreigners, nor would he have belittled his own countrymen" because Bums 
was "no sentimental cosmopolitan".15 No, according to William Wallace he 
was but "a Democratic Imperialist before his time" who would have in effect 
endorsed the British Empire in the above guise 
"because he would have seen in it the best machinery that the wit 
of man has yet devised for securing stable, enlightened, and 
11 D.T. Holmes, "On Bums. An address delivered before the Greenock Bums Club, 
January 25, 1894" in Burnsiana: a collection of literary odds and ends relating to Robert 
Burns compiled by J.D. Ross, Y, (1895), 38. 
12 The Hamilton Burns Club, 1877-1927, (np, nd). John Buchan's address to the club 
dates from 25 th January 1927. 
13 Edinburgh Professor on Scottish Nationalism. Scathing indictment of present status. 
The Scotsman, 1929. 
14 David Dickie, Glasgow Ayrshire Society's Dinner. "The memory of Burns" proposed 
by David Dickie, 25th January 1913, (Glasgow, 1913), p.3. 
15 Govan Burns Club, Speech by Arthur Kay, Esq. At annual dinner on 24th January 
1908, (np, nd), p.9. 
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equitable government, for securing equality of opportunity for 
individuals, and equality of treatment for races, for ensuring the 
triumph, in all departments of political activity, of that 'crowned 
Republic's crowning common sense"'.16 
And last, but not least, there were democrats, reformers and masons 
claiming Bums as their own. Colonel Shaw, for instance, of the Ayr Working 
Men's Reform Association proclaimed in 1859 that" we have assembled for 
the purpose of doing justice to the reformer who, more than seventy years 
ago, went for "manhood suffrage" - singing a man's a man for a' that".17 
"His genius partakes of the Masonic order or type,,18 maintained Benjamin 
Ward Richardson, lllmself a freemason. Colonel Ingersoll, an American 
citizen, demonstrated his republicanism, including his conviction that the 
poet was "in every fibre of his being a sincere democrat" and believed "that 
honest peasants were superior to titled parasites".19 William Elder went as far 
as claiming Burns on behalf of "Freethinkers, Secularists, Atheists".2o 
This barrage of statements, declarations and evaluations demonstrate 
that Burns has practically been all things to all people. Can we in all 
probability safely pronounce Bums a propagator of a single ideology? Is it 
possible to distinguish between his own ideas and those attributed to lllm in 
successive attempts of interpretation and reinterpretation? To analyse the 
possible truth or false of all these allegations would be beyond our scope. 
Since this is a study on aspects of national ideology a verdict on Bums's link 
to nationalism would allow us to form a better idea on the process of 
appropriation and legitimisation that connects the poet with the construction 
of an image of Scotland in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
16 William Wallace, "Robert Burns, Patriot and Democratic Imperialist" in Britannia, 
1901,5. 
17 Ballantine, Chronicle, p.115. 
18 Benjamin Ward Richardson, The Masonic genius of Robert Burns. An address 
delivered in Lodge 'Quatuor Coronati', 2076, lh March 1892, (np, nd), p.5. 
19 John D. Ross (ed.), The Memory of Burns, (Glasgow, 1899). 
20 William Elder, Robert Burns as Freethinker, Poet and Democrat. A lecture delivered 
before the members and friends of the Glasgow Eclectic Institute, If1' October /872, 
(Paisley, 1881), p.4. 
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The fact itself of Burns advocating nationalism or not is not of the 
utmost importance. Our interest lies more in the uses of the poet's work 
through time. The appropriation of 'Scots wha hae' and its elevation to the 
status of national anthem actually matters more in this light than whether it 
was written with deliberation or in a passing moment of patriotic passion. 
However, it does not conform to reason for a person to espouse at the same 
time all the ideologies with which Burns is credited. On that matter we do 
find a kind of consensus. Christopher Whatley assures us of Burns's 
patriotism but does not condone a nationalist reading of his poetry in 
general: "bought and sold for English gold" is "powerful language" that 
swells the heart, lifts the head and provides Scottish patriots with a menu of 
memorable lines.21 However, he believes that as Burns's "most fervent" 
blessings to God for the Stuarts' failures in 1715 and 1745 prove him just a 
sentimental Jacobite, his confused politics and general uncertainty in matters 
of ideology make him only a retrospective nationalist.22 He also suggests that 
we should draw a line between Burns as a citizen and Burns as "self-
consciously the national bard" 23, who became part of a national popular 
canon of Scottish history that frequently fails to correspond with the actual 
facts. Richard Finlay admits a "sentimental appeal to the past" to be his 
dominant view 24 while Thomas Preston takes a different road, pointing us 
towards a whole poetic - political project: "a national literary language ... a 
proto - Scottish print - language,,25. But this should not be taken as an 
expression of nationalism after all.26 Such a detailed and ambitious scheme 
21 Christopher A. Whatley, "Burns and the Union of 1701" in Kenneth Simpson (ed.), 
Love and Liberty. Robert Burns, A Bicentenary Celebration, East Linton 1997, p.184. 
22 Ibid, p.191. 
23 Ibid, p.193. 
24 Richard J. Finlay, "The Burns Cult and Scottish Identity in the Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Centuries" in Simpson (ed.), Love and liberty, p.75. 
25 Thomas R. Preston, "Contrary Scriptings: Implied National Narratives in Burns and 
Smollett" in Simpson (ed.), Love and liberty, p.212. 
26 Ibid, p.204. Preston envisages this project as founded on "a Scottish cultural 
nationalism" that remains engaged in dialogue with the other British cultures. 
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however remains under question if Ian MacIntyre's note on Burns's politics 
being "never less than moderately confused" is to be given any validity.T 
For a differing opinion on Burns's national ideals we have to rely on 
Paul H. Scott and Andrew Noble. 28 Right from the beginning Scott claims 
him as "a patriot, or if you prefer, a nationalist, especially because he deeply 
resented Scotland's loss of independence".29 According to him Burns's true 
political ideas can be found in 'Scots wha hae' and 'Parcel of rogues in a 
nation' and echo his support of the Jacobite cause, in essence a nationalist 
attempt to overthrow the Union.3D The main problem in the course of Scott's 
analysis is a methodological one. His arguments rest rather on a series of 
statements and assumptions than on a chain of proven facts: 
"His regret for the loss of the Scottish monarchy is regret for 
the loss of sovereignty and legislative power ... These feelings 
for the 'injured Stewart line' more, I think, because they were 
Scottish than because they were royal ... Jacobitism in Scotland 
was largely a patriotic, nationalist attempt to overthrow the 
Union,,31. 
These opinions however are stated without any examples or 
justifications following in order to build a compelling case and persuade the 
reader. It is not so much that the Jacobite uprisings do not exhibit key traits 
and characteristics found in national revolutions as that known facts contrary 
to the author's opinions are either neglected or not sufficiently explained. 
"Be Britain still to Britain true" is not an easy verse to accommodate in this 
27 Macintyre, Dirt and deity, p.123. Thomas Crawford also notes this in observing that "it 
is by no means certain that the patriotic but still radical mood of 'Does haughty Gaul 
invasion threat' would have been any more permanent than that which underlay his 
public declaration of 'attachment to the Constitution & ... abhorrence of Riot' two years 
earlier, in 1793". In. Crawford, Burns. A study of the Poems and songs, p.23 7. 
28 Paul H. Scott, "Robert Burns, Patriot" in Simpson (ed.), Love and liberty, pp. 266-273; 
Andrew Noble, "Burns and Scottish Nationalism" in K. Simpson (ed.), Burns Now, pp. 
167-192. 
29 Scott, "Robert Burns, Patriot", p.266. 
3D Ibid, pp.266-269. 
31 Ibid, pp.268-269. 
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light and his rendering as nothing but "prudent insincerities"32, written in 
order to temporarily placate the government and secure the poet's income 
seems at the least shaky . .fu.e we to attribute the poet's observation on his 
gratefulness for the failure of the Stuarts - and indeed every instance of his 
expressing pro-Union sentiments - to stricdy pecuniary reasons? Although 
certainly Bums articulated his loyalty to his native country in a clear and 
precise way, it is also plain that he did not advocate the dissolution of the 
Union. Finally, to accept Scott's views would mean to agree on Burns's basic 
political consistency. If Burns, however, had been politically consistent his 
image would have probably resisted any and all efforts at reinterpretation and 
would have remained just another particular symbol, not the property of the 
nation. 
Andrew Noble's technique is subder but his conclusion is essentially 
the same. Noble argues for the existence of a gap between Burns's actual 
sympathies and his place in society, between his convictions and his 
posthumous interpretation. Political circumstances and Bums's social status 
meant that he increasingly had to tone down or muffle his real voice and give 
in to what his audience in the Scottish establishment, the literati and 
privileged wished to hear from a loyal subject. For the author the dichotomy 
between 'patricians and plebs', with the heaven-taught ploughman naturally 
on the side of the latter forms not just a cultural but also a political antithesis. 
It is implied that the 'Scottish establishment' held an anglicised, British-
imperial stance, which presumably, was not in agreement with popular 
feelings. Therefore, Noble casts Burns into a radical guise in attributing to 
him the diagnosis of two ills that supposedly still plague Scottish society: "the 
corrupting politics and psychology generated by the Union; the degeneration 
of parliament and of other British civic and fiscal institutions causing 
increasing disparity between rich and poor" 33 lie at the heart of Burns's 
political vision. Burns's Scodand remains a victim of British imperial 
ambitions and the greed of its ruling class - a parcel of rogues in a nation. 
But such dichotomies are easy to construct and evoke, usually 
bringing us in front of dilemmatic situations. What is not accounted for here 
32 Scott, "Robert Bums, Patriot", p.272. 
33 Noble, "Bums and Scottish Nationalism", p. 188. 
- 194 -
IS Bums's deviations from the purported nonn: a sentimental Jacobite, a 
cautious radical, an earlY supporter of the French Revolution, he never carried 
any of these extreme ideas to the end. Examining at length the fonner part 
of and attributing the latter to mere pretensions suggests that sometimes the 
halo of the national symbol exceeds our ability to distinguish the intricacies 
of an actual person. 
Bums does not appear to have been either a staunch nationalist or 
an apologist for lost causes as some nineteenth-century and sometimes more 
recent admirers would have him. There is no doubt that he was an 
internationalist. He supported the American Revolution seeing in it a noble 
cause and remained favourable to the French revolution for the same reason. 
This was not all, however. Marilyn Buder persuasively argues on twists, turns 
and hidden meanings in 'Scots wha hae', 'A man's a man for a' that' and 
'Does haughty Gaul invasion threat' to show that in the context they were 
written these poems include verses with implications contrary to what is 
perceived as their main point.34 Thus, besides rallying the people round the 
Scottish, British or common brotherhood flag, the above are considered to 
contain notions towards the realising of French Revolution ideals. Buder 
observes the ambiguity: 'Scots wha hae' could equally be a call to arms 
against the government in London or one on the side of the French Republic 
or even for the ideal of Liberty anywhere.35 Fond of dramatic turns as he 
was, Bums "rarely continues levelly in one vain".36 
To try and sum all this up and at the same time give a plausible 
explanation we have to bear in mind the era in which the poet lived. 
Nationalism and the Romantic movement led to the search for folklore and 
the hasty interest for the preservation of popular culture all around Europe.37 
Bums's song production was in the same track with the work of James 
Macpherson, Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Johann Gottfried Herder, moving 
34 Marilyn Butler, "Bums and politics" in Crawford (ed.), Burns and cultural authority, 
pp.96-102. 
35 Ibid, p.IOO. Devine puts forward the notion of it being inspired by the 1745 Jacobite 
rebellion. In T.M. Devine, The Scottish Nation, London 2000, p.237. 
36 Butler, "Burns and politics", p.99. 
37 See Peter Burke, Popular culture in Early Modern Europe, (London, 1994) for the 
discovery of popular culture towards the end of the eighteenth century. 
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through dissemination of popular forms towards the creation of a national 
heritage and cultural nationalism. Britain was ready for a rehabilitation of the 
Highlands, something amply demonstrated in the 1760s with Ossian's war 
epics' huge appeal. It is not a coincidence that the Highland Society was 
founded in London in 1778 and that Highlandism was already spreading in 
the Scottish Lowland society in the dissemination of Highland dress38. The 
"radiance of disappearing authenticity,,39 had taken over and in its folklore 
the Scottish past was seen as "surviving into the present". 40 In an era of 
liberal nationalism cultural heritage could be a pan-European concern as 
Ossian and Sir Walter Scott's novels showed. This was certainly not the light 
in which Scottish Nationalists chose to interpret Bums in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. As can be surmised from the above discussion it would 
be far from valid and even less just for him to be cast in such a restricting 
mould. It is his many facets and his political contradictions that permit 
manifold readings of his artistic expression. 
The discussion so far has concerned Bums as a person, considering 
his actual possible views and politics as arising from his own life and art. 
There is no reason, however, to regard Robert Bums the man as an 
equivalent to Robert Bums the national symbol. Symbols are useful 
abstracts, forms that encompass given totals of properties and qualities, 
permitting us to employ them in order to recall otherwise complex concepts 
and meanings41 : national anthems and flags, tartanry or revered artefacts 
indicate common bonds and identities in simple and perceiving ways.42 The 
creation of a national symbol certainly presupposes a process of 
normalization. To create the necessary cohesion certain aspects are given 
emphasis while others are obscured after careful selection. Elevation to that 
status usually means a pre-existing consensus: national ideology abhors 
38 Devine, The Scottish Nation, ch.ll. 
39 Quoted in ibid, p. 244. 
40 Ibid, p.245. 
41 What I have in mind is not so much a definition in terms of anthropology or linguistics 
but the way symbols function in ideology. 
42 For the importance of national anthems and flags see Eric Hobsbawm and T. Ranger, 
The Invention of Tradition, (Cambridge, 1983). On the subject of revered artefacts, the 
cases of the Sword of Wallace and the Stone of Destiny are characteristic. 
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divisions. Fringe figures cannot possibly aspire to such an honour because 
they seldom appear unitary. Finally, it is an inherent characteristic of symbols 
that their services can be employed by diverse parts, subject to the functions 
of reintegration and reinterpretation43: popular, but controversial to the point 
of plunging the country in the midst of an undeclared civil war in his time, 
Eleftherios Venizelos is universally regarded today as having played an 
indispensable part in Greece's course towards modernization.44 
On his way to being created a national symbol of the first magnitude 
his perceived Scottishness made Burns a wholly appropriate figure. In 
Andrew Nash's words Bums's reception ill the nineteenth century 
"identified him as the national expressIon of Scotland".4s His exalted 
position in Scots' conscience was already thoroughly established in 1859: 
councillor Martin, addressing a gathering of 150 in the Tontine Reading 
Room, Glasgow, described him as "the representative poet of Scotland".46 
His undisputed literary merits notwithstanding ("the power of imparting a 
sense of reality to the scenes of imagination... breadth and 
massiveness ... vigour and intensity"), it was his Scottishness that emerged as 
his most dear and valued quality: "he has portrayed Scottish manners, habits 
and customs with such marked individuality of character and such intensely 
national feeling... He is intensely Scotch".47 This "intensely Scotch" 
personality possessed exemplary qualities, in depicting the Scottish character: 
"there is an exalted spirit of freedom and independence - there is 
a native valour, which is oftentimes evoked and displayed in 
deeds of dauntless daring - there is a passion which young men 
43 Maurice Agulhon' s seminal work Marianne into battle : Republican imagery and 
symbolism in France, (Cambridge, 1981), vividly marks the course of this Republican 
archetype from the moment of its canonisation in the 1880s. 
44 He was recently declared in various polls as the most important Greek of the 20th 
century while he is also the only politician to appear in the Greek edition of the Eurn 
monetary unit. Therefore, there was no fitter choice for the new Athens airport to be 
named after. See TA NEA newspaper, 12/1/2000, 12/5/2000 and 5/7/2000, 17/3/2001. 
45 Andrew Nash, "The Cotter's Kailyard", in Crawford (ed.), Robert Burns and cultural 
authority, p.181. 
46 Ballantine, Chronicle, p. 77. 
47 Ibid. 
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and maidens fondly designate love, with the depth, the intensity, 
the sincerity and the tenderness of its characteristics, as 
manifested in the nature of Scotchmen - there is a geniality and 
breadth of humour which cheers and gladdens the social circle -
there is a love of truth and high integrity of character deep-seated 
in the Scottish heart - there is an earnest religious spirit, which 
has not only been productive of great events, but also renders 
sacred the hearts and homes of even the lowest of the people, 
and which brings contentment and peace, and joy, even to honest 
poverty, by a confident trust in the kindness and wisdom of 
Providence".48 
Martin therefore viewed the poet's works as a kind of mirror in 
which a realistic reflection of Scotland could be found - even if this 
reflection seemed to possess good qualities in abundance but strangely 
enough no character faults at all. This literary Scotland is more real than the 
real one: literature is received as authenticating and legitimising a definitive 
national identity.49 In this insinuating way Bums becomes associated with his 
country and acquires the image of a "proverbial Scotsman", one who can 
signify Scotland in all circumstances and stand in for the nation. To obtain a 
clearer idea for the exact relation felt to exist between poet and country we 
tum to Professor Hodgson: "as for Bums, it may be said he was not so 
much Scotch as he was Scotland itself - Scotland incarnate as it were -
Scotland personified - that is, embodied in a person and made visible and 
audible".50 The poet recalls the nation, remains both an inspiration and a 
valid reason to address and praise it. In a remarkable example Professor 
Blackie would bring together on his side William Wallace, Robert the Bruce, 
Patrick Hamilton, John Knox and Walter Scott, in other words all the 
totemic personages of Scottish history, to which "truly representative men" 
Scots should be "most indebted for the inheritance of our great birthright of 
48 Ballantine, Chronicle, pp. 77 -78. 
49 See Nash, 'The Cotter's Kailyard", pp.180-197. 
50 The Anniversary of the birth of Burns. Edinburgh Burns Club in Daily Review, 
Monday, January 26, 1874. 
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national feeling".51 In many instances we will encounter reference to the 
precision with which Burns expressed the spirit of Scotland or preserved the 
true Scottish character, and to the debt his country has incurred. It is not 
simply the "yet many instalments of honour to pay to our peasant-poet, little 
noticed and rewarded as he was by our grandsires,,52. The limits between 
"Scotland's Burns and Scotland ... as 'The Cotter's Saturday Night",53 blur: 
we end up with a textual nation and a nationalised poet. 
The remarkable absence of defects in Burns's textual Scotland did 
not avail its symbolic creator. His social life, full of amorous liaisons, which 
find their way, sometimes quite explicitly, in his poetry had always been a 
point of contention. 54 The facts being widely known there was no question 
of a chance to be struck from the record or to be quietly ignored in order for 
Burns to conform to Victorian gentlemanly ideals. 55 It had to be admitted 
and excuses offered: social causes56 or the human condition. 57 There was 
51 Ballantine, Chronicle, p.14. 
52 James Fergusson in his address in the Ayr County Hall. Ibid, p.99. Cf. Carol 
McGuirk's suggestion that Burns" 'remembered' Scotland on behalf of all its uncounted 
nineteenth century exiles ... and in their turn the Scots remembered Burns" in "Bums 
and ... ", Simpson (ed.), Burns Now, p.60. 
53 Andrew Nash observes the link developing between poet and nation: "it was 
unanimous that by understanding Bums you were understanding Scotland": according to 
George Gilfillan Burns was "a living image of his country ... a microcosm of his nation". 
He also brings to our attention Duncan Macmillan's assertion for Wilkie's painting 'The 
Cotter's Saturday Night' forming "the canonical image of Scottish art". In Nash, "The 
Cotter's Kailyard", p.187, 183 respectively. 
54 Rev. Dr Norman McLeod wishes for "a centenary edition of his poems from which 
every thing would be excluded which a Christian father could not read aloud in his 
family circle". The audience replied with hisses drowned in cheers. In Ballantine, 
Chronicle, p.54. 
55 Although his works and letters were sometimes properly "sanitized" by obliging 
nineteenth-century editors. See G. Ross Roy, "Editing Burns in the Nineteenth Century" 
in Simpson (ed.), Burns Now. 
56 John McGavin blames "the customs of the times" when drink "was held to be the 
symbol of friendship" and "had mingled itself with the most pleasant experiences, as well 
as the most solemn occurrences oflife". In Ballantine, Chronicle, p.61. 
57 Professor Aytoun in the Ayr County Hall puts forth the argument that "all of us, even 
the best, in the eyes of the Creator are but sinners" while Sheriff Napier in a speech of his 
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however a more successful way to bypass the proble~ namely by casting 
him to the role of a "self-destructive genius"S8 whose passions with the one 
hand freely fanned his remarkable art while with the other led him to moral 
lapses and an early grave. 
George Combe, a phrenologist - phrenology being quite an 
acceptable practice at the time - who had conducted an examination of the 
poet's skull, illustrated the argument with scientific authority recounted in 
the appropriate Victorian reticence. Burns was endowed with "powers 
calculated for a far higher sphere than that which he was able to reach, and 
of passions which he could with difficulty restrain, and which it was fatal to 
indulge".s9 Taking care not to refer to any specifics, Lord Ardmil1an 
admitted that "we must deplore and condemn much in the character and in 
the writings of Burns,,60 who was "floating rudderless and helpless on the 
tide of life".61 Sir Archibald Alison conceded his life having been at times 
"irregular" and acknowledged that the common excuse was that "his frailties 
were those to which men of ardent and poetic mind have in all ages been 
most subject".62 And John Hamilton agreed that "his voice ... was simply the 
voice of Nature itself, and the only serious fault of some of his productions 
is that to Nature's truth he was but too true".63 A plain and straightforward 
condemnation though would have been both unrespectable and 
unacceptable, as the vehemence with which The Scotsman had declared as 
"pulpit trash" a lecture in which Burns was deplored as "a person who never 
loved a woman but to betray her, and who never made an acquaintance 
read at the Dumfries Assembly Rooms acknowledges Burns to having partaken "of the 
common lot of sinning mortality". In Ballantine, Chronicle, p.99, 136 respectively. 
58 Nicholas Roe, "Authenticating Robert Burns", in Crawford (ed.), Burns and cultural 
authority, p.161. 
59 Roe, "Authenticating Robert Burns", pp.172-173. 
60 Ballantine, Chronicle, p.7. 
61 Ibid, p.6. The circumlocutions used in the 1859 celebrations to describe Burns's erratic 
behaviour would make for a long list: "jovial habits", ''manly vices", "shortcomings", 
"errors", "weaknesses", "failings", "foibles and frailties", even "the hindrances of 
accidents and circumstance and time" are merely indicative. 
62 Ibid, pp.42-43. 
63 Ibid, p.139. 
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among either young men or women but he injured and corrupted,,64, had 
clearly showed. A venerated symbol may only stand so much criticism. Bums 
as property of the Scottish nation was entitled to some reprieve. 
Belonging to the nation however meant the existence of latent 
powers to be utilized to national benefit. Andrew Nash has established that 
literature had an exceptional place in showing "a powerful potential to 
market and validate an authoritative identity for Scotland". 65 That being the 
case it is easy to understand why Burns the symbol would be useful in 
providing legitimisation to "forces eager to impose their own patterns of 
cultural authority". 66 Political authority did not lag far behind. In the 
nineteenth century Burns was cast into the role of representative of an anti -
aristocratic, democratic, meritocratic Scotland, "older, purer and 
uncorrupted", to "accommodate the predominant laisseVaire ideology of the 
day.67 Indeed, "Burnsian notions of freedom and liberty and the dignity of 
mankind were ideally suited to Scottish middle-class self-perception and the 
erection of statues in his honour throughout the country reinforced the 
belief that talent was God-given and not the preserve of noble birth". 68 In 
this frame Bums was used by Temperance advocates, Churchmen and 
politicians while excused for his perceived Scottish nationalism by repeated 
reference to his British patriotism. When in the twentieth century Liberalism 
gave way to class politics, Burns was properly recast in socialist lines by Keir 
Hardie and Ramsay MacDonald, while the Nationalists easily appropriated 
his "bought and sold for English gold" theme which was lying there for the 
taking. 
Simpson notes the political versatility of the Burns legend, which 
permits both Scottish Socialists and nationalists to employ him as a symbol. 
Finlay's observation that "so long as the man and his work can be 
appropriated by lots of political factions and none has exclusive ideological 
64 Quoted in Roe, "Authenticating Robert Burns", p.l59. 
65 Nash, "The Cotter's kailyard", p.l8!. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Finlay, "The Burns Cult" in Simpson (ed.), Love and liberty, p.71. 
68 Ibid, p.72. 
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ownership his centrality as a Scottish cultural icon is guaranteed,,69 can easily 
be extended to William Wallace, Robert the Bruce and others on whom a 
national consensus exists. This undiminished power as cultural icons, along 
with persistence in being aligned to the other powerful Scottish symbols, 
permits us to underscore their potency. In the proper setting and array 
symbols become irresistible to the point of substituting the concepts they 
represent. Today a possible mention of Wallace, Bruce, Burns, 
Protestantism, the Union of 1707, Scottish Enlightenment, along with 
Devolution and the 1999 parliament sums up Scottish history for every non 
- historian. Such symbols, carefully picked, can provide a handy overview, 
reduce whole patterns to single elements, be encompassing and easily 
accessible at the same time, without being controversial. Such symbols are 
called in to mobilize the people when the nation is in need. Elevated to the 
status of a national symbol Bums can be revered even by Temperance and 
Total Abstinence societies no matter how contradicting to his actual way of 
life this might be. 
/ 
"A safe apolitical emblem" is Finlay's final verdiceo on Burns and the 
popularity of the poet confirms it as a proper one: "Burns permits a safe 
celebration of Scottish identity which raises no awkward political questions, 
and this has been an enduring feature of the Bard's role in Scottish national 
identity".71 It is precisely the work of national ideologies to create such 
'apolitical emblems' that do not raise 'awkward political questions', since 
whatever pertains and belongs to the nation must inherendy and of its own 
nature rise above petty affairs and group interests. Since the nation must be a 
homogeneous whole, devoid of gaps and cleavages that threaten to tear it 
asunder its symbols have to be unitary. Whatever aspires to the national has 
to be both elastic and untouchable at the same time.72 We have already noted 
the extremely wide range of appropriations that the poet has generated in his 
symbolic guise. Because Burns's politics were "never less than moderately 
69 Kenneth Simpson, "Introduction" in Simpson (ed.) Love and liberty, p.2. 
70 Finlay, "The Bums Cult" in Simpson (ed.), Love and liberty, p.76. 
71 Hutchison, "Bums, the Elastic Symbol", p.76. 
72 The controversy ensuing after Ian MacIntyre's initiative for a DNA examination of the 
poet's remains is quite illustrating. 
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confused" his elasticity as a symbol could be stretched to the proper limit. 
Confused politics can easily be turned into an absence of politics or whatever 
politics do not bother the majority at a given moment. In any case, this was 
another contributing factor in elevating him to the status of a national 
symbol. To present and accept Burns as 'apolitical' is to render him 
appropriately national. 
But what exactly was this national identity for which Burns was 
supposed to supply an image, an emblem and inspiration? What was the 
image of Scotland that people were constructing in the long nineteenth 
century through their veneration of Burns? We propose to explore this by 
approaching celebratory addresses in honour of the Bard mostly given at the 
annual January Bums dinners. A great part of our sample derives from the 
centenary celebrations of 1859 but an adequate number remains to confirm 
the trends of later years. The origin of the material means that this is in effect 
the approach an intellectual community was taking and not, for instance, a 
popular view of Scotland. In the course of this examination we do meet 
gatherings and celebrations of the 'working men', 'working classes', 'sons of 
toil'. This is however for the most part fragmentary evidence, filtered 
through the lens of representatives expressing literary aspirations and intent 
on imitating 'the better classes'. If there is an alternative popular conception 
of Scotland for the extent of this period it lies beyond the reach and scope of 
the present work. 
A conduit to diversion: Representations of Scodand in the 
Burns Clubs 
"The lapse of time, the rise and fall of kings, the wars of factions, 
the clashing of rival sects of religionists, and even the Treaty of 
Union itself, - all had failed to deprive Scotland of her distinctive 
nationality. And why was this? It was because our nationality was 
not a myth, it was no mere idle whim, or passing fancy. It was 
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stamped on the aspect of our soil; it was interwoven with our 
manners and customs; it lent a tinge to our superstitions and 
traditions; it gave a character to our music; and was based on all 
the tenderest emotions and deepest affections of the human 
heart. Possessing such elements of undying vitality, it was 
indestructible and imperishable". 73 
Thus Dr. Adam, "late of Dumfries, now of Boston, lincolnshire" spoke in 
the Dumfries Assembly Rooms on 25 January 1859. After the lapse of a 
hundred and fifty-two years between the Union of Parliaments and his time 
the good Doctor was asserting Scotland's "distinctive nationality" and 
distinct national identity. This was by no means an accident in wording or an 
utterance of some extreme figure in the political spectrum. Far from being an 
expression of marginal opinion as it was, it does not follow suite, as 
contemporary experience would expect, that it constitutes a sign of a 
permanent silent majority line formed at some past time and never really 
having wavered since. 
The assertion then of a separate Scottish national identity as differing 
from the English, Irish, Welsh or British was not the prerogative of Dr. 
Adam. Let us turn to Professor John Stuart Blackie (1809-1895) the "most 
prominent feature of the patriotic and literary life of Edinburgh", holder of 
the chair of Latin in Aberdeen (1841-1852) and Greek in Edinburgh (1852-
1882), honorary member of the Greek Literary Society of Constantinople 
and a major contributor in university reform in his sustained efforts towards 
founding the Celtic chair in Edinburgh in 1882. A keen advocate of Scottish 
nationalism, Blackie persistendy referred to the distinctive Scottish character 
to which the great totemic names of Wallace, Bruce, Hamilton, Knox, Burns 
and Scott have contributed 
"to make us what, by the grace of God, we are - a free, an 
independent, a thoughtful, a sober-minded and a conscientious -
an earnest, determined, and persevering - and, as long as we 
cherish these virtues, a prosperous and an invincible people". 74 
73 Ballantine, Chronicle, pp.122-123. 
74 Ibid, p.14. According to the professor a Scotsman should "glory in his national 
peculiarities, as a lion glories in his mane" despite "a certain class of shallow witlings 
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Others made the connection too. Hugh Mamillan's address in 1897 brought 
to the fore a danger that in many cases seems to haunt Scottish thoughts: 
that of assimilation to the English because of "superior wealth and political 
importance". Scots were called upon "to maintain and assert our 
individuality as a nation and country with greater zeal and resoluteness than 
ever',.75 Donald Fraser credited Burns with saving the "old kingdom" from 
"wholly sinking into a province". 76 An anonymous member of the 
Manchester and Salford Caledonian Association informed us in 1900 that the 
"Scottish nationality is perhaps the most intense that can be found".77 1bis 
Scottish consciousness rose from a very deep well since "in a moral sense the 
nation was deeply conscious in the struggle for independence,,78 and in the 
times of Knox. However, it was Burns who "has deepened and intensified 
the feeling, and, what is more, he has given it a clear and articulate voice. It is 
not too much to say, that, by the aid of this one man, Scodand has now 
evolved a national consciousness full and complete". 
This nineteenth-century vein of national advocacy then traces the 
nation's historical course back to the Wars of Independence, the 
Reformation and the eighteenth century, the era of the Union and Burns 
himself. From these three eras different keys to Scottish identity emerge. 
Mention of the thirteenth century not only evokes a time of rallying against 
an invader, it also brings to the fore the existence of an independent state. 
John Knox is the symbol of a religious identity that gready contributed to the 
development of Scottish society. The eighteenth century is a time of great 
change, for better or for worse. What is common in all three eras these 
besouth the Tweed who would have the whole British world refashioned after their 
Anglican image". 
75 Hugh Macmillan, Anniversary of Robert Burns. Address delivered to Greenock Burns 
Club, (Greenock, 1897), ppA-5. 
76 Celebration of the One Hundred and Thirty-Second anniversary of the Birth-day of 
Robert Burns, (Paisley, 1891), p.12. 
77 Anonymous, Robert Burns, Poet and Liberator, (np, nd), p.9. 
78 Addresses delivered at the opening of the Burns Exhibition, Glasgow, 15th July 1896, 
and at the public meeting in commemoration of the centenary of the poet's death in St 
Andrew's Hal/s, Glasgow, 21st July, 1896, by the Right Hon. the Earl ofRosebery, KG., 
K. T, and others, (Glasgow, 1896), p.lO. 
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Scottish intellectuals suggest as watersheds is the rivalry to England. If there 
was to be a Scottish nationality on their terms this was the Other on which 
their antithetical definition was going to rest. Aytoun himself had clearly 
driven the point home in 1853: "The Union neither did nor could de-
nationalise us". 79 
The idea of a distinct nationality though cannot possibly stand alone 
as a simple declaration avoiding any further complications as some current 
interpretations imply. The label of Unionist-Nationalism may be applicable 
to a large number of cases despite their diversity as we will see below but 
sometimes it can only hold so much water. It is not surprising then that 
Provost Palmer in Annan can raise the audience's cheers in describing a 
captivating scene with Bruce "on the hills of Bannockburn, charging the 
ranks of the usurper Edward, driving them from the field, and achieving for 
ever the glory of Scotland's independence". 80 The keyword in the above text 
is not 'independence', it is 'for ever'. What lies beneath this subtle phrasing is 
an essentially Scottish approach to the Union of 1707: equal partnership 
between the two kingdoms does not rest in the Union of Crowns of 1603 
but at the result of the Wars of Independence. These ensured the need for 
"compensation"S\ independence, nationhood or parliament was given up, 
swapped for development, material progress, the Empire. Feeling justified in 
their views these advocates of a free Scotland do not withdraw their loyalty 
or question the Union in an outright way but at times it seems as if they are 
coming within inches of it: 
"True, you may unite Scotland to England by a band of 
parchment (and God forbid that ever I should see them 
disunited) - you may even try to incorporate Scotland with 
England as Nicholas did Poland with Russia - you may, as he 
79 Quoted in Graeme Morton, Unionist-Nationalism. Governing Urban Scotland /830-
/860, (East Linton, 1999), p.146. 
80 Ballantine, Chronicle, p.161. 
81 Carl MacDougall's note brought to attention by K. Simpson on Burns as "a 
compensation for the loss of nationhood" can also be applied to Wallace and Bruce or 
even more appropriately to the Scottish institutions left intact after 1707: Church, Law, 
Education. In Simpson, (ed.), "Introduction" in Love and liberty, p.2. 
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did, attempt to erase her name from the map of Europe, or 
suppress even her very language if you will; but notwithstanding 
of all this, so long as the names of Bruce and Wallace and Burns 
shall live as they have done, and their deeds and fame remain 
engraved on the hearts of Scotland's sons, Scotland shall still 
remain as distinct, as separate, as free and independent a nation 
as on that day when Bruce emancipated her on the bloodstained 
field of Bannockburn". 82 
The strength of J.B.Ross's words is such that the bracketed disclaimer almost 
passes unnoticed. These people take the loyal oaths and proffer the 'loyal 
and patriotic toasts' to the Queen, the Army and the Royal family, 
traditionally set at the beginning of Burns dinners but the answer to the 
question if they remain on the whole loyal and devoted to the British Empire 
would be 'grudgingly SO,.83 
Without doubt these are signs pertaining to the slight malaise the 
Scottish society was exhibiting in the 1850s: the correspondence between -
not a Scot, significandy, but - a North Briton or William Burns with The Times 
and Pahnerston concerning the frequent substitution of the name 'England' 
for 'Great Britain', disputes about heraldry, the whole array of 'grievances' 
that culminated in the formation of the National Association for the 
Vindication of Scottish Rights in 1853 and is studied today under the label of 
'unionist-nationalism,.84 It is certainly noteworthy that a roll call of the 
82 Ballantine, Chronicle, p.262. Address by J.B. Ross in Girvan. 
83 There is no love lost, for instance, between Robert Fergie and what he calls the 
"English Government": " ... ever since the Union, English Governments have ever been 
better at levying taxes on Scotland than bestowing favours, however slight, on her sons, 
unless due servility is forthcoming". In "Address delivered 24th January, 1896, before the 
South Edinburgh Burns Club" from Ross (ed.), The Memory, p.152. 
84 See Morton, Unionist-Nationalism. Governing Urban Scotland 1830-1860, (East 
Linton, 1999); Morton, "What if? The significance of Scotland's missing nationalism in 
the nineteenth century" in D.Broun, R. Finlay and M. Lynch (eds.), Image and Identity: 
The Making and Remaking of Scotland through the ages, (Edinburgh, 1998), pp.156-176; 
Morton, "Scottish Rights and 'centralisation' in the mid-nineteenth century in Nations 
and Nationalism, 2, (1996), 257-279; H.J. Hanham, "Mid-century Scottish nationalism: 
romantic and radical" in R. Robson (ed.), Ideas and institutions of Victorian Britain: 
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Association's most promment figures resembles a coalition of the 
disaffected: W.E. Aytoun and Sir Archibald Alison were High Tories and 
Protectionists, disappointed by the turn of things in their party after the 
repeal of Com Laws, the Rev. James Begg and Duncan MacLaren were 
involved in unsuccessful power struggles inside the Free Church.85 If we 
admit though that the Scottish society had suffered from resurfacing identity 
crises after the Union this was certainly not thought as a great one at the 
time. It only looks important in hindsight, in presenting elements that will 
need almost another century to come to the fore and affect its political and 
ideological structure. 
But it was not an untroubled period altogether, whether we choose 
to attribute its problems to deficiencies of the British political system, within 
which Scotland had sunk to merely provincial status, to the effects of rapid 
industrialisation the country had undergone in the past half-century, to 
differing ideological undercurrents running inside Scottish society, or to all 
of these together. The Disruption of 1843 should not be seen in merely 
religious terms because of its de stabilising role in all three institutions 
constituting the country's semi-independent state since the Union. Kirk, 
courts and universities were deeply enmeshed in this dissension, which even 
if it did not shatter the social consensus at least seriously impaired it for a 
while. The shifting of political alliances and consequent fragmentation 
became evident in the series of elections fought during the 1840s and the 
debate on educational reform in the early 1850s .86 We should not then 
disassociate these developments from the pensive and introspective mood 
we can often discern in the 1850s Scotland. 
Not all Scots felt slighted however, even among supporters of a 
strong national stance. Mark Napier (1798-1879), descended from the 
Napiers of Merchiston and sheriff of Dumfriesshire for 35 years, was 
definitely not one to mince words when the instance demanded it "a keen 
Essays in honour of George Kitson Clark, (London, 1967); Scottish Nationalism, 
(London, 1969). 
85 See I.G.C. Hutchison, A political history of Scotland, 1832-19~4. Parties, Elections 
and Issues, (Edinburgh, 1986), pp. 91-93. 
86 Ibid, ch.3. 
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controversialist and most unsparing in epithets of abuse" was The Scotsman's 
verdict.87 Despite his Jacobitism - described in the Dictionary of National 
Biograp~ as "of the old-fashioned fanatical type" and obvious in his well 
known controversial biography of Montrose - which could have justified any 
possible anti-unionist inclination, in a Dumfries meeting for Bums's 
hundredth birthday he did not hesitate in throwing a rather mocking jab in 
the direction of the National Association and the heraldic obsessions of 
some of its most prominent supporters: 
"Gendemen, we have of late years heard something about those 
grievances of Scodand, which consist in the fanciful danger of 
her national individuality becoming merged and lost. Do not 
Bums and Scott guard it for ever? Are they not better than two 
unicorns![ .. . ]A fig for the armorial monster. For the eternal 
preservation of the national individuality of Scotland, I say we 
have Bums and Scott, and so, not only may the heraldic lion 
chase the heraldic unicorn right about the town, but he may dine 
upon his haunches, and pick his teeth with his horn - so far as 
Scodand either cares or need care". 88 
Napier articulated a more sensible approach in ridiculing matters 
already looking as trifles and echoed the notions of another current of 
thought that viewed Scodand as an indispensable part of the British Empire. 
"Be Britain still to Britain true/ Amang ourselves united/For never but by 
British hands/Maun British wrangs be righted,,89 was Bailie Greig's use of 
Bums's affirmation of British patriotism in commending Scots distinguishing 
themselves in the Indian Army. Wj])iam Young, from the vantage point of 
the Canadian colonies acted as a herald for a unitary nation-state: 
"now that the faint lines between Scotland and England have all 
but vanished, and that Ireland is drawing more closely every day 
to Britain, so that these two magnificent islands - small in 
87 The Scotsman, 2411 111879. 
88 Ballantine, Chronicle, p.135. 
89 Ibid, p.354. 
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dimensions, but magnificent in power - are combining into a 
perfect union, Scottish genius is British genius". 90 
Young's political vision of unitary perfection owes at least part of it to the 
idealization afforded by distance and colonial experience. However, others, 
nearer the centre, were thinking along these lines too: J . Woodhead in 
Huddersfield assured us that 
"Scotland and England are so thoroughly united - their people 
living under the same government, speaking the same language, 
believing essentially in the same religious faith, rejoicing in the 
same freedom, and aiming at the same great destiny".91 
Or take David Masson (1822-1907), Professor of Rhetoric in Edinburgh 
(1865-1895), historiographer-royal for Scotland and an advocate of higher 
education and the medical education of women, a man commended for his 
"broad-minded patriotism, untainted by the parochialism which he heartily 
condemned".92 In a speech in Aberdeen he declared that 
"the sentiment of Scottish nationality is not something barbaric 
and obsolete, the poetical expression of which is justifiable only 
on historical grounds; it exists indestructibly yet among the 
powers and forces of the present composite and united British 
body politic, and is capable of services in the affairs of that body 
politic that may be of incalculate utility even yet".93 
Certainly Burns's hundredth birthday turned out signifying much more 
than simply commemorating the poet. It was to be a celebration of the 
90 Celebration of Burns' centenary, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 25th January 1859 (reported by 
Messrs. Weeks and Cochran), (Halifax, 1859), p.56. 
91 Ballantine, Chronicle, p.454. Woodhead's notion finds its perfect expression in an 
early address (1844) of Sir John Macneil who states that "We are proud of the victories 
of Cressy, of Agincourt, of Poitiers, as if they had been won by our own ancestors". In 
Proceedings at the Great National Festival in honour of the memory of Robert Burns, 
and to welcome his sons to the bank of the Doon, held near Alloway Kirk on Tuesday, 6'h 
August 1844, (np, nd), p.18. 
92 Quoted in The Dictionary of National Biography, Second Supplement, (London, 
1912). 
93 Professor Masson in unveiling the Bums statue in Aberdeen on 15th September 1892 
"in the presence of about 6000 onlookers". In Burnsiana, III, (1894), p.32. 
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Empire. Not only was it celebrated in places as far apart as Edinburgh, 
London, Toronto, Dublin, Melbourne and Bombay - where N owrojee 
Ardaseer Davur, Esq., "kindly lent his splendid mansion at Tardeo for the 
occasion,,94 -, it became an event to remind of imperial successes and 
services, to talk of civilization, trade, religion and other linchpins of Empire 
or to extol the virtues of armies that kept her afloat. In many places the 
occasion was accompanied by pageantry and processions where the 
authorities, civic as in Ayr or imperial as ill Halifax, Nova Scotia95, 
commanded a prominent place. The whole conduct of the ceremonial 
dinners, with the loyal and patriotic toasts to the Queen or the Army and 
Navy, the singing of the national anthem (sometimes 'God save the Queen', 
others 'Rule Britannia') recall to mind the occasions of a Queen's birthday, a 
Jubilee or other public ceremonies effectively stressing "history and 
hierarchy, unity and order, crown and empire".96 Elevated to something 
more than a literary moment or a regional pageant, there was still a 
distinctive Scottish tinge on the palette with which the Empire was painted 
this time and to attribute it simply to the poet's origin would not be the full 
story by far. 
The vision of a Scotland-in-the-Empire became the story of Scottish 
success in matters military and colonial. India had opened great chances 
providing a new field for administration and enterprise, being in the words 
of Walter Scott, "the com-chest of Scodand".97 Patronage and the colonisers' 
individual qualities allowed for the existence of a system of maintenance of 
close links with the home country in trade, industry and new recruits.98 
Forming the majority of Bombay merchants Scots attracted Charles Dilke's 
praise who commented on their advance "from small beginnings without 
external aid" and observed that it was "strange, indeed, that Scodand has not 
94 Ballantine, Chronicle, p.512. 
95 Ibid., pp, 92-95, 515-522 respectively. 
96 David Cannadine, Ornamentalism: How the British saw their Empire, (London, 2001), 
p.l06. 
97 Quoted in Devine, The Scottish Nation, p.216. 
98 John M. Mackenzie, "On Scotland and the Empire", International Historical Review, 
xv, (1993), 724. 
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become the popular name for the United Kingdom".99 The hundredth 
anniversary of Burns's birth fell at the end of the Indian mutiny. In many 
addresses we encounter "amidst the red fields of Ind the tartan'd heroes of 
old Scotia,,100 dreaming of their home "they may never see again". In later 
years we find the ''Burning Plains or ... the Remote Mountains of India" 
where Scotsmen had distinguished themselves "in war and administration 
and commerce and religion" or the "Far Eastern Seas", where the British 
fleet is "maintaining ... equality of opportunity in a great national drama [the 
Boxers' rebellion].101 A special place was reserved for David Livingstone, 
explorer of Africa, where "Scottish Pioneers and Scottish soldiers ... are 
helping to replace Bloodshed and Barbarism by Peace and Civilisation" .102 
The unitary state envisaged and presupposed in the previous 
accounts was not a vision gladly shared by all who supported an Imperial 
Scodand. There were also those who chose to depict a less centralised 
picture. Sir James Fergusson made passing comment on Scodand being 
"only one of a confederacy of nations, with common interests and common 
glories" .103 A 'confederacy of nations' seems indeed an awkward way to 
portray an Empire. The term implies equal authority, brings to mind echoes 
of political debates on the other side of the Adantic and recalls the short-
lived 'Confederate States of America', whose authority principle rested on 
the right of secession, displaying the states' supremacy in regard to a central 
government. Influential writers as Walter Bagehot and John Stuart Mill 
offered their views on federalism in the 1860s commenting on the American 
example and its apparent limitations.104 
There was no need to cross the ocean, however, for the debate on 
federalism in the Empire was already open since the 1830s and related to the 
question of the colonies' participation in their own government. Indeed, 
Canada was created a federal Dominion in 1867 and the next decade saw an 
99 Quoted in Fry, The Scottish Nation, ch.25. 
100 Ballantine, Chronicle, p.82. 
101 Anonymous, The Memory of Burns: A speech at the annual dinner of the Glasgow 
Ayrshire Society on 25th January 1898, (np, nd), pp.25-26. 
102 Anonymous, The Memory of Burns: A speech, p.26. 
103 Ballantine, Chronicle, p.97. 
104 John Kendle, Federal Britain. A history, (London and New York, 1997), pp.28-30. 
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abundance of schemes and proposals of similar arrangements for the sum of 
the Empire - or at least its colonies of white settlement. Not surprisingly, it 
was at some point linked to Irish Home Rule, the great warp of British 
politics in the 1880s, only to be dismissed as a recipe for wea~ ineffective 
government, one irreconcilable to the United Kingdom political tradition. lOS 
In essence, the opponents of federalism viewed it as stepping down from the 
imperial pedigree, something altogether uncalled for and unimaginable: for 
Edward Freeman it was "unrealistic to suggest that the United Kingdom be 
asked to give up its enormous power and become no more powerful in law 
than any other part of the proposed federation" while Henry Thring thought 
that "in so far as an institution is Imperial it cannot be Federal, and in so far 
as it is Federal it cannot be Imperial".106 
To be certain, the debate reflected existing problems ill 
administrating vast territories and has to be considered along with 
developments leading from informal to formal Empire. It was also coupled 
with a latent, but always present, recognition of the multiplicity of elements 
making up Britain - and a perceived kind of anxiety due to that. More 
significantly though, what is actually hinted here is that in the absence of a 
monolithic understanding of the British state people were taking liberties in 
visualizing the United Kingdom and its constituent parts in a number of 
differing approaches. 
But then again, if the federal alternative was gaining ground in the 
1850s, what is one to make of John Fraser, Barrister - at - Law, who was to 
respond in Dublin to the Lord Mayor's toast to "The Land we live in"? After 
alluding to his double descent, both Scottish and Irish, he added that he 
would rather speak as a subject of the British Empire" in admitting that 
''while Ireland could boast of her great men, and Scotland of her 
Burns, England might claim the two greatest uninspired names -
Shakespeare and Newton. (Cheers). Let them remember this, and 
while proud of their great countrymen, let them feel particular 
105 Kendle, Federal Britain, chs.2,3 and 4. 
\06 Ibid, pp.50-51. 
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pride in the greatness and magnificence which the three countries 
as one empire had attained. (Cheers)".11l7 
A note on the Empire being "three countries as one", a union of equals 
where England did not (or should not) enjoy special status or prerogatives -
but the tone was not just one of stating a simple fact but one of warning. 
This resembled a skewed view of a holy trinity, indivisible but not of the 
same substance, taken from theology and transferred into politics in order to 
emphasise the contributions of the Celtic element. As an indicator of 
discomfort towards English prevalence it is quite telling ; however, it does 
not promote any clearer image of Scotland. It just adds another variance. 
A "perfect union'? A "confederacy of nations"? "Sister 
kingdoms,,108? Or "three countries as one empire"? Taking into account 
views of Scotland not as "thoroughly united" to England but "free and 
independent", not to mention outright imperialists boasting that "we hold a 
quarter of the world,,109, we seem to already have encountered a wider array 
of concepts than expected. Where exacdy in that spectrum can we position 
the Imperial Federation League of 1884?110 How to account for the "United 
Empire loyalists", set to promote "the closer union of home country and 
colonies", meaning the "consolidation of the extended nation into a practical 
and effective Confederation"? 111 
The feeling we get is not one of clarity: definitions proliferate where 
we would have least expected, examples appear in abundance, their 
construction and order seem mystifying. Robert Bell in Lerwick puts Bums, 
107 Ballantine, Chronicle, p.509. 
108 Toast to the "Poets of the sister kingdoms" drank in Lauder. In Ballantine, Chronicle, 
p.321. 
109 My emphasis. Govan Burns Club, Speech by Arthur Kay, p.8. 
110 Strengthening of imperial ties as an alternative to "drifting apart" was also widely 
propagated by Joseph Chamberlain. On "constructive imperialism" and its varieties see 
E.H.H. Green, "The political economy of Empire, 1880-1914" in The Oxford History of 
the British Empire, vol. III, (London, 1999), pp. 346-367. 
111 Legend and Editorial in Britannia, (1901), 1. The issue can be considered as a 
fascinating indicator of imperial mentalities. A section called "Stories from Greater 
Britain" provides a short story propagating gentlemanly ideals, cricket, punitive 
expeditions against the rebellious Matabeli and Mashonas and fair play both in love and 
war for the colonists - but hard work for the "Kaffirs". 
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therefore Scotland, ill a thoroughly British perspective flanking him with his 
contemporaries William Pitt and Horatio Nelson. Pitt "kept afloat the good 
ship of the British constitution, richly freighted as she was with the cause of 
order and the liberties of mankind,,112 from the twin dangers of anarchy and 
despotism, namely the French Revolution - which Burns espoused for a 
titnel13 - and Napoleon. Nelson, on the other hand, may have made "the 
name of Britaill feared and honoured" but it was the " 'meteor flag of 
England' " he saw "floating triumphant ... and her empire established on the 
seas" while Burns's 'Scots wha hae' "fanned the flame of patriotic 
ardour ... on the tented fields of the Peninsula and the Crimea".114 Scotland, 
Britaill, England, all appear ill the same sentence, Burns and Pitt stand side 
by side, 'Scots wha hae' is a patriotic song rallying army ranks not in the 
service of the Scottish nation but to the cause of the empire, yet obviously 
the address was not treated as an exercise in incoherence. 
This confusion prompdy reappears and consolidates when the 
interpretation of key national symbols is involved. Mentions of a national 
flag sometitnes appear quite out of context. We read of the 'national colours' 
but which national colours exacdy are we dealing with? Is this St Andrew's 
Cross or the Union Jack? The question is far from being rhetorical because 
this subject is vested in ambiguity. Nelson brings glory to Britain but it is the 
flag of England that floats triumphandy ill Robert Bell's address mentioned 
above. Sometitnes "mingled carelessness" goes to the point where a statue of 
Burns can be flanked by the flags of Scodand, England, France and America 
supported by the shields of Scodand and Glasgow.lls John Clark Ferguson's 
address ill Carlisle, England, offered a singular example of the 
accommodation of symbols in British identity. Ferguson managed to 
concentrate all the questioning we have attempted thus far in a few compact 
lines. He stated that 
112 Ballantine, Chronicle, p.326. 
113 MacIntyre, Dirt and deity, p. 293-297. Burns then went on to join the volunteers 
regiments in 1795 promptly accompanying his decision with Should haughty Gaul 
invasion threat. 
114 Ballantine, Chronicle, p.326. 
115 On the hundredth anniversary of Robert Burns celebration in Glasgow City Hall. In 
Ballantine, Chronicle, p.39. 
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"perhaps, the characteristic which most distinguishes the Scotch 
is the reflection of the patriotic ardour that animated Burns when 
he wrote 'Scots wha hae', the spirit of determined and invincible 
heroism, and in proof of this I need only, gendemen, refer you to 
the conduct of the gallant Highlanders at the ever memorable 
field of Waterloo! - while they have put the seal upon the 
courage and valour, within the recollection of all present, at 
Alma, Balaclava, and Inkermann. And since the sympathies of 
the two countries have become interwoven and consolidated, the 
Scotchman is now one of the main supporters of the majesty of 
that flag, the glorious symbol of our national pride and 
independence - "The flag that braved a thousand years/the 
ballie and the breeze" - that flag which is ever the precursor of 
victory, of destruction to the tyrant, and of mercy to the 
captive" .116 
Ferguson used an example of British frame, namely the Highlanders in 
Waterloo, t~ illustrate the extent of modem Scottish patriotism, implying 
that the feeling expressed in 'Scots wha hae' was essentially the same with the 
spirit of troops who have fought in the Crimean War at Balaclava. To follow 
his reasoning, it ensues that there has been no real transference of loyalties 
for Scots between the middle ages and his contemporary times, just an 
extension of 'sympathies' becoming in the process 'interwoven and 
consolidated' since 1707. Therefore, there is now one nation represented by 
one flag to which the Scottish people pledge their allegiance. However, the 
reference to the 'thousand years spanned' appears opaque for certainly the 
United Kingdom's existence did not span such a period of time. Ferguson 
had in mind the English flag, projecting in a way the British Empire in the 
English past - or an English Empire to his British present. Either way, this 
added an assimilationist spin to his meaning and another layer to this mixture 
of ideas concerning a Scottish-British identity. 
No greater clarity can be found in enqumng after the national 
anthem. In the 1859 celebrations the canon was to open the ceremonies 
116 Ballantine, Chronic/e, p.445. John Clark Ferguson is described as "a poet of ability" 
and is the brother of Carlisle's mayor, Robert Ferguson. 
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sometimes with 'Rule Britannia' but in most cases with 'God save the 
Queen'. Since this was Robert Burns's and Scotland's commemoration it 
would be difficult to avoid 'Scots wha hae' - although its absence from 
English celebrations was conspicuous: it was only mentioned three times.ll7 
It apparently served more than one function. After toasts to the Army and 
Navy, as in, say Bradford, it was only a war song, an appropriate 
accompaniment to honouring the military. However it could also be the 
"indisputably national war-song of Scotland,,118, "national air,,119, "the 
Scottish national lyric for all time,,120. All these designate it effectively as the 
Scottish national anthem. Mr William Hutton, shoemaker, in his turn in the 
Working Men's Soiree in Linlithgow asked "how often has the stem red line 
and the flowing tartans of Caledonia stemmed the furious onset of the foe, 
as the terrible slogan pealed upon the ear 'Scots wha hae wi' Wallace 
bled'" .121 The answer came from Robert Thomson who used the "sublime 
and bold national hymn" to illustrate his own rhetorical question whether 
"do we ever think that there could be found men who would not 
feel as if inspired by some spirit of resistless power, which would 
make them, in the cause of their country, rights, and liberties, as 
strong as the resistless tides of the raging sea, in defence of all 
that is held holy, sacred, good and great in Britain".122 
Unexpected images: A Scottish Empire 
We have mentioned before another layer to the variety of Scottish 
constructions we have come across, linked to an imperial conception of 
117 Twice in Liverpool and once in Bradford. In Ballantine, Chronicle, pp. 458-459, 436 
respectively. 
118 Ballantine, Chronicle, p.175. "It is to us what the war-songs of Alcaeus must have 
been to ancient Greeks" Francis Adams explains. 
119 Ibid, p.179. 
120 Burnsiana, III, (1894), 32. 
121 Ballantine, Chronicle, p.331. 
122 Ibid p.109. 
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Britain with a different kind of assimilationist spin, and it is now time to 
elaborate. From what has already been presented most Scots from roid-
century onwards seemed to regard the state they were living 1n as a 
prospering Empire, celebrating its laws, its civilisation, its bustling 
commerce. It is quite clear they attributed this to the Treaty of Union, which 
had brought together two equal sovereign states forming a new polity of 
their own accord. It was this freedom and equality that shaped an entity to 
which they felt they belonged and were ready to defend. 
However, the product of a hundred and fifty years of Union between 
two equal partners in this line of thought was neither an English Empire nor 
a Scottish Kingdom and, in a way it was not even a fusion of these two 
elements. The British Empire was actually delegated into a Scottish one: "our 
Indian Empire was established by Clive and Cornwallis", David Syme 
announced at Kinross123 and this our taken in its Scottish background is 
telling enough. The underlying 'we' may designate the British element in the 
above sentence, but Scodand has been blended, incorporated, integrated in 
that formation and the relation can also be expressed now in terms of 
equivalence where British state is Scottish state and vice versa. Notice how 
John Blaikie, Esq, of Craigiebuckler, demonstrated this in his recalling of the 
times of Bums: "About the time of his birth we had only one possession in 
India, where Lord Clive was commencing his brilliant career. At that time we 
had not lost our American possessions, and the victories of Lord Nelson and 
the great Duke had still to be gained".124 He went on to remind his audience 
that Lord Erskine had yet to appear, James Watt was still unknown, the 
spinning jenny had yet to be invented by Arkwright and "the institution of 
Blackwood's magazine had not taken place,,12s. 
Here a Scottish setting is quite smoothly framed in an imperial one 
where the first person plural comes as natural. In fact, they blend into each 
123 Ballantine, Chronicle , p.309. Robert Clive,1 st Baron Clive of Plassey (1725-1774) 
and Charles Cornwallis, Viscount Brome (1738-1805) were both English. Syme's speech 
is another one excelling in ambiguities of terms, using 'England', 'Scotland' and 
'British' in an ofihand manner but at least comes clean in considering Scotland as his 
'country'. 
124 Ibid, p.283. 
125 Ibid. 
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other. Celebrating the Indian Army's and the Highland Regiments' successes, 
pioneer work in Africa, colonising efforts in Australia or Canada are ways of 
Scotticising the Empire and emphasize on the act of empire-building as 
particular to their own character.126 Perceiving it in this light permitted Scots 
to be its loyal subjects, work for its aggrandizement, enjoy its prestige and 
power and 'extend their sympathies' to the rest of it, the 'sister kingdoms', 
the 'confederacy of nations' without compromising their distinct Scottish 
identity. From a Scottish point of view then this was more than anything else 
'a confederacy of Empires'. 
The Scottish imperial drive and imperial language certainly did not 
appear for the first time in the nineteenth century. The Scots especially 
managed to keep themselves busy as much before as after the ruin of the 
Darien venture. On an individual level they were to be found as 
indispensable middlemen for various commercial empires. It was exactly in 
this colonial spirit and through this peculiar apprenticeship that the Scots 
shaped their own ideas for a deserved place in the sun. They did not really 
invent an imperialism of their own. However, nor did they borrow the 
English one under its British fas:ade after the Union. They might have 
envisioned "an empire of trade" contrary to the English concept of "an 
empire of settlement,,127 but the distinction was not one of principles but of 
mentalities and attitude towards natives. As for the notion of a 'Christian 
Empire', the fact that trade, religion and politics went hand in hand is 
apparent in Researches in South Africa, the work of John Philip, an evangelical 
nusslonary. The Scottish missionaries while scattering "the seeds of 
civilization" were at the same time "extending British interests, British 
influence and the British empire" .128 
126 "Empire - building was depicted as something peculiarly Scottish and as the 
fulfilment of a national destiny" T.M. Devine observes in The Scottish Nation, p.290. 
The same is pointed out by L. Paterson who adds on the Empire that "it was theirs [the 
Scots'] as much as England's". In Lindsay Paterson, The Autonomy o/modern Scotland, 
(Edinburgh, 1994), p.50. 
127 Fry, The Scottish Empire, ch.? John Mackenzie sees in it a "combination of English 
institutions with the Scottish ethic". In Mackenzie, "On Scotland", p.?3? 
128 Fry, The Scottish Empire, ch.ll. 
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Contemporary historians perceived the Scottish imperial experience 
in their own light. For two examples of radically differing opinions let us 
consider John R. Seeley (1834-1895) and Andrew Dewar Gibb, who wrote 
within fifty years of each other. Seeley in his influential Expansion of England 
(1883) managed not to refer to Scotland at all, her having been assimilated to 
the point that no mention to the Union was needed: "in these islands we feel 
ourselves for all purposes one nation" .129 In addition, the British 'Empire' 
was nothing of the sort, "in the ordinary sense". It was a "mere normal 
extension of the English race into other lands ... It creates not properly an 
Empire, but only a very large state" .130 To be sure, this 'normality' and sense 
of the 'proper' were quite alien to Gibb. He was a nationalist with strong 
convictions who had contributed to the founding of the Scottish National 
Party some years before, but not one to easily give in to delusions. He did 
not hesitate in recognising that the Empire built was essentially English 131. 
England, in his opinion, had used the capabilities and resources of her 
smaller neighbour, had usurped the name of Britain and offered to the Scot 
the place of a subordinate. Equality visualised as an "empire of his own", 
was "inadmissible and intolerable", and his reward for his toil along the 
globe was "a few names in the New Town and a large pillar surmounted by a 
statue of Dundas".132 There was indeed a Scottish contribution, no matter 
how invisible for Seeley, but one only appreciated on an individual leveL 
even if its protagonists were effectively "lost to their own country".133 Gibb, 
citing name after name of Scottish empire-builders, provides an impressive 
roster that does credit to his tide, even if the whole project provides evidence 
129 Although in the same sentence he continued admitting that in Wales and Ireland 
"there is Celtic blood, and Celtic languages utterly unintelligible to us are still spoken". 
In John R. Seeley, The Expansion of England, second edition, (London, 1909), p.59. 
130 Seeley, The Expansion of England, pp.343-44. Politically, Seeley sided with the 
Liberal Unionists and was closely connected to the Imperial Federation League. For 
details on Seeley's life and thought see Deborah Wormell, Sir John Seeley and the uses 
of History, (Cambridge, 1980). 
131 Andrew Dewar Gibb, Scottish Empire, (London, 1937), p.5. 
132 Ibid, p.3 11. 
133 Andrew Dewar Gibb, Scotland Resurgent, (Stirling, 1950), pp.312-14. 
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of his own ambiguities on the matter. In the end the title is as much the 
product of irony as of genuine pride in these accomplishments. 
If the older generation's conception was one of obvious pride in the 
Scottish contribution to the British Empire, Gibb opted for a negative 
stance. His notion of a Scottish Empire was fragmentary, complicated and 
not wholly coherent. He underlined that its beneficiaries were to a great 
extent the ruling classes, those who had acquiesced ''loyally and even blindly" 
in the Union,134 the fortunate who featured in his account, not the people. 
But he was not averse to the imperial concept itself. Had it been realised, the 
Scottish Empire would be acceptable to him - either as a form of British 
integration complying with the dignity of the Scottish nation or as a national 
enterprise in itself. It would have been a preferable version, as "the Scots 
would have brought their own institutions, their own culture, their own 
ideas" .135 Still, as he wrote elsewhere, Scotland remained a "mother nation" 
and "so long as hegemony endures in the British Empire, it must reside in 
England and Scotland, never in England alone".136 Gibb's primary concern 
then, as we shall see below, was with the nation itself. The Empire had run 
its course, becoming through English supremacy an albatross around 
Scotland's neck. It was time to shake off both: "her imperial task ended, she 
will seek to form and to justify a new conception of her function in the 
framework of European civilization" .137 
The extent to which Scots saw this empire as their own affair though, 
not in theoretical texts but in everyday practice, is attested by the fervent 
defence the Scottish Churches put on when the missionary colony on the 
River Shire, tributary of the Zambezi, found itself on ground disputed by the 
Portuguese. Not only did Scots support the demands for declaration of a 
protectorate the missionaries made in 1888, they were themselves buttressed 
by the wider backing they received in public meetings and petitions 
134 Gibb, Scotland Resurgent, p.3l2. 
135 Andrew Dewar Gibb, Scotland in Eclipse, (London, 1930), p.23. 
136 Gibb, Scotland in Eclipse, p.187 . Wales and Ireland were but "satrapies of England". 
The 'mother nation' notion is to be found previously in Scottish National League 
resolutions as early as 1926. In Richard J. Finlay, Independent andfree: Scottish politics 
and the origins o/the Scottish National Party 1918-1945, (Edinburgh, 1994), pp. 66. 
137 Gibb, Scottish Empire, p.315. 
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throughout Scotland when the government seemed for a while ready to cede 
to the Portuguese what they wanted. "This is the voice of Scotland" were the 
words of Dr Archibald Scott, convener of the Kirk's Foreign Missions 
Committee, to the Prime Minister Lord Salisbury in presenting rum with a 
petition signed by 11.000 ministers and elders.138 In 1891 the protectorate, de 
facto existing since 1889, was officially proclaimed. 
Important as it was as an everyday practice this Scottish Empire 
never acquired any philosophical justification. Orators in anniversaries, 
Burns clubs addressees and historians did not layout any grand scheme -
William Burns's 'leading idea' - to justify this development, they only agreed 
in portraying individual after individual in his personal history of conquest, 
success or failure. Alexander Mackenzie, David Livingstone, Henry 
Havelock, even Walter Scott and Robert Burns were employed to embody 
the Scottish spirit and virtues in triumph and noble efforts. This was a direct 
consequence of Scottish culture being unable in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries to override the English comparison. The absence of a 
reliable grand theme in Scottish history, as shown by Colin Kidd and 
Marinell Ash was crucial as its want precluded the development of forceful 
arguments for political ideological use. The result was that where Scottish 
notions of the Empire did not follow the established British norm, the 
Scottish Empire was becoming a shallow theme, a mere list of figureheads.139 
While the Scottish church, education system and civil society in the guise of 
Caledonian and Burns societies spread in the colonies, the "heroic myths" of 
a Scottish Empire continued to be missionaries, explorers and military 
figures. l40 The perennial leitmotif of the Scottish imperial experience became 
that of the self-made man. 
138 Fry, The Scottish Empire, ch.13. The extent of Scottish influence in institutions as 
religion and education is noted by John M. Mackenzie who points out that "the Scots 
succeeded in exporting aspects of their civil society". In Mackenzie, "On Scotland", 
p.732. 
139 Modem retrospective analyses of the Scottish imperial experience may follow the 
same road. See, for instance, Stewart Lamont, When Scotland ruled the world The Story 
of the Golden Age of Genius, Creativity and Exploration, (London, 2001). 
140 See John M. Mackenzie, "Empire and Metropolitan cultures" in The Oxford History of 
the British Empire. vol. III, pp.289-90. 
- ')')') -
How does the view discussed above pertain to Unionist-Nationalis~ 
the current influential model of explaining these times? Graeme Morton 
proposes it as an alternative to previous regards of failed nationalism and 
romantic nationalism in the period 1830-1860. He stresses the demand for 
equality inside the Union, in fact for "more union, not less", far away from 
separatist claims. The arguments rest on the interaction between the civil 
society / state axis and their relation to 'government'. Dual identities 
continued to function in an effective way, especially since the prevalent 
arrangement provided for great autonomy on the level of urban government, 
which actually tended to particular Scottish issues, and where most of the 
political elite and would-be challengers of the status quo were already active. 
Mid - century Scotland appears here as a virtual state, thus enjoying a unique 
relationship which consequendy gave rise to a unique brand of 
nationalism. 141 
Such clarity however is not present in my material. In the second 
half of the nineteenth century a more disjointed and complicated picture 
appears, fascinating in its fragmentation. If the split was merely between a 
majority envisaging Scodand as a part of the Empire and a minority evoking 
a separate nationhood Unionist-Nationalism would look all the more 
attractive as a conciliating force. The diversity of views we encounter, 
though, covers an especially broad range on both unionism and nationalism: 
just like watching light through a prism, these solid blocks dissolve into a 
variety of shades and colours. In the end common ground can be reached 
not in the words themselves but in a mentality hinted at in addresses and 
visible only in perspective. A recurring persistent we that does not refer to the 
British Empire as an external thing implies that for the Scots the Empire is 
also Scottish. In their view Scodand was gradually integrated in the Union, 
not incorporated to England, while the Scottish identity itself expanded to 
provide a wider patriotism. Thus a possible surge of Scottish nationalism was 
141 Variations of the same pattern as 'semi-independence', 'nation within a nation', 
'independence in Britain' have been used by N.T. Phillipson" R.1. Monis and the late 
Donald Dewar and are quoted by Morton in Unionist-Nationalism, p.lO. For a detailed 
treatment of this view see L. Paterson, The Autonomy o/modern Scotland 
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defused and contained before the need arose to come to the fore or at least 
before becoming fully fledged, for there was no apparent reason to demand a 
distinct presence in - or even separation from - a political entity to whom 
Scots felt being part.142 In answering Graeme Morton's fundamental question 
with a question, why ask for a Scottish state while there was a 5 coltish Empire? 
Robert Burns and early nationalism 
The experience of the Great War and its aftermath in the following 
'roaring' but uncertain '20s produced a new boost for the imperial cause and 
seemed to normalize for a while British loyalty as unchallenged in Scodand. 
Donald Macmillan in 1917 made an eloquent sermon in Glasgow on behalf 
of the war effort. He described Scotland as "a small state", proclaimed that 
"no nation that can hold up its head with equal pride,,143 fighting with the 
rest of the British Empire for nationality, liberty, humanity and progress, 
"doing batde to the death" while "the future of civilization is hanging in the 
balance".l44 Three years later Colonel J. Beaufin Irving celebrating Burns's 
memory in Dumfries summarized the spirit of post-Great War by saying that 
"the whole Empire as a body had pulled together in the most wonderful way, 
and every colony, even the very smallest as well as the biggest, gave 
something in money and men to help the Mother Country".145 It would take 
some time for the pendulum to swing back to pre-war order when the 
Scottish Unionists discerned between a "parochial [patriotism] ... based more 
largely on jealousy of others" and an accepted one, a "wider imperial 
. . " 146 patnotlsm . 
However, the age of remembrance and reliance to the old glories of 
the 1914-1918 struggles would not prove enough. As the industrial 
142 Michael Fry observes the initial compatibility of Scottish nationalism and Empire in 
The Scottish Empire, ch.38. 
143 Donald Macmillan, Burns and the War. His message to the Nation. An address 
delivered before the Glasgow and District Burns Association, in Sf. George's Parish 
Church, Glasgow, on 28h JanuaryJ9J7, (Glasgow, 1917), p.3. 
144 Ibid, p. 7. 
145 Centenary Book of the Burns Club of Dumfries, 1820-1920, (op, nd) p.22. 
146 Quoted in Fry, The Scottish Empire,ch. 28. 
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mechanism of the Empire seemed to wind down and Scotland was hit by 
recession, nationalism in its modem guise came into the fore and gained 
al t 'd di 147 Th lla appe 0 a W1 er au ence. e co pse of liberal values in the post-war 
era and the political eclipse of the Liberal party were signs of an extensive 
rearrangement of loyalties and priorities. While British Liberalism, an 
essential product of the nineteenth century, whose most radical policies were 
never more than reformist, did not seem viable at a time of acute 
polarisation, the ascendance of the Labour party to the status of Opposition 
generated anxiety among middle-class majorities. l48 The dissolution of the 
Liberal hegemony in Scotland, even if we allow for the Unionists as a worthy 
political replacement in the inter-war era, meant there was enough ground 
for alternative voices to be heard, especially when the Labour party moved 
towards a more centralist platform disassociating itself from earlier Home 
Rule pledges. Attempting to fill a vacuum of effective ideas and policies and 
accommodate the malaise the Scottish society was experiencing the 
nationalists acted at first as gadfly to Labour, hoping to indicate the 
importance of Home Rule. The electoral challenge they posed however 
caused a gap between parties and contributed to the fusion of nationalists of 
a moderate left background with those of moderate right in a single entity. 
The unification of the Scottish Home Rule Association, the Scottish 
National League and the Scottish National Movement in the National Party 
of Scotland in 1928 did not produce spectacular results. This was mainly due 
to inexperience in conducting political campaigns and the party's hazy 
ideological platform which accompanied such leftists as Roland Muirhead, 
separatists like Tom Gibson, Celticists such as Erskine of Mar, and anti-
democrats as, for example, the early Hugh MacDiarmid. A general air of 
crankiness and extremism may have damaged their prospects at this early 
147 The anxiety over the country's economic state was a key theme in interwar nationalist 
rhetoric: "Look at the Clyde, as silent and ship less as the Orinoco" urged Cunnighame 
Graham on Wallace Commemoration Day in 1933. Quoted in Graeme Morton, William 
Wallace, Man and myth, (Stroud, 2001), p.l27. 
148 See Devine, The Scottish Nation, ch.14. The fortunes of the Liberal Party are 
discussed at length in G.R. Searle, The Liberal Party: Triumph and disintegration, 1886-
1929, (Basingstoke, 2001); Paul Adelman, The Decline a/the Liberal Party 1910-1931, 
(London, 1995). 
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stage. Soon there appeared a challenge from the more right -wing and 
conservative - but also pro-imperial and devolutionist elements who 
followed Andrew Dewar Gibb and George Malcolm Thomson in forming 
the Scottish Party in June 1932. Internal struggles, discontent and political 
disagreement, what Lewis Spence had at an earlier time described as 
"hubbub, outcry, chaos", would afflict the nationalists until the unity of the 
movement was secured after many twists and turns in 1934. 149 
The Scottish National Party may only have emerged in 1934 but the 
first signs of a rekindling of old aspirations dated from the time of the 
Scottish cultural and literary revival in the early twenties. In 1921 J.F. Tocher 
maintained that "this [Bums's birthday] is the time of year when we consider 
ourselves, not as a unit of, but as a unit apart from, the matrix forming the 
British Empire".150 In 1929 the National Party of Scotland circulated a 
reprint from The Scotsman containing the address of professor of French 
language and Literature at Edinburgh University, Charles Sarolea, a speech 
he gave in his capacity as Honorary President of the Greenock Bums Club. 
Sarolea's opinion was that the historical significance of Bums lay in his 
capacity as prophet of Scottish nationalism - and his gospel had to be 
heeded for Scotland's modem history was an obvious retrogression: 
"Scotland has been more and more merged and absorbed in the Empire. She 
has sold her national birthright for a mess of Imperial pottage". He believed 
that Scotland "would serve the Empire much more efficiently if it were a 
self-contained and self-governing unity". To avoid "a dead level of 
uniformity" Scots should "refuse to seek their salvation in Whitehall or 
Westminster" and "follow the spirit and the traditions which made them 
. th . th f: f th d· " 151 great ill e past, ill e ace 0 e most a verse ctrcumstances . 
149 See Finlay, Independent andfree, chs.1-3. Quoted in Morton, William Wallace, p.122. 
Lewis Spence quoted in H.J. Hanham, Scottish Nationalism, (London, 1969), p.154. 
ISO J.F. Tocher, Ancestry, youth and environment of Robert Burns. Remarks made in 
proposing "The Immortal Memory" at the Annual Dinner of the Aberdeen Burns Club on 
25th January 1921, and at the Annual Dinner of the Elgin Burns Club on 26'h January, 
1921, (Aberdeen, 1921), p.5. 
lSI Edinburgh Professor on Scottish Nationalism. Scathing indictment of present status. 
From The Scotsman, Edinburgh 1929. 
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Nationalism may have been a negligible political power in its 
formative years but it nevertheless attracted figures that were far from 
marginal inside Scottish society. Andrew Dewar Gibb was professor of Law 
in the University of Glasgow and his view on contemporary Scottish matters 
was scarcely less bleak than Sarolea's. We have already noted his notions and 
critique of a Scottish Empire. Accordingly, Gibb was not prepared to sing 
hymns to the Union. On the contrary, this was a transaction at gunpoint, 
more reminiscent of highway robbery than anything else: "with the pistol of 
the robber on her head Scotland was forced into acceptance of a Union 
which most of her people loathed and feared".ls2 In his Scotland in Eclipse 
Gibb essentially attributed to the Union a number of problems in Scottish 
society, past and present: Highland depopulation, de-industrialisation, Irish 
immigration.1S3 His views gained in radicalism with the passage of time. In 
1930 he asserted that "the establishment of a Scottish legislature on strictly 
provincial lines is not an event which captures the imagination. But if it be 
thought of as merely a step towards the ideal, it is something which can be 
welcomed" .IS4 Scotland possessed all the necessary prerequisites to attain 
independence: fiscal self-sufficiency, cultural continuity, contributions to 
civilization, a population total similar or greater than other historical 
European nations. ISS Nevertheless, the scheme he proposed involved 
separate Parliaments, executive, possibly consular and diplomatic 
representation and full control of the national purse leaving aside defence, 
foreign affairs, post, telegraph and colonial services for some vague friendly 
152 Gibb, Scotland in Eclipse, p.12. 
153 Ibid, pp.37-78. Gibb was anti-Irish to the point of open racism. (See Gibb, Scotland 
in Eclipse, pp.54-6). These racial prejudices were not a strictly personal quirk. Prominent 
figures of early Scottish nationalism as William Gillies and Lewis Spence shared them 
while the Scottish Presbyterian churches were also influenced by racial doctrines in the 
inter-war years and sought to marginalize the Scoto-Irish both socially and legislatively. 
See Finlay, Independent and free, ch. 1-2; Stewart J. Brown, " 'Outside the Covenant': 
The Scottish Presbyterian Churches and Irish immigration, 1922-1938" in The Innes 
Review, XLII, (1991), 19-45; Richard J. Finlay, "Nationalism, Race, Religion and the 
Irish Question in inter-war Scotland" in The Innes Review, XLII, (1991), 46-67. 
154 Gibb, Scotland in Eclipse, p.183. 
155 Ibid, pp.19-21. 
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arrangement. l56 It was not until 1950 that he argued for total independence, 
complete with a Viceroy and the crowning of a King of Scotland.1s7 
Tocher, Gibb and Sarolea, each in his own way, proposed old wine in 
new casks. To a different degree, they put forward the view that the Union 
had practically failed and somehow a new arrangement should take its place. 
They even challenged the unwavering constant of improvement. From the 
bleak vantage point of recession years the spectacular industrial performance 
that had made Scotland 'workshop of the world' only amounted to gains for 
'individual Scots' and a simultaneous 'retrogression' of their society. 
Moreover, integration in the British Empire had been a vain attempt and an 
empty shell altogether, nothing but a 'mess of Imperial pottage' in 
comparison with the originality and presumed vigour befitting a 'national 
birthright' . 
The inclusion of Bums as a prophet of Scottish nationalism 
projected a figurehead to stretch the practicality and viability of Scotland 
going its own way. To incorporate Bums in a nationalist vision was certainly 
the obvious way out in proportion to his mythic status, but it was by no 
means the only way out. 1SS In 1927, the Rev. James Barr, in moving the 
second reading of the Government of Scotland Bill, could still maintain that 
"we are but setting the songs of Bums to their proper tunes" IS9 seeking to 
accommodate Bums to Home Rule. But in these troubled times when 
Scotland faced economic dislocation and social upheaval the Bums legacy 
156 Gibb, Scotland in Eclipse, pp.184-5. 
157 Gibb, Scotland Resurgent, p.287. 
158 Nor was Burns the only symbol employed for the job. David Livingstone has been at 
this time increasingly appealing and appeared in his biographies as personifying the 
traditional Scottish virtues of practical and intellectual skills, perseverance and resistance 
to hardship, as well as representing a perfect mixture of Highlander and Lowlander. In 
1.M. Mackenzie, "David Livingstone, the construction of the myth" in T. Gallagher and 
G. Walker (eds.), Sermons and Battle Hymns: Protestant popular culture in modern 
Scotland, (Edinburgh, 1990). Livingstone, like Burns, was after his death assimilated into 
a shining example of the cause of British imperialism. His canonising Scots were no 
more put off than the English by his usually denoting the Empire by its - according to 
Michael Fry - "common shorthand" of England. 
159 James Barr, Lang Syne. Memoirs of the Rev. James Barr, B.D., (Glasgow, 1949), 
p.147. 
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looked under considerable strain, something patently manifested in Hugh 
MacDiarmid's attacks both on the validity of his literary status and 
perception. The Burns Clubs, engaged in praising "the externalities of Burns 
and his work"l60, had "year in and year out, conspired to bury Burns under 
an increasing cairn of the most ludicrous and inapposite eulogy,,16t, in a 
"spate of essentially meaningless verbosity" .162 However, even MacDiannid 
could not escape the Bard's shadow, as evident in the complex structure of 
his A Drunk man looks at the thistle163, a fact demonstrating the extent of the 
iconic powers Burns had been endowed with - to the point that he cannot 
be bypassed. Both our last commentators, Sarolea and MacDiarmid, used 
him as a pedigree to air their radical ideas on a new attitude regarding the 
Scottish past and a new future Scottish collective. After the post-Union 
malaise, the heraldic grievances of the 1850s and the Irish-triggered Home 
Rule demands of the 1890s Scottish society moved into the era of outright 
political nationalism in the familjar European pattern. 
Conclusion 
What we have been trying to trace in the course of this chapter was a 
succession of images constructed for Scotland in the period between the first 
centenary of Burns birth and 1930. Burns's importance as a national symbol 
can be discerned from the fact that participants often described these 
celebrations in the language of a national holiday that Scotland - and for 
160 Hugh MacDiarmid, "The Burns Cult (I)" in Contemporary Scottish Studies, 
(Manchester, 1995), p.354. See also "The Burns Cult" in Hugh MacDiarmid, At the sign 
of the thistle. A collection of essays, (London, nd [1934 D· 
161 Ibid, p.355. 
162 Ibid, p.356. 
163 Alan Riach, "MacDiarmid's Burns" in Crawford (ed.), Burns and cultural cJuthority, 
pp.205-208. 
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that, the whole of the United Kingdom -lacks until the present day. 1M Bums 
was regarded as 'Scotland personified' and it is especially this significance 
that permitted him to be used in different schemes and guises, to the 
advantage of diverse politics and ideologies, each with their own national 
vision. However, this plurality of Bums images was equalled by that of 
Scottish identity constructions. 
In the second half of the nineteenth century Scottish identity still 
seemed malleable and fluid enough to fluctuate between a purely national 
version and a British Imperial one. A mere hesitation between these two 
currents was not the extent of the vacillation. Overall, British identity in the 
nineteenth century seemed to accommodate lots of different perspectives: an 
'independent and free Scotland' which you may unite to England by 'a band 
of parchment' but will still remain as distinct and separate as ill 
Bannockburn, a unitary nation-state in the form of the Empire, a 
'confederacy of nations', 'three countries as one empire', a 'perfect union'. 
However, underlying constructions of Scotland in the Empire can be found 
traces of a mentality conceptualising the latter as a not merely British but 
Scottish enterprise worthy of pride and celebration. The vision of a Scottish 
Empire comes as a direct correlation of the equal partnership inside the 
Union. The lack of precision in delineating a Scottish identity though 
repeated itself in the interpretation of key symbols: as a war song 'Scots wha 
hae' could even be sung by Englishmen showing that they rise above 
"national differences and party feuds".165 Not even flags could point towards 
a coherent image in a tangible and efficient way: Nelson may have laboured 
for the glory of Britain but it was "the meteor flag of England floating 
triumphant" that he saw before dying in battle. And surely the Scotsman 
who was then "one of the main supporters of the majesty of that [British] 
flag" would have wondered at the attestation that it had already "braved a 
thousand years". 
164 There are arguably equivalents in Remembrance Day for Britain in its entirety. and St 
Andrew's or St Patrick's day for its parts. They do not however carry strictly national 
connotations. 
165 Ballantine, Chronic/e, p.438. 
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The unionist perspective secured a prominent position in Scotland 
during the time and in the aftermath of the Great War but general 
uncertainty and the Depression in the late '20s prepared the ground for a 
renewed appearance of nationalism, this time in the modem guise of a 
Nationalist party. What we have to stress as a final point is that, while 
appearing quite monolithic to continental Europeans, the United Kingdom 
remained essentially a union of multiple identities and concentric loyalties. 
To employ David Cannadine's apposite point it was another example of large 
areas of the map covered by the same colour : (( that cartographical image 
provided a reassuring picture of coherence and uniformity" .166 In the case of 
Scodand these identities and loyalties which blur a seemingly homogeneous 
surface continued to coexist for a long time besides the vagaries of political 
and economic conjunctures, and in the end designated the structure and 
experience of modem-day Scottish society. 
166 Cannadine, Ornamentalism, p.85. 
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Chapter Five 
'Highest mission' and 'inalienable property': 
'National holidays' and national consciousness in 
Greece and the Ottoman Empire, c.1860 -19231 
Eric J. Hobsbawm has described the invention of tradition as a 
"process of formalization and ritualization" designed to produce a firm link 
to a society's past. The role of such "symbolic complexes" becomes apparent 
in a national setting where these traditions help solidify the contents of 
community rituals. As observed in cases as the British Royal Christmas 
broadcast, the celebrations and imagery of the French Third Republic and 
those of the Second German Empire, invented traditions were used to 
mobilize the people and/or confer legitimacy to relatively new regimes.2 In 
this spirit it is my suggestion that we can observe their function in a vivid 
way in the confirmation of a common identity that the 'national holidays' 
1 Iroklis Vasiadis, prominent member of the Greek Literary Society of Constantinople, 
considered it a bridge connecting Europe to the Orient whose civilising progress 
remained "the highest mission of Hellenism". Ioannis Aristoklis, on the other hand, 
president of the Society in 1877-78, expressed his concern over possible loss of "our 
inalienable property" in Macedonia and Thrace in the wake of the San Stefano treaty. In 
o GV K(J)V(JTavrlVOV7r6AelEM'lV1K6~ CPz).OAOY1K6~ I6MOYO~, H', [1873-74], (1874), 352 
and IB', [1877-78], (1879), 140. As the journal of the Greek Literary Society proved to 
be an irregular publication I have included in square brackets the years each of the 
volumes covered. The journal was published in Constantinople throughout its run. 
2 Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), The Invention of tradition, (Cambridge, 
1983), pp.I-14, 268-278. 
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constitute. State-organised ceremorues ill modem times recall the past ill 
bright pageantry, processions and orations that repeat themselves invariably 
year after year in a semblance of permanence. The importance of, say, the 4th 
of July in the United States or the Bastille Day in France rests on the 
symbolic union they provide for their citizens in an 'imagined community' 
transcending local ties, social groups or political parties. However, the 
context and ideas proclaimed on such occasions remind us that modem 
nations are also political constructs, not spontaneous groupings or results of 
a natural evolutionary progress. 
In the course of this chapter we shall engage in a discussion of 
some aspects of 'national holidays' as invented traditions in the Greek world. 
The first part of the chapter considers the impact of Independence Day 
celebrations in Athens in general, and its University in particular. A 
description of the circumstances of their inception will be followed with an 
analysis of their ideological content as expressed in celebratory addresses. 
The second part will deal with notions of national identity among Greeks in 
the Ottoman Empire. Here, the case is more complex since it concerns the 
unofficial celebration of a literary society where the tones of national 
rhetoric, for a number of reasons, remain subdued. However, what links 
both cases is the interplay of culture and ideology in order to forge a 
particular group identity. Special attention should be paid to what is being 
said about the nation. These 'discursive practices' do not exist in a vacuum; 
they constitute a part of politics where justification is sought and 
legitimization is conferred for ideas and ideologies.3 This 'national discourse', 
conveying a specific symbolic ideological image, is probably the single most 
important element of these occasions. 
In the second half of the nineteenth century academics and men of 
letters in the Greek world held a high social status and were always looked 
upon to provide intellectual leadership. Universities and literary societies in 
independent Greece and among the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire 
captured the public ear in a more forceful way than in Western Europe. 
3 Christos Lyrintzis, To rblo~ raw r(axlwv. KOlVwvia Kal 7rOAmKf{ OV/V Axaia rov 1 Cfv 
alwva, (Athens, 1991), pp.50-51. 
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These institutions were a novelty in the Orient and combined the excitement 
of innovation, respect towards educational efforts and approval of European 
imitation to appeal to broad sections of the public. Moreover, from the 
moment of their inception such institutions had been defined by great 
expectations bestowed upon themselves by founding members who did not 
shy away from lofty goals. The University of Athens would be the 
instrument for the 'enlightenment of the Orient' according to its first dean, 
Konstantinos Shinas, while the Greek Literary Society of Constantinople 
proclaimed a renaissance of Greek letters throughout the Ottoman Empire. 
The measure of the impression such efforts had can be ascertained from the 
stirring their activities produced among the population. Until 1862, the 
annual poetical contest of the University of Athens was brought to its climax 
by a procession of people accompanying the winning poet laureate home. 
During the 1860s and 1870s, the public lectures and organized lessons of the 
Greek Literary Society were widely popular. 
Evidence in this chapter could not embrace the whole of Greek 
presence in the Ottoman Empire. This would be a work far greater in scope 
than of a simple dissertation. To turn our eye towards great civic centres and 
follow bourgeois middle class intellectual activities would be an acceptable 
limit as long as their efforts appealed to segments both of the aristocracy and 
the subaltern classes. That such has been the case in our paradigm will be 
shown in the course of the narrative. As a prospective field of work 
Constantinople was the obvious choice, and not just because of its swarming 
Greek community or its definite value as a centre for trade and arts in the 
Eastern Mediterranean. There is no denying the fact that Constantinople or 
Smyrna would be the right environments for reviewing the attitudes and 
activities of a flourishing Greek merchant class, especially the first, being also 
the seat of the Ecumenical Patriarch, head of the Orthodox millet.4 However, 
4 The millet originally represented religious communities integrated in the administrative 
machine of the Ottoman Empire. Their official recognition in the Constitution of 1876 
signified their rapid transformation into de facto national communities. For more see 
Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, (London, 1968); Stanford J. Shaw 
and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey, (Cambridge, 
1976-77); Benjamin Braude, "Foundation Myths of the Millet System" in Benjamin 
Braude and Bernard Lewis (eds), Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The 
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nineteenth-century Constantinople was the perfect crossroads between the 
Orient and Western Europe.s Indeed, it was a place of contradictions. Less 
than a European capital but more than just another Balkan city, turn-of-the-
century Constantinople was a place of abounding and conflicting identities 
and loyalties, its citizens pledging allegiance at the same time to the Sultan, 
the Ecumenical Patriarch, the Bulgarian Exarch, the Balkan states of their 
ethnic origins or various other European nationalities. 
Assessing Greek national identity in such a context becomes 
necessary for our understanding of the complex relations between the 
independent kingdom and outside Greek communities. Although the former 
was indeed foremost in procuring policies and directions in foreign affairs, 
culture and education, some of the latter, self-assured and financially 
prosperous, were still seeking an active role of their own. In the most 
interesting of these cases the urban Greek element in the Ottoman Empire 
enjoyed a rejuvenation after the 1840s taking advantage of a favourable 
economic situation in sustaining successful trading and banking activities. 
This emerging merchant class gradually felt the pull and influence of the 
Greek state while at the same time struggled to perform the requirements of 
everyday reality under the Sultan's regime. It is in a place and time where 
national identity, ethnic origins and civil citizenship did not match, that we 
have to look for attitudes and factors commanding or overriding loyalties. 
For thus we can gain knowledge of the measure, variances, common or 
different perceptions of a national identity that was neither homogeneous 
functioning of a plural society, (New York, 1982); Kemal H. Karpat, "Millets and 
Nationality: The Roots of Incongruity of Nation and State in the Post-Ottoman Era" in B. 
Braude and B. Lewis (eds.), Christians and Jews; Roderic H. Davison, "The Millets as 
Agents of Change in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Empire" in B. Braude and B. 
Lewis (eds.), Christians and Jews. 
5 On an attempt to reconstruct 'the Orient' in 'the West' and its repercussions, see 
Edward W. Said, Orientalism. Western conceptions of the Orient, (London, 1991); Said, 
Culture and Imperialism, (London, 1993). For a related approach in a Balkan context, 
see Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, 
(Oxford, 1997). 
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nor unified nor compact, but fluid and evolving until the end of the Great 
War. 
Independence Day ceremonies in Athens 
Although political power and executive authority during the Greek 
War of Independence had been fiercely contested between rival factions, the 
aftermath of the Revolution did not see different groups vying for its 
heritage.6 Political figures from the past and newcomers on the stage quickly 
polarised along other lines. In the late 1830s the apple of discord remained 
the Bavarian Regency of underage King Otho. When the Regents were 
fmally ousted the young king received his crown in a general mood of 
exhilaration. Slow to think and act and keeping less than brilliant councillors 
in his court Otho did not prove himself an able and steadfast king. Where he 
excelled was in manipulating symbols to strengthen the power of the throne. 
In times of crisis he did not hesitate to conjure the vision of a restored Greek 
empire in order to alleviate internal discontent and rally the people behind 
him.? As early as 1838, the first year of his reign, he made a bold move in 
declaring the 25th of March a national holiday to honour Independence Day 
and thus the 1821 revolution. 
The instances of its inception shed light on the mechanisms of 
establishing a national holiday. To begin with, there was a direct attempt to 
legitimize this 'invented tradition' by linking it to its supposed precedents. 
The AO'lvd newspaper mentioned in an article in 1840 a great variety of such 
occasions beginning with national holidays as appeared in the Bible and 
continuing with relevant examples in ancient Greece and Rome. The 
conclusion was that "even if these celebrations did not exist among other 
6 See above ch.2 for the historiographical consensus on the War of Independence. 
Although individuals essayed to justify their own conduct during the war in their 
memoirs and histories all agreed to uphold the national character of the Revolution. 
? Elli Skopetea, To «1rPOW1rO fJauil£lO» Kal 1f MqOJ..t, I~ta. D'I'£IC; roD dJvlKOV 
1rpofJ).ljf1aroc; 1830-1880, (Athens, 1986), pp.273-286. 
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nations, new and old, the Greek one should establish some national holiday 
because of the unique example it represents in history, namely, its 
resurrection after all these centuries".8 The need for continuity in post-
revolutionary Greece was so palpable that there were direct calls for the 
introduction of community rituals. The times were ripe for such calls: in 
1840-41 the Greeks twice felt what to them amounted to rejection by their 
European mentors. The Protective Powers forbade any moves against the 
Ottoman Empire and the historian Jacob Philipp Fallmerayer denied them 
any real link to Classical Antiquity. Was then a national holiday 
compensation enough? 
The decision was a popular one since the Regents were frequendy 
castigated for neglecting the survivors of the Revolution. To cash in on that 
popularity there was a deliberate effort to make the festivities revolve around 
the king's person. The main attraction was the procession of the royal couple 
to Athens' metropolitan church where a celebratory mass was held. Gun 
salutes of 21 volleys were fired on the eve and again in the morning of the 
25th of March, as was the case after the mass. Early in the morning, the City 
Guard deployed in the streets from where the royal couple were to proceed 
to the church on a chariot. In front and behind the chariot representatives of 
the guilds and bands of people "danced in exaltation and blessed our King 
and Queen".9 But when in 1839, a turbulent year because of Eastern 
Question complications, the national holiday was quiedy bypassed, allegedly 
for coinciding with Easter, the lack of dances and illumination in the city was 
criticised and attributed to machinations of the Minister of the Interior. 
'What kind of danger", the press protested, 
"could arise for the country from a holiday that in silencing 
passions and erasing local differences would reconcile in the 
same feelings the inhabitants of the Peloponnese, Roumeli and 
the islands and which in revealing us all as citizens and 
members of one and the same society, one and the same body, 
8 The ABr,va newspaper, 20/3/1 840. 
9 ABr,va, 25/3/1 838. 
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would gradually extinguish the partisan spirit that splits and 
mangles the Greek nation?,,10 
According to the press, Independence Day was unique in bringing 
on a spirit of public unity. It was described as "the only political celebration 
considered sacred by all Greeks with absolutely no exception" .11 This 
celebration needed visible symbols for the public to focus on and the king to 
attach himself to, since neither Otho nor the subsequent monarchs of the 
Danish Glucksburg dynasty could establish any direct connection or 
contribution to the Revolution. Any surviving military chiefs were still 
considered its living symbols. During the ceremonies in 1867 king George I 
saw to it that lieutenant general Gennaios Kolokotronis, son of Theodoros 
Kolokotronis, was seated next to him.12 In the first years of his reign, the 
press commented quite favourably on his custom of inviting surviving 
combatants from the rank of major upwards to the supper he used to hold 
for the city authorities in the palace.13 Such living symbols were always 
revered and treated most deferentially. So much so that the AtuJv newspaper 
did not hesitate in declaring Theodoros Kolokotronis' wearing of r(JOf!0vXta in 
the 1842 ceremonies as a grave statement.14 George I took care to keep 
perfect relations with this glorious generation of living symbols. His idea to 
pay a visit to the old fire-ship captain Konstantinos Kanaris in the latter's 
demesne in Kypseli on the eve of the national holiday in 1873 was 
commended again as "most fortunate and national, worthy of a king of 
Greeks" .15 
Until the end of the nineteenth century, the ceremorues for 
celebrating Independence Day went through a number of phases, ebbs and 
flows, according to current political circumstances. A decade of slack 
10 AOr,va, 114/1839. Such assurances of inclusion should not be taken at face value. The 
25th of March marks the Orthodox Annunciation and it is doubtful that its significance on 
the symbolic plane would move Roman Catholic or Jew Greek citizens. 
II The Au:vv newspaper, 25/3/1846. As mentioned before (ch. 2), this was the official 
view of the matter. 
12 AIWV, 27/3/1867. 
13 Ibid, 23/3/1872 and 23/3/1873. 
14 Ibid, 27/3/1842. 
15 Ibid, 27/3/1873. 
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performances succeeded the illustrious ceremorues of 1838. In 1842 the 
celebration consisted only of the church mass and an additional in honour of 
the war dead while next year a "rainy night" made for a meagre outcome.16 
"The usual adornments, abundance of symbols and iconic shows did not 
occur this year" journalists reported in 1845.17 The most disappointing of all 
proved to be 1846: no ceremonies, no city illumination, no adornments, not 
even any participation of the public. The ceremony was not held in the 
centre of Athens but at Georgios Karaiskakis' tomb at Phaleron and the 
celebratory address of Rigas Palamidis, Speaker of the House, was 
considered contrary to the spirit of the 1843 revolution that had established a 
constitutional monarchy.18 In times of surge in the national feeling though, 
the ceremonies were upgraded and the public rose to the occasion. "The day 
before yesterday the national holiday of the 25th of March was celebrated 
with all the enthusiasm expected in the present circumstances" the AluJV 
newspaper reported amidst the Crimean War in 1854.19 While in 1867 it wa 
reported that "the national holiday was celebrated in a more solemn and 
ceremonial way, no doubt because of the Cretan struggle and the 
circumstances besetting US".20 In 1905, at an instance of another great 
eruption of the Cretan Question, Athens would behold one of the greatest 
celebrations ever, involving fireworks and illuminating the Acropolis.21 
This attitude clearly reveals that in the view of the public 
Independence Day was supposed to bring together any and all elements 
belonging to the nation: the people, religious and civic authorities, the head 
of state. But on the other hand the above rituals imply that the political 
hatreds formed in the fires of the Revolution were still far from being 
doused, so that a national holiday was broadly considered as a unifying factor 
of an otherwise fragmented political body. The faultlines along which Greeks 
polarised, both regional and factional, had to to be countered with 
symbolical affirmations of identity. However, the need for expressing and 
16 ABr,wi., 21/3/1842; AuiJv, 27/3/1843. 
17 AuiJv, 27/3/1845. 
18 Ibid, 27/3/1846. 
19 Ibid, 27/3/1854. 
20 Ibid, 27/3/1867. 
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articulating sentiments on a day like that could not possibly rely just on 
symbols and imagery, obviously vivid but altogether silent. It should be 
addressed in inspiring words and stirring messages. 
All over the Greek world, the celebratory address has been a distinct 
literary genre, thoroughly representative of the nineteenth century and 
vigorously cultivated among its manifold societies. As Greeks in their 
independent kingdom, the Ottoman Empire and various communities in the 
Old and New World moved into bourgeois middle class they were prone to 
copy already existing forms of collective bodies to express and propagate 
their values. All sorts of educationa~ literary, politic~ sports and charitable 
societies and associations sprang into the fore in the 1860s and 1870s in such 
a prominent way that the Athenian press, always eager to identify and 
comment on new trends, did not hesitate to talk pejoratively of an 
"associational mania".22 
In their own words however these associations were not to be taken 
lighdy. Their final scope was more or less the formation of a general plan on 
the improvement of Hellenism. The Conference of the Greek Associations 
in Athens in 1879 could have been, for example, a great event in itself 
altogether in bringing along large numbers of vigorous personalities and 
learned scholars23 to debate on subjects of their interest. At a second glance 
it would seem to be more or less an effort to chart an educational and 
cultural policy in the areas where "unredeemed brothers" where to be found: 
Macedonia, Thrace and Asia Minor.24 Collective bodies acting in such a 
21 The A KP01l'OAl(;, newspaper, 26/3/1905. 
22 Skopetea, To «1l'POW1l'O pauiAElO», p.81. F. Paraskeuaidis sounded the alarm on a 
phenomenon "that does not bring light but burns the heart of the nation to ashes". 
23 Their overwhelming majority came from Greece and 'the Orient', which in Greek 
nineteenth-century use denoted the Ottoman Empire. 
24 The widely perceived poor showing of successive Greek governments during the 
Eastern Question crisis between 1875 and 1878 was surely a defming factor in the course 
of organizing this conference. However, it must be noted that in the view of Greek 
societies from the Ottoman Empire it was also an attempt of the Greek state to direct and 
dictate policies that should exclusively be their own affair. Details on the Conference in 
};vvtbplOV rwv EllrrlllKWV Ivlloywv, IlPaKrlKG. rTf(;' 1l'PWTfl"; a. uro v uvv6r5ov, 
uvy1Cf1OUf(}dU1'f(;' 61' A fhTval(;' ell ml 1879, (Athens, 1879). 
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frame of mind surely needed to constandy remind their members and the 
public of their final goal: hence, the celebratory addresses. And the occasions 
for remembrance were plenty: national holidays, religious holidays25, local 
holidays, celebrations on the society's foundation day. What better way of 
determining the future than reciting the past? 
In inquiring after the functions of a celebratory address, we should 
start from the obvious. Etymologically speaking, the nominal function of 
such a peroration is to celebrate, laud, commend on the facts, meaning and 
importance of a given circumstance. Inherent in its nature is a final 
favourable look on things, even when the oudook of the moment is bleak. 
Rarely would one find addresses that end on anything but an upbeat tone on 
the future prospects of the group, be it a small society or a whole nation. 
There is also a distinct time frame moving in an axis leading from the past to 
this future. Usually some glorious past is evoked or remembered in order not 
only to commemorate successful instances but also to provide legitimacy for 
the group. Then, the glories of the past can act as a beacon, both assuring 
future achievements and lighting the way towards them with their example. 
This general format can be said to apply, with variations of course, to all 
kinds of celebratory addresses. However, the present, the particular moment 
the event of the speech is taking place, has not a fixed use. It depends on the 
occasion and the audience. In the Independence Day addresses we are going 
to examine, whether they belong to the University of Athens or not, the 
present time is used mosdy as a bridge, a time of trials which will eventually 
lead towards the nation's manifest destiny. In the Greek Literary Society's 
speeches though, which also mark the annual report of the society's 
activities, the present is much more palpable, reduced to facts and numbers 
that underline each administration's abilities. 
The celebratory address's most crucial function though is the one 
underlying precisely that trip along the time axis: committing to memory, 
25 Or both, as in the case of the Independence Day. In King Otho's decree there is 
mention of the 25th March being already "a radiant day for every Greek because of the 
Annunciation of Holy Mary". ABr,wi, 23/311838. 
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instructing and acting as "a stimulus for self-consciousness".26 In almost all 
circumstances in the era under consideration a national holiday is marked by 
the speech, which becomes the focal point and culmination of the festivities. 
The centrality of a commemoration act provides a historical perspective and 
content. This perspective of course cannot help but conform to the 
standards set at the time. A national holiday reasonably implies the existence 
of national history. Thus, history in celebratory addresses is national history 
even at times when the state is a multinational empire as the Ottoman, 
although in such cases deviations, restrictions and twists according to the 
political situation of the moment can be clearly discerned. Undoubtedly, we 
can follow these twists, turns and developments in national ideology by 
examining celebratory addresses; what is more, we can even get the measure 
of official national ideology. The University of Athens was not just another 
educational institute. As emphasized by its full tide it was a 'national', hence a 
state institution, and its scholars were in many cases quite active in Greek 
politicallife27• 
Celebratory addresses on Independence Day 
To the scholar approaching for the first time the subject of 
Independence Day celebratory addresses, finding material in abundance 
would seem to be the order of the day. Considering the rapid growth of 
societies and associations in Greece and the Greek world in the second half 
of the nineteenth century, and all their honorary sessions every March 25, 
26 George B. Leontaritis, «0 m>J.lJ30AlOJ.l6<; 1:0U 1tavTlYUPlKOU Kat 0 l<JtOPlK6<; A.(YY0 9>, 
MV11IWJV 14, (1992), 119, where also more to be found on the functions of celebratory 
addresses. 
27 Spyridon Lampros, for instance, professor of history and politician, was in 1897 
member of an 'Invisible Directorate' of a secret society determined to uphold Greek 
interests in Macedonia. For more see Giannis Giannoulopoulos, «H wycviJl; )iat; 
U){{JAW(Jll; ... ». E,WfePlloj 7COAlrl,a, Kal «dJvlKa 8€)iara» arro UfV r,ITa rov /897 tWI; rrt 
M1KpaUlarua1 KaraurpoffJit , (A91lva, 1998). 
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that would hardly seem strange. On a national holiday so gloriously 
celebrated with torchlight processions, 21-gun salutes and church masses, an 
institution with high profile and prospects as the University of Athens 
should get a prominent place, as was its due. Not only was the university 
looked upon as one of the most important state institutions, it was also 
awarded first place among all associations and societies as mentioned in the 
yearbook the Conference of the Greek Associations published in 1879.28 
However, the first celebratory addresses officially assigned by the Senate can 
only be traced in its abstracts or Dean's reports in 1899, while a compact 
corpus exists merely from 1952. This is at first glance a paradox, not because 
somebody would expect to find a celebration ritual perfecdy defined from 
the moment of its inception, but because of the University's high profile. 
It was inaugurated in 1837 in an exuberant atmosphere and was 
heralded by Greek intellectuals as a major development in matters 
educational (and political) in the Balkans. For the ever-impatient heirs of the 
ancient Greeks, the University was to bring about a great cultural task, that 
of "enlightening the Orient"Z9. Underlining these expectations was the 
conviction that Greece formed a part of Europe but the fact was yet 
unacknowledged by the Europeans. Seeking a plausible mission fitting the 
laurels of Classical Antiquity, the new state embraced the passing on of 
civilization to the not so fortunate in order to prove its still disputed merit 
and establish itself among the great. This mimicking of the W est in 
undertaking a civilizing mission in the Orient also emphasized Greek interest 
in the geographical area of the Near East. For all these reasons the University 
of Athens had to be an outpost of progress. 
With these great prospects beckoning, the least we would expect was 
participating in some way in the Independence Day celebrations as it already 
did in the cases of honouring the memory of the Three Hierarchs (since 
28 K.Th.Dimaras, Kmvuravrivo<; []wrapPYfyon:OVA.Oe;, (Athens, 1986), p.352. Dimaras 
continues: "This helps us to understand exactly the place this higher educational 
institution commanded among Athenian scholars". 
29 Konstantinos Shinas, AoyfbplOv €K<pmv"Btv €lC; UfV YfIl€Pa.v Ufe; CYKaBlbpv(J£me; WI! 
[]a.v€7r:lur1'fpfov DBmvoe;, (Athens, 1837), p.l. 
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1842)30 and the annual feast for its inauguration (between 1837 and 1875).31 
Nevertheless, for the period before the end of the nineteenth century there is 
no accurate information on whether the University of Athens participated in 
any official or unofficial way in the celebrations on 25 March. 
Practically, there was no reason for an official celebration before the 
1870s. As we have already seen in the first years of its inception, 
Independence Day was a rather centralized affair. Taking into consideration 
that the Athenian population in the late 1830s and early 1840s did not exceed 
30,000 by much it is easy to grasp that to fragment the festivities would be 
both inadvisable and unnecessary. From the 1850s on, we are informed that 
the weight of the celebration had shifted. The king was now a constitutional 
monarch and not as popular as in the first few years of its reign. Accordingly, 
and as the city was starting to prosper, wealthy merchants stepped into the 
fore to further the country's literary renaissance by sponsoring poetic 
contests organized and supervised by the University of Athens; otherwise 
they would not have any merit. 
The Ralleios poetic contest was held for the first time in 25 March 
1851 and instantly captured the imagination of Athenians. From that year on 
until 1862, when it was moved to May 3, the anniversary of the University's 
inauguration, the Great Hall was always packed for the announcement of the 
results, which followed mass at the metropolitan church of Saint Eirini. A 
foreigner's description of the whole atmosphere would suffice to impart the 
spirit of the day: 
"On this day, the whole of Athens is in a turmoil. All social 
classes show the same enthusiasm. Markets and cafes are emptied 
while squares are full of people gesticulating, shouting and 
conversing in an excitement so natural to them. After reading a 
report on the diverse works submitted, the chairman announces 
30 A religious feast of three church fathers of the Eastern Orthodox Church who are 
considered patron saints of letters. Details for the participation of the University of 
Athens in Ioannis Pantazidis, XPOVIKOV TTfC; 1CpmTTfC; 1CE:VT1fKovracciac; rov EJJ.r,vlKOV 
flaw:1CIOT11f1 iov, (Athens, 1899), p. 150. 
31 " •.• the celebration of the University's inauguration was converted into a literary 
contest" and lasted until the end of the Tsokaneios (1855-60) and Rodokanakeios (1860-
75) literary contests. Pantazidis, XPOVIKOV, p. 275, 135-137 and 249-250. 
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the winner, congratulates him on behalf of the whole nation 
, 
recites his verses and crowns him with a wreath of laurels. At the 
end of the ceremony, the poet laureate is cheered by the crowd 
and led home in an almost triumphal procession. It is impossible 
for somebody to imagine the disputes and stormy debates that 
permeate this great literary event until its last possible 
moment".32 
This is a very lively and convincing description of a clearly important 
event. I would like though to point out from the start that since it was the 
product of a European and not a Greek scholar some things are left unsaid 
and others are being taken for granted. It did not occur to Eugene Yemeniz 
to make the connection with Independence Day being celebrated, although 
he did mention the chairman congratulating the winner "on behalf of the 
nation".33 After closer inspection the ideological connotations of the event 
come to the fore. The crowning with a wreath of laurels, the triumphal 
procession, even the chairman's congratulations were direct references to the 
Olympic games and recalled the locus of Greek antiquity. The demand of A.S. 
Rallis to settle on the archaic (an extreme kathareuousa) and not the demotike as 
acceptable language for contestants34 is telling enough of the sponsor's 
intentions. What was sought was "an image, a symbol, a vivid reference to 
Greek Antiquity", as Moullas points out, ''because our world is the world of 
the Antiquity or at least its continuation".35 In the end, this aspiration to 
continuity and legitimation became perfecdy clear in the words of The odor os 
Afentoulis, a member of the electing committee in 1872: this poetic contest 
was nothing but a refutation of Fallmerayer's slurs against the Modem 
32 Panayiotis Moullas, «TIO{l1011 Kat tOEOAOY{U: Ot u911VUtKO{ 1tuvcntcrnunUKo{ 
ourYffiVtcrllO{ (1851-1877)>> in Pr"el~ Kat EVVtxelC~. Mcltre~ y,a 'l'OV 1 C/' alwva, (Athens, 
1993), p.283. 
33 The Greek term used ("in the name of the nation") is even more forceful and 
indicative. 
34 Panayiotis Moullas, Les concours poetiques de /'universite d'Athenes 1851-1877, 
(Athens, 1989), p.4l, Dimaras, K(J)wJTavrivo~ Jlwcapp'1y67T:ovlo~, pp.190-191. 
35 Moullas, Pr"el~ Kat lJVVtxele~, p.284. When the sponsor changed in the person of 
progressive merchant Voutsinas so did the rules and works written in the demotike were 
accepted. 
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Greeks. Had they chosen to deliver a celebratory address instead, the 
organisers of the contest could have hardly been more eloquent. 
Until 1877 then in the University of Athens a literary contest seems 
to overshadow the historical and commemorating functions of celebratory 
addresses. Significant in itself, this fact does not fully explain the reluctance 
of the Senate to declare an official holiday in honour of Independence Day. 
This reluctance was partly due to an already existent unofficial celebration 
not under direct control of university authorities. Student commemoration in 
the beginning of the twentieth century led to a serious wave of altercations 
and bitter arguments with the authorities that ended in a sit-in and a 
subsequent military intervention.36 In the past, there had been more than a 
few instances where student activities took on a distinct political tone. 
During the 1843 Revolution, when King Otho I conceded a constitution, 
Athens was patrolled at night by a Student Column, an event that repeated 
itself in 1862 when Otho was finally ousted - and this time Konstantinos 
Paparrigopoulos was leading the formation. In 1858, the funeral of professor 
of History Theodoros Manousis provided an occasion for students to air 
their liberal tendencies and denounce Otho and his establishment. To try and 
fill the void of an official University celebration with their own would not 
only be an act of academic defiance for the students but also a clear political 
statement. 
The evidence is of course fragmentary, since the Senate abstracts 
usually deal with administrative matters and seldom record student activity, 
but it remains significant nevertheless. There was a general disorder in 1843 
when they were not permitted to celebrate, something that was unfavourably 
interpreted in the context of a general distrust of authorities, while the debate 
on constitutional demands was already heating.37 Almost half a century later, 
in 1891 the students requested Spyridon Lampros, professor in History to 
deliver an address to celebrate the seventieth anniversary of the War of 
36 See Abstracts of the Senate of the University of Athens, vol. 22, December 1907 
sessions. 
37 Moullas, P~;;el"; Kal (JVvtXeleC;. p.293. 
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Independence.38 In 1902, they organised a torchlight procession.39 Next year 
matters took a rather sinister turn when some students started collecting 
money inside the premises to organise a celebration, in spite of the Senate 
having already forbidden this particular way of funding. A delegation 
appeared before the Dean Spyridon Sakellaropoulos and asked for the 
standard of the university to be delivered to them in order for the celebration 
to have a more distinctive colour. The Dean refused on the grounds that 
" ... this sacred symbol should not be removed from its place save for the 
most exceptional of circumstances".40 The students behaved in an "unseemly 
way" but the "disorder" did not get out of hand although two of them were 
suspended 41 
From this limited information we get out of the Senate abstracts we 
can at least testify on a procedure the students considered traditional, if not 
official and, in certain cases, not even sanctioned by university authorities. 
There is no word of the students' celebration being officially prohibited, but 
there seems to be an effort to downgrade it after the Senate decided on 
formal festivities: the torch procession of 1902 was sponsored by the 
University and we have already noted how raising funds was discouraged 
next year. It is plain that from the point of view of the university authorities 
students as spectators were preferred to actively celebrating students, 
possibly promoting uncontrollable political messages. Constant political 
tension between liberal students and conservative university authorities was a 
marked characteristic of the era and led to "disputes and stormy debates" in 
the verdicts of the poetic contests. 42 
However, in 1899 the Senate saw fit to announce the participation of 
the University of Athens in the Independence Day celebrations. Details are 
again sketchy. The Dean Timoleon Argyropoulos, in his annual report said 
that 
38 Spyridon Lampros, Ta Ekv(}tPla. AOYOI Kal 6.p(}pa f:1ri'CT/ £:8vl101 £:oprr, 'CT/' 25 Matyriov, 
1891-1910, (Athens, 1911). 
39 Abstracts o/the Senate, vol. 21, p.9. 
40 Ibid, p.153. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Moullas, P'7'£:I, Kal lYVvi:x£:I£:" pp.286-87 and 298-300. 
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" ... we also deemed necessary for the National 
University especially to celebrate the National holiday of 25 th 
March and, therefore, on the day of the festivities we 
summoned all the students in the Great Hall where, according 
to the Senate's decision, the professor Mr. S. Lampros 
eloquently expressed the feelings that hold sway over the souls 
of Greeks on this occasion, which, he very appositely 
proceeded to call 'a holiday of Freedom' ".43 
The Senate abstracts are proven even sparser: "Address of 
Sp.Lampros" is the only comment the stenographer saw fit to print on the 
margins.44 Although the first step had been taken with the decision to hold an 
official celebration the details were still not thought over. Between 1899 and 
1912 the person appointed by the Senate to deliver the celebratory speech 
was sometimes omitted in the abstracts, while it was not until the latter date 
that the authorities made a point of observing that the law decrees the 25th of 
March to be a celebration day. These ideological reinforcements then, were 
only established after military defeat by the Ottomans in 1897. It was in a 
climate of instability that the University of Athens had to step in, take up its 
role as a respected institution, a real "diverter of European civilization in the 
Orient" 45 and console the nation. 
Consolation's burden fell on the shoulders of historians. The great 
majority of celebratory addresses between 1900 and 1930 belonged to them 
with few exceptions: in 1914 Margaritis Euaggelidis, professor of Philosophy 
delivered the speech while three years later the honour was conferred to K. 
Vasileiou, Dean of Law School. Spyridon Lampros, to whom we should be 
grateful for a number of reasons, supplied most of the rest. Lampros was a 
significant historian and politician and at the same time a consistent and 
reliable scholar, dutifully compiling his diverse addresses and publishing 
them at regular intervals. Of course, this was something quite common to 
43 National University, Ta Karc.x U/V llpvravGiav TzfJ.o).iovr:o~ Apyvp01T:ov).ov, (Athens, 
1900), p.44. In 1895-96 there was an early official celebration that did not repeat itself 
until 1899. See National University, Ta Kara U/V IlpvravGiav A. JIOfJ.~bov~ KvplaKOv, 
(Athens, 1898), p.59. 
44 Abstracts of the Senate, vol. 19, p.455. 
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scholars of this age. However, what draws attention to Lampros's works is 
that he managed to fill almost an entire volume with speeches and articles 
referring to Independence Day. In this compilation he included his 
University addresses but also speeches assigned to him by societies as the 
Pamassus Literary Society of Athens or associations such as that of the 
Shop-Assistants, offering us an opportunity to view different angles of his 
expressed ideology as articulated before varied audiences.46 Meanwhile 
Lampros's general ideas and his treatment of Greek history seem to conform 
to a general scheme, which is to be analysed a little later. 
This is probably the right moment to pause for a while and 
properly introduce this outstanding personage. To begin with, Spyridon 
Lampros (1851-1919) was bom in Athens to a well-known family. He 
studied in Athens (1867-1871), Berlin and Leipzig, obtaining there his 
doctorate of Philosophy in 1873. Returning to Greece he pursued an 
uninterrupted academic career for 35 years. He taught history and 
palaeography at first, became Professor of General History in Extraordinary 
in 1887 and in Ordinary three years later, in a chair he was to occupy until 
1913. Lampros was extraordinarily prolific, even for nineteenth-century 
standards. His published works number 479 publications covering a wide 
variety of subjects in history, palaeography and general matters pertaining to 
Greek society. Not one to produce a great synthesis or even innovative 
monographs on a grand scale, he remained a popularizer. At the same time 
he constituted a scholar gready influencing the course of Greek 
historiography in his exceptional diligence, prolific research and strictness of 
methodology, the virtues in his most distinguished work, a History of Greece 
from the ancient times to the fall of Constantinople.47 The fact that he did not 
attempt a major synthetic work is probably due to his teacher Konstantinos 
Paparrigopoulos and amply demonstrates the latter's dominion over 
historians of both his own and later generations. Lampros was not the only 
45 Skopetea, To «7CPOro7CO /3a(JiklO», p.159. 
46 Lampros, Ta EkvOtPIa. 
47 Spyridon Lampros, IOTopia U/C; EMMoc; f..lGT 'eIKovwv, wro rwv apxalOrarwv xpovw\, 
fJqpl rrtC; alW(Jf;())C; U/C; KwvOTavrZVOV7COkwc;, 6 vols., (Athens, 1886-1908). 
- 249-
one to let the matter rest. His peers were content to remam tn 
Paparrigopoulos's protective shadow. As a result, from the 1880s onwards 
nobody seriously tried to refute Paparrigopoulos and, perhaps more 
significantly, no one tried to follow in his footsteps. The sole exception, 
Pavlos Karolides's work in the 1920s, was in fact to edit and update the 
'national historiographer's' own project. 
On the other hand, Lampros's tnterest tn politics exceeded 
Paparrigopoulos's by far and bordered on a commitment. Although it was 
certainly not surprising for a nineteenth-century intellectual to cultivate his 
presence in an array of literary, scientific or philanthropic societies we have 
to keep in mind that these associations also carried virtual political 
connotations, especially in later nineteenth-century Greece. We only have to 
recall the 1879 Athens Conference of Associations as evidence to that. The 
extent then of Lampros' involvement can be shown in his multiple activities: 
at times founding member, secretary and president of the most influencing 
societies,48 twice Dean of the University of Athens in 1893-94 and 1912-13, 
prime minister in 1916-17. This extraordinary resume becomes even more 
impressive if we recall that being prime minister of Greece in 1916 essentially 
meant taking sides in an undeclared civil war between the pro-Entente 
supporters of twice resigned former prime minister Eleftherios Venizelos 
and those of the pro-neutral - and covertly pro-German - King 
Konstantinos 1. Lampros, a conservative by nature and a product of German 
culture took his chances with the King and after the latter's abdication under 
Entente coercion and the return of Venizelos, he was deported to the islands 
of Hydra and Skopelos. His health failing after these hardships, he died in 
Athens in 1919. 
In fact Lampros's career as a politician was overshadowed by his 
stint as a conspiratorial leader of secret societies. 1broughout the whole 
48 He was a founding member of the Historical and Ethnological Society of Greece, 
founding member of the Parnassus Literary Society, prominent member of the 
Archaeological, Ethnographical [Aaoypaq>11cT1C;] and Educational [<J)tlmmatOroTtK1lC;] 
societies, secretary of the Olympic Games committee (1901-1918) president of the 
Epirus committee in 1907, president of the Supervisory Board for Secondary Education 
in 1908 and president of the Board of Greek Sports and Gymnastic Associations (1897-
1906). 
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'associational mania' that took over the Greek world in the second half of 
the nineteenth century surely the Ethnike Hetaireia (National Society) has to 
be considered one of the most obscure - and possibly the most infamous. 
Although it was in principle a secret society, participation in it was so 
widespread, especially in the army ranks, its existence so widely known and 
its activities so extensively discussed that anybody would hesitate to describe 
it as such. Its tide was a tribute and a reminiscence of the revolutionary 
Philike Hetaireia: it signified preparations, undertaken on behalf of the nation, 
for a new struggle towards completion of the unfinished Independence in 
1821. Their pamphlets promised wide uprisings in the Ottoman Empire at a 
time when the Cretan Question had once again flared up and the Great 
Powers were hard pressed for a solution accommodating not only the 
conflicting states but their own disagreements on the matter as well. The 
'great curator of the nation's interests', as the Hetaireids self-praise ran, 
intended to use the Cretan revolt of 1895 in order to press not only for this 
island's Union with Greece but to demand a general rearrangement of the 
Greek border to include Macedonia. 
The Greek government tried to execute a series of delicate and risky 
manoeuvres befitting tightrope walkers rather than politicians. The aim was 
to retain public confidence and at the same time avoid war with Turkey by 
way of a timely intervention of the Great Powers, in a replay of a similar 
situation in 1885-86.49 This time round the assumptions proved wrong, the 
manoeuvres miscarried and foreign intervention did not materialize. 
Although Prime Minister Theodoros Diligiannis's allegations after the 
debacle of the Greco-Turkish war in 1897, that the Ethnike Hetaireia actually 
49 Theodoros Diligiannis was also prime minister at the time of another Eastern Crisis 
precipitated by the Bulgarian decision to unilaterally annex Eastern Rumelia which the 
1878 Congress of Berlin had declared autonomous under Ottoman suzerainty. 
Diligiannis, giving in to populism, grabbed the chance of a brief Serbo-Bulgarian war 
and general uncertainty to mobilise the army and demand a border correction from the 
Ottoman Empire in the form of ceding a part of Epirus that, while having already been 
granted to Greece, was still occupied. When pressure shifted to the Greek side 
Diligiannis, rmding himself in a dead end, managed a heroic retreat when the Great 
Powers declared a blockade on Greece. His stunt was mockingly referred to as "peaceful 
war" [Elp'7V01r6k,uo~] and "armed beggary" [tvmrA.~ C1l"arrcia]. 
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usurped foreign policy from his own government, are not to be taken at face 
value, there is plenty of evidence their influence was certainly great both in 
army and government circles. So great in fact, that Diligiannis's government 
took the easy way out in placating a public inspired by the Hctaireia s 
inflammatory manifestos and declared war on Turkey, a war that was 
prompdy lost and proved financially destructive.5u 
Lampros's role was that of conspirator in chief, as it was determined 
later on. He was one of the persons forming an 'Invisible Directoire', as it 
was known at the time. His were decisions affecting acceptance of members, 
amassing capital, purchasing and distributing guns to Greeks in Macedonia, 
organising military contingents in Ottoman territory. It is not our intention 
though to pronounce him solely responsible for the inception and conduct 
of the Hetaireia. 51 In a sense, this network of conspirators cannot be detached 
from its Balkan context. The Ethnikc Hctaireia can be seen as the result of the 
mood prevailing among Greeks in the aftermath of the Eastern Crisis of 
1875-1878. The fact that Bulgarians and Bosnian-Herzegovinians were seen 
in the eyes of the European public as the principal victims of Ottoman 
repression - and subsequendy the principal beneficiaries of the Great 
Powers' favour - certainly accounted for a feeling of injustice. Greece as a 
state had been founded by direct intervention of the Great Powers and they 
had guaranteed its independence. In the eyes of many Greeks that was the 
equivalent of a contract in which their part was to follow a path to modernity 
while Europe should look after their nation's interests. It was not merely the 
'national dignity' that suffered in 1878 though. 52 Vital Greek interests, in fact 
50 Giannis N. Giannoulopoulos, "IIoAl'tlKEC; 6\j1Etc; TOU EMT)VO'tOUp1ClKou 7tOAEIlOU» in the 
Abstracts of Historical Conference in Moraitis School, 0 7COA.ef10C; rov 1897. Jl~f1ePO f1e 
Ufv evKalpia TCUV 100 xpovcuv, (Athens, 1999), pp. 15-77; Giannoulopoulos, «H evYew7C; 
f1ac; rorp).,cu(Ju; ... ». 
51 For details on Lampros's involvement in the Ethnike Hetaireia, its action and the 
Greco-Turkish War in 1897 see Giannoulopoulos, «H eVYeV~C; f1ac; Wrp).,CU(J1C;», and 
«IIoAt'tlKEC; 6\j1Etc;» in 0 7COA.ef10C; rov 1897. 
52 For some aspects on Greek foreign policy during the Eastern Question crisis in 1875-
1878 and repercussions of the loss of 'national dignity' see Euaggelos Kofos, «~1.(J1(AolCiJ 
mpU'tT)YlKWV Kat TUlC'tlKWV E7ttA0YWV: 0 T ptKOinrTlC; KU'tU 'tT)v A VU'tOAllCiJ KpiaT\. 1875-
1878» and Lina LOllvi, «H wroKuTumuOTI 'tT)C; dMlCiJc; a1;\07tpt7tEWC;: 11 EUJ((ltpW TT)<; 
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the whole construct of its foreign policy was at stake. The impression that 
panslavism was on the rise with the blessings of the Western Powers had 
taken root.53 In this spirit Lampros was only acting for a swift recovery of 
territories deemed "historically just" for Greece before they fell, once and for 
all, in the hands of "latecomers". 54 
Taking the initiative in national matters also meant personal gains. 
Using Spyridon Lampros as an example Efi Gazi points out that intellectuals 
in general, and the academic community in particular, viewed what was 
essentially a direct venture into politics - their association with the Ethnike 
Hetaireia - as a natural consequence of their occupation in shaping national 
discourse. The nation's ideology, which they were building, should be 
translated into action; and they were the people to act. Gazi sees in that case 
an attempt on the part of these intellectuals to secure a place for themselves 
inside the state's political machine. 55 In that spirit Lampros, himself a student 
of Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos, drew a more than interesting parallel and 
put one of his teacher's sayings into a completely different use: 
Atyl>1t,to'u», both to be found in Kaiti Aroni-Tsihli and Lydia Triha (eds.), 0 XapUao<; 
Tpl1coiJ1rYf<; Kal Yf enox~ rov. IIoAlrlKE<; enu51m~el<; Kal KOlVWV1KE<; (Jl)VBf{KeC;, (Athens, 
2000), pp. 43-62 and 119-l32 respectively. The warmongering climate of the time is 
vividly shown in Lina Louvi, IIepIY8AWTOC; BaaiklOv. 01 aarzplKEC; e({J'1fJ.epiaec; Kal TO 
EBvIKO Z~T'7f-la (1875-1886), (Athens, 2002). 
53 See Odysseas Ialemos, EM~VWV iJiKala Kal KaBf{Kovra, (Athens, 1877). In its 
Memorandum to the Great Powers on the San Stefano treaty, the Greek Literary Society 
of Constantinople decried Bulgarians as "peasant latecomers" and declared "in the event 
of an irrevocable political solution all the land beyond the great mountains [Balkans] 
from the Ionian Sea to the Thracian Bosphorus should only belong to [Hellenism]". See 
Georgios Giannakopoulos, "0 EMTJvu(6~ <D1AOAoyt.K~ LUMOYO~ K<.Ov(JCavnvol)1[6A£<.O~ 
(1861-1922). H EUTJvtKi) 1tat()ElU Kat €1tt<ITf)~TJ <.o~ ESvtKi) 1tOAtnKi) <JCfJv oe<.O~avtKi) 
AU'tOKPU'tOpia", [unpublished Ph.D thesis, (Athens 1998)], pp.l32-l33. My sincere 
thanks to the author for permitting me to consult this groundbreaking work. 
54 Ialemos, EMJ1VWV iJiKala, p.59. 
55 Efi Gazi, «Ll)~~OAtK6~ A6yO~ Kat 1tohnKi) 1tpUK'ttKi) KU'ta 'tTJV 1tEpio()o 'tOl) 1to)J;~Ol) 
'tOl) 1897: <:rUy1cA.tCJT), wr6utCJT), <ri>yKPOl)CJT)) in the Abstracts of Historical Conference in 
Moraitis School, 0 7rokfJ.o<; rov 1897. Panayiotis Stathis also observes the connection 
between the nineteenth-century academic historians and politics. In Panayiotis Stathis, 
«O"'Et~ 'tTJ~ ()tu~6p<p<.OCJT)~ 'tTJ~ ESvtKi)~ t(JCoptoypu<pi~ <JCfJv EUa()a tOy IE)' alwva: 11 
(J'\)~J30Ait nov Ku9TJY11'twv I(JCop~ 'tOl) navE1tl<JCfJ~iol) A9TJvwv». 
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"This duty is both scientific and national. No other science 
than history can be at the same time both servant and 
defender of the just interests of the nation. Truly, there is no 
greater solidarity between the historian's desk and the tent of 
an encamped army. The same flag flies above both and it is 
the flag of the motherland". 56 
In this way Paparrigopoulos's cautionary remark on the historian's duties 
(scientific and national) and their burden became in Lampros's context the 
militarisation of history and a call to arms. 
Having concluded a brief excursion to the land of politics, it is time 
we got back to academic reality to observe its impact on the historians' 
oudook. From the beginning, we have to point out that the standard 
Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos had set, the tripartite format of Greek history, 
was never contested. It had already acquired the mantle of orthodoxy among 
Greek historians. Still, in two of his university speeches, in 1891 and 1899 
respectively, Spyridon Lampros only alluded to Byzantium either by referring 
to certain emperors 57 or to popular songs. 58 This absence of the Byzantine 
element can probably be attributed to the timing of addresses. The 1899 
speech, for example, was given "on the aftermath of an ominous national 
de feat" 59 , that in the Greco-Turkish war of 1897. A direct reference to 
Byzantium, terminated in the seizure of Constantinople by the Ottomans, 
would run the danger of causing distress and recall unwanted parallels to the 
audience. 
The Byzantine Empire was a key feature in many of the addresses, in 
contrast to times past when its Hellenic content was severely disputed. In a 
perfect swing, there were now some who held that this Hellenic identity for 
the Empire was never really contested. "The Athenian [medieval] historian 
Laonikos Halkokondyles was the first to prove that the fallen empire was 
56 Gazi, «L'\)J.l~OA1K6~ A&yO~ Kat 1tOAlnKll1tpUKnKll», p.ll O. 
57 Lampros, Ta Ekv()tPla, p.9. 
58 Ibid, p.49. "Ours once more" is a popular song dating from the seventeenth -
eighteenth centuries and referring to the seizure of Constantinople by the Ottomans and 
its future liberation. 
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properly Greek" was Simos Menardos's argument.60 The past thirty years had 
taught Greek intellectuals that by integrating Byzantium into the national 
discourse they automatically acquired a completely new arsenal of arguments. 
In such a frame, classical antiquity was somehow inferior to medieval times. 
The robust Byzantine state was a great improvement in comparison to the 
splintered world of Greek city-states. Spyridon Lampros not only viewed 
Byzantium in a sympathetic light, not only imagined a funeral cortege to 
Constantine Palaeologus as a funeral cortege to the sum of Hellenism6\ he 
also stated that 
"that free, great Greece [of classical antiquity] had not formed 
the perfect concept of the great Greek idea, which appears for 
the most part in the Byzantine days and gathers shape during 
the time of slavery". 62 
The 'idea' Lampros referred to was the political unity of all Greeks under a 
single state, in essence the basis for the post-revolutionary Megali Idea. 
Usually these addresses do not dwell for a long time upon the 
achievements of Byzantium. The seizure of Constantinople by the Ottomans 
and the death of Constantine Palaeologus were constandy invoked as 
symbols and appropriate images of the whole.63 Constantinople was the 
symbol of Greek civilization and the temple of St Sophia stood as an image 
of the "Christian Greek nation".64 The "Christian Empire", as Byzantium 
59 Lampros, TaEAev(Jtpla, p.19. 
60 Simos Menardos, llavrryvpl1c{)(; eu; UfV KE' Mapriov, eKf/JmVTf(Jei~ evmmov Uf~ A.M rov 
Ba(JlUm~ Kmv(JTavrivov rov IB' ev Uf w:yw..1'{ at(JOVU1'/ rov JIavemrnrt;.dov V7ro J:iflOV 
Mevapbov, bl&ix:ropo~ Ufe tf>uouof/Jia~ Kal Uf~ NO)JI""~, 1XJXTlKOV Kafhrtrrcov rmv 
EMI'{V1KmV YP(J.)J)Jarmv, (Athens, 1916), p.6. The King was present during the address and 
he was referred to as 'Constantine XII', his Danish origins notwithstanding. The last 
Byzantine emperor was Constantine XI Palaeologus. 
61 Lampros, Ta E2ev(JtPla, pp.86-87. 
62 Ibid, p. 77. 
63 See 0 1raVTfYVPIU)JO~ Uf eKarovraerl'{piaa~ Uf~ E)J..11Vl""~ e1rava(JTauem~. AOyOI ev U/ 
at(JovU1'/ rmv reAcrmv rov 1rave1rlrnrt)Jiov Uf 25" Mapriov 1930 V1rO f)eof/Juov Bopta Kat 
Kmv(JT. A)Javrov, (Athens, 1930), p.7. Also Menardos, JIaVTfyvP1KO~, p.7; Lampros, Ta 
EAeV(JtPla, pp.66-69, 84-87. 
64 Pavlos Karolides, A6y~ 1CaVTfYVPlK~, wrayyclfki~ V1rO ll.Kapolibov, raKrlKOV 
Ka81'{yl'{rov r'le; E)J..'IVl""~ 1(JTopi~, Kara Ufl' ev rm JIavemrnrtfliw rcieu(JEiaav U/ } 5" 
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was branded in the first half of the nineteenth century, transformed itself 
into a "Christian Greek Empire" which had contributed a lot on the cultural 
level. Theofilos V oreas chose to remind to all who may have forgotten that 
the Renaissance was actually the result of "Greek letters being transferred to 
the West,,65 and cited an extended sequence of scholars to sustain his 
argument. The empire may not get credit for "profusion of originality" or 
"delicacy in creation" as Classical Antiquity but held as counterweight the 
martial virtues of Justinian, Heraclius and Vassilius 1166 which permitted it to 
survive the test of time and become "a guardian of the masterpieces of 
ancient Greek wisdom", source of Christianity and a Noah's ark of Roman 
Law.67 While the "Christian" nature of Byzantium weakened in comparison 
to the "Greek" one, its old image as a rampart defending Europe against the 
Arabs became inactive. The emperor Vassilius II who successfully fought 
against Bulgarians, those "latecomers" in the Balkans who coveted 
Macedonia, got to be cited a lot more than Leon III who had repelled the 
Arabs. Once more Paparrigopoulos's quotation about history in Greece 
having a more practical character than elsewhere proved to be accurate. 
The three components constituting the Greek past do not always 
appear together; and they are not credited with equal importance. Naturally, 
it was the "great revolution" that got the lion's share. Its hopes and trials68, 
its tragic moments69, the combatants 70, places and battles71 were recounted in 
great length. This pattern emerged clearly in Spyridon Lampros's addresses 
which moved along a main axis focusing on the nation's course in history 
from past to future while the present was just a transitional moment merely 
containing the celebration of the day: "today we celebrate the eve of the 
Mapriov 1921t;oprr,v i1'/C; eKarovtaEUfpi()oc; rov W:yw..ov V7r:tp ekvOepiac; aychvoc; roV 
1821, (Athens, 1921), p.? 
65 Theofilos Voreas, H al(J)via EMac;:A6yoC; Kar' evrO.A.qv i1'/C; .Evy7cl~rov ev i1'/ r(J)v 
rclerchv alOOVt:lT/ roV llave1CUTr1'flliov p1'fOei<; i1'/ 25Mapriov 1919, (Athens, 1919), p.24. 
66 Ibid, pp.18-20. 
67 Ibid, p.23. 
68 Lampros, Ta EkvOtPla, pp.20-21, 58, 89-90, 118-119. 
69 Ibid, pp.120-126 (fall ofMessolonghi), 127-130 (ruin ofPsara). 
70 Ibid, pp.l1-13, 113-114. 
71 Ibid, p.115. 
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great feast of the nation's rebirth".72 His duty was to preserve this special 
occasion and the nation's historical progress in the collective memorv. It is 
, 
significant then that the words 'memory' and 'commemoration' were 
frequendy mentioned in the speeches. The same frequency also applies to 
the Classical Antiquity leitmotif. By uniting all Greeks in common celebration 
the 25th of March reminded Lampros of the Olympic games.73 Elsewhere he 
cited exempla of feminine bravery74 or compared the glory of the dead of the 
1897 war to that of those in Thermopylae.75 He finished his speech to the 
students, who had pressed for an address in honour of the Revolution's 
seventieth-year anniversary in 1891, by imagining future youths, on their 
victorious return from a war against an unnamed but altogether known 
enemy, to address an icon of Greece in the Attic dialect: 'Eypco pdrcp! Arise 
Mother!76 Significandy enough for both the sense of Classical Antiquity and 
revanche for the lost war of 1897, his 1899 speech to a similar audience 
ended with an appeal to Nemesis. 77 
Of greater interest are connections drawn between Classical 
Antiquity and the other constituents in the Greek historical scheme. Events 
and personages from the War of Independence, for example, were to be 
linked to their counterparts in antiquity. The chosen equivalents were 
episodes and protagonists of the Persian Wars.78 According to Ch. 
Androutsos "the Spartan King's MoMJv }..apt echoed a million times in 
Modem Greek utterances" while Odysseas Androutsos was the reincarnation 
of Leonidas and Andreas Miaoulis that of Themistocles.79 Ch. Androutsos 
72 Lampros, Ta Ekv()epla, p.lO l. 
73 Ibid, p.8. 
74 Ibid, p.22. 
75 Ibid, p.88. 
76 Ibid, p.16. Lampros chose his connotations carefully to raise the audience's spirits: 
K. Th. Dimaras notes that this snippet is to be met in a large number of texts featuring 
revolutionary content in the eighteenth and nineteenth century until the War of 
Independence. In Dimaras, KWW1Tavcivo~ nwrappTfY07rOV;'O~, p.427. 
77 Lampros, Ta Ekv()epla, p.36. 
78 S. Menardos deviated by lauding revolutionary heroes in Thucydides' words. S. 
Menardos, naV'lyvpIK6~, pp.25-26. 
79 Christos Androutsos, A6y~ TCW'lYVPl1'~ el~ UfV 25 Mapriov, 'lllepav ",e; dJvryeP(Ji~, 
eKf{Jwv'l()de; Kar' evro;'ljv Ufe; .Evyclljrov ev Uf lleyOl" az()ova" !W\' !cI.rn;j\' rov 
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considered as the Revolution's greatest fruit not the emergence of an 
independent Greek state but evidence that 
"we Greeks are in essence our ancestors' direct descents... We 
are our ancestors' direct descents because, as our sacred struggle 
has shown, we are animated by the same military and social 
virtues. The single fact of the Revolution overruled the 18th 
century historians' view that time had erased ancient Greece and 
that the history of Byzantium is in everything detached and 
altogether different to ancient Greek life". 80 
The direct link to ancient Greece continued to echo the Fallmerayer dispute 
long after its end and demonstrated how crucial an element continuity had 
become for Greek identity. 
During the optimistic era following the victories in the Balkan Wars 
and Greece's doubling of territory and population some scholars felt that the 
War of Independence could now step into the background. The unfinished 
Revolution could now rest in peace and its phase presented as bridging the 
gap between Classical Antiquity and the triumphs of 1912-1913. 
"This is the day in which Plataias begot Vassilika and Gravias's 
Hostel prepared Kilkis, in which Mykalis begot Eressos and 
Eressos the victories of the modem Greek fleet in the 
Dardanelle ... This is the day that ancient heroes march as 
modem ones, in the same avenue crowned with laurels, along 
with the veterans of 1821 and the pioneers of the nation's rebirth 
walk alongside the liberators of 1912 and 1913".81 
Nevertheless, the weight of the past was so strong that when in 1919 
Theofilos V oreas detailed the national expectations in the wake of the 
Versailles conference Homer, Thales, Heraclitus and Anaxagoras urged with 
their origin towards cession of Asia Minor to Greece while Protagoras and 
Democritus did the same for Thrace.82 
llaw:mtJ'Ul#iov. Xp~(JfOV Aw5povruov, raxrlKOV Kaer,y'1rov rov llaw:rclUT'ff..dov Kal 
Kou#~ropoc; UfC; e801OYI~C; .Exol~c;, (Athens, 1922), p.9. 
80 Androutsos, AoyoC; rcav'1YVPIKOC; 81C; UfV 25 Mapriov, p.12. 
81 Spyridon Lampros, llaWfYVplKOC; lOyoC;, 25 Mapriov 1915, (Athens, 1915), p.27. 
82 Voreas, H alCvvia Ello.c;, pp.4-5. 
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Meanwhile the addressers sought inventive ways to tnsptte their 
student audience into action. Lampros recalled to memory an imaginary 
teacher in the years of Ottoman domination. The teacher showed his pupils 
"the sea of Salamis, the field of Marathon, the mountain of 
Valathisti, where Vassilius vanquished the Bulgarians ... Athens 
and Byzantium, the twin poles of Hellenism arose in life in the 
pupil's heart but his teacher did not tell him 'Stay inert, Miltiades 
and Themistocles, Heraclius and Vassilius will save you"'. 83 
When speaking Lampros quite often ventured into the Byzantine past in 
search of suitable arguments. In another political interpretation of the past 
along the lines of the present he referred to Vassilius II's double pilgrimage 
to St Sophia in Constantinople and to the Parthenon, serving in medieval 
times as the church of Holy-Mary-in-Athens. According to Lampros 
"Vassilius righdy understood the victory against Bulgarians as a common one 
of both an ancient Hellenism flourishing on the banks of Ilissus river and a 
new one on the coast of Bosphorus".84 The invocation of Classical Antiquity, 
far from being accidental, played right into common anti-Bulgarian 
sentiment: "latecomers" could be nothing but loutish peasants, unfit to 
compare to the pillars of modem civilization. 
There was still another important component discussed in these 
addresses. What did those scholars think about the nation's future? Up to a 
point, with terminus ante quem 1912-1913, the years of the Balkan wars, the 
struggle begun in the Revolution imposed a clear duty on future generations: 
redemption of the rest of the nation. "The effort towards liberating the rest 
of the Greeks remains [Greece's] finest work" C. Amantos related in a 
nostalgic tone at a time when all ideas, great and small, had turned to ashes 
along with their Ionian visions.85 Spyridon Lampros joined him from another 
time by attesting that only when these people were free once more could the 
celebration of the 25th of March be full and complete,86 
83 Lampros, Ta Ekv8tPla, p.75. 
84 Lampros, llavrrrvPIKO<;, p.16. 
85 Amantos, 0 7rav"yvpl(Jf-IO<;, p.17. 
86 Lampros, Ta Elev()f;Pla, pp.91-92. 
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"when Hellenism will have the right and the courage to unfurl 
the banner of Constantine Palaeologus', who died for faith and 
country, and raise the flag which Philip's blond son took from 
Macedonia only to bring victoriously on the walls of Persepolis 
and the ramparts of Babylon". 87 
Therefore, Lampros counselled, everyone's duty was to renew the vows of 
the Revolution until there would be reason for greater celebration still.88 
Theofilos Voreas in 1919 believed that "the struggle to restore the Greek 
nation which began with such glories the Greeks have just completed".89 
Pavlos Karolides agreed with him in 1921, just one year before the final 
defeat of the Greek army in Anatolia. The bright future, which all post-
revolutionary generations aspired to, had timely arrived on the hundredth 
year from the beginning of the Revolution. 
"N ow Greece is about to accomplish its political unity in order to 
devote itself afterwards to the effort of an intellectual conquest 
and mastery in the Orient, according to the great destiny in the 
moral order of this world that the God of our fathers, creator 
and illuminator of the world, saw fit in his wisdom to bestow on 
the Greek nation". 90 
What were the ambitions linked to that 'political unity' Greece was 
about to achieve? To say the least, these aspirations were certainly far from 
definite. Of course Konstantinos Shinas, first Dean of the University of 
Athens, did not make idle talk when he spoke of channelling knowledge 
from the West to the Orient, just as King George I did not use an empty 
phrase when he promised to strive for a 'model kingdom in the Orient'. 
Spyridon Lampros considered Greece as a "crossroads" between the West 
and the Orient91 while Christos Androutsos talked of a "bridge,,92 that 
connected them. All the above personages definitely agreed on the 
geographical place the country occupied. They also implied that taking 
87 Lampros, Ta Ekv()tpza, p.36. 
88 Ibid, p.116. 
89 Voreas, H alwvia E..ua~, p.31. 
90 Karolides, A6}'o~ 1CaV1fYVPIK6~, p.29. 
91 Lampros, Ilav'l}'vpl1(6~, p.4. 
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precedence in Classical Antiquity's heritage notwithstanding, this was no 
pledge for the state's participation in 'civilized Europe'. To be the inheritors 
of Ancient Greek civilization, considered by Western Europeans as the basis 
of the modern, did not automatically elevate the country from its status of 
"Balkan pet,,93. So, intellectuals and politicians hopefully turned their eyes 
towards 'the Orient', but always as a means of reaching 'the West'. 
Finally, what did this mysterious "Orient" signify? Geographically 
speaking, it denoted the Eastern Mediterranean; politically, it referred to the 
Ottoman Empire. The two meanings though could be intertwined in such a 
way that differences became blurred and distinctions delicate. Of course, all 
this ambiguity was quite proper in the nineteenth century and was welcome 
to politicians, intellectuals and journalists. During the course of the Crimean 
War K. Paparrigopoulos was in charge of the magazine Le spectateur de I' 
Orient, in circulation between 1853 and 1857. The tide may have referred 
only to the Ottoman Empire, which was by all means the centre of attention 
throughout Europe. However, K. Th. Dimaras points out that "this new 
publication's goal [was] to familiarize foreign readers with general subjects 
having to do with modern Hellenism, but especially and much more clearly 
to demonstrate urgent matters of Greek interest".94 These were naturally 
related to national objectives and aspirations. When the international crisis 
subsided, as Dimaras mentions, the magazine discontinued its pUblication95: 
after the war, there was no chance of influencing European foreign policy in 
'the Orient'. 
In the same time frame a new slogan entered Greek political life: 'the 
Orient by the Orient' ['7 AvaroNj oui "le; AvaroNj~ was similar to what in a 
92 Androutsos, Aoyo, 1f:av11YVPIKO" p.12. 
93 For 'pet nations' in the Balkans see Todorova, Imagining, p.82. As far as it concerns 
Britain, Todorova and Skopetea see in this a transference of problems British society 
faced: Ireland for Macedonia, poverty for suppressed nationalities, feminism for life in 
the harem, India or the Boer War as guilt for Turkish atrocities. In Todorova, Imagining, 
p.lOO; Elli Skopetea, H L1vU1/ Uf' AvaTOA17" E,KOV8, weo TO rtA.~ Uf' Ofkvpavl1c", 
AVTOKpaTOpia" (Athens, 1992), pp.136-7. One may of course draw parallels between 
these cases and the international interest in the war in Yugoslavia. 
94 Dimaras, KwvOTavrivo, llweapp'1Y01f:OVA.O" p.177. 
95 Ibid 
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few years would be Italia fara ria sc. Elli Skopetea shows that this phrase "not 
only does not conform to a simple interpretation but can easily apply itself to 
contradicting aims" .96 At first sight, this slogan may even seem unintelligible. 
It meant that the Orient should be elevated by its own powers but this was 
not a matter of gaining independence as in the Risorgimcnto Italy; at least not 
as a primary goal. The Greeks of the Ottoman Empire seemed to use the 
phrase in a context signifying their ascendancy on a status that would 
eventually mean either administering the state on the basis of a settlement 
similar to that of the Austro-Hungarian Empire or even the Greek element 
succeeding the Turkish outright. 97 For the Greeks of the independent 
kingdom though, 'I AvalON} &0. rr;r; AvaroN}r; signified a direct influence on 
the part of Greece proper: "the whole of the Orient is being regenerated, 
civilized and prospers through Greece" A.I. Olympios ascertained in 1871.98 
The geopolitical terms the world was divided into were quite 
clear. Where Greek intellectuals had trouble in most cases was to link the 
independent kingdom with a place and a mission. Timoleon Philimon's 
distinction between a 'civilized world' and 'the Orient' did not make for a 
groundbreaking discovery. As a state Greece was too young to carry any 
important weight in the 'civilized world' but the nation's historical 
achievements and former glory did not allow it to be considered on a par 
with the obviously 'uncivilized' Orient. Therefore, the proper role for Greece 
was to gain mastery in the latter. However, here was where the limits 
between the Orient as 'the East' and as 'the Ottoman Empire' became 
entirely blurred and meanings interchangeable. The Dean of the University 
of Athens Anastasios Hristomanos, for instance, stressed that without 
developing the sciences "we are not to gain our deserved mastery in the 
96 Skopetea, To «1CPfrcV1W pa(JiklO», p.342. 
97 G.Giannakopoulos also notes some instances where the slogan is meant as criticism 
towards the Greek kingdom's foreign policy. See his 0 EAlrfvlKa~ (/>UOA.OYIK~ };vlloyo~, 
p.54. 
98 A.1. Olympios, AOy~ cl~ "IV 7Cf:VC1/KovraGU/pibav "I~ EAlrfvud!~ Ave~oprrf(Ji~, 
eK({Jwv"ed~ evroA.q TOD OVllOyOD, cv TW (/>UOA.0YIKW };vllOyw fla.pva(J(Jw Uf\' 2-1 A7rP1A.ioD 
1871 V1ca A.I. OA.vp1CioD, (Athens, 1871), p.5. 
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Orient neither intellectually nor materially nor territorially".99 Hristomanos 
went on to justify this role: 
"Since Greece is from all sides surrounded by the ocean, since it 
forms the natural sea lane between the West and the Orient and 
possesses great natural wealth, it could and should be the Orient 
for the West and for the still semi-savage Orient, the civilized 
W t" 100 es . 
Nevertheless, to what exactly did he refer to? The Balkan peninsula and the 
Ottoman Empire or simply the latter? Both answers are equally applicable 
without changing anything in the sentence. The critical point then was 
'mastery deserved'. The area could be conveniently left unclear. 
Some more daring spoke more openly. Timoleon Philimon tried to 
define this 'semi-savage' Orient. The Greeks had been its "scouts and 
warders" for centuries and they could never be ousted by "novel people" 
even though they might enjoy the support of the mighty. For, in the final 
analysis, 
"the Orient does not mean the inaccessible lands, the high 
peaks of the Balkan mountains, the valleys of the Sava and 
Morava rivers, the Black Mountain and Sophia. The Orient, the 
always alive and glorious Orient that conquered and prospered, 
are the shores, the coasts, and the sea. [ .. .].101 
"Dominance of the seas has always been awarded to the Greeks", so "the 
coast of the Orient along with a thin stripe of land" would be enough for the 
Greek merchant marine to dominate.102 This was the definitive way towards 
achieving a 'great structure' in the Oriene03• Philimon in 1877 suggested 
dropping the Balkans altogether as a field of foreign policy, because the 
future of Hellenism lay where his past had been, in Asia Minor. In the wake 
99 Anastasios K. Hristomanos, ADYOI Kat cv(J6vat AV(J.OT(J.uiov K. XP'lOTOf-lavov, (Athens, 
1898), p.33. 
100 Hristomanos, ADYOI Kat €v(J6vat, p.33. 
\01 Timoleon Phi limon, H KE'Mapriov. A6yo~ 7t:(J.V'lYVP1Ki)(; €Krp(j)V'l(ki~ UfV 3 A7t:puiov 
1877, €V A or,vat~, V7t:D Tlf-lo).£ovro~ if>u~f-lOVO~, fJOVAwrov A rrl~~, raxrlKov f-li;).ou..,,-. Kar' 
€vrOA.~V rov ovM6yov. [nOA.lnK6~ LUUoyO~ «PtlYU9>], (Athens, 1877). 
102 Ibid, pp. 12-13. 
103 Timoleon Philimon, H KE'Mapriov, p.49. 
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of defeat in the Asia Minor War Konstantinos Amantos returned to the 
Balkans. The importance of the Greek Revolution may have been great for 
the entire Orient but the Greeks have been trying to inspire the spirit of 
freedom to the Balkan people since the time of Rigas Velestinlis. Although 
they have been opposed, "in part by other Oriental people" only the fact of 
the existence of their independent kingdom should be considered as a benefit 
for them all. 104 
I t seems then that the only conclusion one can safely draw from 
examlojog the use of the term 'Orient' has to do with the influence of 
political conjuncture on the content of celebratory addresses. This influence 
certainly demonstrates the University's role as producer and purveyor of 
state ideology and its deep implication in political conflicts raging in Greek 
society. When Sp. Lampros, a known opponent of Venizelos's policy held 
that "every storm erupting on the horizon of the oriental world" and" every 
whirlwind originating in the West" could sweep Greece along 105 surely stated 
a generally accepted opinion. At the same time it was a convenient way to 
allude to the circumstances of the Great War and suggest caution as a true 
Royalist. When Simos Menardos set out to laud the glory of the Balkan Wars 
he referred to the King as "destined, bom in the purple Avenger": 
"Konstantinos XII is he who rapidly leads the grandchildren of those who 
defeated the Turks in victories royal in every respect, the one who bears the 
enchanting name, the orthodox, Athenian Konstantinos".106 This image of a 
soldier-king was widely cultivated to the point that Margaritis Euaggelidis in 
1914 almost neglected the War of Independence in order to praise 
Konstantinos. l07 Certainly it does not constitute a surprise that Menardos, 
like Lampros before, sought in 1916 a veiled way to extol the virtues of 
., firs d " 108 
neutrality: "in the middle of the present fire storm caution is our t uty. 
Menardos delivered his speech after Venizelos had resigned for a second 
time in the space of six months; the French had already occupied Corfu to 
104 Amantos, 07CaVYfyvpIUjjOC;, pp.12-13. 
105 Lampros, AoyoC; 7CavT/YDPIKOC;, p.8. 
106 Menardos, llavYfyvpIKOC;, p.13. 
107 Margaritis Evaggelidis, A6yoc; wcayyclBEic; KaT' EVToblv TYfC; ~"jjajiajc; avyKhjrov, 
(Athens, 1914). 
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accommodate the remnants of the beaten Serbian army and the country 
teetered on the brink of civil strife which would materialize towards the end 
of the year when Venizelos in Thessaloniki contested the King's authority in 
Athens. Still, in 1921 when the "whirlwind" Lampros had mentioned was 
about to be reaped, Pavlos Karolides would ask of the students that formed 
his audience, to protect faith, language, freedom and along with them a 
monarchy proved to be "both popular and friendly towards the people" and 
always preserved liberty from the syzygy of "anarchist tyranny and tyrannical 
anarchy" .109 
On a final note, it was not just visions of mastery in the Orient and 
veiled anti-V enizelist sentiments that found their way in our politically 
charged celebratory addresses. More than anything, the University of Athens 
has been throughout its long history a pillar of the established order of 
things and a paragon of official state ideology. It was out of this sense of 
duty that K. Amantos hastened in 1930 to condemn certain revisionist 
theories on the War of Independence that had recently seen the light of day. 
"Those who have recently examined the factors that lead to the 
Greek Revolution wrongly commented on its success having 
been an achievement of a certain class. The truth is that the 
entire Nation has laboured to be set free, because everybody, 
rich and poor alike, were suffering under the yoke of slavery 
. th . h li " 110 and one and all wanted to acqmre eng t to ve .... 
What Amantos criticised and subsequently rejected was the socialist views on 
a peasant movement that Ioannis Kordatos had just codified in his work on 
the Social meaning of the Revolution in 1821. In this case Amantos's 'scientific 
duty' had to stand together with 'national duty' just as Paparrigopoulos had 
joined them in his phrase of almost fifty years past. 
As we have seen in the above analysis, invented traditions in Greece 
at the end of the nineteenth century were changing in content to adapt to 
new terms and conditions. The content and structure of celebratory 
\08 Menardos, IlavrrYVPl1c{)(;, p.13. 
109 Karolides, A6yo~ lraV'lyvpIK6~, p.27. 
110 Amantos, 0 mxvrrrvPI(Jp~, p.ll. 
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addresses became more or less fixed111 and the nation's unbroken continuity, 
Paparrigopoulos's formidable achievement, proved itself incontestable. With 
the advent of the twentieth century came along a new ritual focusing on 
parading - of schoolchildren at first, military added later - that gradually 
substituted and displaced the celebratory address as a means of expression. 
From that point on, the national discourse was less articulated than 
symbolically expressed in front of the public. However, the schemes of a 
'national completion' or 'mastery in the Orient' had already been dropped 
since, after the Asia Minor War and the exchange of populations between 
Greece and Turkey, they had stopped serving any ideological needs. Interests 
now turned inwards. It was ascertained that "efforts towards liberating the 
rest of the Greeks" along with other geopolitical factors were to be blamed 
for the "slow or uneven development of the state" .112 There were however 
still sound reasons to be optimistic since "our past guarantees our future".113 
Greek science, which in the first centenary of the independent state's life had 
served Greece and the Orient, according to C. Amantos, was now called 
upon to benefit all of humanity. The only ambitions left could be of an 
intellectual nature. 
The Greek Literary Society of Constantinople and the 
adventures of Greek identity in the Ottoman Empire 
In the second part of this chapter, we do not deal so overtly with 
national celebrations although they still provide the basic material of our 
discussion. In the context of a Greek literary association in a foreign country 
we may not speak of a 'national holiday' since there was no official authority. 
III See Petros Haris (ed.), To ElKOUzEva. fIavrryvPlKOi lOyOI axaJTf/iaiicwv, (Athens, 
1977). Especially, the addresses ofK. Palamas (1930) and N.K. Louros (1976), pp.55-68 
and 989-998 respectively, noting the endurance of the tripartite scheme in celebratory 
speeches and its applications accordingly to temporal and political conjunctures. 
112 Amantos, 01mvTfYVPlu/ick, p.16. 
113 Ibid, p. 17. 
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Moreover, what was being proclaimed as the Society's official ideology could 
not be overtly nationalist; therefore it had to be compared to the rest of its 
efforts and day-to-day activities. Our outlook will not be turning to history 
so much as to the concept of education. For reasons inherent in both the 
Greek element's presence in the Empire and the Literary Society's 
conception and policy, history as an identity and ideology pointer was 
downplayed. Whether it was the members' disagreement on key subjects, 
their professed avoidance of politics, their reluctance to challenge Ottoman 
authorities, their compliance to Ottoman legitimacy, their supposed 
'Ottoman patriotism' of a 'common country' for all ethnicities, or all of these 
together and in various degrees, it is a matter of question. There surely exists 
a gap between the way history was presented and used in the Society's 
meetings and the way it was taught in schools that the Society funded and 
provided with textbooks. The Greek identity of the Byzantine Empire, for 
example, was never openly discussed by members but referred to in 
schoolbooks. Yet, to approach this inconsistency effectively it is to the 
educational policies of the Greek elites we have to turn to, since they provide 
us with clearer identity markers for the appointed place and time. 
Because of their significant numbers, innate qualities and 
geographical position the ethnic Greeks of the Ottoman Empire formed a 
special part of the diaspora, whose relation to and interaction with Greece 
greatly differed from similar communities in the rest of Europe or America. 
Much as it would like to, the independent kingdom was neither the 
paramount force in the Balkans nor the only source of culture and ideas for 
'external Greeks'. There is no possible way of detaching the Greek element 
in the Ottoman Empire from the rest of this society and examining it as a 
separate piece. Ottoman Greeks at the same time formed a part of the Greek 
nation in diaspora and an essential component of the Sultan's state and it is 
in such a context that they should be studied. Their conceptions of identity 
were formed in an environment distinctively shaped by Ottoman reforms in 
the nineteenth century.114 The modernising attempts known as 'Tanzimat' 
114 On the Ottoman reforms and the history of the Empire in the 19th and 20th centuries 
see R.H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876, (Princeton, 1963); "The 
Millets as Agents of Change"; Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey. 
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(1839-1876) may have not been enough to transform the ailing Ottoman 
Empire into a model state but they did create new perspectives as to the 
internal situation and relations with the Great Powers. 
Where did the Ottoman reforms specifically influence the Greek 
element's position? Their pre-eminent outcome was that they gready altered 
the relationship between the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the Ottoman 
government and the orthodox community. When the Patriarch's dealings 
with the government stopped being ruled by custom and became subject to 
law under the regulations of 1856 all matters pertaining to them and the 
Greek community were formally translated into administrative ones. 
Although this kind of formal recognition of the Patriarchate's authority 
signified its consolidation and expansion, from another point of view it 
turned out to be limiting and restricting.IIS One of the Tanzimat's targets was 
to achieve secularisation of the state and that certainly meant religious 
institutions were to enjoy less of an open field than before. Hence, a series of 
recurring conflicts between the Patriarchate and the government, from the 
1880s onwards, on what was known as the CPrerogatives' Question'. The 
crucible was the definition of which among these prerogatives, historically 
conferred by the Sultans on a customary basis, constituted 'spiritual matters' 
and were still to be left under the Patriarch's care, and which should be 
labelled 'temporal' ones, for which responsibility should rest with a 'National 
Council' comprised by both cleric and lay members. Correct and accurate 
interpretation of these terms not only determined relations between 
Ecumenical Patriarchate and Ottoman Government, it also brought out 
obstacles and dissensions amidst the Greek community itself.116 
Until then the Ecumenical Patriarch was primarily the head of a 
religious community whose authority on lay matters concerning it was 
respected out of deference to the weight of tradition. This view was about to 
(London, 1961); Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History o/the Ottoman Empire 
and modern Turkey, (Cambridge, 1976-77); Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks, (Oxford, 
1969); A.L.Macfie, The End o/the Ottoman Empire 1908-1923, (London, 1998). 
115 See Karpat, "Millets and Nationality", pp. 164-5 for some of the implications of these 
changes. 
\16 Sia Anagnostopoulou, M1Kp<J. Auia, 1 gor; alwvac; - 1919: 01 EM'lVop806o(€C; 
KOIVOVrC€c;. A1Co to)1zV.i:c rcvv PCV)11WV l1TO clh7vlKO tBvoc;, (Athens 1998), pp.283-289. 
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be challenged. The nineteenth century had already seen a gradual ascendancy 
of a Greek merchant middle class that became quite visible between 1839 
and 1856 when many of the greatest bankers and financiers of 
Constantinople were of Greek origin. Confident of their vision for the future 
and eager to transform the fortunes of Ottoman Greeks through a vigorous 
programme and a modem syllabus, they proceeded in the 1860s to take over 
educational matters from the hands of the Patriarchate, something the latter 
resented on grounds of principle and power. The 'ethnarchic tradition' 
dictated that every initiative of such magnitude should be the Patriarchate's 
prerogative as the font of authority and de facto arbiter of matters Greek.l17 
The regulations or organic laws provided by a committee under the urging of 
the Sublime Porte between 1860 and 1862 formally introduced the lay 
element in millet administration.llS By creating a kind of 'National Council' 
comprised by both cleric and lay members the Tanzimat reforms 
acknowledged a de jure lay authority on all subjects pertaining to the 
Orthodox and effectively forced the Patriarchate to relinquish part of its 
own. Meanwhile, from 1861 onwards the Greek literary Society of 
Constantinople functioned as a de facto secretariat for educational matters, 
propagating the vision of secular education, with national consciousness in 
mind and in complete independence from the Patriarchate. Naturally, this 
did not please the latter since it was considered a direct infringement of its 
responsibilities. There were frequent attempts to short -circuit the rules and 
gain back what was taken; there were arguments on the usefulness of the 
Society, contemptuous comments on the 'new centres of knowledge' and in 
1880 the Greek Literary Society found itself trying to compete against a new 
and attractive association founded by the Great Church. By 1890, faced with 
dire financial trouble and harassment on the part of the Ottoman 
117 It is noteworthy that even today the Patriarchate evokes the weight of history in 
arguments with sister churches: Bartholomew I has recently seen fit to remind the 
Church of Greece that ''the Ecumenical Patriarchate carries 1700 years of history" and its 
authority should not be treated lightly. (From TA NEA newspaper, 17/4/2001). 
118 The Patriarchate had already drawn up a set of "General Ordinances" in 1858-60. For 
details on the 1862-63 procedures see Davison, Reform, pp. 114-120, 126-129 . For an 
overview of the Greek millet see Richard Clogg, "The Greek Millet in the Ottoman 
Empire" in Braude and Lewis, Christians and Jews. 
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government the Society conceded to the Patriarchate, which on its part was 
quite content to offer legitimation, in order to alleviate its problems. 119 
As far as it concerns the Great Church there seems to be at least one 
contradiction in terms. In the course of this narrative, we have been talking 
about an Orthodox 'Ecumenical' Patriarchate, which forms the authority of a 
'Greek' community. To be 'ecumenical' naturally meant not to be bound by 
adjectives or behaviour partial to or indicative of nationality. An easy answer 
could be that simplifying was due to the Greeks being the predominant 
orthodox element in Constantinople. Closer to the truth though would be 
the view that as the nineteenth century drew on the Patriarchate increasingly 
tended to associate itself with the Greek element. The rise of nationalism in 
the Balkans would be confirmed by the decision of the Bulgarian church to 
secede from the Patriarch's spiritual leadership and elect in his stead an 
Exarch of Bulgarian origin in 1870. With that bold move a pattern for the 
future was set, the vehement reaction of the Patriarchate notwithstanding. 
Every claim the Patriarchate laid to being an institution untainted by 
nationalism was shattered and similar motions in other Balkan states, notably 
Romania, had to be settled by uneasy compromises. I20 When it finally 
became clear that old policies were no more fit for modem times, the 
Patriarchate turned to the element more likely to support it. Furthermore, 
this about-turn automatically signified upgraded relations with the Greek 
state - and greater dependency on it as well. For the remainder of the 
nineteenth century the Patriarchate would pay close attention to the 
Bulgarian church's claims to purported followers in Macedonia, where the 
Greek kingdom was more than eager to prevent what were considered as 
political ambitions in areas thought to be Greek by hereditary right. I2l 
119 Anagnostopoulou, MIKpa Auia, pp.290-301. 
120 An independent Romanian church was recognised in 1885 (in Macfie, The End, p.7) 
but according to Mark Mazower (The Balkans,p.75) it had already broken away without 
the Patriarchate's sanction in 1871. Similar moves in the 1830s had resulted to 
autocephalus churches in Serbia and Greece that the Patriarchate reluctantly accepted (in 
the case of Greece years later, in 1850-1851). 
121 This does not mean that the relations between the Patriarchate and the Greek state 
were always cordial: the latter took for granted a certain primacy in drawing a political 
course and directing the policies affecting the totality of Greek populations inside the 
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The passage of time did not leave the Great Church itself unaffected-, 
being drawn into the politics of nationalism it had lost its previous 
uniformity. Joachim III, twice Ecumenical Patriarch in times of crisis in 
1878-1884 and 1901-1912 belonged to the old school of thought, a 
'Byzantine Greek'.I22 When some time after the Young Turk coup in 1908 he 
was asked about his political programme concerning the Greek community, 
he answered: "What programme would you expect from the Patriarchate? 
The Patriarchate has traditions, it has rights and prerogatives ... There is only 
one programme for the Patriarchate, to save its rights and prerogatives and 
hope" .123 For others, younger and more vigorous figures, as Chrysostomos, 
metropolitan of Drama at first, and later on Smyrna, Joachim was the 
'wooden statue' and 'the most false of Patriarchs' for his reluctance to accept 
the authority and the vision of the Greek Kingdom.124 It might be said that 
the latter correctly recognised the necessities of the times - but whether their 
proposed solution was a suitable one it remained to be seen. In the wake of 
Kingdom and abroad. Furthermore, its outlook was definitely nationalist - something 
that the Patriarchate still found hard to approve. In an instructive episode of this uneasy 
alliance Harilaos Trikoupis, the most prominent Greek politician between 1875 and 
1895, strongly disagreed with Joachim III. Their radically different approaches to Greek 
interests led to the Patriarch's abdication in 1884. See for more /aropia rov EM1fV1KOV 
'EOvovr;, vol.IL\', pp. 16-20; Sia Anagnostopoulou, <ill cnYyK:pou<rI1 X. T PU(ofutrj -
IwaKE1/l ['. 'O"'E~ Tll~ 1tOA.U1tA.oK1l~ Kat avnq>anKfJ~ ()ta()tKa<ria~ yta Tllv E1tt~OA.it Tl1~ 
A9itv~ O)~ 1tOAt'ttKO-E9vlKOU KEvtPOl») in Kaiti Aroni-Tsihli and Lydia Triha (eds.), 0 
XapiAaor; TpIKOv7Ufr; Kal 11 e7rOX~ rov, pp.99-106; Christos Kardaras, /waxeif1 r'-
XapiAaor; TpIKOv7Ufr;. H (XV'mcap6.()eU1'f. Am) U/V avi:K~OU/ a»..r,loypatpia rov O,KOVf1£V,KOV 
Ilarplapxeiov (/878-1884), (Athens, 1998). 
122 In Ion Dragoumis, 0 EM1fVlflf10r; f10v Kal 01 'Ell1f\ler;. EM1fV1KOr; Iloll!ltTf1Or;, (Athens, 
2000), pp.116-7. 
123 Athanasios Souliotis-Nikolaides, Opyavw(Jlr; KwvaravnvoV1cokwr;, (Athens, 1984), 
pp.70-1. 
124 Professor Kitromilides has aptly demonstrated these rifts inside the Eastern Orthodox 
Church and the latter's interaction with the Greek state in P.M. Kitromilides, «To tv..o~ 
Tll~ E9vapXtKi]~ 1tap6.bo<rl1~. MapropiE~ wt6 avtK()OtE~ E1tt<rro~ tOU Xpooom6/lou 
L/lUPV11~ 1tpO~ tOV 'Iwva L\payou/lll» in Af111ror; tTU/ f1~Wl cf>wUf A7roaro167rovlov, 
(Athens, 1984), p.489, 496. Chrysostomos had played an important role in the 
Macedonian struggle in the past and later on openly asked Ion Dragoumis for the Greek 
state to intervene to the Patriarchate and have him reinstated as a metropolitan. 
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the twentieth century, especially after the Young Turk Revolution, when 
incorporation to the Greek state was increasingly coming to represent in the 
eyes of the Ottoman Greeks the only viable alternative among past routes, 
the Patriarchate could do nothing but accept this fact and act accordingly. 
In the midst of such a cultural mosaic and political labyrinth, we have 
to try establishing the Greek Literary Society of Constantinople's identity. To 
determine it we have to start with the obvious question: who were the people 
that in 1861 founded the Literary Society? In a catalogue of thirty-three 
founding members, we find ten physicians, seven coming from the 
entrepreneurial world (six merchants and one banker), six academics and 
scholars, four Ottoman civil servants and only one cleric, all of them 
Greek.125 Initial numbers show a slight preponderance for members of an 
urban Greek upper middle class: merchants, bankers and civil servants. This 
preponderance rises into pre-eminence looking at a catalogue of regular 
members in 1879: 155 out of 304, a little over half of the total number fall 
into these three categories while lawyers or physicians, typical middle class 
professionals, make only for 8,4%. Without doubt the Literary Society in its 
first period, from its inception until well into the 1890s had been under the 
influence of upper middle class. A brief look at the names of the presidents 
for its first decade (Stefanos Karatheodori, Petros Zanos, Spyridon 
Maurogenis, Konstantinos Karatheodori, Christakis Zografos, Staurakis 
Aristarchis, Konstantinos Karapanos) is enough to demonstrate their origins 
in wealthy and/or otherwise longstanding Constantinopolitan families. There 
is a striking differentiation between these days and the first decade of the 20th 
century when merchants and bankers only accounted for 20% of the regular 
members while 'middle' middle class professions in the guise of physicians, 
lawyers and architects prevailed with almost a third of the total.
l26 
125 Haris Exertzoglou, EBvIKft ravrorrrra aT11v KWWJTavrIVOV1COA.'l rov 1 Cf OJcVva. 0 
W'lVIKOC; (/)UOA.aylKOC; L'vllayoc; KWV(JTavrlVOV1COA£WC; 1861-1912, (Athens, 1996), p.20, 
where also the ful1 names are to be found. 
126 Ibid, p.34, where also the table of regular members for the period 1879-1909 can be 
found. 
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Our main task is to examine the ideology underlining the Society's 
members plentiful and diverse action and the impact this had on the 
perception of Greek identity itself inside the Ottoman Empire. To detennine 
that would therefore require of us to settle on the fundamental character of 
the Society as a community of intellectuals. Are we dealing with an 
association whose members only concern was the propagation of science for 
the common good, or does its vigorous activity aspired to political ends? 
In the language of its founders, their aim was both clear and true. It 
was a literary society127, being the result of Greek initiative and residing in 
Constantinople. Its ends were altogether simple: "The Society's object", the 
president Michalis Psallidas pointed out in 1904, "as clearly stated in Article 1 
of its charter, is the advancement of letters and sciences and their propagation throughout 
the Orient".128 Three years later another president, Leonidas Limarakis would 
resume the subject and elaborate on it: 
"Our founding fathers, having taken these things into 
consideration, and having set as their purpose the cultivation and 
propagation of our ancient wisdom in the Orient, and through 
this, the regeneration of our Race (Tivo<;), besides their other toils 
on the general educational movement of our nation, they 
introduced this stadium of intellectual labour, the Greek literary 
S · . A ril1861" 129 oClety, ill p . 
Both presidents emphasised the scientific standing of their association 
although from differing points of view, Psallidas being more cosmopolitan, 
while Limarakis interpreting the whole effort as of purely Greek interest. 
Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that this undertaking was only a 
voluntary society with the best of intentions. 
The Literary Society then, according to its members, was purported to 
be a purely scientific association with cultural and educational interests. A 
127 The adjective "literary" [qJlAOA.OYIKO~·] in Greek usually refers to all humanities. 
128 «Aoyobocriu nov KU'ta 'to MI" (1)UoytKOV tro<; 1903-1904 1trnpuYlltvoov f:V TOO 
(1)U610») , 13/6/1904, in 0 cv KWVaTavTrvoV1rOA.E1 EJJ..r,vIK~ <Pu..OAO)'IKfk LVMO)'lX 
(Journal of the Greek Literary Society of Constantinople), vol.KEr [1902-1905], (1907), 
54. Underlined in the original text. 
129 «Aoyobocriu nov KUTa 'to MLT' (1)UoytK<l>V tro<; 1906-1907 1trnpaYIlb.'oov £\' TOO 
(1)U610»), 13/5/1907 in 0 cv KwvaTavrrvoV7rOA.EI, A' [1905-1907], (1908), 78. 
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reasonable next question would be what it was not. Not surprisingly, we find 
out a warning that under no circumstance this should be interpreted as a 
political association: article 2 of its charter bans politics and political 
discussions from the Society.130 Evidently, this did not prove enough for in 
the course of time, and in an almost regular way, a number of people 
vehemently denied any relation between politics and their association. Iroklis 
Vasiadis, one of the founders and its most prominent member stressed as 
early as 1869 that 
"the Society, as a friend of peacetime works has never aspired to 
anything else since its inception than the cultivation of sciences 
and letters; therefore, we exercised every caution in abstaining 
from politics and it was a wise decision". 131 
Almost twenty years later, when the Macedonian Society was looking for 
premises to hold its regular meetings, the Society would be happy to oblige 
on a number of conditions of which the main was that "political or religious 
debates are to be prohibited" .132 This policy was to be diligently observed 
and proclaimed at intervals throughout the Society's long history, being 
broken only in the aftermath of the Young Turks Revolution in 1908. 
However, even at the time the Greek army was fighting in Asia Minor in 
1922 the president Minas Afthentopoulos still attempted to maintain the 
weight of tradition: " ... our society does not practice politics, except if those 
who do, on purpose confuse politics with any national activity for whose 
benefit this humble institution has been founded and ever since strived" .133 
In fact, it was all a matter of interpretation. The Ottoman state had 
never been particularly interested in the education of its subjects, which for a 
long time was a prerogative associated with its various religions and was 
130 0 ev KWWITavTlVOV7rOAEI, A' [1863], (1864), E'. 
131 «EK'taKtO~ ouvE()piacrt~ "t11~ E1tEtEtOl) 7t<Mly6PEoo~ tooV EMllVtKWV Ll)MOyooV», 
4/5/1869 in 0 ev KWV(1TavTlVOV7rOAEI, /),: [1865-1870], (1871), 239. 
\32 0 ev KWV(1TavrlVOV7rOAEI, KA' [1887-1889], (1891), 242. 
133 Minas Afthentopoulos, "Aoyobooia nov Kata to 3A' OUMoytK6v E-t~ 1921-1922 
7tE1tpaYIlSvoov EV tOO EMllVtKW ~tAOA.oytKW Ll)MOyoo, avayvoocr9Etcra Kala tllv E1tE-t£lOV 
auto\> EoptiJV "t11 17/30 A7tptAiou 1922 U7t6 tOl) 7tpot()P0l) KOl) M. AueEVto7toUAOU", in 
Minas Afthentopoulos, Aoyobouiaz M'lwi. Av(}evr07rOVAOV, 7rpoMpov rov €\' 
KWV(1TavTlVOV7rOAEllf>u..OAOYIKOV};VMOyOV 1918-1922, (Athens, 1972), p.95. 
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organised under their auspices. Attempts for secularisation in the times of 
the Tanzimat did not move beyond providing half-measures. There was to 
be a University in Constantinople in 1870 - 71 and again in 1900, but since 
already first conceived (in the 1840s) it was not designed as an agent of a 
common educational pattern for all ethnic communities. Each of them was 
left to its own devices to curve a high road to the professed and desired 
common Ottoman patriotism (osmanlilik) with the collaboration between lay 
and cleric element as the only significant condition. But entrusting the 
minorities with their own education without the counter-balance of some 
common higher institution pointing towards a more or less general course 
meant that the government could not exercise- or did not risk imposing -
effective control. It was fairly reasonable for the multiple ethnicities of the 
Empire, given the prevailing of national ideology in the Balkans, to move 
towards confirming their own national identities and not embrace some 
vague novel 'Ottoman patriotism'. This not being a desired effect, the 
authorities were forced to step outside normal procedures and resort to 
coercion. Greek schooltexts, for example, were frequently censored.134 The 
point the Ottoman government kept missing was the potential political role 
of education in an era of nationalism.135 In fact, the precise implications of 
the nationalist concept itself seem to have eluded them until relatively late. 136 
But again, this was only one facet of the educational puzzle in the 
Ottoman state. We have already mentioned the conflict inside the Christian 
Orthodox millet in the 1870s between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the 
newfound Bulgarian Exarchate. It chiefly rested not on questions of dogma 
but of national awareness137 and the prize both sides sought for themselves 
were the Christians of Macedonia, a province constituting a hodgepodge of 
ethnicities, Greeks, Bulgarians, Turks, Albanians, Vlachs, for whom language 
134 Anagnostopoulou, Mll(pa Auia, p.383. 
\35 Not according to Davison who observes that Ali Pasha, Fuad Pasha and others were 
conscious of the problem. In Davison, Reform, p.133. Nonetheless, the extent of their 
grip on it remains a question mark. See Davison, Reform, pp.248-49. 
136 Davison points out that the reorganization in millet lines actually helped to "re-
emphasise lack of homogeneity among Ottoman peoples". In Davison, Reform, p.132. 
I37 The Exarchate clergy held mass in the Bulgarian language and appealed to 'ethnic' 
Bulgarians. 
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and ethnic origin were not clear pointers at all because they did not coincide. 
Until then these people were living the pre-national order of things in simply 
defining themselves in terms of religion. The schism gready upset the local 
communities and threw them into much confusion as to which their proper 
identity should be.138 The Bulgarian - speaking village of Tyrnovo although 
following the Exarchate for a number of years, later on drafted a petition to 
the Metropolitan of Andrianople asking the Patriarchate for pardon and 
reverting to its jurisdiction.139 The case of another Bulgarian - speaking 
village, that of Velika, illustrates the fluidity of the situation. The village priest 
wrote a letter to the Literary Society asking for funds to set up a scho04 
"because the Tymovians night and day are trying to send us both Bulgarian 
priest and teacher but we are used in Roman (Greek) letters and want to stay 
the same" .140 Language not being a watershed, it was not striking that the 
Greek educational associations would call to the Literary Society for an 
extension of the school grid 
"through which only it would be possible for the Greek language 
to be propagated in Bulgarian and Turkish speaking Greek 
communities, thus becoming the family language and prevailing ; 
without it Hellenism will never be able to wrest from the crooked 
talons of Panslavism our non-Greek speaking brothers in 
M d ." 141 ace orua .. , 
In Asia Minor though, the Greek communities seemed to face 
somewhat different troubles. Here, it was presupposed that Turkophone 
Orthodox Christians "of a most Greek character type"t42 had somehow lost 
their patrimonial language in the past and they should be prompdy restored 
138 See Anastasia Karakasidou, Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood, (Chicago, 1997). On the 
whole this is a fascinating anthropological picture of Macedonian loyalties in the last two 
centuries although the Mega/i Idea is presented in it as a monolithic block. 
139 Exertzoglou, EOvIJdf 'fav'fOurra. p.80. 
140 0 t:V KwwrravrzvOV7rOA£I, H' [1873-74], (1874), 264. Both churches would 
continuously argue on repression tactics being pursued to convert followers and rising 
tensions would eventually lead to open confrontation between partisan groups sent from 
Greece and Bulgaria in 1904-1908. 
141 Ibid, If' [1878-1879], (1880), 210-11. 
142 Ibid, Z' [1872-1873], (1874), p.209. 
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to it stnce there was a clear danger of their being lost to the nahon. 
Moreover, this lack of preserving the Greek language exposed these 
populations to the dangers of conversion by protestant missionaries, 
something that seems would automatically exclude them from partaking of 
Hellenism. In Ikonion the local magistrates of a community of 150 
Turkophone families would welcome the establishment of a girls' school in 
order 
"to save from an imminent national religious ruin this handful of 
Greeks who, after having lost the patrimonial language, are also 
in danger of forfeiting religion, the only bond still connecting 
them to Hellenism, by being persecuted by missionaries".143 
In this setting where the Patriarchate's authority was not seriously challenged 
by a schismatic church, language took precedence as a desired criterion of 
nationality compared to religion. This becomes clearer when we point that 
the existence of these Turkophone Greeks was not a result of the recent past 
but stemmed from the realities of this particular geographical area and was 
known for centuries. However, the necessities of national identity inherently 
require a kind of conformity and it was towards this that Greek educational 
societies aspired in this area. The same process can be observed in 
Macedonia later on, in the beginning of the 20th century when lines were 
finally drawn and language, religion and ethnicity were on their way to 
concurring. Meanwhile, the Greek Literary Society and other educational 
associations in the Ottoman Empire viewed the expansion of a school 
network as the only solution to strengthening Greek national consciousness. 
In the setting described above education can be finally considered as a 
virtually political concept, gradually developing into an instrument for 
distinguishing between ethnicities. Should we accordingly consider the 
Literary Society as a political project then? As far as it was aspiring to build a 
national identity for the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire, we have to answer 
in the affirmative. There are only variations on the degree of affirmation. 
Haris Exertzoglou, for example, believes that "although the Society did not 
form an overtly political organisation, its activities had an indirect political 
143 0 E:V KWVOTaVTlVOV1r()),e" Ir' [1878-1879], (1880), p.116. 
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tinge slllce partaking of a clearly political field, that of conflicting 
nationalisms" .144 Giorgos Giannakopoulos, on the other hand, states that 
"the Greek Literary Society of Constantinople was an essentially 
political organisation. Its efforts towards bolstering educational 
activities, the propagation of Greek language and culture and the 
growth of science, were certainly not of neutral but of a political 
character as far as their object was the forging and strengthening 
of Greek national consciousness and serving the motion for the 
unity of Hellenism".145 
A look through some of the most important activities of the Society 
would easily affirm these views. Besides providing schools in various areas of 
the Ottoman Empire with 5.300 Turkish lire between 1872 and 1877, they 
also contributed significant sums to textbook (grammar, geography, history) 
and Greek folklore (concentrating on "Greek dialects, mores, customs and 
superstitions") contests. l46 They organised lessons and addresses for "the 
popular classes of our society ... and their moral regeneration and intellectual 
formation" along with Sunday schools.147 The Society drafted and dispatched 
two memorandums on the just cause and plea of Greek populations in the 
Ottoman Empire, one to be delivered to the Congress of Berlin in 1878 and 
the other to the Paris Peace Conference after the end of the Great War. By 
all means, the Literary Society did not brandish a political flag but it certainly 
was "a child of the Reform,,148, propagating a virtually political, national 
programme. 
The ideological composition of the Greek Literary Society shows the 
different views prevailing in the Greek Constantinopolitan middle class. The 
association has been neither homogeneous nor monolithic as to opinions 
expressed. Following its journal we can draw an initial line between an 
official view, carried out in the celebratory addresses the president delivered 
144 Exertzoglou, EBvlloj ravr6rrrra, p.73. 
145 Giannakopoulos, 0 EM"VIK6~ (/>lAOAOYIK6~ .EvMOYO~, p.lII. "Hellenism" constitutes 
an abstract concept used to describe the sum of Greeks worldwide or the Greek spirit in 
general. 
146 Exertzoglou, EBvl10j ravr6vrra. pp. 99, 104. 
147 Ibid, p.67. 
148 Giannakopoulos, 0 m"VIK~ (/>';'OAOYIK6~ .Evnoyo~, p.382. 
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every spnng, and informal views shown in lectures, meetings or wntten 
articles. The president's addresses, for instance, always exercised caution in 
avoiding references to the current political situation, refrained from 
mentioning the Greek state even as a factor of cultural influence and were 
careful in giving the Ottoman government its due, that ranged from a typical 
expression of gratitude to the reigning Sultan to more substantial thanks to 
some functionary for a favourable decision. 149 Informal lectures or debates 
on the other hand, indicate some gaps to that immaculate picture and suggest 
that legitimist approach to be sometimes no more than a necessary evil, a 
subject we will have to tum to later on. However, the same gaps can be 
discerned when we attempt a broad classification of the Society's general 
ideological trends in chronological order. From its inception to roughly 1878, 
a spirit of obedience to the government run along with ideas of a possible 
partnership between Greeks and Ottomans. After 1878 and the 
memorandum sent to the Berlin Congress on the rights and expectations of 
Greek populations the Society was beset by financial problems and troubles 
with the Hamidian regime. From 1908 onwards, the bonds with the Greek 
state were proclaimed and it seems incorporation in it sounded the only 
viable alternative, something that would be clearly shown after the advent of 
the Greek army in Asia Minor in 1919. 
The 1860s and 1870s was the period in which the Society functioned in 
a smooth and untroubled way throughout an era of reforms, secularisation 
and a conjuncture of economic prosperity. Not only the Ottoman 
government was offering guarantees - in principle, at least- of respecting 
their religion and means, it also officially sanctioned the partial secularisation 
of their millet. As a result, the Literary Society grew rapidly and its proclaimed 
aims matured and came to focus. From the initial all embracing, humanistic 
and possibly utopian "propagation of letters to the Christian Orthodox 
peoples of the Ottoman Empire in general and especially to the female sex, 
149 See, for example 0 c:v Kwwnavnvovrr6kl, «Aoyo<>ocriu nov KUTa 1"0 ME'cruUoytK6v 
ttoc:; 1905-1906 1tE1tpuy~tvrov EV TID croU6yro» , A', [1905-1907], (1908), p.45; 
«tKTUKTOC:; LUW;<>piacrtc:;» 5/5/1863, A', [1861-62], (1863), 204; lA', [1876-77], (1878). 
143; «LUVE<>piacrtc:; (roUKToc:;)>> 13/5/1884, IH', (1883-84], (1888), 101; KZ', (1895-99], 
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without any discrimjnation, be that religious or linguistic"l50 they arrived to 
the more flexible and realistic "regeneration of our Race (rtvo~)".151 Between 
1861 and 1878 the Literary Society gradually conceived and proceeded 
towards fulfilling an extensive educational programme: funding of schools in 
Macedonia, Thrace and Asia Minor,152 organising competitions for the 
writing of schoolbooks,153 providing textbooks on geography, history and 
grammar, lectures and popularising lessons for the lower classes of 
Constantinople. What was the common denominator of these efforts? Greek 
culture, according to Georgios Sophocles, who noted that in the span of the 
nineteenth century "we fought to Frankicise ourselves ... we lived as Franks, 
walked as Franks, were born, lived, died as Franks ".154 This anxiety over the 
nation's future was palpable in many of the Society'S documents: notice the 
'crooked talons of Panslavism' in Macedonia, 'the lost patrimonial language' 
in Asia Minor, the imitation of the Franks in Constantinople. They remain 
indicators of a conscious national discourse seeking to curve a niche for the 
Greek element. 
Take for instance Iroklis Vasiadis and the image he conceived of the 
mission of the Greek ethnicity in the Orient. "The Greek race", he wrote, 
"has been placed in the Orient as yeast, in order to stimulate 
growth, as soul, in order to grant life and energy; Greeks in the 
Orient today are still, as twenty two centuries ago, the motive 
power; for wherever in the Orient the letters, trade, industry or 
civilisation have flourished it is due to the successful striving of 
industrious Greeks. The Greek race, as an intellectual and 
vigorous power, is preordained to rekindle and regenerate the 
other Christian peoples of Asia holding in perpetuity primacy of 
(1900), 32; «LUVEOpi.a~ (OO(lK'tO~) E7tl TTl K8' E7tEtEiw 'tou crull6you EOprip> 
l3/5/1890, KB', [1889-1891], (1891), 66. 
ISO Exertzoglou, EOvl1cft ravrav,ra, p.19. Charter of the Educational Institution, an 
association founded in 1860 by the same people who next year formed the Literary 
Society, which can be viewed as its heir. 
lSI Exertzoglou, EOvl1a1 ravro-rr,ra, p.24. 
152 Ibid, p.26. 
153 Details in ibid, pp.1 03-l31. 
154 0 f:V Kwwrravnvov1Cokl, A', [1861-1862], (1863), 109. 
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intellect and civilisation and moral influence. Greeks are the 
mediators through which European ideas and civilisation are 
conveyed to other peoples in the Orient; because close and 
direct contact to Europe impairs rather than benefits these 
people, corrupts rather than elevates, brings rather death than 
life. Greeks form the bridge that attaches Asia to Europe 
neither with wood, nor with rafts or other soulless bonds as 
Xerxes had attempted by building the Hellespont Bridge, but 
with irrevocable affiliations of spirit and intellect" .155 
This extensive and certainly highly optimistic view was actually less 
pompous than the nineteenth-century manner in which it was delivered lets 
us perceive. It represented a constant of Greek thought on both sides of the 
Aegean. It sprung forth from the need of a sense of mission and invented a 
role in the great scheme of things. It was the 'enlightenment of the Orient' 
the first Dean of the University of Athens had imagined in 1837 all over 
again with a small but significant change. Vasiadis, being an Ottoman Greek 
and a Constantinopolitan, put the Society in the University's place: "such a 
bridge [between the West and the Orient] our own society becomes".156 This 
minor change lies at the heart of Ottoman Greek beliefs before 1878 and 
signifies the divergence of policies between them and mainland Greeks until 
the end of the nineteenth century - and for the Patriarchate even further on. 
Towards the end of the 1870s and in the 1880s both the Greek 
Constantinopolitan middle class and the Literary Society faced a series of 
setbacks that were more or less intertwined. First of all, the favourable 
economical conjuncture that had made the fortune of many Greek bankers 
ceased to exist with the final regulation of the Ottoman public debt in 1881. 
The problems of solvency the Ottoman state had met with in the aftermath 
of the 1875 bankruptcy, and chose to counter with short-term loans that left 
great profits to the banks issuing them, had been overcome. The 1875 
insurrections in Bosnia - Herzegovina spread into Bulgaria and became a 
full-blown Eastern crisis, complete with a Russo-Turkish war that for a time 
155 0 t:V KwvaTavTIvovn:6k" 8', [1862-1863], (1864), 241. 
156 «I;UVE<>piacru; (t1cta1C't<><;) E1[{ TIl E1[EttU.o Eopn»> 8/511874 in 0 t:V KWVuravrlVOVn:6k" 
H', [1873-1874], (1874), 352. 
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even threatened to tum Constantinople into Russian territory. The treaty of 
San Stefano and the Berlin Congress sounded a double alarm. The Ottoman 
Empire lost both provinces while the Greek state seemed totally unprepared 
to defend its own interests, unable to follow a consistent and successful 
strategy and emerged discredited from the whole affair. 
The time of compliance was over as the Ottoman regime moved away 
from the period of reforms and into the autocratic reign of Abdul Hamid II. 
In Constantinople for the first time the Literary Society encountered a series 
of direct problems with censorship. Its journal was out of circulation 
between 1880 and 1884 because "due to misunderstanding"lS7 the 
government withheld its permission. When permission was finally given, 
several conditions accompanied it. ISS In 1886 the government prohibited a 
conference the Society was about to organise in celebration of its twenty-five 
years, again "due to misunderstanding" according to Vasiadis, presumably 
because of its international character.159 A third 'misunderstanding' occurred 
in 1888 when the celebratory volume for the twenty-five year jubilee was 
confiscated and remained out of circulation until 1890 when the government 
proved its "partiality to arts", as the president Konstantinos Kalliades 
informs us, and allowed its publication with minor changes.l60 The same year 
the government raised doubts on the legitimacy of the Society because of its 
157 0 t:V KmwnavrlVov7Cok" IH', [1883-1884], (1888), 48. 
158 Ibid, IH', [1883-1884], (1888), 48. Among the conditions were : "This journal is to 
contain as of old scientific, literary and philosophic articles, barring any articles or texts 
dealing with the administrative or political science. ( ... ) Political news or thoughts are to 
be excluded. ( ... ) Treatises on aspects of the various nations and religions and their 
ongoing arguments are not to be included. ( ... ) On the request of the Press Office any 
treatise should be handed over in its entirety for necessary reading and inspection prior to 
publication". 
159 «A6yoc., Hpoiliouc., Buma.oou, 1tpotbpoU, Kura TIlv E1KOat.1tEVtO£TT)pilia 'tOU 
LUMOyO\») 7/19/9/1886 in EIKO(JI7Ct:VrO£rrfpiC; 1861-1886, (Constantinople, 1888), pp.ll-
12. 
160 «LUVEbpia<nc., (OOUlC'toc.,) E1ti TIl KEY E1tEtruu 'tou <ruM6yOU EOpnp) 13/5/1890 in 0 €'V 
KmvOTavrlvov7Cok" KB', [1889-1891], (1891), 66. H. Exertzoglou is mistaken in stating 
that ''with the exception of prohibiting a scientific conference the Society organised to 
celebrate its twenty-five years, the Ottoman government seems not to have interfered 
with its activities". In Exertzogloll, EOvoo1 -cav-cOurra. p.7l. 
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lacking an imperial decree for its foundation. In the absence of any other 
significant leverage its members had to fall back on the Patriarchate, still the 
supreme Greek authority in the Empire and source of the whole millets 
legitimacy, in order to intervene on their behalf.161 This meant though that 
they had to capitulate to the Patriarch on educational mattersl62 since the 
Patriarchate had never really recognised their primacy and had already 
formed its own educational association in 1880. This initiative split the 
energies of the city elite and added to the Society's pressing financial 
bl 163 pro ems. 
As a result of all this trouble there was a gradual but distinct shift in the 
Society's capabilities and interests. Its financial condition could not meet the 
needs of an expanding educational system, so the association had to limit its 
funding and revert to literary and scientific concerns. A new 'Committee of 
sociology' was in session for the first time in 1896-1897 besides the 
traditional archaeological, educational and literary ones.l64 Changes also 
affected the Society's ideology. For the first time one of its members openly 
advocated inclusion in the independent state. Odysseas Ialemos had 
participated in the Greek Constitutional Assembly that drew the 1864 
Constitution, but he remained nevertheless one of the Society's most 
significant members and its elected president for 1879. It was before that 
though, in 1876, in the eventful period following Abdul Aziz's death and 
Murad V's deposition, almost a month before the new Sultan Abdul Hamid 
II promulgated the first Ottoman constitution, that Ialemos wrote in 
Constantinople and subsequendy published in Athens an interesting article 
on the ongoing crisis of the Eastern Question. It is doubtful that this work 
could have seen the light of day in Constantinople where the press was under 
strict surveillance from the mid-1860s. Indeed, it was probably written with 
161 Anagnostopoulou, Ml1(pa Auia, p.385. 
162 Ibid, p.297. The Society invited for the first time in its meetings the Patriarchical 
"Central Educational Committee" and submitted its conclusions to "our Supreme Centre, 
where educational matters of our nation are to be reported". 
163 Ten out of twelve members of the new association's council were at the same time 
members in the Literary Society. Giannakopoulos, 0 Ev.r,V1KO~ <PV.OJ..OY1KO~ !.:6)J.oyn,,'. 
p.144. 
164 0 E:V KwwJTavTlvov;r:okl, KZ', [1895-1899], (1900), 132. 
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the Athenian public in mind since references to Byzantine emperors and the 
Persian Wars of ancient Greece can be found in abundance and the ghost of 
Fallmerayer was once more evoked.165 The piece was essentially a reappraisal 
of Greek foreign policy on the eve of the crisis and a discussion of the 
possibilities open to the Greek element in both the independent kingdom 
and the Ottoman Empire. What is striking is Ialemos's mind not to reproach 
past policies in Athens and Constantinople or put the blame to any particular 
individuals but to present a clear line of argument for the future. Since 1870, 
Ialemos argued, 
"we have moved into an era of civilised barbarity and whomever 
chooses not to go about clad in iron and does not spend the 
sweat of the poor and the surplus of the rich in buying Krupps 
and breechloader guns, this man does not conform to the vital 
" f th· " 166 Sp1t1t 0 e 1:1mes . 
Therefore, he concluded, it is the Greek state's duty to "quickly come to an 
understanding with the rest of the Greeks wherever they might be, to issue a 
loan or to levy a significant tax; one percent of each Greek's property, for 
example, would suffice to build an effective military", especially since the 
Greek navy "has to conform to the needs of the entire nation" and not just 
to those of the state.167 The message was plain. The demands of the times 
had surpassed their own means; therefore it was now the Greek kingdom's 
duty to protect the Greek community in the Ottoman Empire. 
Certainly, this is no more than a simple indicator. It is only in hindsight 
that we can say with conviction that 1878 had indeed been a significant date 
in the ideological evolution of the Literary Society. As the nineteenth century 
was drawing towards its end, the social structure of Greek urban middle class 
was altering and this change was reflected in the people constituting the 
Society. In 1909 out of a total of two hundred regular members, merchants, 
bankers and civil servants only accounted for forty-seven while physicians, 
lawyers and architects had reached seventy (and they were eighty-sL'\: only 
165 Ialemos, E.U1jvrov L1iKala, p.76. 
166 Ibid, p.62. 
167 Ibid, p.74. 
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three years before).168 It has been argued that an ascendancy of a Greek 
'middle' middle class throughout the Ottoman Empire clearly existed and it 
was also linked to an open endorsement of the Megali Idea. The urban class of 
cities in the coast of Asia Minor, especially Smyrna, found itself in a 
favourable economic conjuncture originating from their enjoying double 
citizenship (both Greek and Ottoman) and Greece having been granted 
capitulations status. In the aftermath of the 1897 Greco-Turkish war, which 
the Empire won in a spectacularly easy way, this group's privileges were 
placed under threat for diplomatic and economic relations between the two 
states were disconnected and were not renewed until 1901-1903. Besides the , 
Ottoman state, in an effort to undercut the wide tax exemption this category 
of citizens was enjoying, tried to force them into relinquishing Greek 
citizenship and taking up only the Ottoman on pain of quitting the country 
in the space of two weeks. This motion created an atmosphere of 
confrontation between Greek consular and Ottoman state authorities. 
Naturally, in this sort of climate ties between this Greek urban middle class 
and Greek national ideology as expressed by the Greek state tended to be 
reinforced and consolidated.169 
Unfortunately, this view does not consider Constantinople. We do 
have a few pointers as to its substantiality170 but, as far as the Literary Society 
is concerned, they are lost in the release of sentiments the Young Turk 
Revolution of 1908 provided. The significance of certain manifestations is 
almost palpable. The president Leonidas Ijmarakis wished in 10/9/1908 for 
"the liberty restored to the people of the Empire to prove profitable and 
beneficial to the progress and general activity of our society towards the 
greater good of the Nation".171 Not only was 'the nation' now a gold letter 
word referred to in capital letters, but in the general festive atmosphere, its 
168 Exertzoglou, EBvllClj ravrourra, p.34. 
169 Anagnostopoulou, Ml1(pO. Auia, pp. 307-318. 
170 Giannakopoulos notes that ''there is to be found in the Literary Society a group with 
doctors, lawyers and scholars as its adherents that professed incorporation in the Greek 
state and fell into line with its propagated irredentism". In 0 EM."VIKOC; (/JUO).OYIKOC; 
L'VM.oyOC;, p.25. 
171 «<l>u..OAOYUCi} EOpnp> 18/911908 in 0 t:V Kwwrravnvov1Cok" AB', [1908-1910], 
(1911), 6. 
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symbols appeared in the open. Consider the "Literary fete" the Society 
proclaimed for 18 19/1908. A group of Greeks had arrived in Constantinople 
to convey congratulations in a climate of brotherhood and friendship rather 
common in such changes of polity - especially when change was perceived 
to be for the best in tenus of international relations. Leonidas Limarakis 
delivered an address under the tide 'The Gifts of Liberty' in the presence of 
Prince Sabaheddin - then a leading figure of the liberal faction in the 
Committee of Union and Progress and later of the opposition - which began 
with the Greek national anthem. The stanzas were not in the correct order 
for, significandy enough, Limarakis chose to start with the third one instead 
that reads: "That day [of freedom in Greece] was long to comel and 
everything was silent I cringing with fearl under bitter slavery".172 He went 
on to explicidy mention the Greek Revolution, for the first time in the forty-
seven years of the Society's existence. The light of freedom "was still 
preserved in the homeland, until through an immense struggle it shone again 
in its ancient birthplace eighty-seven years past, and dazzled by it, the 
onlookers declared the whole thing a resurrection" .173 Whether this was the 
result of a suppressed national feeling resurfacing or the completion of a 
volteface of the Society's majority originating in 1878, the important fact is the 
absence of any hesitation. From this moment on the Ottoman Greeks threw 
in their lot with that of the Megali Idea. 
Soon after these festivities the Literary Society was entangled in the 
chaotic political developments and machinations following the Young Turks' 
Revolution. To begin with, the Literary Society had never been the only 
association of the Constantinopolitan Greeks and in the present 
circumstances, since not overdy politic, it proved the worst equipped of all to 
ride the political stonu. Besides the Ecumenical Patriarchate, whose policy 
has been described earlier, after July 1908 the Greek community in the 
capital of the Ottoman Empire were under the influence of the Political 
I72 <l>tlOA.oytKit EOprip> 18/9/1908 in 0 t:V KwwnaWIVOv11:6k" AS' ,[ 1908-191 0].( 1911). 6. 
173 Ibid Contrast this with Limarakis's predecessor, H. Hatzihristos, also a doctor, who 
had lavishly praised Abdul Hamid in his celebratory address of 1116/1906. Ibid. J\'. 
[1905-1907], (1908), 45. 
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Association, in effect a Greek political party, and the Organisation of 
Constantinople, a semi-secret society closely associated with the Greek 
state.174 The Organisation, brainchild of ardent nationalists Ion Dragoumis 
and Athanasios Souliotis-Nikolaides was in its first stage working for the 
realisation of the Megali Idea. 175 In its attempts to secure favourable 
conditions for the Greek community the Organisation was enmeshed in the 
politics of the Committee of Union and Progress, electing to support the 
leader of the liberal faction and nephew of Sultan Abdul Hamid, Prince 
Sabaheddin. However, the scheme backfired when the staged military coup 
against the Young Turks failed in April 1909.176 
The fortunes of the Organisation and the literary Society then were 
bound to cross paths, especially at a time when greater freedom of 
movement for the minorities' clubs and associations was supposed to exist: 
Lmarakis clearly illustrated this feeling in 17 / 5 /1909 by mentioning the "air 
of freedom" which 
"broke the chains of a thirty-three year old tyranny and an 
already centuries old autocracy and inequality between people; 
and all the nations were called, in mutual respect and equality, 
liberty and justice, to participate in the rights and duties in the 
. fth ,,177 setvlce 0 e common country . 
174 Ion Dragoumis was a diplomat in the Greek Embassy at the time while Souliotis was 
sanctioned by the Greek Foreign Ministry. The origins of the Organisation in Souliotis-
Nikolaides, Opyav(J)(Jl, K(J)VcnavflV0V11:0A£(J)" pp.30-39. As a memoir, this is a work 
distanced in time from the actual events and written mainly to justify past actions and 
decisions, an aspect that should be kept in mind while reading it. 
175 See the memoirs of Souliotis-Nikolaides entitled OpyavW(JI, KWVcnavTlVoV7COJ.£OJ,. 
Also Thanos Veremis, <<A7t6 'to E9vl.lc6 lCPCl'tO<; <no tevo<; o{Xox; lCpcl'tO<;. To 7t£1palla TIle; 
OpyUvIDCTIl<; Kwv<nav'ttvou7t6A£ID<;» in Thanos Veremis (ed), EBvIK1] Tavronrra Kal 
E8VlKI(JPO, lIT1'/ NEOrEPrt EMaoa, (Athens 1997), pp.27-52; A.J. Panayotopoulos, "The 
'Great Idea' and the vision of Eastern Federation: A propos of the views of I. Dragoumis 
and A. Souliotis-Nikolaidis in Balkan Studies 21, (1980), pp.331-365. 
176 Souliotis described how Sabaheddin was encouraged and helped by the Greek 
government and the Organisation in his journey from France - through Greece - to 
Constantinople. In OpyU.VW(JI, KwvcnawlVov7Cokw" p.94. 
177 «Aoyooo<rla tIDV Ka'ta to MH' auUoytK6v tto<; 7t£7tpayllf:vWV tv tW auU6yO») 
17/5/1909 in 0 EV KwWnavflVOV11:okl, AS', [1908-1910], (1911), 36. 
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He also mentioned "everybody's urge to enter the field of politics" and a 
motion for the transformation of the Society into a political association that 
had been turned down.178 What he failed to mention was his being a member 
of the Organisation, along with 37 others of the Society, comprising almost 
20% of its regular members for year 1909.179 This clearly shows us that the 
'urge' to formally enter politics was almost upon the Literary Society although 
it would take a few more years to move into the field openly. 
When the Society "rose from the dead" 180 as president Minas 
Afthentopoulos proclaimed in 1919 all questions and illusions finally came to 
an end. The Society had been the victim of serious violence on the part of 
the Ottoman government during the war, its mobile property confiscated 
and thrown into the street and a genuine painting of Homer by Ingres 
adorning the Meeting Hall taken to a police precinct due to debts the 
president decried as fictional. 181 Greek foreign policy was now provided with 
ardent support: "the Society is going to participate valiandy in the glorious 
struggle for Greek regeneration in a spirit of national solidarity" .182 
Eleftherios Venizelos, the Greek Prime Minister, had been proclaimed 
honorary president for life, his name day in 15th December was celebrated as 
an "occasion of worship to our national ideology" and an epic poem entided 
'The Venizeliad' was composed and read in his honour. 183 In the lectures' 
programme, prominent subjects included 'A page out of our national 
history', 'The development of the Megali Idea since the fall of Constantinople, 
on occasion of the hundredth year anniversary of the first National Assembly 
178 «Aoyo()ocria 'nov Kata to MH' <:ruMoytKOV €toe; 1tE1tpay~tvffiV)}, [1908-1910], 
(1911),36. 
179 Cf. catalogue of the Organisation members in Opyav(J)(JIC; K(J)wnavTIVOV7rokwc;, pp. 
219-230 with Literary Society members in llWCT/KOVTXJEU1Pic; (Celebratory volume on the 
fiftieth anniversary of the Greek Literary Society, appendix to vol. Af),:. This last volume 
never actually appeared.), (Constantinople, 1913-1921), pp.E'-t'. According to Souliotis, 
Limarakis was a close associate, visiting him every day in his office. 
180 Afthentopoulos, Aoy()(}o(Jial M'!va AvOwro7roVA.OV, p.21. 
181 Ibid, p.19. The painting was sold in an auction. 
182 Ibid, p.33. 
183 Ibid, pp.20, 38 , 58 respectively. 
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in Epidavros', 'On the Megali lded. l &4 On the 20/3/1919 the president of the 
Society invited the Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Army, in 
Constantinople as part of the force the victors of the Great War had 
appointed to occupy the Straits, to fonnal lunch in his honour in the 
renowned hotel of Pera Palace. Towards the end of his address 
Afthentopoulos said: "Long life to you, therefore, victorious general, hooray 
to you, to the valiant army and to Eleftherios Venizelos, with all them and 
above all hooray for mother Greece, the finally united and great Greece" .185 
In the end, the controversy over the possible political status of the Society 
was settled in defiance of reality: " ... our society does not practise politics, 
except if those who do, on purpose confuse politics with any national activity 
for whose benefit this humble institution has been founded and ever since 
strived" .186 Four months after this final address of Minas Afthentopoulos the 
Greek Anny in Asia Minor was to be defeated by the Turkish forces of 
Mustafa Kemal. The treaty of Lausanne in 1923 would regulate future 
relations between the two countries; almost two million people would 
migrate in panic or be exchanged and the bustling Greek communities of the 
Near East would practically cease to exise87 - the Literary Society of 
Constantinople already had, in the wake of the Greek retreat. 
A last point to be stressed before concluding is to further clarify the 
interaction between the Literary Society and the Greek state. As an agent of 
Greek urban middle class values in the Empire, the Society stands out as a 
remarkable indicator of their attitude towards the policy the Greek kingdom 
followed towards them. Initially, in the first period of the Society between 
1861 and 1878, the Greek Constantinopolitan elites seemed to favour 
legitimism and a kind of collaboration with the Ottoman government which 
has been called 'Greek Ottomanism' .188 What was meant by 'Greek 
184 Afthentopoulos, Aoyoboaiaz M1fVa Av(}evro1T:ovlov, pp.29, 82. 
185 Ibid, p.l3l. 
186 Ibid. 
187 Mazower, The Balkans, p.107. 
188 On 'Greek Ottomanism' see especially Alexis Alexandris, «01 'EUTJvcC; <JT11v 
u1t1lpco{a tTJ~ Oe(O~avllctl~ AUTOlCPUtopiw;, 1850-1922» in ~cl:rio Icrt0Plri)C; Kat 
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Ottomanism' was primarily the acceptance of the preservation of the 
Ottoman Empire. For the upper middle class of Constantinople the Greek 
kingdom could not offer the guarantees necessary to invest upon: it was 
small, diminutive and ineffective. After the Crimean War it seemed as if the 
Ottoman Empire would still retain its tenacious hold to existence for the 
foreseeable future. The best bet would be to roll with the tide. The Tanzimat 
presented the chance to comply with the will of the Great Powers in their 
search for a Russian deterrent and at the same time try to take advantage of it 
in imagining a future Ottoman Empire as a prospective condominium 
between Greeks and Turks.189 This view, Skopetea notes, suggested that "the 
Empire would not be undermined from the inside but Greeks would be 
incorporated to the Ottoman administrative machine; Greeks in the Empire 
would not be prominent members of the Greek ethnicity but privileged 
Ottoman subjects"l90. It anticipated the 1867 arrangement that produced the 
Austro - Hungarian Empire by almost a decade. And last, but not least, this 
way the Greek upper middle class was originating a rival scheme to the Megali 
Idea propagated by Athens, thus regaining the ideological initiative lost since 
the formation of the independent Greek state. However, there was also a 
cultural level in 'Greek Ottomanism'. It had to do with strengthening the 
Greek position inside the Christian Orthodox millet in order to compete with 
a rising Slav nationalism and retain the Greek upper middle class's control of 
it. The educational efforts undertaken and mentioned cannot be understood 
I f thi 191 proper y out 0 s context. 
Without denying coherence and plausibility to the above arguments, 
we should also remember that the terms 'Greek Ottomanism' or Megali Idea 
were not the rigid structures they might appear on paper. In this quest for 
Greek identity we encounter not merely the primary colours but also their 
shades. As 'Greek Ottomanism' never became a dominant ideology, the 
future was to prove that the Megali Idea itself was not an object of unanimous 
E9voAOYU(llC; Etatpdac;, vol. Kr', (1980), 365-404; Skopetea, To «7rponnw {Jaaij'.EIO». 
pp.309-325. 
189 Skopetea, To «7rponJ71:o {Ja,O-[)£IO»" pp.304-305, 314-315. 
190 Ibid, p.315. 
191 Anagnostopoulou, MlIcpa Aaia., p.305. 
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agreement even among the mainlanders. The disagreement between King 
Constantine and Venizelos on the country's alignment in the Great War was 
not a simple personal feud. It showed the difficulties of translating national 
ideology to working foreign policy, especially when this was to be direcdy 
related to the interests and competition among the Great Powers. Thus 
Venizelos's 'Ionian vision' and Constantine's image of a 'small yet honest 
Greece' transcended the dilemmas of the Great War in being variations on 
the political ideology the Greek state had pledged itself since its inception. 
Similar dilemmas were being faced on the other bank of the Aegean. 
For instance, the Greek upper middle class in the Ottoman Empire was not 
itself totally homogeneous on accepting or denouncing the Greek kingdom. 
Odysseas Ialemos made a curious statement in an 1877 address on the 
'History of the Literary Society', in which he maintained that by certain 
changes in its charter the Society had become "not merely Greek but 
Panhellenic, engulfing with its spiritual energies every province m the 
Ottoman Empire inhabited by Greek or Orthodox desiring Greek 
education" .192 It is indeed a strange definition of 'panhellenic' one that 
prompdy excludes the independent kingdom. Iroklis Vasiadis, probably the 
most prominent member of the Literary Society and the closest thing to its 
spokesman in the 1860s, had not hesitated to call the independent state "lillie 
Greece,,193, alluding to a greater one either in the broad sense of the diaspora 
or specifically having in mind the community living in the Ottoman Empire. 
He had also castigated what he considered as an Athenian cultural hegemony 
using very strong language: 
"it is now fifty years that only one home and source of Greek 
lights remains and all others have been destroyed; almost all our 
scholars have now flocked there; because of that a frosty, 
deathly cold pervaded the rim where all initiative and activity 
has withered while the centre suffers from great swelling and 
oversupply; stricken and assailed by that most of them have 
become overheated and copied the politicians in altercations 
and controversies and in abusing each other nllgarly and 
192 0 ev KWVOTavrIVOV1COkl, IB' [1877-1878], (1879), 17. 
193 Ibid, B' (1864-1865), (1871), 275. 
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profusely, thinking that by arratgrung others on grounds of 
ignorance and thus debasing their own selves they were actually 
elevated and triumphed upon their opponents". 194 
These words were certain not to make Vasiadis a popular figure in Athens. 
However, the same person who was being so critical of these educational 
aspects of Greek foreign policy had collaborated with the Central Committee 
of Cretans in Athens as a representative of the Constantinopolitan Cretan 
Committee in 1866 and was sent in the capital of the kingdom to buy guns 
for the Cretan insurrection then in progress.195 This goes to show that 
rhetoric notwithstanding, there was always a minimum of cooperation 
between the Kingdom and Ottoman Greek leaders when wider aims were 
considered. For the existence of a committee collecting sums for the Cretans, 
although drawing upon a general interest of the public as in all similar cases, 
surely presupposed the contributions and sponsoring of wealthier citizens. 
Besides, it constituted an instance where the considered upholders of 'Greek 
Ottomanism' were working not only to the interest of their 'irredentist 
brothers', but towards the aggrandizement of 'little Greece' since the 
majority of Cretans demanded the Union. 
Moreover, what has already been discussed as to the Literary 
Society's ideology and activities should be juxtaposed to considering 'Greek 
Ottomanism' as a coherent alternative to the Megali Idea. Odysseas Ialemos 
again, attributed 'Greek Ottomanist' attitudes not only to the Greeks of the 
Empire but those of the independent state too: 
"This traditional policy was surely attended by the system ill 
which Greece and the Greeks seemed to say to Turkey 'we are 
going to peacefully exist together, at least for a certain time, 
because it is in your interest to tend your natural resources and 
it is in ours to operate in the Orient at ease".l96 
194 <ffiK'taK'to~ m>vEopiacru; t1'l~ E7tEtEiOl) 1[avTly\>PEo)~ nov EUllvtICO>v LUU&yroV» 
4/5/1869 in 0 ev KwwJTavnvov77:ok" Il:, [1865-1870], (1871), 242. 
195 Giannakopoulos, 0 FJJ..r,vIKO, f/>UO).OYIKO, .EVMoyO" p.52. Also Tatiana Stavrou, 0 
eV KWWJTavrlVOV77:ok, EM'1VIKO' f/>UO).OYIKO, .EVMOYO,. To v77:ovpydov flau5da...,- rov 
W.VYPWYOV FJ.J..r,vIUpOV, (Athens, 1967), p.87. 
196 ialemos, E.M.r1vwv L1 iKala, p.29. 
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In the years that followed the Cretan Revolution of 1866-1869, the Greek 
state had conceded to an improvement of its relations with the Ottoman 
Empire, finding in it an uneasy but equally alarmed partner over the rise of 
Bulgarian nationalism in Macedonia. This brief respite of a detente, called b1! 
an enthusiastic Constantinopolitan Greek newspaper "the new, really 
MEGAU (Great) Idea,,197, lasted for roughly three years between 1870 and 
1873 before both countries saw fit to revert to the previous and more familiar 
pattern. By the time Ialemos was writing the above piece, which was set to 
appear in Athens, 'Greek Ottomanism', never really popular in Greece198, was 
already in retreat even in Constantinople. The Eastern Crisis and the 
subsequent Russo-Turkish war put paid to thoughts of rapprochement. In 
1876 Ialemos called for the Greek state to enlarge its borders and proceed in 
solving the Eastern Question by itself.l99 From this point on the aims of 
Ottoman and mainland Greeks increasingly converged. 
In the end, what was probably more remarkable than the Literary 
Society's compliance to the regulations of the Ottoman government was its 
manifest will to retain control of the national discourse circulating in the 
Empire on behalf of the local Greek community and in spite of the 
independent kingdom's attempts to the contrary. We have mentioned before 
Vasiadis's severe criticism of the Greek state's cultural policy regarding 
'external Greek' communities. The solution was clear to him: "it is necessary 
to introduce manifold luminous seats of Greek learning to rekindle noble 
competition and pride".2oo The keyword here is 'manifold', in contrast to the 
sovereignty of Athens. The Greek capital was pursuing the wardship of 
197 Skopetea, To «7CpOnJ7T;O paUiklO», p.316. 
198 Anastasios Vyzantios wrote in 1878: "There [in Constantinople] in the days of old 
was born the monster certain sages today call Greco-Roman civilization and others 
Greco-Roman barbarity.( ... ) Five hundred years have passed and we have a new 
birthday! ( ... ) A second, similar but worse monster which in the next centuries future 
Paparrigopouloi will be ready, no doubt, to baptise as Greco-Turkish civilization. ( ... ) 
And this offspring of adultery mumbles Turkish ideas in Greek language; to the Turks 
declares itself Turkish and to Greeks, Greek ... ". In Skopetea, To «7rPOW7rO fJauW:IO». 
p.312. 
199 Ialemos, EUtlvwv L1f1(aza, p.59. 
200 Giannakopoulos, 0 mr,VIKO~ CP';"OlO]IKOC;; E6lloyoc;;. p. 52. 
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Ottoman Greeks,,201 and for their part they had a "reasonable claim of acting 
on their own advice in their own area".202 The Literary Society functioned as 
"father and progenitor" as to other societies and associations in the Ottoman 
Empire.203 Giannakopoulos writes that "almost every newfound association 
hastens to notify the S ode!) of its formation, thus proclaiming it into a kind 
of registry offering a sort of recognition".204 What was inside the borders of 
the Ottoman Empire laid outside Athenian jurisdiction and was de jure under 
the auspices of the Society as far as it concerned them. Odysseas Ialemos 
interpreted the charter's modification in 1871 as an effort for the association 
to become "the leader of all Greeks in Turkey in educational activities and 
the epicentre of every yeaming and act pertaining to it, ( ... ) a virtual ministry 
of Education for Greeks and those desiring Greek culture (''Ellr;V!(OVTE~-') in 
Turkey".205 Bearing in mind that the Society in the 1870s was coordinating 
the efforts of hundreds of local educational societies the term 'ministry' is 
perfecdy apt. Not only does it recall to mind an organised system, it also 
implies authority; the authority to articulate a national discourse or to 
administer another produced elsewhere, and even skilfully alter and shape it 
to fulfil the demands of an altogether different reality. Thus, the 
fundamentally Greek ideology of reuniting all populations of Greek origin in 
the Balkans and the Near East under the sceptre of the King of Hellenes, in 
other words the essence of the Megali Idea, was transformed, 'orientalised', 
into a prospective condominium of Ottomans and Greeks of the Empire -
or at least in their cultural supremacy.206 The Greek element's ascendancy 
201 Giannakopoulos, 0 EM"VIKO~ <PIJ..OJ..OYIKO~ L'6MOYO~, p.119. 
202 Ibid, p.l38. 
203 Ibid, p.122. 
204 Ibid. 
205 Exertzoglou, EOvIl"] ravroT1rra, pp.24-25. Ialemos's comment in 1877. 
206 "A peculiar ethnogenesis" is the term Elli Skopetea uses to sum up the Greek 
experience in the Ottoman Empire in the latter part of the nineteenth century pointing out 
that it remained incomplete. In Iuropia T1/~ EJ.J.iJ.Ja~ urov 200 auiJva, vol. A2, (Athens, 
.' . d . th 1860s and 1870s in 2000), p.22. Maria Todorova observes slImlar attltu es 10 e 
advocating a "dualist Turko-Bulgarian state" inspired from the Austro-Hungarian 
compromise. In Todorova, Imagining,p.167. 
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remained a constant. Which particular Greek element was to avail itself did 
not. 
Conclusion 
My main aim in this chapter was to chart the course of a Greek 
identity in Greece and the Ottoman Empire between roughly the 1860s and 
1930. In the mainland developments were more straightforward altogether. 
The existence of an independent kingdom ensured the gradual formation 
and dissemination of an official ideology that put its stamp on national 
identity. As it has been shown before207 an Enlightenment view of Greek 
history decrying Byzantium as corrupt and immoral was substituted in the 
1870s and 1880s by Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos's tripartite format that 
incorporated the Constantinopolitan state into the main trunk of Greek 
history. Twenty years later, when our first celebratory addresses from the 
University of Athens start to appear, we can find it there, fully fledged, as the 
spine of national ideology. It was out of the past, whether that of Classical 
Antiquity, or more often, Byzantine medieval times, that political authority 
was sought and the Megali Idea was planted. While Classical Antiquity offered 
a deep temporal background for any demands and a link to modern Europe, 
Byzantium's image determined the extent of spatial claims and conferred 
legitimacy as the previous form of a Greek state. These elements were 
employed to enhance Greek foreign policy as historically just, insofar as the 
Megali Idea in its rather hazy aspects of a deliverance of 'unredeemed 
brothers' or a cultural 'enlightenment of the Orient' was applied as such. We 
have seen how Spyridon Lampros had manipulated similar arguments to 
galvanise his students' national feelings in more than one occasion. We have 
also seen him seeking to employ history for more practical reasons, in 
helping to create secret societies that hoped to act as its agents in fulfilling 
the above mentioned claims en lieu of the state. Because national rhetoric 
207 See above, ch.l. 
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notwithstanding, foreign policy cannot be enacted without clear and precise 
aims the Greek Kingdom from the 1870s on had set a table of priorities and 
Macedonia occupied the top place. It was there that history and ideology 
were to converge and translate into action. 
At this point Greek consciousness and institutions in the 
Ottoman Empire came into play. Going through a modem textbook or a 
general Greek history one may safely conclude that the Greek element there 
remained a passive observer of developments in the independent kingdom, 
merely sitting and waiting for deliverance. However, without an equally 
careful examination of Ottoman Greeks a study of national identity would be 
far from complete. It is a widely held assumption, rooted in the above 
treatment, that their thoughts and aspirations were exactly the same as those 
of mainland Greeks; that they were uncritical upholders of the Megan Idea 
and strong supporters of the Union. This is rather a product of wishful 
thinking on the part of its propagators than the result of consistent research. 
The Greek element may have been integrated in the Ottoman Empire but 
still retained its own institutions that permitted the existence of a civil society 
of their own. People looked up to the Ecumenical Patriarchate for religious 
solace and the legitimacy of their millet, to the schools of the community for 
proper education and to their clubs and associations, the Literary Society of 
Constantinople taking point, for intellectual and ideological guidance. 
Differences in political, social and economical conditions between the 
independent kingdom and the Ottoman Empire practically guaranteed that, 
for some time at least, respected notions of national consciousness were 
bound to diverge. 1bis was clearly expressed in what has been called 'Greek 
Ottomanism' . 
'Greek Ottomanism' cannot be considered as a mere offshoot of 
the Megali Idea as Tatiana Stavrou has suggested208 because it does not 
presuppose the dominant role of the Greek Kingdom. Insofar as this was 
identified with the state's foreign policy, the views of the Ottoman Greeks 
until the 1870s were exactly the opposite. To be subordinate to a weak and 
diminutive polity was definitely not their aim. On the other hand 'Greek 
Ottomanism' cannot be said to have represented a full acceptance of 
208 Stavrou, 0 t:V KWVOTavrrvOV1cok, Ell'lV1KOC; (/>UOA.OY1KOC; ~6Uoyoc;. 
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Ottoman sovereignty or the willingness to serve the aims and policy of the 
Ottoman Empire. 'Greek Ottomanism' as seen in the activities of the 
Literary Society was in fact the Megali Idea in an oriental setting. It 
represented a double effort on the part of the elites to secure for themsekes 
and for the rest of the Greek community a better place in the quicksand that 
the Empire was becoming in the second part of the nineteenth century - and 
to resist the gravitational pull the Greek Kingdom exacted. 
To that extent, an autonomous role in ideological dissemination and 
cultural matters was a prerequisite. By transforming and altering concepts of 
national discourse propagated by the Greek state, mainly in the schools, 
which were created by local communities but staffed with teachers form 
Greece209, the Ottoman Greeks could arrive to a functional construct serving 
their own part of the nation's needs. The Literary Society of Constantinople 
gathered and channelled these energies for almost twenty years after its 
inception, providing a focus for ideology and attempting to keep control of 
things educational in Macedonia, where the Society for the Propagation of 
Greek Letters was expanding the influence of the Greek Kingdom since 
1869. It was this strange course between politics and science that determined 
the Society's fate in an age and place where rival nationalisms were about to 
overthrow the old order in which it was conceived and realised. 
On this last point the answer concerning the adventures of Greek 
national identity between 1860 and 1923 may finally rest. As the nineteenth 
century drew to its end the 'Ottoman Greeks' realised that these two 
components were gradually transforming into a contradiction in terms. If 
before 1878 they were eager to preserve this multinational society in the 
shape of a condominium with the Turkish element or exchange even this 
prospect for cultural hegemony, after the failure of the Reforms this was no 
longer an option. Incorporation to an enlarged Greek Kingdom became an 
inviting alternative, initially expressed in so many words in 1908, in the 
joyous aftermath of the Young Turk Revolution and briefly accomplished in 
209 It was also common for scholarships to be given from Ottoman Greek associations for 
studies undertaken in the University of Athens with the provision that students should 
return after graduation and "enable their fellow villagers to become superior to those of 
other races and to retain this superiority". In Clogg, "The Greek .\lil/d', p. 197. 
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1919 when the Greek anny assumed responsibility in the mandate of 
Smyrna. If Ottoman Greeks have been 'Ottoman' before 1878 then, they 
certainly became increasingly more 'Greek' later. The culmination of this 
course came in 1919, shortly before the Greek army landing in Smyrna, when 
the Ecumenical Patriarchate "formally released the Ottoman Greeks from 
their civic responsibilities as Ottoman citizens".210 It took almost three years 
and a war lost to strike the former adjective and leave a unified Greek 
identity and ideology. Ironically enough though, reality ensured that its 
essence would be stripped from any Megali Idea territorial ambitions. 
210 Clogg, "The Greek Millet", p.200. 
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Conclusion 
The purpose of this study has been to explore themes in the 
development of national ideology in Scotland and Greece largely in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Using the comparative method, I have 
tried to show how a variety of elements functioned in the procedure of 
shaping the nation through the quest for an acceptable self-image, the 
construction of a national discourse or image through historiography, and 
the ultimate fusion of these components into a specific national identity. 
Cultural and political factors were employed to examine different currents of 
thought and underline the peculiarities of the Scottish and Greek cases in the 
belief that the development of nationalism in Europe may not have been as 
neat or streamlined as is sometimes described. In fact, what these examples 
demonstrate is that modem ethnogenesis, far from corroborating any 
determinist propositions on a 'predestined' outcome, proceeded through 
intricate paths and came along with its own uncertainty principle. There 
remain however a few points I would like to mention or emphasise before 
concluding this thesis. 
It is obvious that in looking back towards the formation of 
nations and the processes of establishing a national ideology we essentially 
look back towards the making of history itself. Certainly, we have been aware 
for some time of the contribution of our discipline in the construction and 
imposition of a coherent whole out of scattered parts of past, what has been 
termed as "narrating the nation".1 Insofar as the latter remains not an actual 
but an 'imagined community', a representation rather than a tangible reality, 
it is to the historical discipline we have to look for its articulation and 
placement in an accepted timeframe. The formulation of a national imaginary 
accompanying and appealing to the national sentiment has frequently been 
the work of historians who set the limits and suggest the shape of national 
I Homi K. Bhabha (ed.), Nation and Narration, (London, 1990). 
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memory. Values and aspirations of the present are enforced and projected to 
the past which undergoes a selective procedure to comply with a suitable 
pattern for a contemporary society. In this guise of an intellectual vanguard 
historians and archaeologists may be indeed understood as nation-builders.:! 
On the one hand then there is narration. On the other, there is 
the object of this narration: national identity. 'Identity' in the way the term is 
employed today is a modem concept itself, having been popularised by Erik 
Erikson in the late 1950s. What prevents us from being anachronistic when 
applying it to ages past are the various forms of communal solidarity and the 
questions of origins expressed in these societies. We have seen how the Scots 
began their quest for identity in entering a discussion concerning their origins 
in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. Meanwhile, on the other 
side of Europe, a variation of the Enlightenment introduced a similar 
question and a possible answer into Greek society under Ottoman rule.:; 
What was sought in both cases was continuity in language and culture. Goths 
or Gaels and classical Greek antiquity were building blocks needed for 
contemporary political and ideological constructs. The particular 
characteristics of national consciousness and the existing version of national 
identity in Scotland and Greece are to a great extent the result of a process 
whose roots were firmly planted in the eighteenth century, during the dawn 
of the modem age. 
Yet, it was the Romantic paradigm that saw in the nation the 
agent of history. Where Enlightenment affirmed the uniformity of human 
nature and society as unchanging through the ages the Romantics were 
increasingly concerned with national character and race. The pervasiveness 
of national ideology can be discerned in Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos, 
whose History of the Greek Nation projected this concept onto classical 
2 See Dennis Deletant and Harry Hannak (eds.), Historians as nation-builders, (London, 
1988). Also, Margarita Diaz-Andreu and Timothy Champion (eds.), Nationalism and 
archaeology in Europe, (London, 1996); Philip L. Kohl and Clare Fawcett (eds.), 
Nationalism, politics and the practice of archaeology, (Cambridge, 1995). 
3 Being a part of the continent, Greece was more influenced by the French movement but 
the works of David Hume and Adam Smith were not unfamiliar to the disciples of 
Adamantios Korais. See Paschalis M. Kitromilides, N£odJ.'1V1KO,; L1W.qJOJflfff.JO<;, (Athens. 
1998), p.462. 
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antiquity, incorporating with it not merely Byzantium but 3,000 years of 
history that found its fulfilment in modem Greece. Yet, here we might note 
the peculiarity of the Scottish example: although Scots Enlightenment and 
Romantic figures as Robertson, Hume or Sir Walter Scott have been central 
to the evolution of new perceptions and techniques, Scotland as a country 
did not respond to these stimuli in an overtly nationalist way. The Union of 
1707 ensured in the long run that neither a sovereign Scottish nation nor a 
predominant Scottish history became the canon. 
A created historical consensus acted as the cornerstone of national 
ideology. This in turn offered a broad base for political arguments. Scottish 
references to a Union of equals sprang from the acceptance of a number of 
assumptions on Scottish identity into the historical canon. The particular way 
Scots interpreted the Wat of Independence and the medieval kingdom of 
Scotland reinforced political arguments and claims to Westminster. 
Territorial demands and appeals to liberate Greek 'unredeemed brothers' still 
under the authority of the Ottoman Empire were not made only in the light 
of statistics or economic viability plans for each region. The vision of 
Byzantium as an expanded form of modem Greece thrust in its furthest 
limits was only made possible when the dominant historical format was 
properly modified. 
However, the inevitability of a specific national identity is put into 
question by both our cases. Out of this consolidating process neither a 
monolithic sense of Scottishness nor a unitary Greekness emerged. In fact, 
Scodand, locked in Union with England, a much larger state in terms of 
population, resources, financial and cultural influence, succeeded nonetheless 
_ or possibly because of that - in generating a surprising number of partial 
images and identities. Besides the Unionist British identity that exacted a 
great influence, we have encountered in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century identifications with an 'independent and free' Scodand. Expressions 
of loyalty were proffered however to 'sister kingdoms', to 'three countries as 
one empire', even to a 'perfect union' - one that had abolished both the 
previous states putting in their place a new, fused creation. Indeed, it wa~ far 
from unusual to observe these being articulated side to side in such a \-irtual 
national holiday as the celebration of Robert Burns. The extent of 
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ambiguities and uncertainties ill these multiple late nineteenth-centun-
'Scotlands' is probably outlined in the 1880 poster from Gladstone's 
Midlothian campaign, where the English Liberal leader addressed an eager 
public while the spectral figures of William Wallace and Robert the Bruce 
stood beside him in silent approval. 
Inside Greece, on the other hand, modem state organization and 
machinery in the form of the army and education despite being mocked for 
sluggishness and inefficiency, succeeded nonetheless in disseminating the 
official national ideology. Out of the heavily particularistic tendencies still 
evident at the end of the War of Independence a cohesive national identity 
was formed, quickly finding inspiration in the plight of the 'unredeemed 
Greeks' of the Ottoman Empire and the Megali Idea. The rest of the Greek 
communities however, especially the richer ones in the Ottoman Empire, 
were not attracted instandy. There, Greeks produced their own variations of 
a national ideology that had largely to do with the aspirations and worldview 
of a society not merely Greek but Ottoman Greek. As we have shown, the 
Megali Idea was 'orientalised' into 'Greek Ottomanism', the notion of 
cooperating with the Turkish element in a reformed Empire in order to 
elevate Greek authority and culture or even to supplant the Turks as the 
predominant element in the Ottoman Empire. This essentially meant the 
prospective existence of two Greek states, because this view evidendy did 
not take into account the independent kingdom's foreign policy of 
incorporating the 'unredeemed brothers'. 1bis 'peculiar ethnogenesis' 
however failed after 1878 as economic factors in the Near East and political 
priorities in Europe started to change. 
The fluidity of national identity then is my main point. Two minor 
ones uncovered by my research that merit further examination stem from 
this general sentence, one concerning Scotland, the other Greece. There are 
hints that freedom of movement and favourable conditions for individual 
enrichment was enough for a sizeable number of Scots to develop faith in a 
Scottish Empire not as a mere rhetorical scheme devised to disguise English 
supremacy but as a tangible reality that saw them expanding their busine~~ to 
the furthest comers of the world. The celebration of pioneers, missionaries, 
Scots in the Indian Army or those in the colonial administration wa~ 
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frequendy embedded in a thoroughly Scottish context. In the encL Scots 
managed to accommodate their intense national feeling and the reality of a 
British Empire run by the English in assuring themselves that the latter also 
belonged to them. 
One might say that as Scots 'scotticised' the British Empire, Ottoman 
Greeks 'orientalised' the Megali Idea. Pressed between two centres of power 
and disadvantaged by lacking even 'semi-independence' they tried 
nevertheless to articulate a distinct national discourse. At a time when the 
Greek kingdom offered an attractive rhetorical vision but very little else 
convincing the financiers and merchants, intellectuals and community leaders 
of Constantinople, who were undoubtedly in the vanguard of their element, 
favoured 'Greek Ottomanism' as an alternative that would secure cultural 
mastery or even a condominium in the Ottoman Empire. Tbis informal 
revision of mainland Greek aspirations was the result of the existence of a 
separate civil society, aiming at retaining its autonomy. To them the right to 
decision-making and possible gains out of any rearrangements in the Orient 
should be an exclusive prerogative of Ottoman Greeks. 
The final outcome that determined the modern shape of Scottish and 
Greek national ideologies should not be attributed to purely internal social 
developments. On the contrary, and this is where the study of these distant 
nations comes together, it has to be set in a wider European perspective. 
From the end of the nineteenth century onwards these societies have 
partook of increasingly common experiences. The two World Wars, the Cold 
War and the present reality of the European Union certainly stand out as 
milestones in the history of the continent and the traces they have left shall 
not be easily erased. Developments in politics, culture or science had for all 
this time instant repercussions for citizens of regions as far away as Scotland 
and Greece. The decline of British Unionism in the former or the drive 
towards a model Western European state in the latter would be difficult to 
explain in any other light. Under these conditions it becomes all the more 
important for the historian to broaden his view, familiarize himself with the 
particulars of diverse cultures and be careful to place his studies in an 
international context. 
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The comparison ends in dissimijarity rather than similarity. No clear 
parallel exists in the general course of these nations' history. Hints to a latent 
relationship exist in the pride both countries share in their history and 
heritage, the keenness to express their nationality and the importance they 
apply to their distinctive identity. If we had to place the two countries on the 
axis of Eric Hobsbawm's 'dual revolution', Scotland would come out as the 
par excellence child of the industrial while Greece would be the obvious 
progeny of the French revolution. This basic disparity is the reason why in 
many instances common elements found in both societies as religious 
dedication, the convergence of religion and politics, intense political feeling 
or enthusiastic endorsement of national ideology actually lead to divergent 
ways and distinct outcomes. A comparative study does not necessarily have 
to always come up with matching results. For our goals then, this diversion 
instead of posing a problem becomes all the more reason for studying as it 
exposes even more vividly the workings and intricacies of national identity 
building. 
I believe that the above analysis has also shown the limits of the 
comparative method. The problems a comparative historian faces in the 
effort to offer consistent and valid interpretations are multiple. The danger 
of superficial semblances and forced parallels is only inferior to the necessity 
of bringing together elements from different contexts and social realities. 
This raises the question on the adequacy of our terminology and conceptual 
tools to rise to the challenge. It seems that comparative history inherently 
presupposes a broader, less detailed view, and wider interpretations. As the 
grand narratives and syntheses of the past have given way to a multiplicity of 
specialised approaches and case studies, in order not to proffer 
comprehensive but to suggest partial explanations, one might wonder 
whether among this perpetual splintering, comparative history is not 
becoming increasingly redundant. 
In the end it seems that nationalism triumphed in both Scotland and 
Greece even if its roads there were far from straightforward. Although both 
b hi . the European Union
4
, their countries enjoy presently mem ers p ill 
. . . till . di imil' For some the operung of a respective pOSitions s rematn ss ar. 
4 Greece as a full member state, Scotland as part of Great Britain. 
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parliament in Edinburgh in 1999 seems to have testified to the fact that 
Scodand is not a 'stateless nation' any more.s Nevertheless, it is still not a 
nation-state. It seems however that the historical consensus on national 
cornerstones has found its equivalent in the field of politics. Nationalism in 
accepting the nation as the paramount ideological category is now firmly 
rooted in both countries, as I can attest myself as a contemporary observer 
of recent elections there. The pattern of all major Greek political parties 
accepting and asserting a kind of national rhetoric has also emerged in the 
North with mjnjmal exceptions. What this change signifies is that Scottish 
nationalism is about to shed, if it has not done already, some of its peculiar 
spectral qualities that made it stand out at times and at others withdraw 
behind the unique features of the United Kingdom's structure. It shall 
become more visible, nearer to the Greek and indeed, to the majority of 
contemporary European nationalisms. But the spectres of the past, be they 
Scots or Greeks, will not go away, because they are embedded in our political 
and ideological institutions, because they form part of the routines of 
everyday life. 
. . . 1" fr the subtitle of his 2001 
5 David McCrone has dropped the adjectIve "state ess om 
edition of Understanding Scotland 
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